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Analysis of the Rules of the International Law of the Sea 
Governing the Delimitation of Maritime Areas Under
National Sovereignty
This thesis examines the rules of the international law of the sea 
governing the delimitation of maritime areas which fall under the 
sovereignty of States. These areas comprise internal waters, archipelagic 
waters and the territorial sea. Accordingly, this thesis analyses issues 
related to: (a) the delimitation of internal waters behind the normal 
and/or straight baselines; (b) the delimitation of single-State bays; (c) the 
delimitation of multi-State bays; (d) the enclosure of mid-ocean 
archipelagos; and (e) the delimitation of the outer limit of the territorial 
sea.
The thesis demonstrates how States have extended their sovereignty 
over adjacent maritime spaces by relying on different means mainly 
influenced by the rules developed in the contemporary law of the sea. 
These means include the use of straight baselines where normal baselines 
could be employed; the extension of national sovereignty over adjacent 
maritime areas on such bases as the protection of security, economic, and 
environmental interests, and in certain cases on the basis of historic title; 
and the extension of the outer limit of the territorial sea to 12 nautical 
miles.
In addition, the thesis shows that some developments in the 
international law of the sea have also contributed to the inclusion of 
larger maritime spaces into maritime areas under national sovereignty. 
Examples are the recognition of a closing line of 24 nautical miles length 
for the enclosure of single-State bays, and the adoption of a new legal 
regime for the enclosure of mid-ocean archipelagos.
The thesis demonstrates that the law of the sea has always 
developed in a manner to accommodate the interests of coastal States and 
those of international community, and concludes that the developments in
Vil
the rules of the delimitation of maritime areas under national sovereignty 
show that:
(a) the law of the sea has developed rules for such delimitation parallel to 
the tendency of States to claim larger maritime areas; while
(b) the law of the sea has, at the same time, taken into account the 
traditional rights of the international community in these areas. Examples 
are the maintenance of navigational rights in the maritime areas which 
were newly enclosed by straight baselines, the preservation of the right of 
passage through archipelagic waters, and the consolidation of the right of 
innocent passage in territorial seas.
Vili
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Delimitation issues have always been among the most important 
issues in the law of the sea. The significance of these issues springs from 
the competing interests over the seas: the exclusive interests of coastal 
States versus the inclusive interests of the international community. The 
delimitation of maritime areas of coastal States is particularly important 
because it determines the boundaries of different maritime areas over 
which these States exercise different degrees of authority, from absolute 
sovereignty to sovereign rights. The most important aspect of the 
delimitation of maritime areas is the interaction between the enclosure of 
these areas and its impact on the high seas and the freedoms exercised 
there. It is because of this impact that the ICJ in the Fisheries Case 
emphasised that the delimitation of maritime areas has two aspects: 
national action and international recognition. As the ICJ recognised:
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it 
cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as 
expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of 
delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State 
is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard 
to other States depends upon international law.1
To ensure the proper demarcation of maritime areas by States, the 
law of the sea has developed rules and standards to regulate the conduct of 
States in the delimitation of these areas. Despite the codification of these 
rules, many States have adopted liberal approaches to these rules, and 
have included larger areas under their control. In addition, the lack of 
precise rules and, in some cases, the lack of any rules at all, have created 
opportunities for coastal States to rely on their own policy for 
demarcation of maritime areas adjacent to their coasts. This policy has 
mostly been in favour of inclusion of larger maritime spaces into the 
areas under the authority of coastal States. This thesis studies these issues 
in detail and demonstrates how the liberal interpretation of rules on 
delimitation of adjacent maritime areas, and also the inadequacy of these
1 Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), ICJ Reports. 1951, p.132. The ICJ also pointed out that while a 
coastal State “must be allowed the latitude necessary in order to be able to adapt its delimitation to 
practical needs and local requirements, the drawing of base-lines must not depart to any appreciable 
extent from the general direction o f the coast” Ibid., p.133. As regards the factors which may be taken 
into account in appraisal o f lawful delimitation of maritime areas, Evensen asserted that various factors 
o f a geographical, economical, historical and political nature “may play an important role in determining 
the legality under international law of concrete acts o f delimitation o f territorial waters”. Evensen, Jens, 
‘Certain Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of Archipelagos’, UN Doc. 
A/CONF/13/18, in UNCLOS I. Official Records. V ol.l, 1958, pp.289-290.
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rules in certain cases, have given chances to States to extend their 
jurisdiction over adjacent maritime areas.
It is in this context that the thesis discusses the rules of the 
international law of the sea on the delimitation of maritime areas adjacent 
to coasts of States which fall under their sovereignty. The water areas 
which are covered by this study include: (a) internal waters behind the 
low-water mark and straight baselines; (b) national waters within single­
State bays and those within multi-State bays2; (c) waters within 
archipelagic baselines (archipelagic waters); and (d) waters within the 
extent of the territorial sea.
In general, delimitation issues are not limited to these areas but also 
include issues related to those areas such as the EEZs and the continental 
shelves over which States have sovereign rights for exploitation of living 
and non-living resources.3 In fact, States have two types of control power 
over their maritime zones: “sovereignty” and “sovereign rights.” Those 
maritime areas which are subject to sovereignty of States are internal 
waters, the territorial sea, and archipelagic waters (in the case of 
archipelagic States).4 The maritime areas which are subject to sovereign 
rights of States include the EEZ and the continental shelf (beyond the 
limit of 12 nautical miles).
2There are also issues related to the claims o f States over certain adjacent waters on the basis o f historic 
title. These waters are generally called “historic waters” which include historic bays. Bouchez defines 
historic waters as follows: “Historic waters are waters over which the coastal State, contrary to the 
generally applicable rules o f international law, clearly, effectively, continuously, and over a substantial 
period o f time, exercises sovereign rights with the acquiescence o f the community o f States." Bouchez, 
Leo J., The Regime of Bavs in International Law. A. W. Sythoff, Leyden, 1964, p.281. Historic 
claims to bays or other bodies o f waters are made because these claims cannot be justified under the 
normal legal rules governing the delimitation of these maritime areas. Large areas o f waters have been 
enclosed by historic claims and this has impacted on the size of the high seas available for the use o f all 
States. This why strict requirements have been set up for proving historic titles to bays or other bodies 
of waters. Whether there will be an end to the fresh claims over maritime spaces on historic basis 
remains to be seen. What is apparent is that States have always had the desire to extend their maritime 
zones and bring larger maritime spaces under their control, preferably under their sovereignty. The 
doctrine of historic waters is an obvious example where there is no restriction on the size o f a maritime 
area a coastal State can claim if the requirements for establishment o f historic titles over such maritime 
area are m et
3Delimitation o f maritime areas (including territorial seas, the EEZs, and the continental shelves) between 
adjacent and opposite coastal States are also important issues.
4What all these areas have in common is that the authority of States over these areas is described by the 
concept o f sovereignty, although the degree of this sovereignty is not the same. While States have full 
sovereignty over internal waters behind the normal and straight baselines as well as closing lines of 
bays, the sovereignty of States over the territorial sea and archipelagic waters is modified by recognition 
o f the right o f international community to exercise peaceful passage through these waters. Compared 
with the territorial sea, sovereignty over archipelagic waters is more modified by the recognition o f the 
right o f archipelagic sea lanes passage where there are internationally used straits within archipelagic 
waters.
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It is important to clarify the distinction between the concepts of 
“sovereignty” and “sovereign rights.” The concept of sovereignty of a 
State over the land and maritime areas under its national jurisdiction 
(internal waters, the territorial sea, and archipelagic waters), includes, 
inter alia, the following rights:
[The rights] ... to legislate concerning its interests, to administer its 
services, to enforce its laws and regulations, and to determine the 
jurisdiction and competence of its courts.5
However, the concept of “sovereign rights” with respect to the EEZ 
and the continental shelf is defined as follows:
“Sovereign rights” are related to one or more specific purposes. The 
term conveys ... [that] the coastal State does not have full sovereignty 
as on its land territory or in the territorial sea, but has a right of 
jurisdiction which is related to certain purposes.6
The purposes for which States have sovereign rights include: (a) 
exploration and exploitation of living and non-living resources; (b) 
conservation and management of living and non-living resources; (c) the 
conduct of marine scientific research; (d) the protection of marine 
environment; and (e) some activities such as the production of energy 
from the seas and installation of artificial islands or other facilities for the 
purpose of exploitation of the resources.7 Therefore, “sovereign rights” 
are a limited version of the rights which are included under the concept 
of “sovereignty.”
States also have some limited rights over the Contiguous Zone. 
Although States have the right to prevent violation of their customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws in the Contiguous Zone (which 
extends up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline), they do not have 
sovereignty over this zone.8 The zone, however, is overlapped by the
5Westerman, Gayl S., The Juridical Bav. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, p.20. Therefore, the 
recognition o f the concept of sovereignty over certain adjacent maritime areas empowers coastal States to 
prescribe laws and to enforce these laws within these maritime areas.
6Fleischer, Carl August, ‘Fisheries and Biological Resources’, in René-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes 
(eds.), A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea. Vol.2, Ch.19, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht,
1991, pp.989-1126, at 1068.
7See Articles 56 and 77 o f the LOSC.
8Article 33(1) o f the LOSC (Article 24(1) o f the TSC) provides that in the Contiguous Zone “the coastal 
States may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement o f  its customs, Fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary laws regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of 
the above laws regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.”
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EEZ (which extends up to 200 miles from the baseline), and by the 
continental shelf where States have sovereign rights for exploration and 
exploitation of living and non-living resources.9
The issues related to the theme of this thesis are discussed in six 
chapters as follows.10 Chapter One presents a historical background to the 
approaches on the rights of States over the seas, from ancient times to the 
contemporary law of the sea. In particular, the chapter analyses the 
concepts of mare liberum and mare clausum as well as the theories of res 
communis and res nullius. The chapter also analyses competing interests 
of coastal States in extending their jurisdiction over the adjacent seas and 
those of maritime powers in keeping the areas of the high seas as large as 
possible. The chapter addresses the efforts made at the international level 
to reconcile these competing interests and to establish rules that, on one 
hand, would satisfy new trends of States in having control over larger 
maritime areas adjacent to their shores, and, on the other hand, would 
avoid unnecessary encroachment upon the high seas.
Chapter Two of the thesis is devoted to the role of the baselines in 
the delimitation of maritime areas. These baselines are called normal 
baselines and straight baselines. The chapter defines these two independent 
baselines and discusses where these baselines are employed. The chapter 
analyses the I d ’s decision in the 1951 Fisheries Case, where the validity 
of straight baseline system used by Norway was under examination. 
Although the I d  recognised the Norwegian baseline system due to 
particular geographical conditions of the Norwegian coasts, it set up rules 
for the application of the straight baselines, so as to prevent unnecessary 
enclosure of the high seas into maritime areas under national sovereignty. 
The chapter also analyses the provisions of the TSC and the LOSC on the 
application of normal and straight baselines and studies the practices of 
States in use of these baselines. As the chapter will demonstrate, many 
coastal States have employed straight baselines around their coasts, even
9It should be pointed out that no State may exercise jurisdiction on the high seas, except in cases 
stipulated by the international law o f the sea. See, for example, Article 22 o f the 1958 High Seas 
Convention and Article 110 of the LOSC.
10In analysing the rules for the delimitation o f maritime areas under the scope o f the present study, the 
thesis examines all sources o f international law of the sea including international conventions (most 
importantly the TSC and the LOSC) and customary law, the judgments o f the ICJ and arbitral tribunals 
and the views o f publicists. The documents o f the international conferences on the law o f the sea are 
also taken into consideration, since they are travaux préparatoires and evidence of the position o f States.
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where the coastal conditions do not justify the use of straight baselines. 
This has resulted in encroachment upon the high seas.
Chapter Three discusses the issue of the delimitation of single-State 
bays. It defines the concepts of bays and gulfs in geographical and legal 
terms11 and also presents the historical background to the development of 
the rules governing the delimitation of bays located on the coast of a 
single State. It examines the process of establishing geographical and 
mathematical criteria for a legal definition of bays. The codification of 
provisions on single-State bays in the TSC (1958) was a turning point in 
removing uncertainty and controversy over the delimitation of these bays. 
The chapter analyses the provisions of Article 7 of the TSC (Article 10 of 
the LOSC) and provides reasons why bays meeting the legal criteria 
(geographical and mathematical criteria) are treated in a special way. As 
part of the national territory of coastal States, waters within the closing 
lines of legal bays are internal waters, and are subject to the same rules as 
land territories. The chapter examines the shortcomings and ambiguities 
in the codified provisions on the delimitation of single-State bays. The 
chapter demonstrates how the rules on delimitation of single-State bays, 
particularly the adoption of a closing line up to 24 nautical miles, have 
impacted on the reduction of high seas areas.
The focus of Chapter Four is on the issue of the delimitation of 
multi-State bays. Multi-State bays are those bays which are located in the 
coast of more than one coastal State. The chapter identifies the general 
rules which apply to multi-State bays. These rules are presented on the 
basis of general principles of international law, views expressed by 
governments, and the main trends found in the views of publicists. 
Neither the TSC nor the LOSC contains any provision on the delimitation 
of bays which are situated in the shores of more than one State. This 
raises the issue as to whether multi-State bays can be enclosed in the same 
manner as single-State bays. The chapter points out that the enclosure of 
multi-State bays is another step towards the reduction of the areas falling 
under the legal regime of the high seas. It discusses how the right of 
navigation within these bays can be affected depending on whether or not 
they are subject to enclosure. The chapter also examines the question as to
11Not all bays or gulfs can be qualified as legal bays. A body of water may be described as a bay or a gulf 
from a geographical viewpoint, but might not be considered as a legal bay.
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whether multi-State bays can be closed on the basis of historic title and, in 
this connection, it studies the case of Gulf of Fonseca.
Chapter Five discusses a newly recognised system of delimitation 
for mid-ocean archipelagos - archipelagic baselines. It includes the 
historical study of the issue and examines codification efforts made by the 
international community to establish rules for the enclosure of mid-ocean 
archipelagos as independent units which would be different from the rules 
governing the delimitation of islands. The chapter analyses the study 
undertaken on the delimitation of territorial waters of archipelagos for 
the UNCLOS I12, and examines the practice of certain States consisting of 
individual islands before and after the UNCLOS I. The chapter also 
reviews the efforts made at the UNCLOS III to establish the new legal 
regime for the delimitation of mid-ocean archipelagos. The legal 
definitions for mid-ocean archipelagos and archipelagic States are also 
identified and analysed.13
The recognition of a new legal regime for the enclosure of mid­
ocean archipelagos by archipelagic baselines has led to the enclosure of 
vast areas of the high seas into archipelagic waters, that is waters within 
archipelagic baselines which are under the sovereignty of archipelagic 
States. However, archipelagic States were not left to employ archipelagic 
baselines at their own discretion. Essential requirements were 
incorporated into the LOSC (Art.47) for archipelagic baselines to ensure 
a balance between the needs of archipelagic States and the maintenance of 
rights enjoyed by international community, whether within archipelagic 
waters or on the high seas. The chapter also discusses the various reasons 
by which the enclosure of mid-ocean archipelagos was justified. They 
include geographical, historical, political, economic, security, and 
environmental reasons. The chapter examines the practice of island States 
after the UNCLOS III and argues that although the legal regime of 
archipelagos as adopted in the UNCLOS III reflects a balance between 
competing interests of archipelagic States and those of other States, the 
enclosure of mid-ocean archipelagos has had a direct impact on the 
reduction of areas of the high seas.
12‘Certain Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters o f Archipelagos’ , op. 
cit., pp.289-302.
13 As the case o f bays, not all archipelagos are legally qualified as mid-ocean archipelagos, while they are 
considered so from a geographical viewpoint
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Finally, Chapter Six is an examination of the issue of delimitation 
of the outer limit of the territorial sea which has long been one of the 
most controversial issues in the contemporary law of the sea. It is 
sufficient to say that the 1930 Hague Conference and the two United 
Nations conferences on the law of the sea (the UNCLOS I (Geneva, 1958) 
and the UNCLOS II (Geneva, I960)) failed to resolve the issue. It was not 
until the UNCLOS HI (Caracas Session, 7 March 1975) that the issue was 
eventually resolved by the recognition of a twelve mile limit for the 
extent of the territorial sea. The chapter studies the nature of the issue in 
historical perspective and examines the developing trends in State Practice 
before and after the UNCLOS IE. The chapter also examines the status of 
the twelve mile rule as the maximum permissible limit for the territorial 
sea from two viewpoints: as a contractual rule and as a customary 
international law rule. It demonstrates that the twelve mile rule has 
acquired the status of customary international law. The chapter points out 
that the significant support for the twelve mile rule resulted from the 
balance struck between the competing interests of coastal States and the 
international community by the adoption of this rule, and simultaneous 
agreements on some other interrelated issues such as the guaranteed right 
of navigation through straits used for international navigation.
As the opening paragraph of this introduction observed, the 
examination of the issues related to the delimitation of maritime areas 
under national sovereignty is important due to the competing interests 
involved: the exclusive interests of coastal States and the inclusive 
interests of the international community. Although the TSC and the LOSC 
include essential rules for the delimitation of adjacent maritime areas, 
there are still a number of shortcomings and ambiguities in the present 
relevant rules of the international law of the sea. These ambiguities and 
shortcomings may encourage coastal States to delimit maritime areas 
under their sovereignty in a manner inconsistent with the interests of 
other States. This action may result in conflict among the States 
concerned. The nature and the degree of this conflict depend on a wide 
range of factors from the importance of the maritime area for 
international navigation to the political relations between the coastal State 
and the opposing State. The dispute between the USA and Libya over the 
delimitation of the Gulf of Sidra (which led to a military conflict) is a 
clear example that issues related to the delimitation of areas under 
sovereignty of States are among the most sensitive issues in the
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international law of the sea. This sensitivity shows the importance of a 
thorough understanding of the issues involved in such delimitation, as the 
first step, and the avoidance of disputes among States through proper 
interpretation and implementation of the rules concerned, as the second 
step.
Against this background, this thesis: (a) identifies issues arising 
from the delimitation of maritime areas under national sovereignty; (b) 
shows the ambiguities in the rules of the international law of the sea 
governing the delimitation of maritime areas under national sovereignty;
(c) addresses the shortcomings in these rules; and (d) demonstrates the 
impact of these ambiguities and shortcomings on the enclosure of larger 
parts of the high seas, and the necessity of formulating new rules to 
clarify the ambiguities and to remove the shortcomings. The thesis, 
particularly, demonstrates that a liberal application of the present rules of 
the international law of the sea on the delimitation of maritime areas 
under national sovereignty has led to the enclosure of large parts of the 
high seas into these areas. The thesis, however, concludes that in the 
delimitation of their adjacent maritime areas, coastal States are bound to 
observe the requirements of the rules concerned while taking the interests 
of the international community into account.
Chapter One








The purpose of this introductory chapter is: (a) to present an 
analysis of the classical theories and doctrines with respect to the rights of 
States over the seas and oceans; (b) to discuss the competing interests of 
States over ocean spaces, namely the interests of coastal States in extending 
the maritime areas under their sovereignty versus the interests of user 
States in maintaining free seas as large as possible; and finally (c) to review 
the international efforts made to reconcile these competing interests for 
establishing a new world order for the uses of oceans. This introductory 
chapter will, therefore, present a background for the discussion of issues 
concerning the delimitation of maritime areas under national authority.
II. Historical Background of the Law of the Sea
In general, two principles have mainly constituted the foundations of 
the law of the sea: the principle of the freedom of the seas; and the 
principle of the rights of a coastal State over adjacent seas for protection, as 
well as other legitimate interests.1 They constitute the foundations of the 
most controversial classical theories regarding the right of navigation in 
particular and rights over the seas in general. These theories are the theory 
of res communis versus the theory of res nullius, which will be discussed in 
this chapter.
lrThe principle o f the freedom of the seas has played a significant role in the history of the law of the sea. 
Anand states that ‘[t]he history of the law of the sea is to a large extent the story of the development of 
the “freedom of seas” doctrine and the vicissitudes through which it has passed over years.’ Anand, R. 
P., ‘Changing Concepts o f Freedom of the Seas: A Historical Perspective’, in Van Dyke, Jon M., 
Durwood Zaelke and Grant Hewison (eds.), Freedom for the Seas in the 21th Century: Ocean 
Governance and Environmental Harmony. Island Press, Washington D.C., 1993, p.72. Although the 
sovereignty o f coastal States over territorial seas was recognised, it was an essential exception to the 
general rule o f the freedom o f the seas. Such a recognition was primarily due to the importance of 
security for these States, though other interests were also expressed to justify the necessity of granting 
rights to shore States in their adjacent seas.
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The long-established principle of the open seas can be traced as far 
back as the time of Rhodians (200-300 B.C.).2 Rhodes3 was among the 
defenders of the freedom of the seas and protected the merchant shipping in 
the Mediterranean region for regional and international sea trade.4 Romans 
were also supportive of the free seas.5 Roman jurists were of the opinion 
that the seas were common to all human-beings {commune omnium) and all 
nations were free to use the seas.6 This view was the foundation of the 
theory which was latter known as mare liberum. This theory was then 
opposed by a few countries (mainly Spain and Portugal) in the fifteenth 
century. These countries claimed exclusive rights over ocean spaces and 
regarded the seas as closed to other nations, thus introducing the theory of 
mare clausum. However, the revised version of the Roman approach on 
the free seas was presented in the early seventeenth century as a reaction to 
extensive and exclusive claims of some nations over the seas.7 8
Like other aspects of the relationship among ancient nations, the uses 
of the seas were subject to primary rules and principles common among the 
nations. The development of the law of the sea’s principles is, in fact, an 
integral part of the broader process of the development of international law. 
Although there was a series of laws in the classical times on the relations of 
primitive form of States, there was no international legal system in those 
times. Some historical evidence acknowledges that certain principles 
existed within the framework of the ancient civilisations including Persia, 
Rome, and Greece that were applied to foreigners. For example, there was 
a series of principles - jus gentium? - applicable to the relations between the 
independent cities of Athens in regard to their citizens. Also there were
2Anand, Ram Prakash, Origin and Development o f the Law of the Sea. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague, 1982, p . l l .
3Before being an independent State, Rhodes (a small Aegean island) was a colony o f Phoenicians (1500 
B.C.) and later became part o f the Persian Empire (397-88 B.C.). Ibid., p.10.
4Ibid. As the Roman historian Starbo writes ‘[b]y her continental and successful wars with the pirates, 
who at that time disturbed the peace o f the seas in great bands, Rhodes had become the protectress and 
refuge o f merchant shipping in “Eastern Waters”.’ Ibid., p .l l .
5For example, Ulpian argued that the Sun, air and waves are naturally free to be used by all and no one 
has sovereignty over them. Ovid and Cicero also expressed similar view. Brown, Joan et al, Case 
Studies in Oceanography and Marine Affairs, published by Pergamon Press in association with The 
Open University, Oxford, 1991, p.40. Romans were o f the view that the freedom of the seas included 
navigation in rivers and access to ports. Ibid.
6The concept o f commune omnium was lost after the collapse o f the Roman Empire and it was Grotius 
who revived the concept by the introduction o f the Mare Liberum theory. Anand, op. cit., 1993, p.72. 
Also see Meurer, Christian, The Program of the Freedom of the Sea. Translated by Leo Franchtenberg, 
1919, pp.4-7.
7See Anand, op. cit., 1993, pp.72-73.
8 As opposed to jus civile.
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some established principles to govern relations of States in the maritime 
realms, though the scope of application was limited to certain regions. It is 
clear that one can talk about international law when there are independent 
States which have relationships in as broad a range as necessary. This 
apparently happened when the Roman Empire disintegrated into 
independent States in the sixteenth century. This is what has been called 
“birth of territoriality”.9 This has been a major event in establishing 
principles of international law in general. It has also had its impacts on the 
formation of principles of the law of the sea. For example, after the 
formation of the independent States it was accepted that coastal States have 
regulatory rights in the adjacent seas.10 Also as Smith writes “... from very 
early times the needs of commerce had made necessary the acceptance of 
some agreed rules for the conduct of maritime trade”.11
The law of the sea developed as the law of nations developed in 
general.12 The modern origins of the law of nations are mainly attributed to 
developments in Western Europe at the end of the Middle Ages when there 
was a need to establish a common code of conduct for the independent 
entities.13 The law of the sea also evolved during this period of time when 
some written codes for the use of the seas originated from the 
Mediterranean.14 The old maritime codes of “Rhodian Sea Law (the Sea 
Laws of Rhodians)” in the eighth century15 and the “Consolato del Mare” 
in the fourteenth century are examples of the written codes for maritime 
conduct.16 Also, the freedom of the seas has been exercised in the Asian
9Churchill, Robin Rolf, and Alan Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea. Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1983, p.53.
10Ibid.
^Sm ith, H. A., The Law and Custom of the Sea. Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1948, p.2.
12Along with the process o f this development, one thing became clear that rules and principles governing 
the relations o f the nations in the time of peace is different from those applicable in the time o f war and 
the law o f the sea was no exception.
13 I b id ,  p .l.
14As regards the importance and value o f maritime codes, Colombos holds that although theses codes did 
not promulgate by any sovereign authority, they “gradually assumed a binding character freely 
recognised by the merchants and traders o f all nations alike. Their outstanding value in this connection 
is that they contained rules found by practice to be suitable to the needs o f a community which knows 
no national boundaries- the international community o f seafarers.” Colombos, C. John, The 
International T .aw o f the Sea. Sixth Revised Edition, Longmans, London, 1967, p.31.
15The Rhodian Sea Law was primarily codified in 200-300 B.C.. It is said that Rhodian Sea Law “laid 
the foundation o f the modem maritime jurisprudence” and “gave rise to several maritime codes”. 
Anand, op. cit., 1982, p . l l .
16Smith, op. cit., p.2. Among embodied rules in the “Consolato del Mare” was the rule that “in time o f  
war enemy goods are liable to capture under the neutral flag.” Ibid. Also the freedom o f the seas was 
among rules adopted by the Rhodian Maritime Code. Anand, op. cit., 1993, p.73. Some other old 
maritime codes include the Basilika (7th century) “a code of Byzantine law regulating the commerce of 
Levant”, the Rolls o f Oleron (12th century) in the Atlantic, the Hanseatic code (17th century) in the
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region, particularly in the Indian Ocean, for navigation and commercial 
shipping for many centuries.17 The maritime codes of Macassar and 
Malacca in the thirteenth century cited the principle of freedom of the 
seas.18
1. The Controversial Issue of the Exclusive Division of the Seas
Although there had been instances of appropriation of some parts of 
the sea in earlier times19, it was in the fifteenth century that the issue of 
exclusive jurisdiction over the seas became more controversial. The 
question was whether the seas may be appropriated by States and if so 
whether this appropriation was limited exclusively to some States. The 
problem of exclusive appropriation became crucial in 1493 when Pope 
Alexander VI, Federigo Borgia, issued his four decrees (the so-called Papal 
Bulls)20 one of which was to draw a demarcation line from the North to the 
South Pole dividing the “undiscovered world” between Spain and 
Portugal.21 Although there were religious reasons behind such a division, 
particularly for the purpose of religious missions, and while there was no 
primary intention of “a reservation of the seas”, Spain and Portugal relied 
on the decree for preventing foreign ships from sea trade in the divided
Baltic, the Guidon de la Mer (17th century) in the Mediterranean. See Colombos, op. cit., pp.30-36. 
There are also modem maritime codes such as British manual of prize law. Ibid., pp.36-45.
17For the history o f navigation in Asia, particularly in the Indian Ocean, see: Narrative of the Journey o f  
Ahd-er-Razek. A Persian Traveller and Ambassador o f Shah Rukh (1442). in India in the fifteenth 
Century. Edited by: R.H. Major; The Travels o f Marco Polo. Edited and translated by: William  
Marsden, 1948; Alexanderowicz, C.H., An Introduction to the History o f the Law o f Nations in the 
East Indies (16th to 18 centuries). 1967; Rawlinson, H.G., Intercourse between India and the Western 
World: From the Earliest Times to the Fall o f Rome. 1926; and Warmington, E.H., Th<? Commerce 
between the Roman and India. 1974.
18Anand, op. cit., 1993, p.73.
19For example, Colombos writes that in the tenth century, English King Edgar claimed to be “Sovereign 
o f the Britanic Ocean”. This claim was followed by his successors but in 1322 was encountered by a 
protest from the king o f France to English King Edward II. In his protest, the King o f France 
complained to Edward II against those “who call themselves the custodians o f the sea on your behalf.” 
Colombos, op. cit., p.48. Also Brown refers to the claim of Venice over the whole Adriatic in the 
thirteenth century and the later claims of Genoa in the Ligurian Sea and o f the Scandinavians in the 
Baltic. Brown, op. cit., p.41.
20Before 1493, there were also two bulls issued by the attempts of Portuguese to gain tide over territories 
“along the African coast toward India”. These two decrees were the decree o f Pope Nicholas V in 
1454 and its confirming decree o f Pope Calixtus II on March 13,1456. Anand, op. cit., 1982, pp.43-44.
21Mangone, Gerard, T .aw for the World Ocean. Stevens & Sons, London, 1981, p.13. The Papal Decree 
drew a line which passed through Brazil and its eastern side became Portuguese and the western side of 
the line became Spanish. O’Connell, D.P., The International Law of the Sea, Vol. I, Edited by: I. A. 
Shearer, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982, p.2. It soon became clear that such claims would not 
legally be recognised. Buchholz mentions that Nunez de Balboa, following his expedition to the 
Pacific Ocean in 1513, claimed the Ocean “as mar do sur for the king o f Spain.” However, “it was 
never legally accepted as Spanish property”. Buchholz, Hanns J., Law o f the Sea Zones in the Pacific 
Ocean. Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1987, p.2.
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areas.22 Following the Papal decree and by the Treaty of Tordesillas (7 
June 1494) Portugal and Spain determined the range of their domain over 
“undiscovered world”.23 (See Figure 1.1 below.)
Figure 1.1
Division of the Seas between Spain and Portugal based on 
the 1493 Papal Decree and the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas
Source: Francalanci, G., and T. Scovazzi (eds.), Lines in the Sea.
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994, p.3.
Following the division of the seas by Pope Alexander VI between 
Spain and Portugal, Philip III, King of Spain sent a letter to Don Martin 
Alfonso, his Councillor and Viceroy for the East Indies on 28 November 
1606. In his letter, he, inter alia, wrote that:
I prohibit all commerce of foreigners in India itself, and in other 
regions across the seas.24
220 ’Connell, op. cit., p.2. As Fulton in 1911 wrote “Spain claimed the exclusive right o f navigation in 
the western portion o f the Atlantic, in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Pacific. Portugal assumed a 
similar right in the Atlantic south o f Morocco and in the Indian Ocean.” Fulton, Thomas W., I M  
Sovereignty o f the Sea. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinbourgh, 1911, p.5.
23Mangone, op. cit., pp.13-14.
24Grotius, Hugo, The Freedom of the Seas. Translated with a revision o f the Latin Text o f 1633 by Ralph 
Van Deman Magoffin, Oxford University Press, New York, 1916, p.77.
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As far as the effects of the division are concerned, it was in no way 
in accordance with basic principles of the use of the seas for all nations. 
This is because the division deprived other States from enjoying equal 
access to the divided areas. It was inevitable that the exclusive division of 
the seas would be challenged by other States having interests in the divided 
areas. In 1580 when Drake sailed the Golden Hind, its passage was 
challenged by Spain.25 Spain was of the view that the Drake’s voyage was 
a violation of its sovereignty over the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In 
response, Queen Elizabeth I, in echoing the Roman jurists, stated that:
[n]either nature nor public interest permit the exclusive possession of 
the sea by a single nation or private individual; the ocean is free to 
everybody; no legal titles exist whatever that would grant its 
possession to anyone in particular; neither nature nor usage permit its 
seizure; the domains of the sea and of the air are common property of 
all men.26
It was in this context that Spain and England concluded the Treaty of 
London (18-24 August 1604) in which free navigation on the seas was 
preserved.27
2. The Classical Theories on the Legal Nature of the Seas
The classical history of the law of the sea presents a divergence of 
views on the nature of jurisdiction of States and the degree of their control 
over the seas and oceans. Basically, there were uncertainties as to whether 
States have any competence to exercise their domain over the maritime 
spaces and whether the seas and oceans belong to specific States entitling 
them to exclude others from using them.
25Smith, op. cit., p.3.
26Anand, op. cit., 1982, p.95. In 1602, Queen Elizabeth I stated that “property o f seas in some small 
distance from the coast may yield some oversight and jurisdiction” but she excluded fishing and 
navigation from enforcement o f jurisdiction by the coastal power. This view was asserted in a case 
with Denmark. O ’Connell, op. cit., p.3 (footnote 7). The Danish claim covered the seas between 
Norway, Iceland, and Grreenland. Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, Fourth 
Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 233 (footnote 9). Although Britain was in favour o f 
freedom o f the high seas, it claimed jurisdiction over maritime areas around the Britain in seventeenth 
century. In 1633, Boroughs asserted that “Princes may have an exclusive property in the sovereigntie 
o f the several parts o f the sea, and in the passage, fishing and shores thereof.” (emphasis added) 
O’Connell, op. cit., p.6. The term “British Seas” was an indicative o f the English property doctrine that 
vested the property rights over the British Seas to the Crown. This term was used in some treaties 
between England and some other countries. As far as the treaties were concerned, the Court o f  
Admiralty (1719) held that the term “British Sea” referred only to the English Channel. Ibid., p.7.
27Treves, Tullio, “Navigation”, in Rene-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes (eds.), A Handbook on the New 
J aw o f the Sea. Vol.2, Ch.17, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991, p.835.
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Examination of the history of the law of the sea demonstrates that 
the dominant theme is “the competition between the exercise of 
governmental authority over the sea and the idea of the freedom of the 
seas”.28 As a result, it was not until recent times that positive international 
laws put an end to the issue of the nature of States rights over the maritime 
zones.29 However, the recent history of the law of the sea has also 
witnessed the extension of jurisdiction of States over their adjacent seas 
what is now known as the “creeping jurisdiction”, which has had 
implications for international shipping. The next chapter shows how States 
have extended their domain over the marginal waters, which has resulted in 
making the passage of foreign ships in some areas (such as internal waters) 
subject to the consent of littoral States or to the requirement that passage 
must be innocent.
Throughout history the seas and oceans have been dominated by 
two conflicting interests: on one side the interests of coastal States and on 
the other side the interests of maritime powers. Coastal States have 
attempted to extend their exclusive sovereignty over maritime areas in the 
vicinity of their coastlines and maritime powers have struggled to establish 
a free usage of the seas.
These competing interests were also reflected in seventeenth century 
theories of free seas versus closed seas. These two opposite approaches on 
jurisdiction of States over maritime areas reveal different tendencies and 
trends of States in the classical history of the law of the sea. The views 
asserted by Grotius and Selden are particularly illustrative of the battle of 
thoughts on the legal nature of the seas. Although their views were 
primarily asserted in line with the existing interests of their countries, these 
views reflect the conflicting practice of States in seventeenth century.
Huig de Groot (Hugo Grotius, Dutch jurist, 1583-1645) is known as 
the new founder of the principle of open seas. However, some writers had 
earlier asserted their opposition to the claims of some States in exercising
280 ’Connell, op. cit., p .l. It is also argued that “the history of the modem international law of the sea can 
perhaps be best understood by perceiving it as a continual conflict between two opposing, yet 
complementary, fundamental principles - territorial sovereignty and the freedom o f the seas” . 
(emphasis added) Brown, E. D., ‘Maritime Zones: a survey of claims’, in Churchill et al (eds.), Ngw 
Directions in the Law o f the Sea (DncnmentsV Vol.III, Oceana Publications INC, Dobbs Ferry, New  
York, 1973, p.157.
29For example, see Article 1 o f the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
(TSC) and Article 2 o f the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea (LOSC) regarding 
the concept of sovereignty over the territorial sea.
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sovereignty over a vast maritime area. Among these were the sixteenth 
century Spanish writers Ayala, Vitoria (1480-1546), and de Soto.30 These 
writers rejected the legality of claims by States to have the right of 
ownership over the seas, such as those of the Italian Republics in the 
Mediterranean waters, Denmark and Sweden in the Baltic31, and Spain and 
Portugal in the Atlantic.32 When the Scottish King, James VI, became 
James I of England in 1603, he continued claiming exclusive fishing rights 
over some seas.33 It is interesting to note that during this period Gentili 
(1552-1608), who was as a Professor of law at Oxford and previously 
favoured the freedom of the seas, supported the idea that not all seas are 
free for the use of all Sates.34
The exclusive claims over the seas were contrary to the Dutch 
commercial interests in the seas. In particular, as a consequence of 
exclusive claims made by Spain and Portugal in the Atlantic and Eastern 
Seas, the freedom of sea trade for the Dutch in these seas and also its rights 
to fish in the North Sea were threatened.35 These restrictions on the seas 
for the Dutch led to legal analysis of the theory of the freedom of the seas 
by Grotius.
A. Grotius’ Theory of the Freedom of the Seas
In 1609, Grotius supported the principle of freedom of the seas in his 
work entitled Mare liberum sive de jure quod batavis competit ad indicana 
commercia dissertation (The Freedom of the Seas, or the law governing
30W ilson, Charles, ‘Hugo Grotius and his world’, in The World o f Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). 
Proceedings o f the International Colloquium organised by the Grotius Committee o f the Royal 
Netherlands Academy o f Arts and Sciences, Rotterdom, 6-9 April 1983, p.5.
3 ̂ ’Connell writes that the Swedish claim over the Baltic was to exclude foreign vessels from sea trade 
in the Baltic as a closed sea, unless they were ready to pay tolls. O’Connell, op. cit., p.3.
32Wilson, op. cit., p.5. To these claims, the British claims in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
over some seas can be added. These claims were made over the North Sea, the Channel, the Irish Sea, 
and parts o f the Atlantic as “British seas”. Mangone, op. cit., p.20. On the claims o f certain States over 
vast areas o f the seas see also Momtaz, Djamchid, ‘The High Seas’, in Rene-Jean Dupuy and Daniel 
Vignes (eds.), A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea. V ol.l, Ch.7, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1991, pp.383-423, at 386.
33James I, in fact, followed the Scottish view that “the King of Scotland was deemed to possess whatever 
lay within the range o f vision o f a ship in sight of the coast”. O ’Connell, op. cit., p.3.
34Wilson, op. cit., p.6.
njbid.
3^This book was originally Chapter XII of the earlier treatise of Grotius, De Jure Praedae (On the Law 
o f Prize), written in 1604-5. It was in 1864 that after discovery o f this treatise the aforementioned fact 
was found. Mangone, op. cit., p. 18. “On the Law of Prize” was written on the request o f the Dutch 
East India Company (formed in 1602) to justify the involvement of this company in trading with the 
East Indies, since the Portuguese excluded ships o f the company from engagement in sea trade in that 
region. Churchill, op. cit., p.5. Although in the early seventeenth century the Dutch were at war with 
Spain, there was no war between the Dutch and Portugal. However, at the time Spain and Portugal
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the Dutch trade in the Indies) or Mare Liberum?1 for short. He stated that 
no state has exclusive sovereignty over the seas. He also mentioned that 
all states have equal right of shipping and navigation. Indeed, Grotius 
attempted to establish a regime of free navigation which cannot be denied.
In his book, The Freedom of the Seas, Grotius used a number of 
reasons to defend the principle of freedom of the open sea in response to 
the claims of Spain and Portugal in the early seventeenth century, 
particularly as far as navigation is concerned.* 328 While Spain claimed the 
Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico, Portugal claimed the Atlantic south 
of Morocco and Indian Ocean.39 The major purpose for such claims was to 
exclude foreign ships from traversing or entering these waters. Grotius 
challenged the division of the seas by the Pope and argued that:
... since n e ith er  the se a  n o r  the r ig h t o f  n av ig a tin g  it can b e co m e  the  
p r iv a te  p r o p e r ty  o f  an y  m a n , it follows that it could not have been 
given by the Pope, nor accepted by the Portuguese.40 ( em ph asis  
a d d e d )
Grotius was also of the opinion that States have no right to deprive 
ships of other States from navigating through the seas because “if they 
have any right at all upon the sea, it is merely one of jurisdiction and 
protection”.41 This was in response to the positions of Spain and Portugal 
claiming exclusive right of shipping on the seas and excluding other 
nations from traversing the Indies waters. Grotius rejected the claim that 
the right of navigation to the East Indies belonged only to the Portuguese 
because of prescription42 or custom. Grotius asserted that “[prescription is
were under the same Crown. In 1601, the Portuguese galleon (Santa Catharina) was seized by the 
Dutch Navy .in the Straits o f Malacca. This action was later objected to by the Company which asked 
Grotius to argue in support o f free sea trade. It was in De jure praedae that Grotius discussed the 
seizure o f the Portuguese galleon. See Anand, op. cit., 1982, pp.2-3.
32Mare Liberum consists o f an introduction and thirteen chapters. In Chapters II-IV, Grotius discusses
titles to sovereignty. Chapters I, V-VII deal with right of navigation and Chapters VIH-XIII are related
to international sea trade. e .
38As Mangone writes “[t]he doctrine of the freedom of the seas in modem times must be seen within the
context o f  the Spanish-Portuguese discoveries and ocean trade route monopolies in the Indies and
America, opposed to the rising mercantile powers o f England and Holland in the seventeenth century .
Mangone, op. cit., p.17.
39Anand, op. cit., 1982, p.44.
40Grotius, op. cit., p.45.
Ib id , p.46.
42According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term prescription in international law means “[ajcqusition of 
sovereignty over a territory through continuous and undisputed exercise o f sovereignty over it during 
such a period as is necessary to create under the influence o f historical development the general 
conviction that the present condition o f things is in conformity with international order.” Black, Henry 
Campbell et al, Black’s Law Dictionary. Sixth Edition, West Publishing CO., St. Paul, 1990, p.1183.
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a matter of domestic law”43 and domestic law cannot be relied upon to 
prevent other nations from exercising their rights under the law of nations. 
Grotius pointed out that a domestic law is not reliable “when it is in 
conflict with that which always is stronger than municipal law, namely, the 
law of nature or nations”.44 In addition, prohibition of other nations from 
navigating the seas is not only considered “contrary to the [existing] laws, 
but is contrary also to natural law or the primary law o f nations' \ 45 
(emphasis added)
Grotius considered the seas as res communis, including for the 
purpose of navigation. Accordingly, no one can exclude others from 
navigating the seas. This is because “no man has a right nor can acquire a 
right over the seas and waters which would be prejudicial to their common 
use”.46
Another reasoning applied by Grotius to support his doctrine was the 
principle of freedom of trade among nations in the law of nations, that is to 
say, “[e]very nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with 
it”.47 This was why the Portuguese claim to exclusive sea trade with the 
East Indies was rejected by reliance on the freedom of trade. Even 
discovery or occupation of the East Indies by the Portuguese did not create 
any exclusive right of trade.48 Grotius did not accept that the “Papal 
Donation” or non-involvement of other nations in trading with the East 
Indies form any foundation for the Portuguese to make the sea trade with 
the East Indies exclusive. In addition, the principle of equity enables 
nations to get involved in sea trade on a free and equal bases.49
Grotius concludes that the freedoms of navigation to and sea trade 
with the East Indies for the Dutch and other nations is a reflection of the 
principles of law and equity.50 He suggests that there are three possibilities





4SIbid., p.61 & 65.
49Ibid., pp.69-71. Although Grotius directed his arguments against the Portuguese, the same reasoning 
could be also advanced against the position o f Spain in monopolising trade in the W est Indies. 
Brownlie, op. cit., p.233.
50Despite his reasoning to defend the right of free sea trade, Grotius was asked to argue for the Dutch 
monopoly to trade with Spice Islands. In March 1613, Grotius accompanied the Dutch diplomatic 
mission to England to discuss issues over prevention o f English seafarers to trade with the Spice 
Islanders. Grotius argued that the right o f the Dutch to monopolise the trade with the Spice Islands was
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to remove any obstacles to these freedoms: by peaceful discussions, by 
concluding a treaty, or by war.51 Alternatively, the case could be taken to a 
court for determination.
Although Grotius is a supporter of the freedom of the seas, he 
confirms that countries can have the right of jurisdiction and protection 
over offshore areas.52 This shows a confirmation of Roman independent 
States theory on the regulatory powers of coastal States.53 As Churchill 
underlines: “Grotius ... did not claim that all the seas were open to use by 
all men”.54 This should not be interpreted as saying States might claim 
some of the seas (if not all the seas); rather that States might have some 
rights in the marginal seas while the freedom of the seas is not impaired. 
In 1625 Grotius argued in his book on the Law of War and Peace (De jure 
belli ac pads) that the seas should be open to all nations for sailing, 
fishing, and other uses such as those for commercial purposes. However, 
he recognised that an adjacent maritime area may fall under the jurisdiction 
of coastal States for security purposes.55
In fact, like Baldus (an Italian civil lawyer of the fourteenth 
century), Grotius made a distinction between the right of ownership 
{dominium) and the right of jurisdiction (imperium).56 This is clear from 
the view of Grotius in De Jure belli ac pads  in which, despite 
reconfirmation of freedom of the seas, he made clear that coastal States can
a result o f  its long engagement in sea trade with these islands. He stated that the legal basis for such 
monopolising was the conclusion o f treaties with the Spice Islanders. England maintained that Grotius 
was depending on those arguments used by Portuguese and Spaniards. England relied on the work of 
Grotius to argue against his reasoning. In addition, England was o f the view that free trade was a 
mandatory rule o f the law o f nations that could not be affected by such treaties. See Anand, op. cit., 
1982, pp.96-97.
51See Grotius, op. cit., pp.72-76. Cicero states that “[t]here are two ways o f settling a dispute; first, by 
discussion; second, by physical force; we must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves 
o f discussion”. Ibid., p.75.
52Grotius writes that those supporting the principle that Romans had rights over a certain sea did not 
mean to establish the concept o f ownership regarding the seas but to give the rights to Romans for 
jurisdiction and protection purposes. Ibid., p.35.
53The legal position o f the Roman Empire over the seas before its division was mainly based on the view  
o f the Roman legal scholar, Domitius Ulphianus ( A.D. 228). This scholar was o f the opinion that “the 
sea by its nature is open to everyone.” Mangone, op. cit., pp.7-8.
54Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.53.
55Mangone, Gerard J., “Demarcation o f International Straits”, in Dorinda G. Dallmeyer and Louis De 
Vorsey, Jr. (eds.), Rights to Oceanic Resources: Deciding and Drawing Maritime Boundaries. Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, p.101.
56Grotius also made such a distinction in his two other works: Defensio and De jure belli ac pads. In the 
former, he did not discuss imperium et jurisdictio as, in his view, it was not related to dominium and jus 
piscandi. As O’Connell understands from the distinction made in the latter, the idea is that “there may 
be imperium  over a public way (the seas) but no dominium because it is common”. See O’Connell, 
supra note 15, p.16;
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have sovereignty over bays and straits and also over adjacent waters as 
long as “innocent passage” of foreign ships is not disrupted.57 This theory 
was later developed by Bynkershoek, arguing that the sovereignty of 
coastal States is limited to the power of its artillery at the shores.58
It is necessary to point out that the principles of the freedom of the 
seas and the freedom of navigation originated from the traditional law of 
the sea but do not necessarily represent the same concept. Although the 
former contains the notion of free navigation, it is not limited to the right of 
shipping. In fact, the freedoms of the high seas are discussed in a broad 
context which covers free navigation through these seas. However, the 
effective exercise of the freedom of navigation has required the passage of 
foreign ships through territorial waters of littoral States. Accordingly, it is 
argued that navigation through territorial waters is a result of the adoption 
of the freedom of the high seas and this freedom exists because of “the 
absence of any territorial sovereignty over the high seas”.59
B. Selden’s Theory of Closed Seas
In contrast to the theory of open seas, Selden (in an effort to disprove 
the theory o f "mare liberum") propounded the theory o f"mare clausum:” in 
1635.60 Based on this theory, coastal States have exclusive sovereignty 
over a maritime area adjacent to their coastlines. His book, entitled Mare 
clausum sive dominio maris61 (The Closed Sea or Dominion over the Sea)62 
was written to justify the claims made by England over the seas around this 
country in the seventeenth century.63
57Mangone, op. cit., 1981, p.20. Grotius argued that “... the sea can also be acquired by him who holds 
the land on both sides, even though it may extend above as a bay or above or below as a strait, provided 
that the sea in question is not so large that when compared with the lands on both sides, it does not 
seem a part o f them”. II De jure belli ac p a d s , Chapter III, Section VIII. Cited in Mangone, op. a t., 
1989 ,p . l l l  (footnote 1).
58It is stated that the doctrine o f the sovereignty over the seas was first asserted by Bodin in his treaties 
on sovereignty in 1582. This doctrine was considered to be a reflective o f the traditional enforcement 
o f jurisdiction by Italy over its adjacent waters. O’Connell, op. d t., pp.2-3.
59 T ,nhls ra se  (19271. PCLJ Series A. No. 10. p.25.
60Selden’s book, Closed Seas or Mare Clausum, was presented to King James in 1618. It was revised 
and then published in 1635 following the order o f King Charles. It was published to support British 
claims over certain seas. Anand, op. d t., 1982, p.105.
61For short mare dausum.
62See Selden, John, O f the Dominion or Ownership o f the Sea (Mare Clausum Seu De Dominio Maris), 
Two B o o k s, London, 1952.
63Churchill and Lowe write that the mare liberum was regarded as a threat to “contemporary British 
claims to control the seas around Great Britain”. Churchill and Lowe, op. d t., p.5. Unlike Selden who 
mainly relied on philosophical arguments, some authors tried to disprove Grotius’s theory based on 
theological bases, particularly “the theological concept o f property in the sea.” For example,
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Although English claims over the seas were not as extensive as those 
of Spain and Portugal, England claimed “the high seas to the south and east 
of England, as well as to undefined regions to the north and west”.64 It is 
notable that while Queen Elizabeth I was defending the principle of open 
sea in the sixteenth century against the protest of Spain relating to violation 
of its domain by the British vessel, Britain’s position changed in the 
seventeenth century following the expansion of its colonies overseas.65 In 
fact, at this time, Britain followed a position similar to that of Spain and 
Portugal over the seas, inter alia, monopolising maritime commerce.66 
Selden prepared his series of arguments to defend the theory of closed sea 
as a justification of British interests.
Selden first outlined the existing theories regarding the seas and 
wrote that “[tjhere are among foreign writers, who rashly attribute your 
Majesty’s (King Charles I) more southern and eastern sea to their princes. 
Nor are there a few, who following chiefly some ancient Caesarian 
lawyers, endeavour to affirm, or beyond reason too easily admit, that all 
seas are common to the universality of mankind”.67 Selden relied on the 
practice of some nations in appropriating certain parts of the seas to argue 
that there is a custom to claim maritime sovereignty. For example, he 
referred to such ancient people as Romans, Carthaginians, Cretans, 
Liydians, Tharcians, Phoenicians, Egyptians, as well as some European 
States.68 Accordingly, Selden considered the seas as private property in 
contrast to Grotius who argued that the seas are common property of 
mankind and are free for navigation, sea trade and fishing of all nations. 
Selden noted:
... the sea, by the law of nature or nations, is not common to all men, 
but capable of private dominion or property as well as land.69
Godolphin (1661) argued that “the world was no sooner created but man had Dominion over fish of the 
sea, jure divino”. The purpose o f this argument was to express the exclusive fishing rights o f coastal 
States. O ’Connell., op. cit., p . l l .
64Scott, James Brown, Introductory Note to Mare Liberum (The Freedom o f the Seas), op. cit., p.viii.
65This is an indication o f how the positions o f States may alter depending on their changing interests in 
the seas. See, for example, Anand, op. cit., 1993, p.76.
66It is mentioned that England made such a claim in order to protect its fisheries interests by exclusion of 
others from fishing in certain maritime areas. It was to this end that England expressed its intention to 
enclose, inter alia, “the English Channel and the whole o f the North Sea up to the north o f Norway”. 
Bimie, P.W., “The Law o f the Sea Before and After UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II”, in R. P. Barston and 
Patricia Bim ie (eds.), The Maritime Dimension. George Allen & Unwin, London, 1980, p.8.
67Quoted by Scott, op. cit., p.ix.
68Anand, op. cit., 1982, p.105.
69Scott, op. cit., p.ix. Accordingly, Selden concludes that “... the King o f Great Britain is the lord o f the 
sea flowing about, as an inseparable and perpetual appendant o f the British Empire”. Ibid. Dr. James
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Selden argued that the claims of Spain and Portugal were not 
acceptable because their claims were not based on “legitimate title” and 
they lacked adequate naval forces to exercise their sovereignty on the 
claimed seas.70 This indicates that Selden gave an important role to the 
navy for asserting sovereignty over the seas. Although Selden maintained 
that peaceful navigation and commerce should be free, he considered this 
as a matter of “humanity” and asserted that it was not inconsistent with the 
law of nature and the law of nations to prevent navigation and commerce in 
certain parts of the seas.71 Selden then argued that England had exercised 
its sovereignty over the adjacent seas by preventing foreigners to fish and 
navigate therein.
Selden’s doctrine was supported by some scholars while others 
refuted his work. Two Dutch jurists, Dirck Graswinckle and Pontanus 
(1637), argued against Selden’s doctrine while Boroughs supported his 
view to justify the claims made by Britain to enclose waters of several seas 
subject to exclusive use. Boroughs stated:
That princes may have an exclusive property in the soveraigntie of the 
severall parts of the sea, and in navigation, fishing and shores thereof, 
is so evidently true by way of fact, as no man that is not desperately 
impudent can deny it.72
Although the doctrines of free seas and closed seas were primarily 
the products of the interests of individual countries73, arguments for and 
against these doctrines became part of academic discussion in the following
Brown Scott states that William W elwod (1613), Professor o f Civil Law at the University o f Aberdeen, 
justified claims made by England earlier than Seldon, but using theological arguments. In his book, An 
Abridgement o f all the Sea-Lawes, W elwod favoured the position o f England in claiming the seas 
around it. Ibid ., p.viii, footnote 1. Churchill and Lowe name this author as Scot W ei wood. Churchill 
and Lowe, op. cit., p.5. Even before Welwood, Graig, a Scottish legal scholar, in support o f the James 
VI o f Scotland, stated that the seas belong to those whose lands locate nearest the seas such as the 
English Sea adjacent to the coast o f England and the French Sea in the vicinity o f the French coast. 
Graig also claimed that “occupied parts o f the sea belong to the territory o f that nation which has 
occupied them”. O ’Connell, op. cit., p.4. Also Alberto Gentili, Professor o f Civil Law at Oxford 
University, is mentioned among authors o f the seventeenth century opposing the theory o f freedom of 
the seas and considering no legal effects for the theory. Gentili supported the claims made by Britain 
and Spain over the seas. Mangone, op. cit., 1981 pp.18-19.
70Anand, op. cit., 1982, p.106.
71Ibid. m m
72Sir John Boroughs, The Soveraigntv o f the British Seas. Proved bv Records. History and the Municipal 
T aws o f thp Kingdome. written in 1633 and published in 1651. Cited in Allott, Philip, ‘Mare Nostrum: 
A New International Law o f the Sea’, in Durwood Zaelke and Grant Hewison (eds.), Freedom f<X the 
flras in the 9.1th Century: Ocean Governance and Environmental Harmony, Van Dyke, Jon M., Island 
Press, Washington D.C., 1993, pp.49 and 68 (no. 1).
73Potter states that “the works o f Grotius and Selden and their coadjutors were products o f personal and 
national desires rather than works o f pure and unbiased juristic science”. Quoted in Anand, op. cit., 
1982, pp.106-107.
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centuries. However, even these discussions were affected by the practices 
of States in expressing their rights over the seas.
C. Responses to the Classical Theories
Despite extreme claims made over the seas by some countries in the 
fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, it became clear that it was 
impracticable to impair navigation of other States vessels on the high 
seas.74 This is evidenced by the failure of Spain and Portugal in preventing 
foreign vessels from passing through maritime areas claimed by them 
which in fact were part of the high seas.75
Pontanus in Holland, Welwood in Scotland, and Meadows in 
England were among authors who favoured the right of ownership of States 
over the marginal seas.76 7 These authors argued that it is because of 
property rights of States over the adjacent seas that they have jurisdiction 
over these seas. This jurisdiction, in turn, is for the purpose of protection 
of these States and to exclude foreigners from the use of the adjacent seas 
as property of coastal States. Accordingly, the marginal belts might be 
appropriated while other parts of the seas are open to use for all. The major 
difference between the theory of Grotius and the above mentioned authors 
is that these authors argue the States have the right of dominium in the 
marginal seas while Grotius considered this as imperium.11
According to O’Connell, “[b]y 1700, there were only echoes of the 
sovereignty of the seas to be heard, and the only question was the extent of 
coastal waters”.78 (<emphasis added) It was in 1702 that Cornelius van
74In fact, by the end of the seventeenth century the new version of the Roman doctrine o f freedom o f the 
seas was widely adopted and “the right o f free navigation won general acceptance”. Shalowitz, Aaron 
L., Shore and Sea Boundaries. V o l.l, United States Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.,
1962, p.24.
75Shalowitz states that the maintenance o f claims over the seas depended on the ability o f claimant States 
to preserve such claims in practice. In his words, in the Middle Ages “each nation asserted such claims 
as seemed warranted in its own eyes, and obtained recognition o f them in proportion to its power to 
defend them”, (emphasis added) Ibid.
76Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.53. In 1665, Codrington reiterated the Selden’s argument. See 
O ’Connell, op. cit., pp.6-7. O ’Connell names authors such as Gothoferdus (1637) and Loccenius 
(1650) among those who consider a close link between the notions o f imperium and dominium. Ibid.,
P-17. .
77Jessup’s view is “[a]s far as the littoral power extended seaward, so far could the sea be claimed as 
under the imperium o f the neighbouring state.” Jessup, Philip, The Law of  Territorial Waters and 
Maritime Jurisdiction. G. A. Jennings Co., INC., New York, 1927, p.5.
780 ’Connell, op. cit., p.10. In another part o f his book, O’Connell refers to the view o f interrelation of 
imperium (the power to rule} and dominium (the power o f ownership o f the sea) by 1700. This view is 
that “the power to rule and to legislate, which is the power o f imperium, could extend only so far as the 
ruler and legislator possessed dominium, or the rights o f an owner”. Ibid., p.15.
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Bynkershoek (a Dutch jurist) wrote his book, De dominio marts dissertatio 
(Sovereignty over the Sea), relying on “the actual practice of states” instead 
of depending on “the principles of the law of nature”.79 Bynkershoek 
asserted that the seas are free for all States but coastal States have full 
sovereignty over the seas adjoining their shores.80 This full sovereignty 
enabled coastal States to deprive foreign ships from having access to the 
marginal seas. Although it was accepted that coastal States should have 
sovereignty over the territorial waters, authors like Vattle (1758, Le droit 
des gens), were of the view that foreign ships have to become entitled to 
navigate through the marginal seas.81
While the nature of navigation and the kind of vessels entitled to 
navigate in the marginal waters became subject to some debates, the 
principle of navigation through these waters was not rejected and since the 
early nineteenth century this principle has become part of customary 
international law.82 This was due to the fact that acceptance of the theory 
of sovereignty of States over the marginal seas resulted in division of seas 
into territorial waters and the high seas.83 With the prevalence of the 
cannon-shot rule in the late eighteenth century84, the extensive claims over 
the seas ceased and in the nineteenth century the principle of freedom of 
the seas, particularly for naval and commercial purposes, gained British, 
French, and American support.85
It should be noted that the sovereignty of England over its territorial 
waters beyond three nautical miles from the English shore was rejected by 
Lord S to well (formerly Sir William Scott) in the case of The Louis
79Mangone, op. cit., 1981, p.20. The reliance on State practice is the milestone o f the positivist view  
developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Positivism was a response to the natural law 
theory. Accordingly, positivists were “more concerned with what nations actually do than with what it 
might be thought they should do”. Brown, op. cit., p.42.
80 Churchill and Lowe,, op. cit., p.54.
SiIbid.
%2Ibid.
83Developm ents in State practice with respect to maritime zones in recent decades have created new  
principles on division o f the seas. The seas (including their submerged lands) are now divided into the 
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf, and the high 
seas with special principles governing them.
84By the late eighteenth century Spain and Portugal stopped proclaiming vast areas o f  the seas as their 
national domains. For example, Spain claimed a six mile limit in 1760. Brownlie, op. cit., p.234 (no.
12). . „ 
85Ibid., p.234. The Russian support for the freedom of the sea was first expressed in 1587. Ibid., p.233
(no.9).
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(1817)86. In line with the developments in the law of the seas, Lord 
Stowell argued, inter alia, that:
... all nations being equal, all have an equal right to the u n in te rru p ted  
u se o f  the  u n a p p ro p r ia te d  p a r ts  o f  the o cea n  f o r  th e ir  n a v ig a tio n . In 
places where no local authority exists, where the subjects of all States 
meet upon a footing of entire equality and independence, no one state, 
or any of its subjects, has a right to assume or exercise authority over
the subjects of another.87 (em ph asis  added)
The concept of freedom of the seas has also been supported in the 
practice of the United States courts since the early nineteenth century. In 
The Mariana Flora case, Justice Story held that "... upon the ocean in time 
of peace, all possess an entire equality. It is the common highway of all, 
appropriated to the use of all, and no one can vindicate to himself a 
superior or exclusive prerogative there”.88 (emphasis added) A similar 
view was expressed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Louisiana in 1960 when it stated “... the high seas, as distinguished from 
inland waters, are generally conceded by modem nations to be subject to 
the exclusive sovereignty of no single nation”.89
III. The Concepts of Res Communis and Res Nullius
The history of the law of the sea also reflects the battle between the 
concepts of res nullius and res communis.90 For many centuries, the
86Le Louis was a French ship which was involved in African slave trade, while this trade was declared to 
be unlawful in accordance with French laws and the treaty between Great Britain and France. The 
Louis was seized by the British cutter, the “Queen Charlotte” on 11 March 1816. This seizure occurred 
because the Louis refused to permit the British cutter to search it. In dealing with this case, Lord 
Stowell stated that “I can find no authority that gives the right of interruption to the navigation o f states 
in amity upon the high seas, excepting that which the rights o f war give to both belligerents against 
neutrals” . Le Louis (1817), 2 Dodson 210,165 ER 1464. It is now recognised that a warship can board 
a foreign ship on the high seas if  such ship is engaged in piracy, slave trade, and unauthorised 
broadcasting, or the ship is without nationality or refuse to show its flag. See Article 110 (Right of 
Visit) o f the LOSC.
87Scott, op. cit., p.x. It was in 1876 that Great Britain legislated the Customs Consolidation Act and 
claimed the three mile limit, thus taking its new position in favour o f the freedom o f the seas. By this 
Act invalidated the Hovering Acts which extended the control power o f Great Britain up to twelve 
miles from its coast. Jessup, op. cit., p.4 (also no. 7).
88Cited in McNees, Richard B., ‘Freedom of Transit through International Straits’, Journal Of Maritime 
T .aw and Commerce. Vol.6, No.2, January 1975,, p.178.
%9Ibid. For more details on the history o f the law o f the sea, including the right of navigation, see Fulton, 
op. cit. pp.1-22 (Introduction); Brown, E. D., Passage through the Territorial Sea. Straits Used for 
fntpmational Navigation and Archipelagos. University College, London, December 1973, Introduction; 
O ’Connell, op. cit., pp.1-20; Anand, R. P., op. cit, 1982; and Guiliano, Scovazi, Treves, Diritto. 
intpmanonale. II, Milan, 1983, pp.254-265.
90Brittin defines the concept o f res communis as “[s]omething enjoyed by everyone and not subject to 
exclusive acquisition.” Brittin, Burdick, International Law for Seagoing Officers. Fourth Edition, US 
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1981, p.460. Therefore, the concept o f res nullius, in contrast, means 
something which is subject to exclusive acquisition.
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dispute over these concepts brought about conflicts of interests among 
States.91 This is because the implementation of these concepts led to 
different legal consequences. These two concepts have opposite meanings. 
As far as the seas are concerned, the concept of res communis means that 
the seas are the common possession of all nations and, therefore, open for 
their uses. Accordingly, the seas are not subject to appropriation by any 
means. In contrast, the concept of res nullius means that the seas belong 
to no State and are the property of no one. Therefore, based on this concept 
the seas are susceptible to occupation and they become property of the first 
occupiers.
In fact, there is an interrelation between the concepts of res 
communis and res nullius regarding the legal status of the seas and the 
theories of mare liberum and mare clausum. When Grotius argued that the 
seas are free for the use of all nations, he considered the seas as res 
communis. In the same manner, when Selden favoured the idea of the 
mare clausum, he applied the theory of res nullius to the seas.
While many States supported the concept of res communis 
concerning the seas, others (mostly maritime powers) adhered to the 
concept of res nullius, based on their own interests. This resulted in 
conflicts between the interests of coastal States and those of maritime 
powers. However, the recent developments in the law of the sea, 
particularly in the 1960s, led to the adoption of the theory of res 
communis.92
In the modem law of the sea, the battle between the theories of mare 
liberum (res communis) and mare clausum (res nullius) finally was 
concluded by the clarification of the scope of the former theory and the 
modification of the latter. Also there have been some developments in 
State practice in the past decades reflecting, to some extent, the tendency 
towards the theory of mare clausum. There now exist international 
conventions on the law of the sea which recognise the concept of 
sovereignty over the territorial sea as forming part of the territory of coastal 
States (and also sovereignty over archipelagic waters). These universal
91 Although the theories o f res communis and res nullius emerged when the seas were only used for 
navigation and fishing, the impacts o f these theories on the modem law of the sea are still observable. 
The concepts o f territorial sovereignty over adjacent seas and the common heritage o f mankind 
regarding the resources on seabed and in subsoil thereof, beyond the national jurisdiction, reflect these
theories. . . .  . .
^Notwithstanding the theory o f res nullius preserved its effect, though in a limited way. This effect is 
evident in acceptance o f a narrow adjacent sea for coastal States, known as the territorial sea.
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treaties also grant control powers over the contiguous zone (extending up 
to twenty-four nautical miles seaward of the baselines); and accord 
sovereign rights to coastal States in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs, 
limited to 200 nautical miles seaward of the baselines) and on the 
continental shelves (up to 200 nautical miles and in certain circumstances 
up to 350 nautical miles seaward of the baselines).
There is also a new trend which does not limit the approaches 
towards the nature of the seas to mare liberum or mare clausum. A new 
perspective is that the seas are mare nostrum. Allott is among those who 
look at the seas as mare nostrum. He writes that:
The sea is naturally neither m are  liberu m  (Grotius) nor m a re  c lau su m  
(Selden) but rather m a re  n o s tru m  (our sea). ... The sea is our sea 
because we find ourselves to be cohabitants with the sea on the Planet 
Earth and because all human beings naturally share its potentialities.93
Although the seas may naturally be considered as mare nostrum, not 
all seas may legally be considered so. A more accurate view is that the 
seas now fall into three main categories from a legal perspective: (a) mare 
clausum (internal waters), mare liberum (the high seas) and mare nostrum 
(territorial seas, archipelagic waters, and EEZs). The concept of certain 
seas as mare nostrum means that these maritime areas ‘basically “belong” 
to the adjoining coastal state with clearly stated limited rights of access — 
they are mare nostrum with a right-of-way.”94
93Allott, op. cit., p.56. .
94Gold, Edgar, ‘Mare Liberum? Mare Clausum? Mare Nostrum?: Can We Really Have It All? , in John 
P. Craven, Jan Schneider, and Carol Stimson (eds.), The International Implications o f Extendsd 
fyiaritime Jurisdiction in the Pacific. Proceedings o f the 21st Annual Conference o f the Law o f the Sea 
(3-6 August 1987, Honolulu), The Law o f the Sea Institute, Honolulu, 1989, pp.447-448.
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IV. The Issue of Competing Interests: The Interests of Maritime 
Nations v. Those of Maritime Powers95
The law of the sea has been developed through the interaction of 
interests of States. In 1983, Burke and Deleo wrote that “the recent history 
of the law of the sea continues to reflect conflicts between states seeking 
unhampered navigation and utilisation of resources and other states seeking 
exclusive control over adjacent seas”.96 In many cases, State practice has 
reflected divergent views. As long as States’ efforts are focused on 
securing their own interests over the seas and oceans, there will always be a 
possibility of conflicts over the use of ocean spaces.
Like any other branch of international law, the law of the sea has 
played a determinant role in reconciling conflicts of States in the use of the 
seas. While many States have been seeking to gain control rights over a 
relatively wide maritime area, a few States with large interests in the seas 
have been struggling to keep the seas as free as possible. It is important to 
examine how these competing interests have been co-existing or 
reconciling in the light of developments in the law of the sea.97 This 
review is essential because it will assist to find out how the rights of 
navigation have been affected by a wide range of claims over the seas.98
95The term “maritime nations” used here is to represent most o f coastal States in contrast to those 
maritime nations known as “ maritime powers”. Some use the terms “maritime nations” or “maritime 
states” referring to “maritime powers” but this usage does not seem to be appropriate since all coastal 
States are maritime nations and States, though with different capabilities and potentillas to use the seas. 
It seems the term “maritime States” may refer to those States with a considerable commercial and 
military fleets but not as large as maritime powers. Although the term “maritime powers” is used in 
many texts, there is no recognised definition for this term. Brown writes that maritime power is “the 
active shipping State as opposed to the relatively passive coastal State.” Brown, op. cit., p.2. It is, 
however, debateable that countries like Liberia, Panama, and Singapore representing flag o f  
convenience countries can be considered in the category o f maritime powers. It appears that the term 
implies that States should have extensive active commercial and military fleets to be categorised as 
maritime powers. Also, M cNees defines maritime States (maritime powers) as those States “whose 
merchant and naval ships make more than localised use o f the seas.” McNees, op. cit., p.187. Some 
countries such as the USA, Russia, the UK, France, and Japan seem to be placed in the category of 
maritime powers with very similar interests. There still exists a question as to whether countries such 
as Liberia with the large number o f ship registration can be regarded as maritime powers. This seems 
questionable even despite their common interests with maritime powers in free and unrestricted 
navigation through the seas.
96Burke, Karin M., and Deborah A. Deleo, ‘Innocent Passage and Transit Passage in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’, The Yale Journal o f World Public Order. V o l.9 ,1983, p.389.
97For a background to the issue o f competing interests over the seas see McDougal, Myres S. and 
W illiam T Burke, ‘Crisis in the Law o f the Sea: Community Perspectives Versus National Egoism’, 
Thf* Yale T^w Journal. Vol.67, No.4, February 1958, pp.539-589.
98Despite the impacts o f national claims on the rights o f navigation, the right o f peaceful navigation has 
its foundation in the customary law o f the sea. In addition, the law o f the sea has struck a balance 
between legitimate demands o f coastal States and the navigational interests o f maritime powers.
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1. Interests of Maritime Nations: Major Reasons for Expansion of 
National Jurisdiction over Adjacent waters
A relevant question concerns the interests of coastal States in 
extending their jurisdiction over a large area of the sea adjacent to their 
coasts. As early as 1910, Judge Root presented his view on the issue 
jurisdiction of coastal States over adjacent seas, though at that time the 
physical range of such jurisdiction was not as extensive as it is now. Judge 
Elihu Root in the 1910 North Atlantic Fisheries Case relied on a number of 
factors, particularly the necessity of protection of coastal States, to justify 
jurisdiction of these States over adjacent seas in order to narrow the scope 
of the principle of high seas freedom. Judge Root argued that:
The sea became, in general, as free internationally as it was under the 
Roman law. But the new principle of freedom, when it approached 
the shore, met with another principle, the p r in c ip le  o f  p ro te c tio n , not a 
residuum of the old claim, but a new independent basis and reason for 
modification, near the shore, of the principle of freedom. The 
sovereign of the land washed by the sea asserted a new right to protect 
his subjects and citizens against attack, against invasion, against 
interference and injury, to protect them against attack threatening 
their peace, to protect their revenues, to protect their health, to protect 
their industries. This is the basis and sole basis on which is 
established the territorial zone that is recognised in the international 
law of today." (em ph asis  ad d ed )
Although coastal States’ interests may be differently affected by 
such factors as geographical locations and conditions, as well as their 
strategic policies,* 100 they have, more or less, expressed concerns about the 
security, economic, and environmental issues regarding maritime spaces 
adjacent to their coasts. These interests can be examined from various 
aspects, the most significant of which are considered here.101
"Judge Elihu Root, North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration. XI Proceedings, p.2006.
100For example, while the extension o f the exclusive fishing zone was so important for Norway and 
Iceland due to the rich fish stocks around their coasts, what was of more importance for Israel was to 
have access to the high seas through the Strait o f Tiran. This indicates how political and economic 
factors have had their impacts on the codification o f legal rules, since there are now international 
provisions recognising the exclusive economic interests o f coastal States up to 200 nautical miles and 
unimpaired passage through international straits.
101Colombos (1967) classifies the reasons for the expansion o f sovereignty o f coastal States over 
adjacent waters in the following three categories:
(i) the security o f the State demands that it should have exclusive possession o f its 
shores and that it should be able to protect its approaches; (ii) for the purpose o f  
furthering its commercial, fiscal and political interests, a State must be able to 
supervise all ships entering, leaving or anchoring in its territorial waters; (iii) the 
exclusive exploitation and enjoyment o f the products o f the sea within a State’s 
territorial waters is necessary for the existence and welfare o f the people on its 
coasts. Colombos, op. cit., p.87.
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The most important concern of the majority of coastal States has 
been security. Hall justifies the necessity of control power of coastal States 
over adjacent waters on the basis of their security interests. He argues that 
“unless the right to exercise control were admitted, no sufficient security 
would exist for the lives and property of the subjects of the State upon 
land.”102 Protection and defence are vital needs of each State to guarantee 
its continued existence. However, States have different potential and 
capabilities to defend themselves. In addition, there are different strategies 
which are taken by States in their territories depending on the avenues 
available to them. Maritime boundaries present a special situation since 
the territory of States is not limited to lands. Coastal States need to control 
their maritime territory for security purposes. However, many coastal 
States are yet to become fully equipped to patrol their maritime territories, 
particularly where these areas are of significant size.
If a coastal State lacks adequate military equipment to protect and 
support its maritime boundaries, the only precautionary action it can take is 
to extend its exclusive sovereignty to the maritime area adjacent to its 
coasts.103 This makes the passage of foreign ships subject to the condition 
of innocent passage. In particular, many coastal States are concerned about 
the passage of warships which may be used as a means for political 
pressure on them. Extending the maritime territory would lessen and 
weaken this sort of pressure and may guarantee the security of coastal 
States.104 In addition, neutrality is a means of protection on which many 
coastal States rely in time of armed conflicts at seas. These States have 
been seeking to preserve their waters as neutral in time of war as well as to 
avoid impacts of sea war on their land territories.105 Broader coastal waters
l°2Ibid.
103 It was during the period o f the cold war that the East and the West took different positions on the 
strategic importance o f the seas and oceans. While the West attempted to guarantee free passage in 
wider areas o f the seas and oceans, the East was o f the view that coastal States were entitled to have 
“a wider territorial sea than the traditional law of nineteenth century permitted” because it is essential 
“for the defence and protection o f the coastal State”. Kenneth, Bailey, ‘Australia and the Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea’, in D. P. O’Connell (ed.L International Law in Australia. Ch.X, 
The Law Book Company Limited, Sydney, 1967, p.231.
104It is now recognised that no foreign ship may pass through territorial seas, if  its purpose is to 
adversely affect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence o f the coastal State.
105Prescott writes that “[t]he development o f large navies, by countries such as France, Great Britain and 
Holland, and their frequent use as instruments o f policy, caused many small states to seek for means 
o f preserving their neutrality”. Prescott, J. R. V., The Political Geography o f the Oceans. Douglas 
David & Charles, Vancouver, 1975, p.33.
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would make it more likely that the neutrality of coastal States, particularly 
small States, would be respected.106
A second interest of coastal States is their economic interest. Access 
to a large maritime area can play an important role in their economy.107 
Exploitation of living or non-living resources of maritime areas in the 
vicinity of the coastline can meet the essential needs of their population108 
and can be a major source of their revenue.109 This interest is particularly 
important for those coastal States which are not industrialised. Coastal 
areas are rich in terms of fish stocks and other living sea resources.110 The 
sea-bed in offshore areas is also significant for exploitation of petroleum 
and minerals. These areas can be better protected by enforcing national 
jurisdiction over a wide maritime zone.111 This would allow coastal States 
to restrain other States (particularly industrialised States) from exploiting 
their marine resources. Claims over a wider maritime area were particularly 
prompted by technological advances which enabled certain developed
106In contrast, some States (such as the United States o f America) were o f the view that, in time o f war, a 
broader area o f neutrality of adjacent waters may provide a wide zone of free attack for submarines o f  
belligerents, particularly where the coastal States is unable to detect these submarines in its territorial 
waters. Bowett, D. W., ‘The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly. V o l.9 ,1960, p.416.
107A wider maritime area under the control o f coastal States also enables them to apply their laws on 
smuggling in a more extensive area. Accordingly, coastal guards are able to prevent smuggling more 
effectively. This has had an economic impact on coastal States because smuggling deprives coastal 
States o f revenue. In fact, due to the increase o f trade among nations, duties and taxes on goods and 
products are among major sources of revenue for States.
108For example, the Japanese delegate at the UNCLOS I stated that “the Japanese people obtain almost 
9% o f their animal protein requirements from the living resources o f the sea. Moreover, the fishing 
industry plays an important role in Japan’s foreign trade, because a part o f the fishery products is 
exported, enabling japan to import foodstuffs and raw materials which are not available 
domestically.” U N Doc. A/CONF/13/39, p.24.
109In the past decades, some Latin American States (such as Ecuador, El Salvador, and Peru) even 
claimed a very wide territorial sea of 200 nautical mile limit to ensure that maritime resources within 
their adjacent waters would be reserved for their nations to guarantee their economic development. 
This was, in fact, a response to the 1945 Truman Proclamation on the rights over the continental shelf 
which is very narrow in the case o f these American Latin countries.
110 As Kenneth writes “the richest stocks o f fish are to be found in the waters nearest the land”. Kenneth, 
op. cit., p.230.
l u The trend to enclose a wider maritime area is not limited to developing countries. For example, 
Canada has recently claimed a large maritime area as historic waters to change the status o f waters of 
the area to internal waters. This maritime area, which is called the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, is 
formed by a number o f islands. Canada drew straight baselines around this Archipelago which was 
not accepted by some States such as the United States o f America. The result o f the application o f  
these straight baselines is an extension o f sovereignty or sovereign rights o f Canada to the high seas 
that affects the fishing and navigational activities o f other States. The basis o f these baselines is the 
Order respecting geographical co-ordinates of points from which Baselines may be determined, Privy 
Council 1985-2739, 10 September 1985, The Law of the Sea - Baselines: National Legislation With 
Illustrative Mans. Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1989, 
pp.86-98. The area enclosed by this Order is called “Area 7”. Canada has already applied straight 
baselines in six other areas along its coasts.
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countries to exploit not only the living resources in distant waters, but also 
the non-living resources on or under the deep sea-bed.
Another interest of coastal States is the marine environment. Coastal 
States' maritime areas have always been exposed to marine pollution. One 
of the major sources of the pollution has resulted from passage of foreign 
ships, whether because of mere passage, particularly if the power source is 
nuclear power, or as a result of discharging their waste materials, including 
oil, into the sea. These actions also endanger the life of living resources 
and seabirds. Some maritime incidents involving supertankers were also 
among causes of pollution of the marine environment. For example, the 
Torrey Canyon 112and the Amoco Cadiz113 accidents caused marine 
pollution by oil with disastrous effects on the marine life and environment. 
Following these incidents efforts were made to formulate more effective 
rules for the prevention of marine pollution, particularly from oil discharge 
into the seas. These incidents, along with other types of marine pollution, 
brought about stronger incentives among coastal States to combat the issue 
of marine pollution in the seas and oceans, particularly in their territorial 
seas and coastal areas. By extending the maritime areas under new 
jurisdiction, coastal States can enact necessary regulations to protect their 
marine environment in a wider area and expand the range of their 
enforcement powers to prevent marine pollution.114 In particular, coastal
112Torrey Canyon was a supertanker registered in Liberia with 120,890 deadweight tons capacity. On 18 
March 1967, Torrey Canyon (while heading Milford Haven in Wales) foundered in the high seas near 
the coast o f England. It was carrying thousands tons o f crude oil and the accident caused marine 
pollution o f the English and French coasts. The pollution had extensive adverse effects on fish and 
the marine life. Brittin, op. cit., p.94. The damage to the marine environment was so extensive that 
the UK  called the IMCO (now IMO) to hold a meeting to discuss the legal and technical issues 
concerning marine pollution. Two conventions were the main outcomes o f the IMCO efforts after the 
Torrey Canyon incident These conventions were the 1973 Convention on Marine Pollution (the so- 
called MARPOL) and the 1974 Convention on Safety o f Life at Sea (the so-called SOLAS).
1 ̂ Amoco Cadiz was another supertanker registered in Liberia but under American ownership. It was a 
supertanker with 237,000 deadweight tons capacity. On 16 March 1978, Amoco Cadiz broke into two 
parts after colliding with rocks near the coast of Brittany (France) in the severe storm conditions. The 
incident resulted from the loss o f steering control attributed to the lack o f sufficient training. 
Although some other incidents occurred before 1978, the Amoco Cadiz incident was the largest oil 
spill and caused extensive damage to marine environment and marine life. For more details on the 
Amoco Cadiz incident see Nixon, Dennis W., Marine and Coastal Law: Cases and Materials, Ch.10: 
Marine Pollution Law, Praeger Publishers, London, 1994, pp.338-339. Among other main 
supertankers incidents occurring between the Torrey Canyon incident (1967) and the Amoco Cadiz 
incident (1978) were: (a) the Olympic Bravery incident off the coast o f Cuesant Island near Brittany 
(January 1976); (b) the Bohlen incident off Sein Island and Brittany (October 1976); and (c) the Argo 
Merchant incident off Nantucket. Brittin, op. cit., p.95. One o f the recent accidents is the Exxon 
Valdez which grounded in navigable waters on the Alaskan coast in 1989. Nixon, op. cit., p.330.
114With the adoption o f the twelve nautical mile limit as the maximum extent o f territorial sea, there has 
been a question as to whether coastal States are able to claim a wider maritime area for marine 
environmental purposes. For example, following its Decree o f 12 November 1984, the Federal 
Republic o f Germany (then claiming three nautical miles for its territorial sea) extended its territorial 
sea in parts o f the North Sea by establishing a polygonal area in the German Bight to control marine
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States are entitled to enact appropriate provisions on the safety of 
navigation to prevent or reduce collisions of ships which are likely to cause 
marine pollution.
2. The Interests of Maritime Powers: Major Reasons for 
Favouring the Free Seas
Maritime powers have specific interests in the seas. It is apparent 
that maritime powers also have security, economic, and environmental 
interests with respect to maritime areas adjacent to their coasts. However, 
these powers also claim other interests that draw a distinction between 
them and other coastal States. The major interests of maritime powers 
include free navigation, free overflight, and free utilisation of the resources 
of the seas.
Free navigation, free overflight, and free exploitation of the 
resources of the seas have primarily been derived from the principle of 
freedom of the seas. According to this principle every State may use the 
seas for every purpose without any restriction except under international 
rules.115 Maritime powers have claimed that their basic interests depends 
on free utilisation of the seas.116 They have stated that free navigation and 
overflight are necessary for their commercial and military purposes.117 
These powers have particularly been concerned that the extension of 
territorial waters might affect the right of navigation, resulting in longer 
voyages and causing extra costs for countries largely involved in maritime 
trade.118 There is no doubt that wider territorial seas would also cause 
some costs for all coastal States. This is particularly true because coastal
pollution in its coastal waters. The Decree entered into force on 16 March 1986. See the Decree on the 
extension o f the territorial sea in the North Sea for preventing tanker casualties in the German Bight 
o f 12 November 1984, The Law of the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice. Office o f the 
Special Representative o f the Secretary-General for the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 
1987, pp.20-22. Due to the fact that this has resulted in extending the territorial sea o f the Federal 
Republic o f Germany in North Sea, at some areas up to 16 nautical miles, some countries (such as the 
United States and Belgium) protested against it. See, for example, Limits in the Seas (No.112). Office 
o f  Geographer, Bureau o f  Intelligence and Research, the United States Department o f  State, 
Washington D.C., 1992, pp.28-29. Germany now claims a twelve nautical mile limit for its territorial 
sea but the effect o f the 1984 Decree has so far remained unchanged.
115See Nandan, Satya N., and Shabtai Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982: A Commentary. Vol.III: Articles 86-132, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1995, pp.80­
84.
116See, for example, Dean, Arthur H., ‘The Second Geneva Conference on the Law o f the Sea: The Fight 
for Freedom o f the Seas’, AJIL. V o l.5 4 ,1960, p.754.
n 7Ibid.
118See the United States’ view in UNCLOS I (19581 Official Records. Vol.3, New York, 1958, p.26 and 
in TTNCLOS II (I960). Official Records. V ol.l, New York, 1962, p.45.
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States have obligations to maintain the safety of navigation in their 
territorial seas. For this purpose, they have to install necessary navigational 
aids such as buoys. Maritime powers have also argued that not only their 
fleets need to enjoy free navigation and overflight for transportation, 
communication and enforcement of military manoeuvres, but the world 
community can take advantage of these freedoms, particularly for 
international trade.119
In addition, maritime powers have justified exploitation of the sea 
resources by saying that effectiveness of their industries depends on 
extracting raw materials existing in the seas, including the seabeds and 
subsoils.120 They have been arguing that mineral and other resources of the 
seas are necessary for production of manufactured products and 
commodities, both for their domestic needs as well as for export 
purposes.121 Maritime powers with large fishing fleets (such as the USA 
and Japan) have expressed the view that expansion of territorial seas will 
negatively affect their economies.122 This is because they have been 
fishing in areas of the high seas which have now become part of territorial 
waters or EEZs where no right exists for foreign vessels to engage in 
fishing.
Finally, there is a strategic interest in the use of the seas by some 
maritime powers. They consider that free seas, particularly free navigation, 
is necessary for their strategic interests. This is one of the most 
controversial issues in the relations of maritime powers and coastal States 
with the former claiming a vital interest in maintaining the strategic 
balance and the latter expressing concern about their essential security 
interests.123
119For example, the USA argues that not only is maritime trade commercially important for it, but also 
all nations o f  the world are commercially interdependent, particularly through sea trade. See 
Grunawalt, Richard J., ‘United States Policy on International Straits’, Ocean Developm ent and 
International Law. Vol.18, N o .4 ,1987, p.446.
120 Ibid.
121Ibid
122For example, in 1958 the UK considered that it could not produce all food necessary for its population 
and needed to import some foodstuffs. This meant that it had to spend money for food exports with 
impacts on its economy. Fish seemed to be freely available “without spending foreign currency”. 
Accordingly, the UK argued that free access to fish stocks in a large area of the seas “played a very 
important part in balancing the United Kingdom’s economy. And a major part o f the country’s supply 
o f fish was provided by its distant-water and middle-water fishing fleets, which would be grievously 
affected by a twelve-mile zone o f exclusive fishing”. UNCLOS I (1958). Official Records. Vol.3, 
p.104. See also Oda, Shigeru, ‘Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea’, The 
Japanese Annual o f International Law. V o l.3 ,1959, pp.65-86, at 66.
123Some maritime powers have claimed that in time o f war “weak neutral states would experience 
difficulties in preserving the neutrality o f wide territorial seas”. Prescott, op. cit., p. 77.
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It can be concluded that maritime powers claim a wide range of 
interests with respect to the oceans. Notwithstanding, their interests “are 
best served by maximum freedom of access to the oceans for 
transportation, communication, military purposes, and the production and 
exchange of raw materials and goods.”124
The conflict of interests among maritime powers and coastal States 
raises the question of what role the law of the sea has played to resolve 
these issues. Recent history shows that the role of the law of the sea has 
always been to moderate claims of States in order to balance these 
interests.125 The law of the sea has, in fact, developed in a manner to strike 
a balance between competing interests by sharing the seas.126 An example 
is the role of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 
striking a balance between interests of coastal States and those of maritime 
powers with respect to navigational issues. The result of this balance has 
been the incorporation of two rights of passage through waters under 
national sovereignty into the Convention: the right of innocent passage and 
the right of transit passage.127 This process of reconciling competing 
interests became possible through the efforts of the international 
community in the framework of the League of Nations and the United 
Nations. It is, therefore, useful to present a background of these 
international efforts which were the avenues of achieving a balanced 
system of interests in the uses of the seas, including the rights of 
navigation.
124Burke et al, op.. cit., p.391.
125 The established concepts in the modem law of the sea have, in fact, been the outcomes o f centuries 
interaction among competing or even conflicting interests o f coastal States and other States. It is in 
this context that “the special exclusive interests o f the coastal state are expressed in such familiar 
concepts as ‘internal waters’, ‘territorial sea’, ‘contiguous zone’, ‘continental sh e lf , ‘hot pursuit’ and 
so forth; while the more general inclusive interests o f all other states find expression in such 
generalizations as ‘freedom o f navigation and fishing’, ‘innocent passage’, ‘freedom of overflight and 
so on.” McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.545.
126 As McDougal and Burke wrote, the law o f the sea has been developing to establish “a public order in 
the shared use of, and shared competence over, the oceans”. McDougal, Myres S., and William T. 
Burke, ‘The Community Interest in a Narrow Territorial Sea: Inclusive Versus Exclusive Competence 
Over the Oceans’, Cornell Law Quarterly. V o l.45 ,1960, p.171.
127The right o f innocent passage is exercised within the territorial sea while the right o f transit passage is 
exercised within certain straits defined as ’’international straits”. In this context, reference should also 
be made to the right o f innocent passage within archipelagic waters, as w ell as the right o f  
archipelagic sea lanes passage through these waters.
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3. Efforts Made by the International Community to 
Reconcile Competing Interests of States
The 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of International 
Law was the first international effort to reconcile conflicting State practice 
in order to codify uniform rules of international law, including those 
related the law of the sea.128 This Conference was convened and held 
under the auspices of the League of Nations. Three issues were on the 
agenda of the Conference: Territorial Waters, Nationality, and State 
Responsibility for Damage done in their Territory to the Person or Property 
of Foreigners.
The Conference attempted to achieve a convention on territorial 
waters. Despite its efforts, the Conference was unable to conclude such a 
convention mostly because of the failure to reach agreement on the breadth 
of the territorial waters. However, the bases of discussion, draft articles, 
and final act of the Conference were later used by the international 
community in achieving recognised rules on such issues as baselines of 
territorial seas, innocent passage, and jurisdiction of coastal States over the 
seas adjacent to their coasts.129
The first successful effort to provide a reconciliation between two 
major groups of conflicting interests, that is the interests of coastal States
128The initial concern over the need for codification o f international law was expressed through the 
Resolution o f 22 September 1924 of the Assembly o f the League o f Nations. It aimed at preparations 
for “progressive codification o f international law”. The resolution was a basis for setting up a 
Committee o f Experts (Committee o f Experts for the Progressive Codification o f International Law) 
to, inter alia, work on those areas o f international law which were “sufficiently ripe” to be codified. 
The Assembly also adopted another Resolution on 27 September 1927, that is after the Committee o f 
Experts completed four sessions o f its work. This Resolution recalled attempts to codify international 
law for the first time. It stated that “it is material for the progress o f justice and the maintenance of 
peace  to define, improve and develop international law”. (emphasis added) In addition, it provided 
the basis for the Preparatory Committee composed o f five persons with “a wide knowledge o f  
international practice, legal precedents, and scientific data”. This Committee consisted o f Professor 
Jules Basdevant (France) (Chairman), M. Carlos Castro-Ruiz (Chile), M. J. P. A. Francois (The 
Netherlands), Sir Cecil Hurst (Great Britain), and M. Massimo Pilotti (Italy). The Committee was 
required, inter alia , to prepare bases o f discussions for the first Codification Conference. 
Accordingly, these prepared bases o f discussions forwarded to States were the raw materials for the 
negotiations o f delegates at the 1930 Hague Codification Conference. For detailed information on the 
preparation o f  the 1930 Hague Codification Conference see: Rosenne, Shabtai (ed.), Foreword, 
League o f  Nations Conference for the Codification o f International Law 1T9301. V o l.l, Oceana 
Publications INC., Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1975, pp.xiii-xlvii.
129 The draft articles on other aspects o f territorial seas were prepared by the Committee on Territorial 
waters and sent to States for their consideration. These draft articles can be found in Rosenne, Shabtai 
(ed.), League o f Nations Conference for the Codification o f International Law IT9301. Vol.3, Dobbs 
Ferry, New York, 1975, pp.828-836. The work o f the 1930 Hague Conference was greatly used by 
the First United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea (Geneva, 1958) for the preparation o f the 
TSC, even though no mention was made on the recognised breadth for the territorial sea.
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and those of maritime powers, was the codification of four international 
conventions on the law of the sea at the First United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) held in Geneva in 1958.130 These were: 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (TSC)131; the 
Convention on the High Seas132’, the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation o f the Living Resources of the High Seas133; and the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf34. Also a protocol was approved for 
the settlement of disputes arising from interpretation or application of the 
conventions: Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement o f Dispute s135.
The conventions contain a wide variety of rules relating to the seas. 
They have played a considerable role in decreasing conflicts between 
coastal States and maritime powers. However, since there remained some 
unresolved issues, such as the breadth of the territorial sea and the extent of 
exclusive fisheries zones, some conflicts were inevitable. Reconciling these 
conflicts required detailed discussions and some compromises. 
Accordingly, the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS II) was convened and held in Geneva in I960136 to deal with 
these issues.137 Many proposals were submitted to the conference for 
consideration but none was successful in creating a compromise among 
participants to reach agreement on the extents of the territorial sea and the
130The conference was held from 24 February to 27 April 1958 and was attended by representatives o f 
eighty-five countries.
131U.N. Doc. A/Conf.l3/L.52 (1958). 516 UNTS 205 (1964) The Convention was adopted on 29 April 
1958 and entered into force 10 September 1964. By 1995 fifty-one States were parties to the 
Convention, including the United Kingdom, the former U.S.S.R., United States, and France. 
Brownlie, op. cit., p.87.
132U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.53 (1958). 450 UNTS 82 (1963) The Convention was adopted on 29 April 
1958 and entered into force on 30 September 1962. By 1995 sixty-two States were parties to the 
Convention, including the United Kingdom, the former U.S.S.R., United States, and France. Ibid.
133U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.54 (1958). 599 UNTS 285 The Convention was adopted on 29 April 1958 
and entered into force on 20 March 1966. By 1995 thirty-six States had become parties to the 
Convention, including the United Kingdom, United States and France. Ibid.
134U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.55 (1958). 499 TINTS 3 11 (1964) The Convention was adopted on 29 April 
1958 and entered into force on 10 June 1964. By 1995 fifty-six States were parties to the Convention, 
including United Kingdom, the former U.S.S.R., United States, and France. Ibid., p.88.
135UJ4. Doc. A/Conf.l3/L.57 (1958). 450 UNTS 169 (1963) The Protocol was adopted on 29 April 
1958 and entered into force on 30 September 1962. As at 31 December 1988 thirty-eight States were 
parties to the Protocol, including Australia, France, and the United Kingdom. The United States 
signed the Protocol on 15 September 1958 but has not yet ratified it. The former USSR did not sign 
the Protocol and has not yet acceded to i t  Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General. 
Status as at 31 December 1988, United Nations, New York, 1989, p.750.
136The conference was held from 17 March to 27 April 1960 and was attended by eighty-seven States. 
The conference was convened by a resolution o f the UNGA of 10 December 1958. U N  Doc. No. 
A/RES/1307 (Xfil), 1958 in Yearbook of the I Jnited Nations. 1958, pp.381-383.
137See Dean, op. cit., p.752. Also see Bowett, op. cit., pp.421-433.
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exclusive fishing zone.138 The failure of the Conference in producing a 
convention was due to the inability of proposals to accommodate the 
interests and needs of coastal States, the most important of which was to 
monopolise the exploitation of resources in the adjacent seas.
The failure of the 1958 and 1960 conferences to settle the outer 
limits of the territorial seas and exclusive fishing zones, along with the 
developments and evolutions in the law of the sea and changes in the 
global political composition, necessitated a thorough review of all rules 
governing the seas. Its purpose was to achieve a single international 
convention containing rules for all uses of the seas. This required 
convening another international conference on the law of the sea: the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS HI), 
beginning in 1973 and concluding in 1982.139 The outcome of the 
UNCLOS in was agreement on a document of considerable length: the 
United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea (the Law of Sea 
Convention (LOSC)).140 The LOSC finally resulted from compromises 
made among groups of States advancing competing interests in the 
UNCLOS HI. This convention, among others,:
• contains basic principles and provisions of the four Geneva conventions;
• clarifies the ambiguities existing in these documents (for example with 
respect to the outer limit of the continental shelf);
• supplements them by incorporation of provisions such as those 
establishing the breadths of the territorial sea and the exclusive economic 
zone; and
• introduces and develops such issues as right of passage through maritime 
areas under the authority of States; the exploitation of the high seas
138See ibid., pp.772-782.
139 At the UNCLOS III the interest groups were no longer limited to coastal States and maritime powers. 
A  number o f new interests were also claimed in the UNCLOS III. These included the interests of 
land-locked States and geographically disadvantaged States. The reference should also be made to the 
“Group o f 77”, which operated as the strong arm of developing countries to ensure that the UNCLOS 
III would safeguard their essential interests.
140United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982). The 
Convention, which contains 320 articles and nine annexes, has created an evolution in the law of the 
sea and has contributed to its development
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resources; protection of the marine environment; and the methods for 
dispute settlement.141
Although some ambiguities in the LOSC need clarification, it has 
considerably reduced conflicts since its conclusion in 1982. The LOSC has 
also had an impact on harmonisation of State practice. In fact, some aspects 
of its draft provisions were crystallised in State practice before its 
adoption.142 However, the codification of the LOSC has not yet put an end 
to certain conflicts.143 These conflicts may arise due either to the lack of 
adequate provisions in the LOSC, or to the ambiguities existing in its 
provisions. Conflicts will continue to exist, unless States give a priority to 
the interests of the world community and attempt to act in a manner 
consistent with the spirit of the LOSC.
V. Conclusion
The classical history of the law of the sea demonstrates that a 
number of nations proclaimed certain seas and oceans as their exclusive 
domain to prevent other nations from using them. It soon became clear 
that these unilateral claims could not be maintained because they were 
contrary to the rights of other nations over the seas. The history of the law 
of the sea clearly indicates that such claims were never effective and were 
impossible to enforce. Despite this fact, exclusive claims over the seas led 
to the creation of various theories on the uses of the seas that primarily 
focused on the right of navigation.
141The LOSC also includes provisions to meet the economic needs o f certain States, including land­
locked and geographically disadvantaged States (for example provisions of Articles 69 ,70 , and 125 of 
the LOSC.)
142For example, the concept o f the exclusive economic zone was reflected in State practice before the 
UNCLOS III. The origin o f this concept is found in claims over areas beyond the territorial sea that 
were termed exclusive fishing zones or economic zones. See the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK v. 
Iceland, Federal Republic o f German v. Iceland), ICJ Reports. 1974 where the Court ruled that the 
twelve mile exclusive fishing zone is a rule o f customary international law and recognised that coastal 
States have preferential rights over fish resources in the adjacent maritime areas beyond the twelve 
mile lim it
143 For example, there is a question as to whether the passage o f warships through the territorial sea is 
subject to the requirements o f prior notification or authorisation. Although the LOSC appears to 
recognise peaceful passage o f warships through the territorial sea, there are still a large number of 
coastal State applying these requirements. These States argue that the LOSC does not prevent them 
from imposing such requirements. The differences between States on this issue may result in military 
incidents. The case o f the Gulf of Sidra (1982) is an example which indicated that a maritime power 
like the United States o f America may seek military means for resolving existing differences over the 
seas.
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The development of the law of the sea in the past few centuries 
contributed to the most appropriate workable theory consistent with the 
interests of all nations and enforceable in practice. In particular, this 
century has witnessed significant advancements in the regulation of the 
uses of the seas and oceans and developments in the law of the sea. The 
1958 Conventions and the LOSC are examples of the international 
regulation which established a world order for ocean spaces. Despite the 
fact that the LOSC removed a number of ambiguities and inadequacies in 
the 1958 Conventions, there are still some provisions of the LOSC open to 
different interpretations, including those related to delimitation of maritime 
zones under national control. This illustrates the need for continued 
development of the LOSC.
Chapter Two
Delimitation of Inner Boundary of 
Maritime Zones:
Normal and Straight Baselines
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Chapter 2
Delimitation of Inner Boundary of Maritime Zones: 
Normal and Straight Baselines
I. Introduction
This chapter will examine the issue of drawing baselines for the 
measurement of the territorial sea and other maritime zones. The chapter 
will demonstrate how coastal States have enclosed ocean spaces either by 
liberal interpretation of codified rules on baselines, or by relying upon a 
number of factors to justify deviations from these rules. Such national 
claims have had implications for navigation since they have reduced the 
ocean spaces available for free navigation. Accordingly, it is important to 
address the legality of claims laid over the seas from a navigational 
perspective.
The freedom of the high seas is recognised as one of the fundamental 
principles of international law.1 Although the range of this freedom is 
considered to be extensive, such a freedom is formulated and regulated by 
international conventions.2 The principle of freedom of the high seas 
grants rights to all nations to navigate through these seas, to fish, to overfly 
the seas, and to put submerged cables and pipes.3 However, the high seas 
are no longer under the regime of absolute freedom and unlimited use. 
Accordingly, no State may involve in overfishing, polluting, monopolising 
living and non-living resources in the high seas and these seas should be 
used for peaceful purposes.4 If a ship engages in an act which is 
contradictory to the principle of freedom of the high seas, it is the 
responsibility of its flag State to take action against this ship. The 
jurisdiction of flag States over their ships in the high seas is in fact a 
corollary of the principle of the high seas. However, the evolutions in State
lS e e  Schwarzenberger, G., ‘The Fundamental Principles o f International Law’, Recueil de U  Academie. 
fa  firn it International de La Haye. Vol.87, Ch. VIII, 1955.
2See Momtaz, Djamchid, ‘The High Seas’, in Rene-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes (eds.), A Handbook 
r>n pie Ne\y T aw nf flie Sea. V o l.l, Ch.7, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991, pp.383-423, at
400-401.
3 See Article 2 o f the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and Article 87 o f the LOSC on the 
freedom o f the high seas.
4See the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and Part VII o f the LOSC (High Seas).
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practice in the field of maritime spaces brought about a need for a new 
balance in the use of the seas.
As far as the freedom of the high seas is concerned, it is noted that 
“the necessary regulation of this freedom may best be effected by a change 
in its geographical scope - by extending the area of national maritime 
jurisdiction.”5 This allows coastal States to enact necessary legislation and 
to enforce their laws against ships abusing the freedom of the high seas, at 
least to the extent that these open seas were converted to the maritime areas 
under the control of coastal States. However, as a corollary to the principle 
of freedom of the high seas, it is the flag State which has jurisdiction over 
its ships on the high seas for any violation of international rules to prevent 
the abuse of the freedom. In general, as far as the navigation through 
maritime zones is concerned, there exists the question of the nature and 
scope of “freedom v e r s u s  restraint”, “the interests of coastal States v e r s u s  
those of shipping States”, and “national jurisdiction v e r s u s  international 
regulation”.6
In 1948 Smith wrote that “[o]f the vast water area of the globe only a 
very small proportion falls within the national jurisdiction of the sixty or 
seventy independent states.”7 The political developments in the world 
along with evolution of the law of the sea in the past decades demonstrate 
that as a consequence of increase in number of independent States and their 
desire to expand the national jurisdiction over the seas, considerable parts 
of the seas and oceans now fall within the control of coastal States. In fact, 
coastal States have been attempting to bring vast areas of the high seas into 
their control and jurisdiction for different purposes. These claims have had 
impacts on reducing the sea areas where freedoms of the high seas have 
been performed. As a result of new developments in the law of the sea [i]t 
is roughly estimated that... one third of the oceanic space will come under 
national jurisdiction.”8 This implies a partial change in the contemporary 
law of the sea towards the theory of m a r e  c la u su m .  This evolution in the 
trends of coastal States indicates how the high seas can be affected by 
changes in practice of coastal States.
5Brown, E. D ., Passage through the Territorial Sea. Straits Used for International Navigation .Md 
Archipelagos. University College, London, December 1973, p.2.
6 Ibid.
7Smith, H. A., The T ,aw and Custom of the Sea, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1948, p .l.
8zhang, Hong Zeng, ‘The Adjacent Sea’, in Mohammed Bedjauoi, International Law; Achievements and 
prospects. Ch.38, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dodrecht, 1991, p.849.
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Notwithstanding, the expansion of national jurisdiction is far away 
from the theory of mare clausum. This is mainly because the modem law 
of the sea puts limitations on such an expansion. However, coastal States 
have relied on various means to extend their jurisdiction over the high seas 
by one way or another. This is why it is stated that the doctrine of the 
freedom of the seas “has been slowly modified in the last sixty-five years, 
and new theories about the use of the oceans by modern states are 
gradually being translated into law.”9
In particular, the rights of navigation have been influenced by the 
extension of control powers of coastal States over the seas. Free navigation 
is one of the essential outcomes of the freedom of the high seas and even 
its continuity through territorial waters of coastal States is traditionally 
guaranteed by the customary rule of the innocent passage (passage 
inoffensif). It is true that the nature of passage through waters under 
control of coastal States and the range of powers of these States have 
developed during the past decades. However, what is more important is 
that the continuation of navigation was never seriously hindered in peace 
time, particularly with respect to commercial ships. This is mainly because 
of interdependence of countries in the use of the seas and oceans for trade 
and economic objectives.
It is worthy of attention that some claims, which led to the 
extensions of the ocean areas under the control of littoral States, were 
recognised by the ICJ (as it is clear in the 1951 Fisheries case), State 
practice, and international conferences on the law of the sea. This chapter 
intends to demonstrate how the development of State practice and claims 
have impacted on the right of navigation. It is clear that the method chosen 
for drawing baselines would affect the area covered by national waters and 
would lead to the movement of territorial seas towards the high seas.10 
The chapter focuses on the examination of baseline issues with respect to 
normal and irregular coasts. It discusses the issues related to the 
employment of the normal and straight baselines.
9Mangone, Gerard, Law for the World Ocean. Stevens & Sons, London, 1981, p.17.
10A s Teclaff writes the high seas are shrunk “not only by increasing the width o f the territorial sea, but 
also by pushing seaward the baseline from which the extent o f territorial sea is measured.” Teclaff, 
Ludwik A., ‘Shrinking the High Seas by Technical Methods - From the 1930 Hague Conference to the 
1958 Geneva Conference’, University o f Detroit Law Journal. V o l.3 9 ,1962, p.660.
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II. Baselines of the Territorial Sea and Other Maritime Zones: 
General Examination and Functions of Baselines
The issue of the baseline has been one of the fundamental aspects of 
the law of the sea.11 This is because, for the purpose of delimitation of 
coastal States maritime zones, there has been a need to clarify where each 
zone begins and where it ends. Baseline systems were, in fact, introduced 
as starting lines for the measurement of the maritime zones.12 Baselines 
are composed of a series of joined base points along the shores or on lands 
of littoral States.13 Baselines have a multi-functional character. This is 
because baselines are applied for a variety of reasons.
The introduction of baselines was mainly to produce three practical 
consequences: (a) to constitute the boundary line between inland waters14
1 P arson , David L., ‘Naval Weaponry and the Law o f the Sea’, Ocean Development and International 
Lam  Vol.18, N o .2 ,1987, p.132.
12It is now recognised that for non-archipelagic States a baseline system may include: a low-water line 
for normal coasts, straight lines for deeply indented coasts or those fringed with islands in their 
immediate vicinity, and closing lines across the mouths o f bays, rivers and harbours. Archipelagic 
States are now allowed to draw archipelagic straight lines in accordance with requirements 
incorporated into the LOSC (which will be discussed in chapter 5).
13There has been an uncertainty over the definition of “shore” (or its equivalent, the term “coast”), that is 
what the shore is and where is the precise location o f the shore. N o definition o f the term 
“shore/coast” is provided in the conventions on the law of the sea. In the Soult v. L ’Africaine Case (22 
Fed. Cases, 1789-1800, Case No. 13179), the court held that the use o f the term “coasts” in the 1794 
Neutrality Act o f the United States is not defined but it interpreted the term as “to mean land as far as 
low-water.” However, in the Alaska Boundary Case (U.N. Rep., Vol.XV, 481, at 496, 498), Lord 
Alverstone stated that there has been no recognised definition for the term “coast” in international law. 
O’Connell, D. P., The International Law of the Sea. V ol.l, Edited by: I. A. Shearer, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1982, p.170 (also nos. 1&2). According to Shalowitz, the term “coast” implies two 
interrelated meanings: “A zone o f land of indefinite width (perhaps 1 to 3 miles) bordering the sea”; 
and “the land that extends inland from the shore.” Shalowitz, Aaron L., Shore and Sea Boundaries. 
V o l.l, United States Government Printing Office, Washington D. C., 1962, p.283. It is stated that 
“coast” is “a general term for the zone o f contact between the land and sea”. Prescott, J. R. V., The 
Maritime Political Boundaries o f the World. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1985, p.361. This 
definition is similar to definition o f the term “coastline or shoreline” provided by Shalowitz as to mean 
“[t]he line o f contact between land and sea”. Shalowitz, op. cit., p.283. This is why the term coastline 
“may be used as a Synonym for COAST’. Prescott, op. cit., p.362. The coast or the sea-shore is also 
defined as “[t[he narrow strip o f land in immediate contact with any body o f water, including the area 
between high and low-water lines.” (Italics supplied) The Law of the Sea - Baselines: An Examination 
o f the Relevant Provisions o f the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Office for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law o f the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1989, p.50. (Hereinafter The Law of the 
Sea - Baselines) The Submerged Lands Act o f the United States o f America defines the term “coast 
line” as “the line o f ordinary low water along the portion o f the coast which is in direct contact with 
the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit o f inland waters”. Submerged Lands Act, Section 
1301 (Definitions), in Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial S ea  ST/LEG/SER.B/6 
(December 1956), United Nations Publication, New York, 1957, pp.54-56, at 55. It seems the 
discussion has been more o f theoretical aspects and in practice there has been no practical difficulty in 
the determination o f the shoreline.
14The waters landward o f the baselines are also called national or internal waters over which costal States 
have full authority including the right to regulate transit o f foreign ships to ports o f these States. This 
transit is subject to national laws and regulations unless there are bilateral or multilateral agreements
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(such as bays, inlets, estuaries) and territorial sea; (b) to present points or 
lines from which the territorial sea and other maritime zones are measured; 
and (c) to form the basis for the median lines in the case of opposite coastal 
States with overlapping maritime zones and for the equidistance lines in the 
case of adjacent coastal States.15 According to the first function, baselines 
constitute the outer limit of inland waters on one hand and the inner limit 
of the territorial sea and other maritime zones on the other.16
The method of drawing baselines is important17 because they may be 
drawn in such a manner as to be far away from the coast resulting in two 
consequences: “first, expansion of the area of inland waters lying between 
the coast and the baseline(s) [over which coastal States have exclusive 
jurisdiction without any inclusive right for foreign ships, including 
navigation]; second, placing the outer limit of the territorial sea, which is 
measured from the baseline, at great distances from the coast [thus 
reducing the areas of the high seas where the freedom of the seas, including 
the free navigation, are exercised].”18 This indicates how important the
among States. These agreements are usually in the framework o f  Agreement on Friendship, 
Navigation, and Commerce. As Churchill clarifies, the boundary line between internal waters and the 
territorial sea “does not mark the outer limit o f a State’s territory, it does represent the demarcation 
between the maritime area (internal waters) where other States enjoy no general rights, and those 
maritime areas (the territorial sea and other zones) where other States do enjoy certain general rights.” 
Churchill, Robin Rolf, and Alan Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea. Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1983, p.25.
15It is also possible that baselines may have effect on the right of hot pursuit. As regards the effect of 
closing line o f the bays on the extension of jurisdiction of coastal States, the case o f  the U.S. v. 
Carrillo (1935) is worthy o f mention. In this case, a Federal district court held that the ship was not on 
the high seas “because it was situated within a line joining the headlands o f the Bay o f San Pedro in 
California.” McDougal, Myres S., and William T. Burke, The Public Order o f the Oceans: A 
Contemporary International Law of the Sea. Second Printing, Yale University Press, N ew  Haven, 
1965, p.321 (andno.2).
16According to the LOSC, the territorial sea extent is limited to 12 nautical miles (Article 3), the 
contiguous zone to 24 nautical miles (Article 33), the exclusive economic zone to 200 nautical miles 
(Article 57), and the continental shelf to 200 nautical miles and in some locations to 350 nautical miles 
or to 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath (Article 76(1, 5)). All o f  these limits are 
measured from the baselines.
17Shalowitz points out that “[t]he fixing o f a baseline is fundamental in determining how far seaward a 
coastal nation may exercise a given form of jurisdiction”. Shalowitz, op. cit., p.28.
18Leech, Noyes E. et al, The International Legal vSvstem: Cases and Materials. University Casebook 
Series, Foundation Press, January 1976. p.153. Smith refers to two major elements to be taken into 
account in determining a baseline system: “the essential interests o f the shore state” and “prevention of 
unreasonable encroachment upon the high seas”. Smith, op. cit., p.6. The uncertainty on the definition 
o f baselines had been a source o f many incidents at sea. Ibid. Although with the development o f the 
law o f  the sea since 1948 the baseline systems have been defined, the uncertainties now lie on the 
proper application o f these defined systems of baselines. In fact, the use of improper baseline systems 
may result in conflicts among States, particularly because o f their influence on the right o f navigation 
and other freedoms o f the seas. This was the case in the 1981 and 1986 incidents between Libya and 
the USA regarding the Gulf o f  Sirte. The incidents arose as a consequence o f enclosure o f the gulf 
mouth by Libya on the historic grounds, thus forbidding foreign vessels to enter the gulf. The USA  
rejected the claim in accordance with its interest to guarantee the right o f navigation for its vessels.
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proper application of baselines is. Without doubt the improper delimitation 
of inner limit of the territorial sea would impact on navigation through the 
seas. Such an impact was emphasised by the UK in the Fisheries Case 
where its representative held that:
Any departure of the base-line from the coast involves an 
encroachment to in la n d  waters upon the sea, which constitutes an 
even more serious derogation from the freedom of the seas than the 
extension of territorial waters. For the customary right of innocent 
passage has no application to inland waters.19 (Italics supplied in the 
original text)
The issues of baselines were first internationally dealt with in the 
1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law, as part 
of efforts made for codification of rules on various aspects related to 
territorial sea (territorial waters), in which certain principles on the 
application of baselines were prepared.20 However, no international rules 
on baselines were put into effect, since the conference failed to reach 
agreement on the conclusion of a convention on territorial sea. This failure 
was mainly because of the lack of consensus on the breadth of the 
territorial sea.21
However, the ILC, in the preparation of draft conventions on the law 
of the sea for the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(Geneva, 1958 - UNCLOS I)22, used, inter alia, drafts prepared by the 
1930 Hague Conference. In fact, the ILC’s work on baselines was mainly 
based on the work of the 1930 Hague Conference on baselines as well as 
the judgement of the ICJ on the 1951 Fisheries Case.
The case resulted in military conflicts and it was an indication that the USA would use military force 
as an alternative for protection o f its rights over the seas.
19Memorial o f the United Kingdom (27 January 1950), in Pleadings. Oral Arguments, and Documents. 
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway). ICJ. V ol.1 , 1951 pp.58-59. (Hereinafter Pleadings, ICJ 
0 9 5 1 »
20Among draft articles prepared by the Committee on Territorial waters o f the 1930 Hague Conference, 
six articles were dedicated to the issues o f baselines, including the low-water line, low-tide elevations, 
bays, harbour works, islands, and river mouth. For draft articles on baselines see Rosenne, Shabtai 
(ed.), League o f Nations Conference for the Codification o f International Law IT9301. Vol.3, Oceana 
Publications, INC., Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1975, pp.833-836.
21 As Anand writes the 1930 Hague Conference failed “mainly because the big maritime powers, 
especially Great Britain, insisted on a narrow 3-mile territorial sea, and the smaller coastal states were 
deeply concerned about protecting their fisheries and other interests in wider zones.” Anand, R. P., 
‘Changing Concepts o f Freedom o f the Seas: A Historical Perspective’, in Jon M. Van Dyke, Durwood 
Zaeleke and Grant Hewison (eds.), Freedom for the Seas in the 21th Century: Ocean Governance and 
Environmental Harmony. Island Press, Washington D. C., 1993, p.77. Also see Jesse S. Reeves, ‘The 
Codification o f the Law o f Territorial Waters’, ATIL. V o l.2 4 ,1930, p.493.
22See International Law Commission Report, IINGAOR. 11th Session, Supplement No. 9, Doc. No. 
A /3 1 5 9 ,1956.
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The development of principles on the baselines has contributed to 
the enclosure of more parts of the seas coming within the exclusive 
authority of littoral States.23 This is mostly because of a broad 
interpretation of these principles made by maritime nations to enclose 
offshore waters as much as possible. The unilateral actions of States in 
establishing baseline systems around their coasts have, in turn, increased 
national encroachment upon the high seas. In particular, the incorporation 
of newly-established principles of baselines in the TSC (following the 
judgement of the ICJ in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case) paved 
the way for coastal States to review their position on the system of the 
baselines applied to their shores. The result was to spread the national 
jurisdiction over the oceans, thus subjecting navigation in wide areas to 
such a jurisdiction.24 This tendency was followed in the last few decades. 
This is why it is stated that “most coastal States have drawn their baselines 
in the most advantageous manner possible using whatever method is most 
suitable to their coastline and national interests.”25 This has raised the 
issue of legitimacy of existing baselines which have been employed in a 
manner contrary to the concept of proper application of baselines.
As will be shown, the problem arises mostly in relation to improper 
application of straight baselines around shores where the normal baselines 
(low-water marks) are to be used. The major cause of the problem lies in 
the presumption that it is a coastal State that has the discretion in the 
establishment of a baseline system as it deems suitable for its shorelines. 
In practice, this discretion has particularly led to a unilateral approach of 
coastal States in employment of straight baselines to meet their national 
interests. Consequently, parts of the territorial seas have been converted 
into internal waters and parts of high seas became territorial seas. The
23McDougal and Bourke point out that “the most significant effect o f seaward extension o f the baseline 
... is to increase the total area o f water over which the coastal state possesses the most comprehensive 
authority and to decrease the total area within which coastal and non coastal states share authority and 
use.” McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.316.
24It is also argued that claiming waters as internal gives a great power o f control over the marine 
resources. Knight asserts that “[b]y claiming an area as internal waters, the coastal state obviates the 
need for arguing the niceties o f the juridical content o f the territorial sea, fisheries zones, and areas of 
continental shelf. It has absolute jurisdiction over resources in internal waters or the seabed below  
them.” Knight, Gary and Hungdah Chiu, The International Law of the Sea: Cases. Materials, and 
Readings. Elsevier Applied Science, London, 1991, p.53.
25Larson, op. cit., p.134. Larson asserts that there is an interrelation between the movement o f baselines 
towards the seas with the increase in possibility o f arising conflict. Ibid., p.133. For example, this 
possible conflict would occur in the case o f deprivation o f foreign ships in exercising the right o f 
peaceful navigation through the waters affected by baselines drawn inconsistent with the law o f the sea 
rules.
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most important effect of such a change (in the status of waters) is on 
navigation and overflight.26
III. The Normal Baseline: The Low-Water Mark
This part of the chapter relates to the historical development of the 
normal baseline and its application to ordinary coasts. Such a normal 
baseline is often referred to as the low-water mark.
As a general rule (established by practice of States), it is the 
configuration of the coast in regular coastlines that would determine the 
directions of the baselines.27 In regular coastlines, that is the coastlines 
which are relatively straight without fringing islands or other coastal 
features, the baseline is a low-water mark (low-water line).28 This 
baseline29 30, known as “normal baseline”, follows the sinuosities of the coast 
and in fact is a reflection of the coast configuration and is, therefore, 
parallel to it. This method of drawing baseline is also mentioned as the 
trace paralleled Although the low-water mark was not the only method 
for drawing baselines along the coast31, it became the dominant method for 
the normal baselines.
The reference to the rule of “low-water mark” was made as early as 
the first half of the nineteenth century. The first reference to this method
26A s McDougal and Burke assert “[t]he effects o f baseline claims on consequential inclusive uses (such 
as navigation and overflight) may thus be seen to range from complete prohibition to a substantial 
increment in exclusive authority to control and to regulate certain activities (in the seas).” McDougal 
and Burke, op. cit., p.318.
27As Shalowitz writes ”[w]here the coastline is relatively straight, or where slight curvatures exist, there 
is general agreement that the baseline follows the sinuosities of the coast as defined by a tidal plane. 
This is known as the “rule o f the tidemark”. Shalowitz, op. cit., p.28.
28There is no provision in the conventions on the law of the sea defining the term “low-water line” and it 
is not clear what the level o f low-water should be. However, an internationally agreed concept of 
“chart datum” may be used as a standard. This concept is applied to refer to the level for the low-water 
line on a maritime chart. The chart datum is “a plane so low that the tide will not frequently fall below  
it.” Resolution A2.5.. ‘Repertory of Technical Resolutions’, International Hydrographic Organisation.
290 ’Connell calls this baseline as “standard baseline”. O’Connell, op. cit., p.171. This baseline was not 
used by Romans. Instead, they applied the high-water mark on the shore. Ibid. Churchill comments 
that “the variety o f geographical circumstances for which special provisions are laid down makes it 
doubtful whether in particularthe low-water line is the normal baseline for most States.” (emphasis 
added) Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.27.
30As is opposed to the method of the courbe tangante or “envelopes of arcs o f circles,” following the line 
o f the coast. Colombos, C. John, The International Law of the Sea. Sixth Revised Edition, Longmans, 
London, 1967, p.113 (no. 2). It is, however, more accurate to consider these methods as determining 
the outer limit o f the territorial sea (and other maritime zones).
31Other criteria included the high-water mark, the tide at the time o f the case, the point at which the sea is 
navigable, the discretion o f coastal States in determining the standard, and the outermost point at 
which canons could be placed on the shore. O’Connell, op. cit., p.172.
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can be found in the 1825 Treaty between Russia and Great Britain on 
A laska.32 Later on the low-water line was inserted in the Fishery 
Convention (1839) between Great Britain and France.33 It was followed by 
its incorporation into the North Sea Fisheries Convention (1882).34 The 
method was finally adopted by European countries as a “practical 
standard”.35
In the 1930 Hague Conference, the issue of the baselines was widely 
discussed.36 The Second Committee of the Conference (Territorial 
Waters)37 established two sub-committees. The first sub-committee (.Legal 
Sub-Committee) was set up to examine the issues of the breadth of 
territorial waters and the concept of the contiguous zone. Its second sub­
committee (Technical Sub-Committee) was asked to work on the issues of 
the baseline of the territorial sea and rights of coastal and user States within 
territorial waters. As regards the baselines, the main question facing the 
second sub-committee was whether the low-water mark had to constitute 
the basis for drawing the baselines, or the baseline had to be drawn in a 
manner to link certain points on lands or coastal features, or in any other 
manner.38 A remarkable majority of States (eighteen States) responding to 
the Preparatory Committee of the 1930 Conference were in favour of the 
low-water line along the coast.39 Norway, Sweden, and Poland had a 
different view proclaiming the validity of straight lines connecting points 
on headlands.40 The United States suggested a compromise formula for
32Teclaff, op. cit., p.661. According to Teclaff, there were three suggestions on where the line following 
sinuosities had to begin. They included the high tide line, the low tide line, and the line at which the 
sea becomes navigable. Ibid.
330 ’Connell, op. cit., p.172.
34Teclaff, op. cit., p.661. The 1882 Fisheries Convention was concluded among Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, and The Netherlands.
350 ’Connell, op. cit., p.172. The support given to the standard of the low-water mark in the common law 
was later confirmed by the civil law. It was in 1894 that the Institut de Droit International adopted 
the low-water mark as basis for the normal baseline. Ibid.
36As Boggs (Geographer, the United States State Department) mentions o f the 28 “bases o f discussion” 
prepared by the Preparatory Committee o f the 1930 Conference “one-half related to the delimitation of 
territorial waters (including baselines), while the other half related to legal rights and obligations.” 
Boggs, S. Whittemore, ‘Delimitation o f the Territorial Sea’, AJIL. V o l.2 4 ,1930, p.541.
37The First and Third Committees o f the 1930 Conference respectively dealt with the issues o f  
“Nationality” and “Responsibility o f State for damage done in their territory to the Persons or Property 
o f Foreigners”.
38Bases o f Discussion II (Territorial Waters), Point IV, in Rosenne op. cit., V o l.2 ,, p.253.
39Ibid., pp.253-256. The response o f Germany reflected the existing divergences in State practice in the 
application o f the low-level tide. Germany stated that States have uses such methods as the line of 
mean low-water spring tides, the spring-tide low water during the equinoxes, mean water, and mean 
sea level. The Germany’s view indicates that the differences in practice o f States in fixing low-water 
mark existed even before the 1930 Hague Conference. Ibid., p.253.
40Ibid. (Bases o f Discussion), pp.255-256.
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delimitation of the territorial sea that also might be used for the 
determination of baselines. The US proposal was to draw arcs of circles 
from all points, while the radii of these circles would be equal to the 
breadth of the territorial sea.41
In its draft for the Conference, the Preparatory Committee had stated 
that, except in regard to bays and islands, a low-water mark line following 
all the sinuosities of the coast would constitute the basis for drawing 
baselines.42 Similarly, the Technical Sub-Committee of the Second 
Committee of Conference finally viewed that “subject to the provisions 
regarding bays and islands, the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
from the line of low-water mark along the entire coast.”43 Accordingly, 
islands and bays were excepted from mandatory rule of the law-water 
mark. This meant that islands and bays had to be treated differently, as far 
as the issue of baselines was concerned. The Sub-Committee accepted that 
States have used different criteria for demonstrating the low-water marks 
on their maritime charts, but it suggested the line of mean low-water 
springs as the basis.44 It proposed that other lines should not appreciably 
depart from this line.45
Despite detailed discussion on the delimitation aspects of the 
territorial sea, the 1930 Conference was unable to codify a convention on 
the territorial sea due to divergent views expressed by participants States. 
To achieve a convention on the territorial sea, it was necessary to reach 
agreement on all three aspects of delimitation of the territorial sea: its 
baseline, its breadth, and the method of drawing the seaward boundary 
line.46 However, delimitation of the inner limit of the territorial sea was 
not dependent on the determination of the breadth of the territorial sea.
41 Acts o f the Conference (Minutes o f the Second Committee), in Rosenne, op. cit., Vol.4, p.195.
42Basis o f Discussion No.6, in Rosenne, Vol.2., op. cit., p.257. In the view of Boggs (the Special 
Adviser on Geography to the United States State Department), the method o f envelope o f arcs is a 
combination o f straight line and the line following all the sinuosities o f the coast. Teclaff, op. cit, 
p.662 The application o f the envelope of arcs enable sailors to find their position to the coast. This is 
particularly o f importance for sailors to find whether they are in the territorial sea because the legal 
regime o f territorial sea is different from that of the high seas. Ibid.
43Report o f  Sub-Committee No.II, Acts o f the Conference (Plenary Meetings), in Rosenne, op. cit.,
Vol.3, pp.131-134, at 131. . r u. .
44As McDougal and Burke write “[t]his provision was intended to prevent adoption o f a line which 
unreasonably extended the outer limit of the territorial sea. McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.323. In 
the observation, the Sub-Committee indicated that the requirement of non-departure from low-water 
spring tide was considered “[i]n order to guard against abuse”. Report o f Sub-Committee No.II, in 
Rosenne, Vol.3, op. cit., p.833.
45Ibid.
46Boggs, op. cit., pp.541-542.
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In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the International Court of 
Justice recognised the low-water mark as “a general practice of States” and 
emphasised its impact in making a close relation of territorial waters and 
mainlands. The Court held that it had
no difficulty in finding that, for the purpose of measuring the breadth 
of the territorial sea, i t  is the lo w  w a te r  m ark  a s  o p p o s e d  to  the h igh  
w a te r  m ark, o r  the m ean b e tw een  tw o  tides, w hich  h a s g e n e ra lly  been  
a d o p te d  in the p ra c tic e  o f  S ta tes. This criterion is the m o st fa v o u ra b le  
to  th e  c o a s ta l S ta ts  and clearly shows the c h a ra c te r  o f  te r r i to r ia l
w a te rs  a s  appu rten an t to the lan d  te rr ito ry ,47 (emphasis added)
The Court indicated that the application of the low-water mark is 
“the most favourable to the costal State”, in comparison to other criteria, 
such as the high-water mark.48 This is because the use of low-water mark 
results in extension of the maritime domain of coastal States over the seas49 
more than what other standards such as the high-water mark (the shore 
line) can produce.50 In some cases, “there might be a very marked 
difference between a low-water line and the high-tide fine.”51 For example, 
one writer refers to a case where the difference between low-water line and 
high water line is five miles.52 The different effects of the application of 
low-water mark and the high-water mark on the shore is well indicated in 
Figure 2.1.53
47Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), ICJ Reports. 1951, pp.116-144, at 128. [Hereinafter ICJ 
Reports, 1951.]
48There are a range of tidal levels which are used for hydrographical purposes. According to Admiralty 
Tide Tables (Vol.III, p.xxiv.), these tidal levels are: (a) lowest astronomical tide and highest 
astronomical tide; (b) mean low-water springs and mean high-water springs; (c) mean high-water 
neaps and mean low-water neaps; (d) mean-sea level; (e) mean higher high-water (f) mean lower high- 
water; (g) mean lower-low water; and (h) mean higher low-water, as an application o f low-water 
mark. For definition o f these tidal levels, see O’Connell, op. cit., pp.173-174.
49Prescott states that “[t]he advantage o f selecting a low-water mark is that the coastal State secures the 
widest possible area of sea”. Prescott, op. cit., 1985, p.46.
50According to Shalowitz, “[s]ome early writers supported the high-water mark as the baseline for 
measuring the territorial sea. The basis for this probably was that the line of high-water mark was the 
dividing line between land and water on the nautical charts and using it as baseline represented the 
least encroachment on the freedom of the sea doctrine.” Shalowitz, op. cit., p.28 (no. 18).  ̂ There also 
exists a question as what the baseline would be where there is no tide. It is suggested that “the baseline 
is located at the average water line found on the coast in question.” McDougal and Burke, op. cit., 
pp.326-327.
5lIbid., p.321.
52Boggs, S. W., ‘Delimitation o f Seaward Areas under National Jurisdiction’, AJIL. V o l.4 5 ,1951, p.24.
53The effect o f  the use o f low-water mark in pushing maritime areas under national jurisdiction is 
particularly considerable “on coasts where there is an extensive tidal range.” Churchill and Lowe, op. 
cit., p.26.
Figure 2.1
Different Impacts of Low-Tide and High-Tide on the 
Inner Limit of the Territorial Sea
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Source: Shalowitz, Aaron L., Shore and Sea Boundaries. V ol.l, 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington D. C., 1962, 
p.90.
The application of various low-water datums54 can also have 
different results. It is stated “some low-water lines might be located 
considerably further seaward than other possible low-water lines”55. In the 
case of the U.S. v. California (1947), it was mentioned that in many coastal 
areas there was a “substantial distance” between lower low water and 
higher low water.56 It seems that it is left to the discretion of coastal States 
to choose a particular low-water line or high-water line for their coasts.57
Following the Court’s judgement, the ILC opined that “according to 
international law in force, the extent of the territorial sea is measured either 
from the low-water line along the coast, or, ... from straight baselines 
independent of the low-water mark.”58 Although the low-water mark was 
recognised as the foundation for establishing baselines for regular coasts, 
there still exists the issue of multi-application of low tides. Due to the 
existence of different tidal levels around coastlines with different
54For standard low-water levels see The Law of the Sea - Baselines, op. cit., Annex I, p.42.
55McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.321.
56See ibid., p.321 (no.40). . . .
57Ibid., p.327. McDougal states that it is unlikely to find a coastal State choosing the high-tide line 
“since the low-water line permits the inclusion o f broader areas within the boundaries o f the state”.
Ibid.
58YTT.C. Vol.II, 1956, pp.266-267.
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geographical characteristics, there is no single level to be used for the low- 
water mark as a uniform standard.59 This fact was endorsed by the ILC 
holding that “[t]he traditional expression ‘low-water mark’ may have 
different meanings; there is no uniform standard by which States in 
practice determine this line.”60 Accordingly, no specific level for 
application to the low-water marks is imposed by international conventions 
upon coastal States.61 This is why “the low-water line used by one country 
will not necessarily be the same as that chosen by others.”62 Depending on 
which level is used by a coastal States for the low-water mark, there would 
be different results. Although the application of different levels of the low- 
water mark does not have a significant effect on the extension of maritime 
zones, this effect would be significant in relation to some coastlines where 
the case of overlapping claims arise.63
Following a series of events (the discussions in the 1930 Hague 
Conference, the ICJ’s view in the Fisheries Case, and draft prepared by the 
ILC) Article 3 of the TSC finally provided that “[ejxcept where otherwise 
provided (in this Convention) ... the normal baseline for measuring the 
breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast marked on 
large scale charts officially recognised by the coastal State.”64 Article 5 of 
the LOSC contains the same provision. The provision does not clarify a 
case where there is no chart indicating the low-water mark.65 One question
59In the coastal areas o f some countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, where there exists “little or no 
tidal range”, the “meteorological tide” is employed for the level o f low-water line on the nautical 
charts. Maritime Limits and Baselines: A guide to their delineation. Special Publication No.2, Third 
Edition, The Hydrographic Society, Essex, June 1987, p.7 (footnote 11). (Hereinafter Maritime Limits 
and Baselines)
6QYTLC. Vol.II, 1956, p.267.
61 Smith (1948) asserts that with respect to regular coastlines “there is a general agreement that the 
territorial belt must be measured from the low water mark of spring tides. (emphasis added) Smith, op. 
cit., p.5. In British view, this baseline is the line o f mean low-water spring tides. Colombos, op. cit., 
p.113. Brown holds that “international law leaves the choice to the discretion o f the coastal State“. 
Brown, E. D., The International Law of the Sea. Vol.l: Introductory Manual, Dartmouth, Aldershot,
1994, p.23.
62Maritime Limits and Baselines, op. cit., p.7, Para.5.6.
63Ibid., Para.5.7.
64It is useful to define the term chart referred to in the provision, particularly for practical purposes. The 
chart is defined as “a nautical chart intended for use by mariners as an aid to navigation. Only nautical 
charts show all the relevant features such as low-waters lines, low-tide elevations, drying reefs, etc.” 
The Law o f the Sea - Baselines, op. cit., p .l. The existing contractual provisions do not provide what 
would be the normal baseline for an ice-covered coast. In such a coast the low-water line is not 
determinable because it is covered by ice. In this case, it is recommended to use “the ice-foot of 
glacier or ice-cap” as a substitution for the low-water mark. In places where the ice-foot is changing 
over the time, “a mean position” would be applicable. Ibid., pp.3-4.
65In the Li Chia Hsing v. Rankin Case (1978), the applicant argued that there was no large-scale chart 
officially declared by Australia to show the line of low-water mark, including its coastline in the Gulf 
o f Carpentaria. The applicant was arrested on the basis that he was involved in fishing in the
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which arises from this provision is what scale can be regarded as “large 
scale”. This seems to be a technical matter but has a practical effect, thus 
requiring clarification. As Shalowitz suggests this is a “relative term”. 
However, “a scale of 1:80,000 (approximately 1 nautical mile to the inch) 
would probably be the upper limit of such classification.”66 It is also 
suggested that in general the scale of the chart “should be within the range 
1:50,000 to 1:200,000.”67
In a number of cases, coastal States have shown their desires to use 
the lowest-low water mark for their shores thus extending their territorial 
sea towards the high seas.68 For example, the low-water is defined as 
“Lowest Astronomical Tide” in the Schedule introduced in 1983 in 
pursuance to section 7(2-b) of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 of 
Australia.69 Also the lowest-low water mark has been considered for 
delimitation agreements. For instance, Article 1 of the Agreement of 24 
October 1968 between Iran and Saudi Arabia relating to the Persian Gulf 
Islands and Delimitation of the Continental Shelf refers to the “lowest-low 
water mark” as the basis for application of median line.70
Australian fishing zone in contradiction with the Fisheries Act 1952. The High Court o f Australia was 
in the view that the existence o f territorial sea (and similarly fishing zone)is not dependent on the 
existence o f official large scale charts. It was held that in the absence o f such charts, the low-water 
line continues to be the baseline. However, it was adopted that in the case of using straight baselines 
the existence o f charts is necessary. Li Chia Hsing v. Rankin, High Court of Australia (1978) 141 CLR 
182. The High Court referred to the Case o f New South Wales v. The Commonwealth as an evidence 
of long-established existence o f the territorial sea.
66Shalowitz, op. cit., p.274, footnote 165. As far as Coast and Geodetic Survey is concerned, “scales up 
to and including 1:20,000 would be considered large scales, those between 1:20,000 and 1:80,000 
would be classed as intermediate scales, and scales smaller than 1:80,000 would fall into the category 
of small scales.” Ibid., Vol.2 (1964), p.105.
67The Law o f the Sea - Baselines, op. cit., p.2.
68It is also stated that “the desirability of maximising the area of the State’s maritime domain would 
suggest that Mean Low-Water Springs is to be preferred to Mean Low-Water Neaps because the 
former falls further than the latte f \  (emphasis added) Brown, 1994, op. cit., p.23.
69The Proclamation o f the Governor-General o f Australia on the Baseline o f the Territorial Sea (4 
February 1983), Schedule, No.S29, CAG. 9 February 1983, p.2. This proclamation established the 
baselines for all coastlines o f Australia (excluding its external territories for which the proclamation 
does not provide specific baselines). Prior to this proclamation, the 1974 Proclamation was in 
existence which only provided baselines for the southern coast o f New South Wales and the eastern 
coast o f  Tasmania. Proclamation No.89A and 89B (24 October 1974), CAG. 31 October 1974. The 
lowest-low water mark has also been incorporated into national legislation of some countries such as 
Venezuela (Act o f 1941 s.2), Sudan (Decree o f 1970). The mean low-water mark and mean low-water 
springs are among other categories o f the low-water mark used by countries. Example o f the former is 
New Zealand (Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act No. 11 o f 1965 s.9) and example o f the latter is 
Samoa (Territorial Sea Act No. 3 o f 1971 s.8). O’Connell, op. cit., p.178 (no.32).
70Agreement on Sovereignty over the Islands o f Farsi and Al-arabi and the Delimitation o f the 
Continental Shelves o f Iran and Saudi Arabia, 24 October 1968, ILM, Vol.8, p.493. Prescott writes 
that “[a] survey o f 60 declarations about baselines showed that 42 countries simply referred to the low- 
water mark without providing any further detail. Only Australia used the lowest astronomic tide, 
although seven countries in either the Middle East or West Africa referred to the lowest low-water 
mark or the lowest ebb tide”. It is also stated that “[o]nly Ethiopia defined its baseline a the maximum
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If all coastlines were simple, lacking complex configuration and 
coastal features, the low-water mark would be the only permissible 
baseline to be drawn around the shore. However, in reality some coastlines 
are cut into or indented, having coastal features such as islands and islets in 
their vicinity. These geographical conditions have been relied upon to 
introduce another method for drawing baselines - straight baseline system. 
This system, in practice, endows larger internal waters to coastal States 
with expansion of shore areas under the control of coastal States. Such an 
effect requires the legal examination of the system used for certain coasts 
on the basis of geographical circumstances.
IV. Baselines Applied for Indented Coasts or
Those with Fringing Islands: Straight Baselines
This part of the chapter discusses the issues related to the 
employment of straight baselines. In this connection particular attention 
will be made to the ICJ’s view in the 1951 Fisheries case, the UN 
documents on the law of the sea, and to the present State practice.
1. Definition and Historical Background
The straight baseline system is a method of applying straight lines 
joining the outermost points (base points) on indented coasts and/or 
fringing islands.71 The initial application of straight lines dates back to
annual high tide”. See Prescott, J. R. V., Political Frontiers and Boundaries. Allen and Unwin, London 
& Boston, 1987, pp.142-143.
71This method is assimilated to the headland method, that is drawing a straight line from one headland to 
another. The headline theory is, in fact, used in the context of legal bays. As Shalowitz states the 
straight line between the headlands o f a legal bay “is to be distinguished from straight baselines. 
“Such a line, where applicable, applies to a single coastal configuration and may be encountered along 
any coast Straight baselines, on the other hand, constitute a system that is permissible only where the 
unique geography of a coast justifies a departure from the rule o f the tide mark.” An practical 
difference between these two types o f baselines is that “in the case o f a bay the waters enclosed are 
allocated to the inland waters o f the coastal state, whereas in the case o f straight baselines the waters 
enclosed, while inland, are subject to the innocent passage of vessels”. Shalowitz, op. cit., pp.28 & 30 
(no. 33). See Article 5(2) o f TSC and Article 8(2) o f LOSC. In practice, there is a question as to 
which existing straight baseline systems are subject to the residual right o f innocent passage through 
enclosed waters. It is worth to refer to Prescott’s view concerning the main distinction between 
closing lines on one hand and straight and archipelagic baselines on the other. Prescott maintains that 
while closing lines are used for “single features” and are” generally short”, straight and archipelagic 
baselines are applied in the case o f “multiple features and may extend over long distances”. Prescott, 
J. R. V., ‘Straight and Archipelagic Baselines’, in Gerald Blake (ed.), Maritime Boundaries and Ocean 
pp.sonrces. Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1987, p.39.
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early 17th century when England applied these lines around its coast.72 
(See Map 2.1 below.) It was in 1604 when King James I issued a decree 
establishing straight lines among headlands along the English coast.73 
Twenty-seven headlands on the mainland or on adjacent islands were 
connected by twenty-six straight lines to enclose waters which were 
considered “neutral zones”, thus prohibiting belligerents from involving 
war actions.74
Map 2.1
The 1604 Straight Baseline System of England
Source: Brown, Joan e t a l , Case Studies in Oceanography and Marine 
Affairs. Published by Pergamon in association with The Open 
University, Oxford, 1991, p.46.
The straight lines around the English coast were employed to be the 
outer limit of neutral zones and were not to be the interior limit for 
territorial waters. However, the purpose for which the new system of
72Brown, Joan et al, Case Studies in Oceanography and Marine Affairs, Published by Pergamon in 
association with The Open University, Oxford, 1991, p.45.
73Teclaff, op. cit., p.661.
74Brown, Joan (1991), op. cit., p.45. The waters inside the headlands were considered “king’s domain” 
or “king’s chambers”. This proclamation was not accepted by the arbitral turbinal (1854) dealing with 
a dispute between the United States and Great Britain arisen in relation to the ship Washington. 
Teclaff, op. cit., p.661. In 1886, the American Secretary of State, Bayard, declared the opposition of 
the United States with the theory that “the seaward boundary is to be drawn from headland to 
headland”. However, in 1930 Kent commented that due to “the great extent o f the line of^the 
American coasts” the United States was entitled to “a liberal extension of maritime jurisdiction” to 
control waters o f the coasts “though included within lines stretching from quite distant headlands, as, 
for instance, from the Cape Ann to Cape Cod, and from Nantucket to Montauk Point, and from that 
point to the capes o f the Delaware, and from the south cape of Florida to the Mississippi.” Shalowitz, 
op. cit., p.29 (also no. 21).
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straight baselines was used in nineteenth century was to constitute the 
interior limit for territorial waters. In fact, a new application of straight 
baselines can be found in the Norwegian Decrees concerning the issue of 
baselines around the Norwegian coasts first of which was issued in 1812 
(the Danish-Norwegian Royal Decree).75 76 As part of this Decree, it was 
declared that the Danish-Norwegian sovereignty “shall be recognised as 
extending for one ordinary league (four nautical miles) m ea su red  fr o m  the 
is la n d s a n d  islets fu rth e st fr o m  the m a in la n d  not c o v e r e d  b y  the s e a ”16 
(em p h a sis ad d ed )  Although there were a number of incidents between the 
UK and Norway stemming from the decrees, the Norwegian system of 
baselines was mainly challenged by the United Kingdom when Norway 
issued the Decree of 1935 (as modified by the Decree of 10 December 
1937) applying straight baselines linking coastal islands and islets with 
points on the Norwegian mainland. (See Map 2.2: North Coast of 
Norway.)
Map 2.2
Norway’s Straight Baseline System (North Coast of Norway)
Source: Maritime Limits and Baselines: A guide to their delineation. 
Third Edition, The Hydrographic Society, Essex, 1987, p.57.
75The preamble o f the 1935 Norwegian Decrees refers to the decrees of the 22nd February, 1812 as well 
as o f the 16th October, 1869, the 5th January, 1881, and the 9th September, 1889 concerning the 
Norwegian baselines. The Norwegian system of baselines is a general application o f straight baseline 
connecting lands, island and rocks. However, in the earlier case of The Anna, it was only certain 
islands that formed the basis for discussion whether they can be relied upon for the measurement of the 
territorial sea. The Anna was an American ship seized by a British privateer at a point where was 
more than three miles o f the American mainland, but almost two miles from its adjacent island of 
Alluvian near the Mississippi. Lord Stowell held that the islands constituted “natural appendages of 
the coast”, irrespective of “the texture of the soil.”. He considered the islands as “a kind o f portio to 
the mainland” and accordingly concluded that the seizure occurred in the American waters where there 
is the right o f the protection of he territory. This led to the release of the Anna. Colombos, op. cit., 
pp.113-114.
76Evensen, Jens, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and Its Legal Consequences, AJIL. V o l.4 6 ,1952, 
p.609.
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The main purpose of the decree was to establish the new fisheries 
zone of Norway in northward of 66° 28'8" North latitude.77 The decree, 
inter alia, provided that “lines of delimitation towards the high seas of the 
Norwegian fisheries zone as regards that part of Norway which is situated 
northward of 66° 28' 8"  North latitude ... shall run parallel with straight 
base-lines drawn between fixed points on the mainland, on islands or rocks 
...”.78 The decree was a source of conflict between the UK and Norway 
over the right of fishing in the areas affected by the decree. However, as s 
a consequence of arrangements made for settling the dispute between the 
two countries, the decree was not fully enforced until the late 16 September 
1948 when Norway informed the UK of its decision to enforce the decree 
in full.79
Although the 1935 Decree did not contain any certain limit for the 
fisheries zone to be measured from the baselines, it was argued that the 
Norwegian Decrees of 1812, 1869, and 1889 already established the extent 
of such a zone to be four nautical miles.80 The 1935 Decree provided a 
straight baseline system to be enforced around the Norwegian coasts.81 
The reaction of the UK was due to the impact of the Norwegian decree on 
inclusion of maritime areas (in which English fishermen were involved in
77The preamble of the 1935 Decree contains bases for applying the system of baselines mentioned 
therein. These bases include “well-established national titles o f right”; “the geographical conditions 
prevailing on the Norwegian coasts”; and “the safeguard of the vital interests o f the inhabitants o f the 
northernmost parts o f the country”. English Translation o f the Norwegian Royal Decree o f 12 July 
1935, in Pleadings, ICJ (1951), op. cit., p.14. The 1935 Royal Decree o f Norway can also be found in 
the Unite Nations Legislative Series: Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, 
ST/LEG/SER.B/6, op. cit., pp.35-37.
78ICJ Reports, 1951, p.125.
79Following the 16th September 1948 some British fishing vessels were arrested in the Norwegian 
fishing zone measured from the straight baselines drawn in accordance with the 1935 Decree.
80See the Statement o f September (24th September, 1949) of the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office 
(UK) to the Registrar of the Court, Sir Eric Beckett, in Pleadings, ICJ (1951), op. cit., p.9. The Decree 
o f 1812 (which was then applicable to Norway and Denmark) reads, inter alia, that “[i]t is our wish to 
lay down a rule that whenever determining limits of our territorial sovereignty at sea, this sovereignty 
shall be recognised as extending for one ordinary nautical mile, measured from the island or islet 
farthest from the mainland and not covered by the sea.” (emphasis added) Translation made by the 
Registry o f the ICJ. Ibid.
81Many straight lines were employed and some were as large as 30 miles and the longest line amounted 
44 miles. Harris, D. J., Cases and Materials on International Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1991, 
p.355. The straight baselines were drawn among 48 fixed points on the mainland, islands or rocks 
prescribed in the Schedule annexed to the 1935 Norwegian Decree. This decree was slightly amended 
by the 1937 degree. The 1930 Decree concerned those parts o f Norwegian coasts “extended from 
Norwegian-Russian border on the south shore o f Varanger-Fjord northwards along the east coast of 
Finmark to the North Cape and thence southward along the west coast as far as Traena (66’ 28 .81 N.), 
a little to the south o f Vestfjord.” Colombos, op. cit., p.114. For the fixed points between which the 
Norwegian straight baselines were drawn in accordance with the Schedule appended to the Decree of 
12 July 1935, see Pleadings, ICJ (1951), op. cit., Annexes to British Memorial, Annex 17, pp.199-204.
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fishing) as Norwegian exclusive fisheries zone.82 This was contrary to the 
fishing interests of the UK because it would deprive its fishing vessels 
from the right to fish in the new Norwegian waters.
Although Norway (like other Scandinavian countries) was applying 
the four mile limit83 for its territorial sea, the United Kingdom (which 
claimed three mile limit as the maximum limit for the territorial sea) did 
not challenge this limit84, particularly as far as fisheries purposes are 
concerned. What concerned the UK was the method used by Norway for 
drawing baselines around its coasts. The UK argued that “the limits of the 
Norwegian fisheries zone prescribed in the 1935 Decree are incompatible 
with international law and refused to accept the 1935 line as applicable to 
British fishing vessels.”85 In view of the UK the baselines had to be drawn 
from the low-water mark around the coast or properly across the bays86, 
while the Norwegian system was to apply straight baseline connecting the 
outermost points on or off the Norwegian coast, including on islands or any 
other similar feature around the coast such as drying-rocks87. The UK 
contended that the decree would close “to British fishing vessels 
considerable areas of sea off the coast of Norway which under international 
law are high seas and, as such, open to the fisheries of all nations.”88 
Norway was in disagreement with the UK and rejected that the rule of low- 
tide mark and the maximum limit of ten nautical miles for delimitation of 
bays had become customary rules. In particular, Norway claimed that its
82Although the 1935 Norwegian Decree does not directly refer to the concept of territorial sea but refers 
to the fisheries zone, it is understandable that “the zone delimited by this Decree is none other than the 
sea area which Norway considers to be her territorial sea.” ICJ Reports, 1951, op. cit., p.125.
83This was known as the Scandinavian marine league which was different from the European-American 
marine league equalling three miles. The equivalent Norwegian word for the Scandinavian marine 
league is “mil”.
84See for example ICJ Reports, 1951, pp.120 and 128. Although the Court held that the question of the 
extent o f the Norwegian territorial sea (four nautical miles) was not the subject o f adjudication in the 
case, it confirmed that “the 4-mile limit claimed by Norway was acknowledged by the United 
Kingdom in the course o f the proceedings.” Ibid., p.126.
85Pleadings, ICJ (1951), op. cit., p.10. Although the first seizure of a British trawler by Norwegian 
patrol vessels occurred in 1911, as a consequence o f the 1935 Decree, the number o f seizures 
increased. See ICJ Reports, 1951, op. cit., pp. 124-125.
86In the case o f bays, the UK views that a proper closing line should be employed to link “the natural 
geographical entrance points where the indentation ceases to have the configuration o f a bay." 
(iemphasis added) ICJ Reports, 1951, p.120. In general, the position o f the UK appeared to be in line 
with the rules drafted at the 1930 Hague Conference which were then viewed by the UK as 
“declaratory o f existing international law”. Teclaff, op. cit., p.664.
87The Norwegian coast is very cut into and contains a range o f coastal features such as islets, reefs,
islands, drying rocks (known as skjaergaard) in its vicinity. See Map 2.2.
88Pleadings, ICJ (1951), op. cit., p.ll.
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exclusive fishing rights over the coastal areas were already recognised by 
the UK at the time of King Edward IV.89
Since the dispute between the UK and Norway was not resolved 
between them, the UK submitted the dispute to the ICJ on 28 September 
1948 for adjudication.90 The major question was whether the Norwegian 
baselines prescribed in the 1935 Decree for the application to the northern 
coast of Norway are consistent with the principles of international law 
regarding the baselines. This question relates in general to the question as 
to whether the baselines should follow the “actual configuration of the 
coast” or whether straight baselines should be drawn between points “on 
the mainland, on the adjacent islands or on rocks”. The court was also 
asked to “declare the principles of international law to be applied in 
defining the base-lines.”91
2. The ICJ Judgement on the 1951 F isheries C ase (UK v. Norway)
After full examination of merits in the Fisheries Case, the ICJ issued 
its judgement on 18 December 1951. The ICJ confirmed that it is the low- 
water mark which forms the basis for drawing baselines around the shore 
of coastal States. However, the question was whether the low-water mark 
on the shore of the mainland of Norway was the basis for drawing 
baselines or the basis would be the low-water mark on what is called 
“skjaergaard (rock rampart)” in the Norwegian language. This term refers 
to the whole coastal features of Norwegian coast, including islands, islets, 
rocks and reefs.92 The Court considered that the Norwegian mainland does 
not present “a clear dividing line between land and sea”.93 It then relied 
on the adjacency of the skjaergaard to the mainland and held that it is in 
fact the outer line of the skjaergaard which constitutes the baseline of the 
territorial sea.94 The Court disagreed with the UK’s view that straight
89Norway’s counter-memorial in the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Pleadings, ICJ 
(1951), para.32.
90The Court was competent to deal with the case because Norway and the United Kingdom had issued 
declarations in accordance with Article 36(2) of the Court Statute, thus accepting the jurisdiction o f the 
Court.
91/totf.,p.ll. . . .
92The number o f these physical and coastal features are estimated to be around 120,000. This indicates 
that the Norwegian coast is highly fringed with these features such as islands and islets. It is because 
o f these facts and the length o f the Norwegian coast (over 1,500 kms) that the Court described the 




baselines can only be drawn across well-defined bays. Instead, it stated that 
straight baselines can also be drawn between islands, islets and rocks if 
they are situated “between the island formations of the “skjaergaard”, inter 
fauces terrarum”.95
In the Court’s opinion, Norway and the UK were relying on the same 
method of drawing the baselines, namely the use of the low-mater mark, 
but they have applied the method in different ways.96 This means that the 
Court made no distinction between the low-water mark and straight lines as 
two separate systems of baselines.97 However, the Court viewed where 
coasts are deeply indented or cut into “the baseline becomes independent of 
the low-water mark, and can only be determined by means of a geometric 
construction”98, that is by drawing straight baselines between appropriate 
points. In fact, the Court held that “three methods have been contemplated 
to effect the application of the low-water mark rule”.99 These three 
methods are the trace parallele (that is to draw the baseline in a manner to 
follow the contours of the land), the courbe tangente 100 (that is to draw 
arcs of circles from points along the low-water line), and straight 
baselines.101
Accordingly, the Court concluded that:
the method employed for the delimitation of the fisheries zone by the 
Royal Norwegian Decree of July 12, 1953, is not contrary to 
international law .... (and) that the base-lines fixed by the said Decree 
in application of this method are not contrary to international law.102
95Ibid.y p.130.
96Ibid., p.128. The Court was in the view that the question was whether “the relevant low-water mark is 
that o f the mainland or of the “skjaergaard”. (emphasis added) Ibid.
97The TSC (and later the LOSC) deals with these systems o f baselines separately, recognising them as 
two independent system o f  baselines employed in different geographical conditions. In this 
connection, Churchill states “[wjhile the Court suggests that straight baselines are simply a special 
application o f  the low-water mark principle o f constructing the baseline, the Territorial Sea and Law of  
the Sea Conventions more realistically recognise straight baselines as a distinct method o f  
construction.” Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.28.
98ICJ Reports, 1951, op. cit., p.129.
" ib id ., p.128.
100The courbe tangente (envelopes o f arcs of circles) was first proposed by the United States delegation 
at the 1930 Conference. It is a method used for finding the outer limit o f the territorial sea, thus 
assisting seafarers to find their ships’ position at sea. This method is particularly used to determine 
whether a ship is in the territorial sea
101/ ^ . ,  pp.129-130.
102Ibid., p.143. By 10 to two, the Court recognised the validity o f the baseline system used by Norway, 
whereas the legitimacy o f all Norwegian baselines was confirmed by 8 to 4. Ibid. Judge Hasckworth 
agreed with the judgement on the ground that “the Norwegian Government had proved the existence 
o f an historic title to the disputed areas o f water.” (emphasis added) Ibid., p.144. Judge Alvarez also 
confirmed the judgement by arguing that the 1935 Decree “is not contrary to any express provisions
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The Court, in fact, maintained that the Norwegian baseline system 
was not “an exceptional system”, but it was “the application of general 
international law to a specific case”.103 The Court justified its opinion on 
the basis of “geographic realities” and “economic interests peculiar to a 
region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by long 
usage”.104 It further accepted that “certain economic interests peculiar to a 
region” can be taken into account for applying straight baselines if the 
reality and importance of these interests “are clearly evidenced by a long 
usage”.105
Although the Court accepted that the straight baselines can be used 
to enclose internal waters and to measure the extent of the territorial sea 
(and other maritime zones), it deemed necessary to take some requirements 
into account for the application of the straight baseline system. The 
essential requirements laid down by the Court on the validity of the straight 
baselines are as follows.
(a) "the drawing of baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent 
from the general direction of the coast".106
(b) "whether certain sea areas lying within these lines are sufficiently 
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal 
waters".107
o f international law. Nor is it contrary to the general principles o f international law, because the 
delimitation is reasonable, it does not infringe rights acquired by other States, it does no harm to 
general interests and does not constitute an abas de droit. Ibid., Individual Opinion o f Judge Alvarez, 
pp.145-153, at 153. Judge Hsu Mo approved that the Norwegian system o f baselines complies with 
the international law, but he did not accept that the whole straight baselines described in the Decree 
were in accordance with international law principles. See ib id ., Separate Opinion o f Judge Hsu Mo, 
pp.154-157, at 154.
lG3Ibid., p.131. The Norwegian Government argued that the straight baselines system introduced by the 
1935 Decree “does not infringe the general law; it is an adaptation rendered necessary by local 
conditions.” Ibid., p.133.
l04Ibid., pp.128 and 133.
l05Ibid, p.133.
106Ibid. Despite the existence o f such a criterion, there exist some technical questions to be responded. 
The main question, however, is what forms the “general direction of the coast”. As the ICJ pointed out 
that the line o f general direction o f the coast “is devoid o f any mathematical precision”. Ibid., p.142. 
As an attempt to use the Norwegian straight baseline system as a model, it is stated that this system 
did not deviate from the general direction o f the coast by more than 15°. Hodgson, R. D., and L. M. 
Alexander, Towards an Objective Analysis o f Special Circumstances. Occasional Paper No. 13, Law
o f the Sea Institute, Rhode Island, 1972, p.37.
107ICJ Reports, 1951, op. cit., p.133.
66
These requirements were established to prevent the enclosure of the 
seas by unjustified employment of straight baselines. This clearly shows 
that the Court was well aware of the impact of these baselines on the 
extension of jurisdictional zones of coastal States that restricts the long- 
established freedoms of the seas such as navigation and overflight. 
Although the Court set up some requirements to be met in applying the 
straight baselines, some States have proclaimed these baselines in a manner 
contrary to the requirements. States, in practice, made a very liberal 
interpretation of the Court’s decision.
Although the Court accepted that in certain circumstances straight 
baselines can be drawn along the coast, there was a question of the 
maximum length of a permissible straight baseline.108 Again, the Court 
rejected the view of the UK that straight baselines should be of certain 
length. While the UK was of the opinion that the length of straight 
baselines should not exceed ten miles, the Court was not convinced that 
there is any rule in international law to limit such a length. In its words, 
the Court asserted that:
In this connection [the maximum length of ten miles for the straight 
baseline], the practice of States does not justify the formulation of any 
general rule of law. The attempts that have been made to subject 
groups of islands or coastal archipelagos to conditions analogous to 
the limitations concerning bays (distance between the islands not 
exceeding twice the breadth of the territorial waters, or ten or twelve 
miles), have not got beyond the stage of proposals.109
As regards the question of the number of straight baselines, the 
Court held that several lines may be used and left such a determination 
with the coastal States. The Court opined that “the coastal State would 
seem to be in the best position to appraise the local conditions dictating the 
selection.”110 Accordingly, it seems that the Court has left considerable 
discretion to coastal States to apply straight baselines as they consider 
reasonable for their coasts.111
108 At the UNCLOS I, the Japanese delegate asserted that “unless a maximum permissible length for the 
straight baseline is fixed, there is always the possibility that a considerable area o f the sea might be 
placed within such lines, amounting to the costal States subjecting a part o f the high seas to their 
sovereignty. Therefore, it would be necessary to fix the maximum permissible length, in order to 
ensure the freedom o f the high seas.” See UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/39, p.156.
m Ibid., p.131.
n o Ibid.
^ F o r  legal Analysis o f  the 1951 Fisheries Case see, for example: Waldock, The Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case, BYIL. Vol.28, 1951, pp.114-171.; Evensen, Jens, The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
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3. Dissenting Opinions in the 1951 F ish eries  C ase
Although ten judges of the ICJ confirmed the validity of the method 
of straight baselines introduced by the 1935 Norwegian Decree under 
international law, two judges argued in contrary and submitted their 
dissenting views.
Judge McNair of the UK and Judge Read of Canada were two judges 
who disagreed that the Norwegian baseline system was in accordance with 
established principles of international law on baselines. These judges were 
of the view that the rule of international law for the baseline is that it 
should be drawn parallel to the contours of the coast. The main purpose of 
their arguments in favour of a baseline following sinuosities of the coast 
was to prevent the extension of States jurisdiction over the high seas where 
a more liberal legal regime than that of the territorial sea is applicable that 
guarantees the traditional freedoms of the high seas. Judge McNair, 
confirming the UK stance in the case, argued that:
There is an overwhelming consensus of opinion amongst maritime 
States to the effect that the base-line of territorial waters, whatever 
their extent may be, is a line which follows the coast-line along low- 
water mark and not a series of imaginary lines drawn by the coastal 
State for the purpose of giving effect, even within reasonable limits, 
to its economic and other social interests and to other subjective 
factors.112
Judge Read was of the view that “the power of a coastal State to 
delimit its maritime domain” is valid, provided such a power is not used to 
impair rights and privileges conferred by international law to other States 
or the international community. Accordingly, Judge Read dissented the 
judgement of the Court on the ground that “the power of a coastal State to 
mark out its maritime domain cannot be used so as to encroach on the high 
seas and impair these rights and privileges. Its power is limited to the 
marking out of areas already subject to its sovereignty.”113
Case and its legal consequences, AJTT. Vol.46, 1952, pp.609-630, and Smith, The Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case, Yearbook of World Affairs. 1953, pp.283-307.
112Dissenting Opinion o f Judge McNair, ICJ Reports, 1951, op. cit., pp.158-185, at 161.
113Ibid., Dissenting Opinion o f Judge Read, pp.186-206, at 190.
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4. Influence of Straight Baselines on Encroachment upon the Seas
As is clear from the dissenting opinions in the Fisheries Case, the 
main reason for the rejection of the straight line system has been its impact 
on advantages existing on the wider high seas available for the world 
community.114 This is particularly true with respect to those States having 
major interests in accessing vast areas of the seas specially for navigational 
and resource exploitation purposes.115 *
The effect of employment of straight baseline to the extension of 
jurisdictional zones of coastal States is pointed out by Judge Hsu Mo. The 
effect would be more significant if a straight line is improperly drawn. 
Judge Hsu Mo in his statement stressed that:
To leave out all the points on land which interpose between the two 
extreme points Nos. 11 and 12 (that is Savertholthavet and Lopphavet) 
and to  e n c lo se  the w h o le  c o n c a v ity  o f  the c o a s t  b y  d r a w in g  o n e  
e x c e ss iv e ly  lon g  line is  tan tam ou n t to  using the s tra ig h t lin e m e th o d  to  
e x te n d  s e a w a r d  th e  fo u r -m ile  b r e a d th  o f  the te r r i to r ia l  s e a . The  
a p p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  m e th o d  in th is  m a n n er  c a n n o t b e  c o n s id e r e d  
r e a s o n a b le } 16 (I ta lics  su p p lie d )
Accordingly, even where certain circumstances such as exceptional 
geographical configuration justify deviation from the general rule of 
drawing baseline at low-tide, the employment of a straight line between 
“two extreme points” may invalidate the application of such a baseline.
Judge McNair in his dissenting opinion pointed out that the 
acceptance of straight baseline system may have a major influence in 
enclosing the seas, thus depriving wide maritime areas from application of 
freedoms of the seas among which is unrestricted right of navigation. In 
his words, Judge McNair expressed that:
The delimitation of territorial waters made by the Norwegian Decree 
of 1935 is in conflict with international law and its  e ffe c t w il l  b e  to
114As Prescott argues there are three reasons for the use o f straight baselines: “to simplify the 
administration o f regulations governing offshore areas”; “to increase the area of the seas claimed; and 
“to secure an advantage over a neighbouring state in the negotiation o f a common international 
maritime boundary”. Prescott, op. cit., 1985, p.50.
115Even in 1930 Boggs pointed out that in the delimitation of territorial sea (including its baselines) two 
interests were mainly involved: navigation and fishing. Boggs, op. cit., 1930, p.542. As far as 
navigation was concerned, Boggs was in the view that difficulties in delimiting the territorial sea
arose mainly because “the problem has generally been considered from the viewpoint o f a man on the 
land rather than the viewpoint o f the navigator.” Ibid., p.543.
116ICJ Reports, 1951, op. cit., p. 156.
in ju re  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  the f r e e d o m  o f  th e  s e a s  a n d  to  e n c o u ra g e  
f u r th e r  e n c ro a c h m e n ts  u pon  the h igh  s e a s  b y  c o a s ta l  S ta te s .111 
( em ph asis  a d d e d )
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Judge Read disagreed with the Norwegian system because “[it] 
purports to exclude all other States from areas of the high seas”118 where all 
States enjoy rights and privileges. The Norwegian system is an extension 
of Norwegian sovereignty over the seas and discredits the existing rights 
and privileges of the high seas affected by the Norwegian Decree. Judge 
Read holds that:
No question of re s  n u lliu s  or annexation arises in the case of the sea.
All nations enjoy all rights and all privileges in and over all of the sea 
beyond the limit of territorial waters.119
Judge Read disapproved the use of straight lines for demarcation of 
inner limit of territorial sea, because this method of delimitation would 
bring parts of the high seas into control of coastal States and accordingly 
deprives all nations to freely benefit from broader seas as res communis.
As was already mentioned, although Judge Mo accepted the decision 
of the Court regarding the validity of the Norwegian system, he did not 
view that all straight lines used by Norway were valid. His statement 
indicates that it is important to draw straight lines (where permissible) 
properly . Otherwise, the result would be unreasonable extension of 
national jurisdiction towards the seas restricting their free uses.
5. The UN Conferences and Conventions and 
the Issue of Straight Baselines
Despite the fact that the judgement of the ICJ has binding force only 
upon the parties to the dispute before the Court120, the effect of the Court’s 
judgement in the 1951 Fisheries Case was not limited to the UK and 
Norway but the judgment became a basis for codification of a series of 
provisions on straight baselines.121 The ILC used the Court s decision in 17*20
117Ibid., Dissenting Opinion o f Judge McNair, p.185.
n *Ibid., p.189.
n 9 Ibid., p.190. r
120Article 59 o f the Statute o f the ICJ stipulates that “[t]he decision o f the Court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect o f that particular case.”
121 In fact, the Court’s decisions and judgements have had implications for international community 
reflected in State practice or in international treaties. There have been many cases submitted to the
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the preparation of its draft articles that were finally incorporated into the 
TSC (Article 4).122 Accordingly, the ILC not only accepted the general 
rule of normal baseline for regular coasts, as it was the case at the 1930 
Hague Conference123, but it also recognised the use of straight baselines in 
the case of irregular coasts.124 This was one example in which the Court’s 
decision gained the legislative power (i.e. judicial legislation) and indicated 
the role of the Court in developing and establishing rules and principles of 
international law.125
Despite the acceptance by the ILC of the straight baselines in 
appropriate cases (Article 5 of the its Draft Articles)126, there was a 
question of the status of navigation through waters enclosed by these
Court on issues related to the application o f the law o f the sea. The adjudication o f these cases were 
effective in developing the law of the sea and in clarifying the customary or contractual status o f some 
principles and concepts. For example, see the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (as regards the 
equidistance line) and the 1973 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (as regards the exclusive right o f coastal 
States over fishing zone within twelve nautical miles from the baselines). These cases were dealt with 
by the ICJ in 1969 and 1973 respectively. For the judgements o f the Court see: ICJ Reports, 1969 and 
1973.
122 Although the ILC finally drafted articles on the straight baselines on the basis o f the ICJ judgment in 
the Fisheries Case, the decision o f the Court was subject to some discussion since the establishment 
o f the committee o f experts to work on draft articles for the UNCLOS I. For example, this committee 
suggested some restrictions on the use o f straight baselines. These restrictions included the maximum 
length o f ten mile limit for each straight baseline and the maximum distance o f five miles between a 
salient point on the coast and an adjacent island for drawing a straight baseline from the coast to the 
such island. Also, the committee held that the high tide should be the basis for drawing baselines if  
no chart is available. Teclaff, op. cit., p.666. Also see Rapport du Comite d ’Experts sur Certaines 
Questions d ’Ordre Technique Concernant la M er Territoriale, Annex to Docum ent 
A/CN.4/61/Add.l, YILC. V o l.2 ,1953, pp.77-79 . At its seventh session, the ILC accepted the view of 
a number o f States (such as Norway and Sweden) arguing that limiting the length o f straight baseline 
to ten miles is inconsistent with the Court decision in the Fisheries Case. See ILC, Report o f 7th 
Session, YILC. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/Add.l, 1955, p.34, and Comments by governments on the 
provisional articles drafted by the ILC concerning the regime of the territorial sea, Ibid  , pp.43-62.
123At the 1930 Hague Conference, except with respect to legal bays, the general baseline system  
recognised was based on the low-water mark.
124The impact o f the ICJ judgement on the work of the ILC was apparent from the beginning o f its work 
on the regime o f the territorial sea. For example, its Special Rapporteur incorporated the application 
o f straight baselines in Article 5 o f its first draft on the regime of the territorial sea, as an exception to 
the general rule o f  low-tide mark and where coastlines are indented. See Francois, M. J. P. A. 
(Rapporteur Special), Regime o f the Territorial Sea (in French), Document A/CN.4/53, YILC, Vol.2, 
1952, pp.25-43. As Prescott views “[t]he original intention o f substituting straight lines for the low- 
water mark was to avoid situations where the territorial waters are penetrated by deep corridors of 
non-territorial waters or surround enclaves o f such waters”. Prescott, op.cit., 1987 (Straight and 
Archipelagic Baselines), p.39. As regards to the role o f straight baselines in simplifying the outer 
limit o f territorial seas in certain coastal areas (when compared with the use o f low-water mark for the 
same coastal areas), see The Law of the Sea - Baselines, Figures 11 and 12, op. cit., pp.18 & 19.
125 As a result o f the adoption o f straight baselines by the ICJ for certain circumstances and the 
subsequent incorporation o f provisions on straight baselines into the TSC and the LOSC, it is argued 
that Article 4  o f the TSC and Article 7 o f the LOSC are reflective o f customary international law, 
binding upon parties as well as non-parties to these conventions.
126Article 5(1) o f  the ILC’s Draft included that where a coastline is “deeply indented or cut into or 
because there are islands in its immediate vicinity”, the coastal State can use straight baselines for 
such coastline.
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baselines. The replies of governments to the Draft Articles prepared by the 
ILC indicated some concerns over the right of passage existing within 
waters which would be converted into internal waters by the use of new 
straight baselines.127 Among the replies, the British view was one of the 
most critical ones. The UK Government expressed that:
[it is] imperative that, in any new code which would render legitimate 
the use of baselines in proper circumstances, i t  sh o u ld  b e  c le a r ly  
s ta te d  th a t the r ig h t o f  in n o cen t p a s sa g e  sh o u ld  n o t b e  p r e ju d ic e d ... 
(Accordingly) the Commission would be performing a most useful 
function if it were to give mature consideration to the problem h o w  
the use o f  b a se lin e s  is  to  b e  rec o n c ile d  w ith  ex isting  righ ts  o f  p a s sa g e .
For their part, Her Majesty’s Government can only say at this stage 
that, in their view, in case  o f  conflict, the r ig h t o f  p a ssa g e , a s  a  p r io r  
r ig h t a n d  the r ig h t o f  the in tern a tion a l com m unity, m u st p r e v a i l  o v e r  
a n y  a l le g e d  c la im  o f  in d iv id u a l c o a s ta l S ta te s  to  e x te n d  the a r e a s  
su b je c t to  th e ir  exclu sive  ju r isd ic tio n ,128 (em ph asis a d d ed )
Following concerns of some governments with respect to the use of 
new straight baselines and their potential impacts on the right of 
navigation, the ILC discussed the issue of passage through waters 
surrounded by these baselines.129 There existed a dispute of view point in 
the ILC over the issue as to whether the same right of passage as available 
in the territorial sea had to be maintained within waters affected by the use 
of new straight baselines. The majority of the ILC were in support of 
maintaining such right.130 Consequently, the ILC added a new paragraph 
(Paragraph 3) to Article 5 the Draft before its submission to the UNCLOS 
I. This paragraph states:
Where the establishment of a straight baseline has the effect of 
enclosing as internal water areas which p r e v i o u s l y  had been
127See the Report o f the ILC to the United Nations General Assembly on the Work o f its Seventh 
Session, IJNGAOR. 10th Session, Supplement No.9, Doc. A/2934, United Nations, New York, 1955, 
pp.25-49.
l2%Ibid., pp.43-44.
129The issue was also discussed in the 1954 session of the Institut de Droit International at Aix-en- 
Provence. See Institut de Droit International Annuaire. V o l.l. 1954, pp.113-173. In response to the 
report prepared by F. Castberg on the distinction between territorial waters and internal waters, Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice held that “all waters inside the baseline from which territorial waters are 
measured, are internal waters; but that a further distinction is to be drawn between those waters which 
are genuinely inland waters (e.g. rivers, creeks, island, lakes, canals etc.) and those which are not (e.g. 
large bays and waters between the mainland and islands off the coast)... Generally speaking, there is 
no right o f passage through the former waters, but there is, or there should be, through the latter... 
Under no circumstances should the extension of internal waters made possible by the new baseline 
method operate so as to impede the right o f innocent passage through what would be territorial sea if 
the older coast-line (or tide mark) rule were still applied”. Ngantcha, Francis, The Right o f Innocent 
and the Evolution o f the International Law o f the Sea; The Current Regime o f 'Free! 
Navigation in Coastal Waters o f Third State. Printer Publishers, London, 1990, p.75.
130y n  C Vol-II. 1956, p.268.
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considered as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right of 
innocent passage, ... through those waters will be recognised by the 
coastal State in all those areas w h ere  the w a te rs  h a ve  n o rm a lly  been
u se d  f o r  in tern a tio n a l tra ffic .131 (Italics supplied)
As part of its comments on Article 5(3), the ILC clearly indicated 
that the provision was considered to prevent any adverse effects on the 
right of navigation that may be caused by the application of certain straight 
baselines. The ILC commented that “if a State wished to make a fresh 
delimitation of its territorial sea according to the straight baseline principle, 
thus including in its internal waters part of the high seas or of the territorial 
sea that had previously been waters through which international traffic 
passed, other nations could not be deprived of the right of passage in those 
waters. Paragraph 3 of the article is designed to safeguard that right”.132 
{emphasis supplied) The focus of the ILC was, however, on the impact of 
new straight baselines on water areas where there has already existed a 
right o f passage. This raises a question whether there is a right of 
navigation through waters enclosed by fresh straight baselines but no 
passage was previously exercised therein. One argues that the right of 
passage is not limited to the cases uwhere the waters have normally been 
used for international traffic”.133 This is because when construction of a 
new straight baseline leads to conversion of the territorial sea or the high 
seas into internal waters, such construction would eliminate passage 
through waters already were subject to legal regime of the territorial sea or 
the high seas. Accordingly, as far as navigation is concerned, there are two 
kinds of internal waters. Those internal waters created by the use of the 
low water mark where there is no right of passage, and those created by the 
use of new straight baselines where the international community is entitled 
to the right of navigation.134
The proposal of the ILC (Article 5(3) of its Draft) was examined in 
the UNCLOS I and its wording was changed as appeared in Article 5(2) of
l3 lIbid., p.267.
132YILC. Vol.II, 1956, p.268.
133Ngantcha, op. cit., p.77.
134Due to importance o f  maritime communication, the same reasoning has been extended to bays and 
islands. It is, therefore, argued that “a coastal State with an indented coast, islands, and bays could 
exercise the discretion to draw the limits o f its internal waters differenUy for different purposes. But 
where it chooses the method of straight baselines, the internal waters so created, to the limit o f the 
low-water mark, do not prejudice the right of innocent passage of other States”. Ibid., p.78.
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the TSC.135 The TSC recognised the right of navigation previously existed 
through newly defined internal waters where a fresh employment of 
straight baselines has resulted in creation of these new internal waters.136 
However, unlike the ILC’s focus on internal waters “where the waters have 
normally been used for international traffic”, Article 5(2) does not contain 
this clause. Accordingly, no distinction was made between the status of 
international navigation within those newly internal waters which were not 
formerly used for maritime communication and those traditionally used for 
international navigation.
At the UNCLOS I, the work on the territorial sea was delegated to 
the First Committee. At its 48th, 51th, and 52nd meetings, the Committee 
discussed the issue of straight baselines.137 Although in the Fisheries Case, 
the ICJ rejected that any maximum limit for the length of straight baselines 
was set up by State practice, Britain suggested to the Committee to 
consider the maximum length of ten miles.138 In addition, such countries as 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, and the United 
States reiterated the limitation introduced by the committee of experts.139 
They suggested that no straight baseline can be drawn from a point on the 
mainland to an adjacent island, if the island is located further than five 
miles from the point on the mainland. These proposals could not achieve 
adequate support for adoption. A Swedish proposal also failed to be 
accepted. It suggested considering the maximum length of fifteen miles for 
straight baselines. This proposal was put to the vote following the request 
of Canada, the Soviet Union, Norway, and Indonesia but was not 
adopted.140 The final result of discussion on the issue of the straight 
baselines in the UNCLOS I was the incorporation of Article 4 into the 
TSC.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 4 of the TSC (also paras. 1 & 3 of 
Article 7 of the LOSC having the same content) contain the direct language 
of the Court as follows. Those parts made in italics are the wording of the
Court.
135 Article 5(2) o f the TSC provides that “[w]here the establishment of a straight baseline ... has the effect 
o f enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been considered as part o f the territorial sea 
or o f the high seas, a right of innocent passage ... shall exist in those waters”.
136The same rule was maintained in the LOSC as incorporated into its Article 8(2).
137TTNCT.OS T. Official Records. Vol.3, 1958, pp.156-161.
138/ W ,  p.228.
™ Ibid., pp.35-252.
140Ibid., p.161, *nrt I TNCT OS I. Official Records. V o l.2 ,1958, p.62.
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1. In localities141 where the c o a s tlin e  is  d e e p ly  in d e n te d  a n d  cu t 
in to 142, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its 
immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining 
appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.143
2. The d ra w in g  o f  such  b a se lin es  m u st n o t d e p a r t to  a n y  a p p re c ia b le  
e x ten t f r o m  the g e n e ra l d irec tio n  o f  the c o a s t, and the a r e a s  ly in g  
w ith in  the lin es m u st b e  su ffic ien tly  c lo se ly  lin ked  to  the la n d  dom ain  
to  b e  su b je c t to  the reg im e o f  in tern a l w a te rs .144
Although the TSC (and also the LOSC) reflects essential parts of the 
ICJ opinion in the Fisheries Case, a number of additional provisions were 
incorporated in the TSC with respect to straight baselines. These provisions 
were incorporated to prevent, inter alia, improper enclosure of the high 
seas. For example, only those low-tide elevations can be taken into 
account as basepoints for straight baselines upon which there are 
lighthouses or similar facilities permanently above sea level.145 Despite 
fringing islands towards which straight baselines can be drawn, low-tide 
elevations are in general unqualified for the same purpose save in 
exceptional cases.146 In addition, the TSC (and the LOSC) provides that
141 The term “in localities” implies that the use of straight baselines is limited to the coastlines which 
qualify for application o f these baselines. Accordingly, the qualified straight baselines are exceptions 
to the general rule of the normal baselines.
142ICJ Reports, 1951, pp.128-129.
143 As far as geographical aspects are concerned, there is a question as to what purpose the straight 
baselines were permitted to replace the low-water line. In response, it is stated that “[t]he concept of 
straight baselines is designed to avoid the tedious application o f rules dealing with the normal 
baselines and the mouths o f rivers and bays, where their application would produce a complex pattern 
o f territorial seas.” The Law o f the Sea - Baselines, op. cit., p.17. The straight baselines, then, play a 
major role in simplification o f baseline systems in indented coasts or coasts which are cut into or 
fringed with islands. For such an effect see ibid., Figures 11 and 12 at pp.18 & 19.
144ICJ Reports, 1951, p.133. Article 4(4) o f the TSC and Article 7(5) o f the LOSC contain the provision 
on the use o f “regional economic interest” in accordance with the ICJ decision in the Fisheries Case 
for application o f straight baselines.
145 Article 4(3) o f the TSC. It is argued that provision o f Article 4(3) o f the TSC was included “to meet 
the case o f Norway where two of its basepoints on the 1935 line approved by the Court were on low- 
tide elevations”. Prescott, op. cit., 1987 (Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p.41. Article 7(4) of 
the LOSC also considers another possibility for taking low-tide elevations into account as defined 
points for drawing straight baselines, that is to say “where drawing of baselines to and from such 
elevations has received general international recognition.” (emphasis added) In this regard, Prescott 
holds that “[a] country could now announce its baseline and use some low-tide elevations and then 
announce after a few years that the absence or low level o f criticism constitute evidence o f general 
international recognition”. Ibid.
146Although it has generally been accepted that low-tide elevations and islands have their own special 
legal regimes, there have been cases where no agreement existed as to whether a geographical feature 
is a low-tide elevation or an island. This was particularly discussed in the Anglo-French Continental 
Shelf Case (1987-1988). As far as the case was concerned, the analysis o f the issue was of 
significance because while islands can have continental shelf, rocks cannot. (See Article 121 o f the 
LOSC) It was for the purpose of the delimitation of the boundary between their continental shelves 
that the United Kingdom and France agreed to submit the matter to arbitration. The dispute was over 
the status o f the Eddystone Rock located eight miles from the British mainland. The UK was of the
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“[t]he system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a 
manner to cut off from the high seas (or an exclusive economic zone, as 
added in the LOSC) the territorial sea of another State.”147
The approval of the Norwegian baseline system by the ICJ and its 
following acceptance in the UNCLOS I clearly recognised the straight 
baseline system, where drawn properly.148 However, the general rules on 
straight baselines gave a broad discretion to coastal States.149 This broad 
application of straight baselines was resulted from two major inadequacies: 
the uncertainty as to what constitutes departure from direction of the 
coast150; and the lack of an international body to examine straight baseline 
system for their validity. Although drawing baselines is left to coastal
view that the Rock was to be considered an island since they fell into the definition o f an island in 
accordance to the 1964 Territorial Waters Order. According to this Order, an island is a geographical 
feature that is uncovered “at mean high water springs”. Therefore, the Rock can be regarded as an 
island because they “only cover entirely at mean high water spring”. In contrast, France did not agree 
that the Eddystone Rock is an island. France stated that ‘[n]o difference is made in customary law ... 
between types o f tide as the criterion for distinguishing between an island and a low-tide elevation. 
On the contrary , as soon as a reef does not remain uncovered throughout the year, the French 
Government claimed that it has to be ranked as a low-tide elevation”. The Court o f Arbitration did 
not express its opinion over the different views on the status o f the Eddystone Rock as a low-tide 
elevation or an island. However, the Court relied on the French recognition o f the British fisheries 
zone established in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 o f the 1964 European Fisheries Convention. 
The Court held that “[i]n other words, it was in the context o f a baseline o f the territorial sea, as well 
as in the context o f fisheries, that the French Republic in 1964-1965 acknowledged the relevance o f  
the Eddystone Rock as a basepoint.” Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case (1977-1978). Decisions of 
the Court o f Arbitration. 30 June 1977 and 14 March 1978. Misc. No. 15 (1978). Cmnd 7438. pp.68 
(122), 69 (125), and 74 (140)
147 Article 4(5) o f the TSC and Article 7(6) of the LOSC. As an example, Churchill refers to the Aegean 
o f Turkey “where it would be possible for Turkey to draw straight baselines in such a way as to cut 
off the territorial sea of Greek islands that fringe its coast from the high seas”. Churchill and Lowe, 
op. cit., p.29. Also, the sections 28-29-30 of the straight baselines system proclaimed by China on 15 
May 1996 has the effect o f enclosure of Hong Kong and Macao. Accordingly, these segments can be 
valid when Hong Kong and Macao would come under the sovereignty o f China in 1997 and 1999 
respectively. See Prescott, Victor, The South China Sea: Limits of National Claims. MIMA (Marine 
Institute o f Malaysia), Kuala Lumpur, 1996, pp.14-15.
148There is an opinion that “[t]he straight baseline system now seems to be valid erga omnes, 
irrespective o f the opposition or agreement o f other states.” Dixon, Martin, and Robert 
McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law. Blackstone Press Limited, London, 1991, 
p.355. It should, however, be noted that these baselines should be employed properly by a coastal 
State to be protected against opposition from other States.
149 According to Prescott, “by the end of 1972 47 countries out o f 118 had proclaimed straight baselines 
along part or all o f their coast.” Prescott, J. R. V., The Political Geography of the Oceans. Douglas 
David & Charles Limited, Vancouver, 1975, p.78. This calculation does not contain some countries, 
mainly archipelagic States.
150Prescott names Beazley (1978) and Shalowitz (1962) as asserting that the Norwegian straight 
baselines can be regarded as a standard “against which all straight baselines should be tested.” 
Prescott, J. R. V., ‘Straight Baselines: Theory and Practice’, in E. D. Brown and R. R. Churchill 
(eds.), The UN Convention on the Law o f the Sea: Impact and Implementation, Proceedings of 
Nineteenth Annual Conference o f the Law of the Sea Institute (1985, Cardiff, South Glamorgan), The 
Law o f the Sea, Honolulu, 1987, p.307. It is also asserted that in the absence o f fringing islands 
where all basepoints are situated on the mainland “it is very difficult to argue that the general 
direction o f the coast has not been preserved.” Ibid.
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States, their legitimacy depends on international recognition.151 152This fact is 
confirmed by the ICJ which made it clear that:
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it 
cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as 
expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of 
delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal 
State is competent to undertake it, the v a lid ity  o f  the d e lim ita tio n  w ith
r e g a r d  to  o th e r  S ta tes  d ep en d s  upon in tern a tio n a l l a w } 51 (emphasis 
supplied)
The issue of baselines (including the straight baselines) was not 
made subject to detailed discussion in the UNCLOS III. It seems that it 
was supposed that the rules on the baselines had achieved a wide 
recognition.153 The main concern was to apply the rules in a manner 
consistent with the rationale behind them and not to misuse these rules. 
Accordingly, the LOSC, except for a few changes154, repeated the same 
wording of the TSC on baselines in general and on straight baselines in 
particular.155
151 In fact, the ICJ applied a two dimensional approach to the issue o f “delimitation o f sea areas 
(including enclosing internal waters by drawing baselines). Two elements constitute the grounds of 
such an approach: national action and international recognition. Accordingly, where, because o f  
“local conditions” a coastal State draws straight baselines around its coasts, the reaction o f the 
international community towards such baselines plays an important role in evaluating their validity.
152ICJ Reports., 1951, p.132. As regards the range o f discretion o f coastal States in the delimitation of 
the territorial sea, the Court opined that while a coastal State “must be allowed the latitude necessary 
in order to be able to adapt its delimitation to practical needs and local requirements, the drawing of 
base-lines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction o f  the coast. Ibid., 
p.133. The view o f Evensen concerning the role of relevant factors in delimitation o f territorial sea is 
also worthy o f mention. In his memorandum prepared for the UNCLOS I in 1957, Evensen wrote that 
various factors o f a geographical, economical, historical and political nature “may play an important 
role in determining the legality under international law of concrete acts o f delimitation o f territorial 
waters” Evensen, Jens, Certain Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation o f the Territorial Waters 
o f Archipelagos, UN Doc. A/CONF/13/18, in UNCLOS I. Official Records, V o l.l, 1958, pp.289-290.
153The only completely new provision on the straight baselines in the LOSC (in comparison to the TSC) 
is Paragraph 2 o f Article 7 which relates to “unstable coasts”. The Paragraph allows the use o f 
straight baselines for deltas and other natural conditions which make the coastline highly unstable. It 
provides that in the case o f “subsequent regression o f the low water line, the straight baselines shall 
remain effective until changed by the coastal State in accordance with the Convention”. This 
provision was particularly incorporated following the request o f Bangladesh whose coastline is 
unstable due to the presence o f  deltas. Other examples o f unstable coasts are volcanic coasts and
tundra coasts. . . .
154For example, see Article 7(2) o f the LOSC (see above). This provision does not exist in the TSC.
155Part I - Section II (Articles 3-13) o f the TSC deals with the subject o f “Limits o f the Territorial Sea” 
and, inter alia, establishes rules on the use o f baselines for various coastlines. (See Articles 3,4,7, and 
13) Part II - Section II contains similar provisions on baselines under the same heading. (See Articles
5 ,7 ,9 ,  and 10)
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6. Straight Baselines and State Practice
There are now many States, as many as half of coastal States156, 
which proclaim and use straight baselines.157 While some of these 
baselines can be justified in the context of the ICJ’s judgement regarding 
the Norwegian coast, others are hard to justify.158 In some cases, the lines 
have been drawn in a manner that depart from the general direction of the 
coast.159 It is apparent that “[t]he effect of drawing straight baselines, even 
strictly in accordance with the rules, is often to enclose considerable bodies 
of sea as internal waters”.160 It is, therefore, evident that derogation from 
the rules enhances such an effect bringing more parts of the seas into 
control of coastal States.161 This, in turn, restricts the freedoms of the seas
156Zhang, op. cit., p.851.
157Coastal States have applied the method o f straight baselines to bring wider maritime ares under their 
control for the same reasons as they argued to extend the breadth o f their territorial seas, i.e. for 
economic, environmental, and security reasons. Currently the position o f the USA is to apply the line 
o f low-water mark as its baseline and not straight baselines. In response to the request o f the 
Canadian government for a list o f coordinates o f the basepoints for the baselines o f the USA territorial 
sea and the EEZ, the USA stated that “no such list exists” and that the USA baseline is the low water 
along the coast which is “marked on large-scale charts issued by the National Ocean Service o f the 
Department o f Commerce”. United States Aide-Memoire to Canadian government, March 19, 1984 
(Department o f State file P84-0012-1925). Cited in Limits in the Seas (No. 1121. O ffice o f  the 
Geographer, Bureau o f Intelligence and Research, The United States Department o f State, 1992, p.17 
(and no.35). In the United States v. California Case, the USA Supreme Court made the application o f 
straight baselines subject to approval o f the federal government because it argued that the use o f 
straight baselines in accordance with to determine “inland waters claimed against other nations is one 
that rests with the Federal Government, and not with the individual States.” United States v. 
California, 381, U.S. 139, 167-169 (1965). Also see the Louisiana Boundary Case, 349 U.S. 11, 36­
38 (1969), and the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 470 U.S. 9 3 ,9 9  (1985),
158It is said that “the state practice o f straight baseline delimitation has, in many instances, distorted the 
rules for drawing straight baselines. The effect o f an illegal straight baseline is a claim that detracts 
from the international community’s rights to use the oceans.” It is also added that [o]ne result has 
been that these straight baseline systems remain have purported to create large areas o f internal 
waters which legally remain either territorial sea or areas in which the freedoms o f navigation and 
overflight may be exercised.” (<emphasis added) Limits in the Seas (No. 112), op. cit., pp. 19-20.
159Although many o f straight baselines systems were established before the LOSC, this convention 
incorporated the provisions o f the TSC on baselines (including straight baseline), with a few  
additional provisions. Accordingly, the provisions on baselines are o f contractual and customary 
value that should be complied with in good faith.
1 ̂ C hurchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.31. The straight baselines were also used by some States for resource 
purposes. In this connection, Anand writes that “[s]ome countries sought to achieve the same purpose 
without extending their territorial waters or fisheries jurisdiction by adopting straight baselines for 
measuring the territorial sea joining outermost islands, islets, or rocks o ff their coasts.” Anand, op. 
cit., p.79. An example o f such application for fisheries resources is the 1935 Norwegian baseline 
system. The area enclosed by the use o f this system includes several thousands square miles. This 
resource concern is still strong enough to persuade countries in proclaiming straight baselines.
161It was due to this effect that Smith (1948) was in the view that “[i]t is impossible that such a claim 
(the 1935 Norwegian straight baseline system) should be generally accepted, and it is not likely to be 
pressed.” Smith, op. cit., p.5. Although the ICJ confirmed this system o f baselines, it was due to 
exceptional circumstances existed with respect the Northern coast o f Norway. Notwithstanding, the 
ICJ judgement was a means for increasing the application range o f straight to similar geographical 
conditions, and even to some coasts where there are no special geographical features.
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and, inter alia, subjecting navigation of foreign ships to the discretion of 
shore States.
The Fisheries Case was concerned with two conditions existing on 
the Norwegian coasts: one is the fact that the Norwegian coast is very 
indented and cut in ; and the second one is that the Norwegian coast is 
fringed with many islands, islets, and rocks. These two conditions were 
used by other States to justify straight baseline for their coasts.162 
However, it is asserted that there are a number of coastal States which 
employ straight baselines while geographical conditions of their coasts do 
not present any clear fringing island system or are not very indented 
coast.163 Accordingly, it is not clear on what basis or justification these 
systems were applied. Examples of these States include, but are not 
limited to, Albania, Burma, Cuba, Ecuador, Guinea, Haiti, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Portugal, Senegal, Thailand (in Phangan I), and 
Venezuela.164
In general, Prescott asserts that States have employed five 
inappropriate methods in drawing straight baselines:
• where the coast is smooth rather than deeply indented;
• where straight baselines link islands which are not regarded as fringing
islands;
• where the basepoint or the terminus is located at the sea rather than on or 
above the low-water mark;
• where straight baselines are drawn around offshore islands by 
continental States; and
• where straight baselines are not published and are considered as 
imaginary straight baselines.165
162Examples o f relatively similar coastlines to the Norwegian coastline are those o f  Scandinavian
countries, that is Denmark,, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden.
163Examples o f coastal States drawing straight baselines on the basis o f their indented coasts are Chile, 
Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom. Examples o f coastal States using 
straight baselines on the basis o f fringing islands around their coasts are Denmark, Germany, Guinea­
Bissau, M ozambique, South Korea, Thailand (regarding islands o f Phuket and Chang), (the 
former)Yugoslavia. Prescott, op. cit., 1985, p.66.
164¡bid. Prescott names the Australian baseline system among those cases where straight baselines ave 
been drawn along coasts “which are smooth rather than deeply indented.” Prescott, op. cit., 19»7 
(Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p .41.
165s e e  Prescott, op. cit., 1987 (Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p.41-46. Prescott gives examples 
for each o f these five cases, though not all are inconsistent with the existing rules on straight
baselines.
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Table 2.1 presents a large list of existing proclamation of straight 
baselines by coastal States. It provides some data forming a useful basis 
for evaluating of the correctness of the way straight baselines were applied. 
Some proclamations are lawfully able to be recognised, while others need 
modifications or revision, if they are to be regarded as legitimate on the 
basis of the existing principles of the law of the sea. There are even some 
cases where coasts are not indented or cut into or fringed with islands, but 
the States concerned have nonetheless applied a straight baseline system. 
In this context, it is relevant to compare the straight baseline systems of 
Guinea-Bissau and Albania. In the former, there are many islands fringing 
the coast (the Bigagos coastal archipelago) but in the latter case the 
coastline is not fringed with islands, thus making the Albanian straight 
baseline difficult to justify.166 (See Maps 2.3 and 2.4 below.)
166Prescott, op. cit., 1985, p.68. Even in the case of the straight baseline system of Guinea-Bissau (Act 
No. 2/85, 17 May 1985), Senegal declared its protest to this system and stated that articles 1 
(containing defined points for using straight baselines) and 2 of the Act No. 2 of 17 May 1985 “are 
manifestly contrary to international law.” In response, Guinea Bissau asserted that, like other coastal 
States, it “is justified in exercising its right to establish by an act o f its domestic legislation the 
delimitation o f its territorial waters in accordance with a system of straight baselines”. It added that 
“the straight baselines established by the Guinean Act o f 17 May 1985 are in no way in contravention 
of the rules o f international law contained in article 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea”. Guinea-Bissau further maintained that it is the task o f the arbitral tribunal established for 
delimiting the maritime boundary between them to deal with the issue. The Law of the Sea: Current 
Developments in State Practice (No. I). Office of the Special Representative o f the Secretary-General 
for the Law o f the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1987, pp.36-40.
Source: Francalanci, Giampiero 
(ed.), e t a l, Atlas of the Straight 
Baselines - Part 1: Art.7 of the 
Convention of the United 
Nations on the Law of the Sea. 
Giuffre Editore, Milano, 1986, 
p.75.
Map 2.3






Source: Prescott, J. R. V., The 
Maritime Political Boundaries 
of the World. Methuen & Co. 
Ltd., London, 1985, p.67.
In addition to the requirements stipulated by the Court, there are a 
number of factors which should be taken into account when assessing each 
individual straight baseline system. These factors include: (a) the length of 
the straight line; (b) number of straight lines employed; (c) the distance of 
the straight line from the nearest coast; and (d) the water areas enclosed by 
straight baselines (the ratio of land to water). The contractual provisions 
do not provide any guidelines for these factors167 and it is not certain what 
the international standards are for appraisal of a straight baseline 
system.168
167The TSC and LOSC contain no provision as to what the maximum permissible length is for a straight 
baseline; how many straight baselines can be applied; what maximum distance should be between a 
straight baseline and nearest coast; and what maximum area can be enclosed by application of straight 
baselines. Although some o f these factors are referred to in the LOSC regarding archipelagic 
baselines, none of them is mentioned as regards straight baselines. It seems for the same purpose that 
some restrictions were incorporated for the use of archipelagic baselines (such as the length of these 
baselines), namely prevention o f unnecessary enclosure o f the seas, some standards should be 
established for assessing the legality of straight baseline systems. With regard to maximum length for 
straight baselines, there are some authors suggesting a range of extents from 24-45 nautical miles. 
These authors include Roach and Smith (24 nautical miles), Hodgson and Lewis (45 nautical miles), 
Beazley (45 nautical miles). Also a limit of 48 nautical miles has also been suggested. The U.S.A. 
position is that the maximum limit for straight baselines is 24 nautical miles. See Limits in the Seas, 
No.117 (1996), p.4.
168 An analogy can be made to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Article 76 (8) of 
the LOSC empowers the Commission (set up under Annex II to the LOSC) to assess the claims of 
States on continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The legality of such claims depends on their 
recognition by the Commission. It is the Commission which is an international competent body to 
assess the claims and make a decision on their legitimacy. There is no similar international body to 
assess the straight baseline system. Although there are many cases to be dealt with, but the existence 
o f such a body would contribute to the prevention of disputes and conflicts among States regarding 
the straight baseline systems. Such disputes may result in military confrontations. This is because in 
the view of maritime powers some straight baseline system are considered to be unjustified and have a 
significance influence on the reduction of the free sea areas depriving foreign vessels and aircraft to 
exercise free navigation and overflight in certain areas.
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Table 2.1
List of States Proclaiming Straight Baselines 
Along All or Part of Their Coasts*
State
Inform ation  
Available on the 
Baselines
Official Basis o f the 
Proclamation
Source Containing  
the Proclam ation
Albania
N o. o f Segments: 10 
Average Length: 12.5 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 21.2 n.m. 
M D L  6  n.m.
b e c re e  No. 4 656  o^ 9 March 1970 (A s  
am ended by D ecree N o. 5 3 8 4  o f  23 
February 1976 and as m odified by Decree 
No. 7366  on 9 March 1990)
U .N ., S T /L E G /S E R -B /^ , p.3
N a tio n a l L e g is la t io n  on the  
Territorial Sea , p .10
Algeria --
D ecree N o. 84-181 o f  4  A ugust 1984  
defining the baselines for m easuring the 
breadth o f  the m aritim e zon es under 
national jurisdiction
Journal Officiel de la Republique 
Algérienne o f  7 August 1984 (cited 
in Francalancic )
Angola __ Decree-Law  N o. 47,771 o f  27 June 1967 
(enacted by Portugal)
U .N ., S T /L E G /S E R .B /15d , pp. 
112-113
Argentina " Act No. 23.968 o f 14 August 1991 N a tio n a l L e g is la t io n  on the  
Territorial Sea, p.28
Australia No. o f Segments: 396 Proclamation o f  4 February 1983
C o m m o n w ea lth  o f  A u stra lia  
Gazette No. 29  o f February 1983 
The Law o f  the S eae , p.19 et seq
Bangladesh -- Declaration o f 13 April 1974 N ew  Directions1 V ol.V , p.290
Burma
N o. o f Segments: 21 
Average Length: 39.3 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 222.3 n.m. 
MD: 75 n.m.
Territorial Sea and Maritime Zones Law, 
1977 (Law No. 3 o f  April 1977) U .N ., ST/LEG /SER.B/19, p.8
Cameroon -
Decree N o. 71/D F /416 o f 26  August 19711 
(am ending D ecree N o. 62 /D F /216  o f  25 
June 1962)
U .N ., S Î /L E G /S E R .B /1 9 , p . l^ l  
(French text)
Canada -
T erritoria l S ea  and F ish in g  Z o n es  
G eographical Coordinates Orders, 1967, 
1969 ,1972 , 1985
U .N ..S T /L E G /S E R .B /15  (p .54 ), 
and S T /L E G /S E R .B ./1 6 8  (p.6), 
P.C. 1972-966 and P.C. 1985-2739  
o f  the Privy Council
Chile
No. o f Segments: 68  
Total Length: 1,351.073 n.m. 
Average Length: 19.87 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 64.95 n.m. 
MD: 30 n.m.
Decree No. 416 of 14 July 1977
Limits in the Seas*1 N o. 80  (1978) 
and Addendum (1980)
China
N o . o f  S eg m en ts: 411 
(around the mainland and the 
H ainan Island, 28  (around 
the Xisha(Paracel) Island. 
Longest Segment: 121.7 n.m.
Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea o f 4 
September 1958, Article 3 o f  the Law on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
(25 February 1992), (and Statement o f  15 
M ay 1996 on the Baseline)
Limits in the Seas, No. 43 (1972) 
T he Law o f  the Sea: National 
Legislation on the Territorial Sea,
p.86
Limits in the Seas , N o. 117, 1996.
Colombia No. o f Segments: 17 
Longest Segment: 130.5 n.m.
Decree No. 1436 o f 13 June 1984 'Ihe Law o f the Sea, p. 107- 111
Costa Rica -- Law No. 18581 - RE, 21 v November 1988 U n ited  S ta te s  R e sp o n se s  to  
E xcessive Maritime Claim s1, p.78.
Cuba --
Law No. 1 ,2 6  February 19?7
Verbal Note to the UN, 13 November 1985
U n ited  S ta te s  R e sp o n se s  to  
E xcessive Maritime Claims, p.78. 
The Law o f the Sea, pp. 112-118.
Cyprus -- Note Ref. 2001/254, 3 May 1993 U n ited  S ta te s  R e sp o n se s  to  E xcessive Maritime Claim s, p.78.
Denmark2
N o. o f Segments: 70  
Total Length: 41.85 n.m. 
Average Length: 5.83 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 21.81 n.m. 
M D: 7 n.m.
Ordinance No. 437 of 21 December 1966 on 
the Delim itation o f  the Territorial Sea, as 
amended by D ecree N o. 189 o f 19 April 
1978
U .N., S17LEG/SER.B/15, p. / l  
(for the 1966 Order), Limits in the 
Seas, No. 19 - R evised (1978) for 
the 1978 Decree
Djibouti --
L aw  N o . 5 2 /A N /7 8  co n cern in g  the  
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
ex c lu siv e  econ om ic zone, the maritime 
frontiers and fishing, 9 January 1979
The Law o f the Sea, pp. 149-151
Dominican
Republic -
A ct No. 186 o f  13 September 1967 on the 
Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive  
Econom ic Zone and Continental Shelf, as 
amended by Act No. 573 of 1 April 1977
The Law o f the Sea, pp. 152-153
Ecuador
No. o f Segments: 12 
Total Length: 897 n.m. 
Average Length: 74.98 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 136 n.m. 
MD: 52 n.m.
Supreme Decree No. 959-A  o f  28 June 1971 
Prescribing Straight B a se lin es for the 
Measurement o f  the Territorial Sea
U .N ., ST/LEG/SER.B/18*. p.15 
Limits in the Seas, N o. 42  (1972)
Egypt
--
Presidential D ecree No. 27 concerning the 
baselines o f  the maritime zones, 9 January 
1990
Current D evelop m en ts in State 
Practice - N o. I ll , pp.32-38
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(Continued)
Estonia -- Law of 10 March 1^93 U n ite d  S ta te s  R e sp o n se s  to  
E xcessive Maritime Claims, p.78.
Finland
N o. o f Segments: 179 
Total Length: 793.2  n.m. 
Average Length: 4 .4  n.m. 
Longest Segment: 39 n.m. 
MD: 6  n.m.
D ecree N o. 463 o f  18 A ugust 1956 and 
Decree on the Application o f  the Act on the 
Delimitation o f Finland’s Territorial Waters, 
7 M ay 1965
Limits in the Seas, N o. 48 (1972) 
The Law o f  the Sea, pp. 162-167
France3
N o. o f Segments: 77  
Total Length: 715 n.m. 
Average Length: 9.1 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 39 n.m. 
MD: 2 0  n.m.
Decree o f  19 October 1967 on Delim itation  
o f  Territorial Waters
U.N ., ST/LEG /SER .B/15. p.82  
Limits in the Seas, N o.37 (1972)
Germany
(DR)
N o. o f Segments: 7 
Average Length: 11 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 22.8 n.m. 
M D: 7 n.m.
Regulation on Order in the Frontier Areas 
and Territorial Waters - O f 15 June 1972 U .N ., ST /L E G /SE R .B  /18 , pp .20  






(i) N o. o f  Segments: 6
(ii) N o. o f  Segments: 18 
Total Length: 94.71 n.m.
( i )  In fo r m a tio n  C o n c e r n in g  th e  
Establishment o f  Straight B aselines in  the 
Baltic Sea, Effective 8 M ay 1978
(ii)  T he 1970  Charts o f  the German  
Hydrographic Institute
'(i) U .N ., £T /L é <j /£ é R .B M ,  P. l9
(ii)  L im its in the Seas, N o . 38  
(1972)
Guinea4
N o. o f Slegments: 1 
Total Length: 120 n.m. 
Average Length: 120 n.m. 
M D: 17 n.m.
D ecree N o  .2 2 4 /LR g  o f  3 June 1964  
C on cern ing  the D e lim ita tio n  o f  the 
Territorial Sea o f  the Republic o f  Guinea, as 
modified in 1965
U .N ., ST/LEG /SER.B/19, p.32  
Limits in the Seas, N o. 4 0  (1972)
Guinea­
Bissau
N o. o f Segments: 11 
Average Length: 13.9 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 29 n.m. 
M D: 9 n.m.
Act No. 2/85 o f  17 M ay 1985 establishing 
straight baselines
The Law o f  the Sea, pp.180-181
Haiti
N o. o f Segments: 10 
Average Length: 37.2 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 111 n.m. 
M D: 40  n.m.
Decree o f 6  April 1972 Limits in the Seas, N o .5 1 (1973)
Iceland
N o. o f Segments: 36  
Average Length: 21.8 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 74.1 n.m. 
M D: 24  n.m.
Law No. 41 o f 1 June 1979 Concerning the 
Territorial Sea, the E conom ic Z one and 
Continental Shelf
U .N., ST/LEG /SER.B/19, p.43
Iran
-
Law-Decree o f  21 July 1973
(C onfirm ed by M aritim e Z ones A ct o f
1993)
U.N., ST/LEG /SER.B/19, p.55 
Law o f  the Sea B ulletin1, N o. 24, 
1994, p. 10
Ireland
N o. o f  Segments:: 44  
Total Length: 474.20 n.m. 
Average Length: 10.74 n.m. 
Longest Length: 25 .20 n.m. 
M D: 10 n.m.
Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 1959 (Straight 
Baselines) Order, 1959
U .N ., ST/LEG /SER.B/15, p.92  
Limits in the Seas, N o. 3 (1970)
Italy Longest Segment: 60  n.m.
Decree o f  the President o f the Republic No. 
81 6  o f  2 6  April 1977 concerning the 
application o f Law No. 1658 o f  8 December 
1961
Gazzetta Ufficiale della 
Repubblica Italiana N o. 305 o f  9 
N o v e m b e r  1 9 7 7  (c it e d  in  
Francalanci)
Japan N o. o f Segments: 3
Enforcement Order o f  13 June 1977 o f  Law  
No. 30 o f  2 May 1977 on the Territorial Sea U.N ., ST/LEG /SER.B/19, p.57
Kampuchea -- Decree o f  the Council o f  State o f 13 July 
1982
The Law o f  the Sea, pp. 119-121
Kenya Presidential Proclamation o f 28 February 
1979 on Maritime Zones
The Law o f  the Sea, pp.210-212
Korea
(Republic)
N o. o f Segments: 19 
Average Length: 23 .4  n.m. 
Longest Segment: 60 .30  n.m. 
M D: 53 n.m.
P residentia l D ecree  N o. 1962  o f  2 0  
September 1978
U .N ., ST/LEG /SER.B/19, p.98 
Limits in the Seas, N o. 82 (1979)
Madagascar
N o. o f Segments: 37 
Total Length: 1,577.3 n.m. 
Average Length: 42.7 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 123.1 n .m  
M D: 25 n.m.
D ecree N o. 63-131 o f  27 February 1963 
establishing the lim its o f  the territorial sea  
o f the M alagasy Republic
U .N ., ST/LEG /SER.B/15, p.98 
Limits in the Seas, N o. 15 (1970)
Malta -- The memorial o f  26  April 1983 submitted by Malta to the ICJ
IC J , C o n t in e n t a l  S h e l f  
(Libya/M alta), M emorial o f  Malta 
o f  26 April 1983, Vol.III, M ap No. 
2, Malta’s Baselines
Mauritania
N o. o f  Segments: 1 
Average Length: 89 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 89 n.m. 
MD: 34.2 n.m.
Ordinance o f  31 August 1^88 establishing  
the limits and legal regime o f  the territorial 
sea, the contiguous zone, the ex clu siv e  
econom ic zone and the continental sh elf o f  
Mauritania
The Law o f  the Sea, pp.219-220
Mauritius ”
Territorial Seas Act, 16 April 1970 U n ited  S ta te s  R e sp o n se s  to  




N o. o f Segments: 22  
Total Length: 357.4  n.m. 
Average Length: 16.24 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 39.4 n.m. 
M D: 13 n.m.
D ecree o f  28  August 1968 D elim iting the 
M exican Territorial Sea within the G ulf o f  
California
U .N ., ST/LEG /SER .B/16, p .17  
Limits in the Seas, N o. 4  (1970)
Morocco
--
D ecree  N o . ¿ -7 5 -311  o f  21 July 1975  
defining the C losing Lines o f  B ays on the 
Coasts o f  M orocco and the Geographical 
C o-ordinates o f  the Lim it o f  Territorial 
Waters and the Exclusive Fishing Zone
The Law o f  the Sea, pp .224-229
Mozambique
N o. o f Segm ents: 23  
Total Length: 453.4  n.m. 
Average Length: 19.7 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 60 .4  n.m. 
M D: 10 n.m.
L egislative D ecree N o. 47,771 o f  27 June 
1967 (enacted by Portugal)
U .N ., ST /L E G /SE R .B /15, p.113  
Limits in the Seas, N o. 29  (1970)
Netherlands — T erritor ia l S e a  o f  the N eth erla n d s  
(Demarcation) Act o f  9 January 1985




(i) N o  o f  Segm ents: 47  
Total Length: 645 .90  n.m. 
Average Length: 11.9 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 43 .6  n.m.
(i) Royal Decree o f 12 July 1935
(ii) Royal Decree o f  18 July 1952
(i) U ./N ., ST/LEG /SER .B/6m, p.35
(ii) U .N ., ST/LEG /SER .B/6, p .552
Oman Notice o f  1 June 1982 Law o f  the S ea  B ulletin , N o . 1, 
1983, p.35
Portugal
N o. o f  Segments: 2  
A verage Length: 26 .4  n.m. 
Longest Segm ent:31.25 n.m. 
M D: 21 n.m.
D ecree-L aw  N o. 495/85 o f  29 N ovem ber  
1985
The Law o f  the Sea, pp .260-266
Romania
--
A ct concerning the Legal R egim e o f  the 
Internal Waters, The Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone, 7 August 1990
Current D evelop m en ts in  State  
Practice - N o. Ill, pp .104 & 115
Senegal
No. o f Segments: 15 
Total Length: 139.95 n.m. 
Average Length: 9 .33 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 22  n.m. 
M D: 5 n.m.
Decree No. 72-765 o f  6  July 1972 Limits in the Seas, N o. 54  (1973)
Spain -- Royal D ecree N o. 2510/1977 o f  5 August 
1977
U .N ., S f/L fiG /SE R .B /19 , p .l  12
Sri Lanka - Maritime Zones Law No. ¿2  o f  1976 U .N ., ST/LfeG/SER.B/19, p .liÖ
Sweden
N o. o f Segments: 95 
Average Length: 10.4 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 30  n.m. 
M D: 10 n.m.
A ct concerning the Territorial Waters o f  
Sw eden o f  3 June 1966 (as amended in 1978 
and 1979: am endments N o. 959 and N o. 
1140
The Law o f  the Sea, pp. 299-305
Tanzania -- Notice N o. 2 0 9 ,2 4  August 1973 U n ited  S ta te s  R e sp o n se s  to  
E xcessive M aritime Claim s, p.78.
Thailand
N o. o f Segments: 45  
Total Length: 348.15 n.m. 
A verage Length: 8.21 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 33.75 n.m.
Decree o f  12 June 1970 Limits in the Seas, N o. 31 (1971)
Tunisia --
Law N o. 73-49  o f  2 A ugust 1973 and 
D ecree No. 73 -527  o f  3 Novem ber 1973 
concerning baselines
Joum. Off. Rep. Tun., 31 July/3-7  
August 1973 and Joum. Off. Rep. 
Tun., 2-6  N ovem ber 1973 (cited in 
Francalanci)
Turkey
N o. o f Segments: 119 
Total Length: 621 n.m. 
Average Length: 5 .2  n.m. 
Longest Segment: 23.5 n.m. 
M D: 9 n.m.
Territorial Waters Law, No. 476  o f 15 May 
1964
The Law o f  the Sea, pp .313-314
United
Kingdom
N o. o f  Segments: 25 
Total Length: 282 .10  n.m. 
Average Length: 11.25 n.m. 
Longest Segment: 40.25 n.m. 
M D: 10 n.m.
Territorial Waters Order in Council 1964
U .N .,ST /L E G /SE R .B /15, p.129  
Limits in the Seas, N o. 23 (1970)
USSR -- Declarations N o. 4450 and N o./ 4604 The Law of the Sea, pp .315-353
Venezuela
N o. o f segments: 1 
Average Length: 98 .9  n.m. 
Longest Segm ent 98.9 n.m. 
M D: 22 n.m.
A ct o f  27  July 1956  concern ing  the 
Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf, Fishery 
Protection and Air Space
The Law o f  the Sea, pp.381-383
Vietnam
N o. o f Segments: i0  
Total Length: 846 n.m. 
Average Length: 84 .6  n.m. 
Longest Segment: 161.8 n.m
Declaration o f  12 Novem ber 1982 on the 
Territorial Sea Baseline o f  V iet Nam
Law o f the S ea  B ulletin , N o. 1, 
1983, n.74
Limits in the Seas, N o. 9 9  (1983)
Yugoslavia
N o. o f Segments: 26  
Total Length: 244.7  n.m. 
Average Length: 9 .4  n.m. 
Longest Segment: 22.5 n.m. 
M D: 6 .6  n.m.
Law o f 22  M ay 1965 on M arginal Seas, 
Contiguous Zone and Continental S h e lf as 
amended by the Law o f  27  March 1979 on 
Marginal Seas and the Continental Shelf
U .N , S I/L E G /SE R .B /15, p.133  
Limits in the Seas, N o. 6  (1970) 
Sluzbeni L ist o f  3 0  M arch 1979 
(for the Law o f  1979)
♦The table contains sixty-one proclamations on straight baselines. The list does not include those States 
which have not delimited their straight baselines and those which have considered the future application 
o f straight baselines. The former consists o f Syria and Saudi Arabia and the latter includes Barbados,
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Brazil, Bulgaria, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominca, Lithuania, Somalia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Also, 
the list does not include States proclaiming archipelagic straight baselines for which provisions o f Article 
47 o f the LOSC would govern. Information on archipelagic baselines will be presented later.
- The above-mentioned States currently claim the following breadths for their territorial seas.
(i) Twelve nautical miles: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, 
Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan (three nautical miles within the Straits of Soya, Tsugaru, and Osumi and within the 
Eastern and Western Channels of the Tsushima/Korea Strait)), Kampuchea, Kenya, Korea - Republic (three nautical 
miles in the Korea/Tsushima Strait), Madagascar, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, 
Oman, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation (as the successor of the USSR), Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey (also three nautical limit in certain areas), United Kingdom, Venezuela, Viet Nam, 
Yugoslavia.
(ii) Four nautical miles: Norway; (iii) Three nautical miles: Denmark: (iv) Twenty nautical mites: Angola;
(v) Fifty nautical miles: Cameroon; (vi) Two hundred nautical miles: Ecuador
Source: Information obtained from the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, 
United Nations, New York regarding territorial sea limits (as at 16 June 1995)
(Continued)
(1) MD: Maximum distance between baseline and nearest coast.
(2) Denmark also uses straight baselines for the following areas: (a) Faeroe Islands (Decree No. 598 of 21 December 
1976 - The Fishing Territory of the Faeroe Islands); U.N., ST/LEG/SER.B/19, p.192. (b) Greenland Area (Executive 
Order No. 629 of 22 December 1976 - The Fishing Territory of Greenland); U.N., ST/LEG/SER.B/19, p.195.
(3) Other French areas: (a) France - Guiana (Decree of 29 June 1971); U.N., ST/LEG/SER.B/18. p.17. (b) France 
Kerguelen (Decree No. 78-112 of 11 January 1978); Durante and Rodino, Western Europe and the Development of 
the Law of the Sea, loose-leaf, su b  France, p.3 (cited in Francalanci).
(4) According to the Arbitral tribunal for the Delimitation of the Marine Boundary between Guinea and Guinea­
Bissau (the judgement of 14 February 1985), the 1964 Decree of Guinea was replaced by a decree of 30 July 1980.
(5) Other Norwegian Areas: (a) Norway - Jan Mayen (Decree of the Crown Prince Regent of 30 June 1955); U.N., 
ST/LEG/SER.B/6, p.557. (b) Norway - Svalbard (Royal Decree of 25 September 1970 Concerning the Delimitation 
of the Territorial Waters of Parts of Svalbard - Average Length of the Straight Baselines and Longest Segment are 10 
n.m. and 18.5 n.m. respectively.); U.N., ST/LEG/SER.B/16, p.21, Limits in the Seas, No. 39 (1972).
Sources of the Table:
(a) National legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea. United Nations, New York, 1980.
(b) The I.aw of the Sea: National Legislation on the Territorial Sea, the Right of Innocent Passage and thfi 
Contiguous Zone. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, New
York, 1995. . .
(c) Francalanci, Giampiero (ed.), e t  al, Atlas of the Straight Baselmes - Part 1: Art.7 of the Convention Qf th? United 
Nations on the Law of the Sea. Giuffre Editore, Milano, 1986.
(d \ N a tio n a l legislation and Treaties Relating to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone., the Continental ShelLtfag 
H ig h  Seas, and to  F ish in g  and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea. United Nations, New York, 1 9 7 0 .
(e) The Law of the Sea - Baselines: National legislation With Illustrative Maps, Office for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1989.
(f) Churchill, Robin, Myron Nordquist and S. Houston Lay (eds.), New Directions in the Law of the $<?a, Vol.V, 
Oceana Publications, INC., Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1977.
(g) National legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1974.
(h) Limits in the Seas. Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of 
State, Washington D. C..
(i) Roach, J. Ashley and Robert W. Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims, Second Edition, 
Volume 27 of the series of Publications on Ocean Development, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1996.
(j) N a tio n a l legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New, York, 1976.
(k) The T .aw of the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice - No. HI, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of 
the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1992.
(l) Taw of thf- Sea Bulletin. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Law of the Sea 
(currently the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs), United Nations, New
(m)  } aws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea. United Nations, New York, 1957.
- Information on physical characteristics of the straight baselines are mainly extracts from Francalanci, op. cit., 
Limits in the Seas, op. c it ., and Prescott, J. R. V.. The Maritime Political Boundaries of tire World, Methuen & Co.
Ltd., London, 1985, p.66 .
- For the maps of the straight baselines see Francalanci, op. c it ., and The Law of the Sea - Baselines: National
Legislation and Illustrative Maps, op. c it..
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All these requirements and factors must be taken into account when 
judging the application of a specific straight baseline system. For example, 
a system may be formed by many small straight lines but it does not 
enclose a wide area when compared with a system containing a few straight 
lines but enclosing a broad area. In general, the issue of baselines is of a 
technical nature and should be dealt with accurately. Once the technical 
aspects of baselines have been made clear, the issue of legality of these 
baselines should then be addressed.
Some States have directly proclaimed straight baselines while some 
other States have considered the possibility of the use of these baselines 
along their coasts. For example, Article 1 (Sole Paragraph) of the 1993 
Brazilian Law provides that “[i]n localities where the coastline is deeply 
indented into or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its 
immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines, joining appropriate 
points, will be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured.”169 (emphasis added) The Law does not 
provide any list of geographical co-ordinates for the purpose of drawing 
straight baselines. It is the same in the case of Bulgaria which only uses 
different wording but the approach is identical.170 Similar ideas are found 
in legislation of other States. Many States have used a combination of 
methods (that is low-water mark, straight baselines, and closing lines) for 
shaping their baseline system. This is generally permitted by the 
contractual provisions.171 However, State practice is clearly reflecting the 
fact that States do not hesitate to apply straight baselines for their coasts if 
they wish to do so.172 Leaving aside the ICJ (which in a few cases, directly 
or indirectly, dealt with the issue of baselines), baseline systems of States 
have not been subject to international appraisal. Currently, no international 
mechanism is effective enough to stop using improper straight baselines. If 
a baseline case is not made subject to adjudication (particularly by the
169 Article 1, Law No. 8617 (4 January 1993) on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continenti Shelf, The Law of the Sea: National Legislation on the Temtonal 
Spa the Right o f Innocent Passage and the Contiguous Zone. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law 
o f the Sea, Office o f Legal Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1995, p.59.
170Article 16(2), Bulgarian Act of 8 July 1987 governing the ocean space. Ibid., p.63.
171 See Article 14 o f the LOSC (Combination of methods for determining baselines).
172There are some instances in which coastal States recognise the validity o f their straight baselines. For 
example, Article 11 o f the Treaty o f Peace and Friendship between Argentina and Chile (18 October 
1984), provides that “the Parties mutually recognise the straight baselines drawn by them in their 
respective territories.” The Law o f the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice (No.I), op. cit., 
p.173. It is apparent that this kind o f bilateral agreements do not have impact on third States. 
Accordingly, the international recognition o f straight baseline system is dependent on the consistency 
o f such a system with established rules of the international law of the sea for drawing baselines.
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ICJ173), the only mechanism available is to protest against such a baseline. 
The effectiveness of such protest, to some extent, depends on political 
and/or military power of protesting State. However, the application of 
military force is itself in contrast to the use of peaceful means for removing 
conflicts among nations.
According to an analysis of the straight baseline systems in 1970, 
twenty-two States out of thirty-seven States under examination (leaving 
Indonesia, Philippines, and Faeroes aside following the acceptance of 
archipelagic baselines in UNCLOS III), do not comply with the rules 
established for the use of straight baselines.174 According to information 
available in 1992, the number of inconsistent uses of straight baselines has 
increased.175 In some cases, there are extreme departure from the coasts. 
For example, consider the cases of Burma, Colombia176, Ecuador177, 
Vietnam and Haiti178. (See information available on their straight baseline 
systems in Table 1.) Their longest straight baselines are 222.3 n.m., 130.5 
n.m., 136 n.m., 161.8 n.m., and 111 n.m. respectively.179 Also, the
173Even the ICJ is not always desired to comment on baseline systems (if not necessary). For example, 
in 1985 Case concerning the Continental Shelf the ICJ held, inter alia, that “[t]he Court does not 
express any opinion on whether the inclusion ofFilfla in the Maltese baseline was legally justified 
(emphasis added) Judgement of June 3, 1985, Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiria /  Malta), ICJ Reports. 1985, p.48.
174See Limits in the Seas. No. 14 (1970), Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, United States Department of State, Washington DC.
175 See Limits in the Seas (No. 112), op. cit., p.20. According to its Freedom of Navigation Program, the 
USA is considering a number o f measures from diplomatic protests to operational assertions o f rights 
of navigation with respect to the excessive claims in the view of its government. For the reaction of 
the USA to straight baseline systems existing up to 1992, see ibid, Table 2: Claims Made to Straight 
Baselines, pp.22-24. It is now viewed that “of the straight baseline system, over half depart from the 
rules o f international law in one way or another”. Brown, op. cit, 1994, p.41 (no.24).
176For an analysis o f the straight baseline system of Colombia see Straight Baselines: Colombia, Limits 
in the Seas No.103. The Office o f Geographer, Department of State, The United States Government, 
Washington DC, 1985.
177One criticises the Ecuador’s straight baseline, as “an extreme example”, on four bases. “First, the 
coast o f Ecuador is neither deeply indented nor fringed with islands ... Secondly, the lines do not 
conform with the general direction of the coast... Thirdly, one o f the reference points used is Isla La 
Plata, an isolated island 14 miles from the coast...; and finally, the southernmost leg actually ends at 
Cape Blanco in Peru, and not in Ecuador at all (the internal waters so enclosed are split between 
Ecuador and Peru.” Brown, Joan, op. cit., p.50. For the map of Ecuador’s straight baseline system see
ibid., p.49. .....................
178For an analysis o f the straight baseline system of Haiti see Straight Baselines: Haiti, Limit? in th£ 
Seas N o.51. The Office o f Geographer, Department o f State, The United States Government, 
Washington DC, 1973.
179 Prescott writes that the straight baseline proclaimed by Denmark on 1 June 1963 on the west coast of 
Greenland is one o f the largest straight baselines. The length o f this straight baseline is 1,380 nautical 
miles. Denmark uses straight baselines due to the geographical circumstances existing along its coast 
including deeply indented coastline and fringing islands. Prescott, op. cit., 1987 ( ‘Straight Baselines: 
Theory and Practice’), p.289.
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maximum distance between baseline and nearest coast with respect to 
Burma, Ecuador and Haiti is 75 n.m., 52 n.m., and 40 n.m. respectively.
The ratio of land to water is also a significant factor in assessment of 
straight baseline system. While this ratio in the case of Norway is 1:3.5, 
the ratio with regard to Burma is 1:50180, that is the water area enclosed by 
the Burma’s system (49,000 sq. kilometres) is approximately fifteen times 
more than that of Norwegian system. (See Map 2.5.)
Map 2.5
Burma’s Straight Baseline System
Source: Limits in the Seas. No. 112. Office of the Geographer, Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State, 
Washington DC, 1992, p.21.
Although the ICJ did not mention the ratio of land to water among 
criteria to be taken into account for assessing a straight baseline system, it 
is clear that this ratio is quite relevant when evaluating whether such a 
system departs from the general direction of the coast.181 Certain straight
180Prescott, op. cit., 1985, p.68. This ratio for the United Kingdom is similar to that o f Norway, namely 
1:3.5 and the ratio for eastern part of Thailand coast is 1:5. Prescott, op. cit, 1975, p.81.
181 Prescott suggests an index system as a means for evaluation of straight baseline systems. The index 
indicates that how the use of straight baselines increase national waters in comparison to low-water 
mark. The calculation of the index is based on the width claimed by the concerned State. The areas
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baseline systems have faced protests from other States because of the direct 
impact of these baselines have had on the enclosure of the seas being used 
by those States. For example, in 1982 the USA indicated its disagreement 
with the straight baseline system established by Burma in 1977 that 
enclosed the Gulf of Martaban.182
France, Singapore, and Thailand also protested against the 
Vietnamese proclamation of 12 November 1982 on the straight baselines 
on the ground that these baselines do not comply with the relevant rules 
embodied in the TSC and LOSC.183 China has also stated, inter alia, that 
the Vietnamese proclamation is “to appropriate a vast area of the Beibu 
Gulf’.184 In defence, Vietnam has relied on Article 7(5) of the LOSC 
(Art.4(4) of the TSC) for justification of its straight baseline system.185 
This provision enables States to draw straight baselines on the basis of 
“economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and 
importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage.” It appears that 
Vietnam relied on fisheries interests to indicate that there are were 
economic interests which justify the drawing of straight baselines.186 North 
Korea also established a straight line in 1977 to constitute the inner limit of 
its “military” or “security” zone in the Sea of Japan extending to 50 miles 
seaward of this line. This straight line does not fall into the category of 
straight baseline systems as it is not explicitly claimed by North Korea. 
Notwithstanding, the line (which is almost 300 miles in length) is
o f the seas enclosed by straight baselines in comparison to the application of low-water mark are 
calculated and then the result is divided by the length o f baselines. This forms the index which 
indicates the additional areas o f inland waters in square miles for each nautical mile o f straight 
baseline. If the index demonstrates a high value, it can be an indication that the straight baseline 
system was drawn inconsistent with the contractual and customary rules for straight baselines. For 
example, while the index for Senegal and Guinea-Bissau is 0.5 and 1 respectively, the index for Haiti 
and Venezuela is 10.6 and for Ecuador is 13. See Prescott, op. cit., 1985, pp.68-69.
182See United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims, Limits in the Seas, No. 112. op. 
cit., pp.20-22.
183See French Note of 5 December 1983 in The Law of the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice 
(No. P - op cit., p.146; Statement o f Thailand on 22 November 1985, Ibid., p.147; and Note o f 
Singapore on 5 December 1996 in The Law of the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice No. IL 
Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1989, p.84.
1 ̂ C hina’s Note o f 28 November 1982, The Law of the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice (No. 
I}, op. cit., p.145. Vietnam also proclaims part of the Gulf of Bac Bo (Tonkin Gulf) as historic waters 
subject to the rules on internal waters of Vietnam. Ibid., p.143.
185 Valencia, Mark J., ‘Vietnam: Fisheries and navigational policies and issues’, Ocean Development and 
fntpxnfltional Law. Vol.21, No.4, July-August 1990, p.432.
186For an analyses of the straight baselines of Vietnam see Straight Baselines: Vietnam, Limits in the 
fipflg N o-99. Office o f the Geographer, Bureau o f Intelligence and Research, United States 
Department o f State, Washington DC, 1983.
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considered to be at variance with the general direction of the coast.187 In a 
protest to the 1977 announcement of North Korea, the United States of 
America reiterated, inter alia, its position on the issue of the baselines. It 
was stated that “unless exceptional circumstances exist, baselines are to 
conform to the low-water line along the coast”.188 (See Map 2.6.)
Map 2.6
North Korea’s Straight Baseline
Source: Kim, Dalchoong, and Jin-Hyun Paik, ‘The Relation between 
User States and Coastal States with respect to International 
Navigation’, in Tadao Kuribayashi and Edward L. Miles (eds.), The 
Law of the Sea in the 1990s: A Framework for Further International 
Cooperation. Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Conference of 
the Law of the Sea Institute (24-27 July 1990, Tokyo), The Law of the 
Sea Institute, Honolulu, 1992, p.59.
187See Paik, Jin-Hyun, ‘East Asia and the Law of the Sea’, in James Crawford and Donald R. Rothwell 
(eds.), The Law o f the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region; Developments and PrQSPSCtS, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995, p.8. Also see Kim, Dalchoong, and Jin-Hyun Paik, ‘The Relation 
between User States and Coastal States with respect to International Navigation’, in Tadao 
Kuribayashi and Edward L. Miles (eds.), The Law of the Sea in the 1990s: A Framework for Further 
International Cooperation. Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Conference o f the Law of the 
Sea Institute (24-27 July 1990, Tokyo), The Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, 1992, pp.51-67, at 58­
60. . . T
188The United States o f America Note (4 January 1990) communicated to the United Nations, The Law 
o f the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice No. III. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of 
the Sea, Office o f Legal Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1992, p.145. In its note, the United 
States o f America also expressed that according to customary international law and the LOSC the 
maximum breadth o f the territorial sea is 12 n.m. “measured from properly drawn baselines'’ and that 
the LOSC “does not recognise the right of coastal States to assert powers or rights for security 
purposes in peacetime which would restrict the exercise o f the high seas freedoms of navigation and 
overflight beyond the territorial sea.” (emphasis added) Ibid.
90
China issued a Declaration on 15 May 1996 identifying the 
basepoints for the straight lines used as baselines of its territorial sea.189 
China first claimed the straight baseline system on 4 September 1958 when 
it promulgated a declaration - “Declaration of the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sea”. This declaration 
was announced after the ICJ Judgement in the Fisheries Case (1951) and 
the conclusion of the 1958 Geneva Conventions (particularly the TSC 
which contains provisions on the use of straight baselines). Paragraph 2 of 
the 1958 Declaration provided that the baseline of the Chinese territorial 
sea is “the line composed of the straight lines connecting base-points on the 
mainland coast and on the outermost of the coastal islands”.190 The 
Declaration did not define the basepoints for the straight baselines. 
Although China did not have a delegation in the UNCLOS I, it seems that 
China has relied on the ICJ’s decision in the Fisheries Case and on 
straight baseline provisions of the TSC to announce its baseline method. 
As its first basic law on jurisdictional sea areas, China (the National 
Congress) enacted the “Law of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone” on 25 February 1992. This law reaffirmed the baseline method 
announced by the 1958 Declaration. Article 3 of the Law asserts that “[t]he 
baseline of the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China is 
designated with the method of straight baselines, formed by joining the 
various basepoints with straight baselines”.191
The Law does not include any provision on the use of the low-water 
mark around the Chinese coastline. This indicates that China has intended 
to enclose as much maritime areas as possible by drawing straight 
baselines. Without doubt such delimitation of inner limit of the territorial 
sea (and other maritime areas) would impact on the freedoms of the seas, 
particularly the right of navigation.192 The Law did not define the
189China Daily, 16 May 1996. See also Limits in the Seas. No. 117, Straight Baseline Claim: China, 
Office o f Ocean Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
U.S. Department o f State, Washington D.C., 9 July 1996, pp.15-16.
19QThf T o f the Sea - Baselines: National Legislation With Illustrative Maps, Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law o f the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1989, p.104. Paragraph 2 o f the 1958 
Declaration also states that “[t]he water areas inside the baseline, including Pohai Bay and 
Chiungchow Straits, are Chinese inland waters. The islands inside the baseline including Tungyin 
Island, Kaoteng Island, the Matsu Islands, the Paichuan Islands, Wuchiu Islands, the Greater and 
Lesser Quemoy Islands, Tatan Island, Erhatan Island and Tungting Island, are islands o f the Chinese 
inland waters”. Ibid.
191 The Law o f the Sea: National Legislation on the Territorial Sea, the Right o f Innocent Passage and the 
Contiguous Zone, op. cit. , p.86.
192This is especially the case with regard to the passage o f foreign warships through the Chinese 
territorial sea since China requires prior authorisation from the Government o f China before
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basepoints for the claimed straight baselines. These basepoints, however, 
were declared by China on 15 May 1996 in the pursuance of Article 15 of 
the Law.
The 1996 Chinese Declaration contains geographical coordinates for 
the straight baselines of part of China’s mainland (and the Hainan Island) 
territorial sea (49 basepoints) and those of Xisha (Paracel) Islands 
territorial sea (28 basepoints).193 The former is drawn from the northern 
section of the Chinese coast to the west of the Hainan Island, totalling 
1,734.1 miles in length and the total length of the latter is also 282.1 
miles.194 Since the official declaration of the straight baseline system of 
China, this system has been analysed by a number of writers.195 With 
regard to the former set of straight baseline, although parts of Chinese 
coastline are deeply indented and fringed with islands, some basepoints are 
deemed inappropriate for the reason that no particular geographical 
circumstances justify their use as an alternative for the low-water mark.196 
Also the use of certain low-tide elevations by China as the basepoints is 
considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 7(4) and 13 (1) 
of the LOSC (also Articles 4(3) and 11(1) of the TSC).197
In addition, there is a question as to whether the western line of the 
Hainan Island is a segment of newly declared Chinese straight baselines or 
is a separate line. (See Map 2.7.) It was on 8 June 1964 that China 
proclaimed the waters located within the Hainan Strait as internal waters on 
historic grounds. The proclamation established the eastern and western
exercising such passage. See Article 6 of the 1992 Chinese Law o f the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone. Ibid. p.87.
193The Declaration ends by stating that the remaining baselines o f the territorial sea o f China will be 
declared in another time. The Declaration does not provide the baseline from the Chinese land 
territory with North Korea to point 1 of the Declaration (including the Bo-Hai area), along its coast in 
the Gulf o f  Tonkin, or around other islands in the South China sea claimed by China. Limits in the 
Seas, No. 117, op. cit., p .l.
194Ibid., pp.3 & 16. Smith opines that in the area of the segments 8-9, 9-10, and 10-11 the appropriate 
baseline is low-water mark. By the application of these segments, about 1,995 sq.nm (6,831 sq.km.) 
o f the high seas are converted into the Chinese territorial sea and about 550 sq.nm (1,880 sq.km) of 
the Chinese territorial sea into its internal waters. Ibid., p.6.
195See for example the analysis made by Robert W. Smith in Limits in the Seas, N o.l 17, Ibid., pp.1-8.
196The segments 28-29 (71.3 miles) and 29-30 (66.8 miles) are also regarded as inappropriate since they 
enclose Hong Kong and Macao which “have not yet come under Chinese sovereignty”. It is added 
that basepoints 19 and 22 are on the island under Taiwan’s administration and some other islands 
under Tiwan’s administration are also enclosed by Chinese straight baselines. The segment 31-32 is 
also viewed by Smith as to “cut off the eastern approaches to Hainan Strait, an international strait”. 
Ibid., pp.7 & 8.
197According to Smith, there are eight low-tide elevations off China’s coast which are not located within 
12 miles o f the mainland or an island, and also there are no lighthouses or similar installations on 
them. Ibid., p.6.
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lines connecting the Hainan Island to the Chinese mainland.198 Since 1964 
China has made navigation through the Strait of Hanian subject to its 
provisions on internal waters. Accordingly, China has excluded foreign 
warships from exercising navigation through the strait. In addition, foreign 
non-military vessels intending to pass through the strait have been required 
to inform the Chinese Government two days before their voyage. Provided 
that the permission is granted, foreign non-military vessels are entitled to 
navigate through the strait.
Map 2.7
China’s Straight Baselines 
(Mainland and Hainan 
Island)
Source: Limits in the Seas. 
No.117. Straight Baseline 
Claim: China, Office of 
Ocean Affairs, Bureau of 
Oceans and International 
E n v ir o n m e n t a l  and 
Scientific Affairs, U.S. 
Department of  State, 
Washington D.C., 9 July 
1996.
The separate straight lines drawn around the Xisha (Paracel) 
Islands199 have been criticised on the basis that this group of islands is 
situated far away from the mainland and that the normal baseline for the 
scattered islands of a continental State is the low-water mark.200 China’s 
view is that it does not use archipelagic baselines which are only applicable 
to archipelagic States but it applies straight baselines around the Xisha
198The eastern line connects points 20’9.62’N:110’41’E and 20’26’N:110’30.37’E and the western line 
links points 20’13.5’N:109’55.5’E and 20’00.37’N:109’42.1’E. Prescott, op. cit., 1996, p.16.
199 The Xisha (Paracel) Islands are composed of two main groups of islands - Crescent and Amphitrite, 
three isolated islands - Triton, Passu Keah and Lincoln, four large reefs - Bombay, Vulladore, 
Discovery and North, and Pyramid Rock. Ibid.
200It is held that it is possible for an island to have straight baselines, if the requirements of Article 7 of 
the LOSC are met. Limits in the Seas, No.117, op. cit., p.8.
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islands.201 Accordingly, these straight baselines are not subject to the 
requirements made by Article 47 of the LOSC for the validity of 
archipelagic baselines, including the limitations on the maximum 
permissible length for such baselines. Although China rellies on the 
straight baselines method for the Xisha Islands to avoid criticism of the 
baselines on the ground of the application of archipelagic baselines, the 
Chinese reasoning appears to be questionable.
Map 2.8
China’s Straight Baselines (Xisha (Paracel) Islands)
Source: Limits in the Seas. No. 117. Straight Baseline Claim: China, 
Office of Ocean Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
Washington D.C., 9 July 1996.
The main question which arises from the enclosure of the Xisha 
(Paracel) Islands is the status of navigation and overflight in and over 
waters located between the islands. The use of lines to enclose the waters 
within the islands lead to the conversion of waters from the high seas or 
territorial seas status to internal waters where foreign ships generally have 
no right of navigation and no foreign aircraft may fly over these waters 
without permission of the sovereign power. Although it may be said that
201 This view was expressed during a discussion with Professor Chen Degong on the Chinese straight 
baselines at the University o f Wollongong on 1 November 1996. Professor Degong of the China 
Institute for Maritime Development Strategy was a visiting scholar at the Australian National 
University (August - October 1996). As regards the use o f the low-tide elevations as basepoints for 
the Chinese straight baselines, Professor Degong also asserted that there are lighthouses on these 
elevations which may justify the use o f straight baselines. However, these low-tide elevations do not 
meet the requirement of Article 13 (1) o f the LOSC (Article 11(1) o f the TSC).
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the maritime spaces within the islands are not suitable for navigation due to 
their shallowness, and even though there are shipping routes around the 
islands, these facts do not justify the use of lines connecting outermost 
points of outermost islands in the island group of Xisha (Paracel). Further, 
if navigation may not practically be possible in waters within islands, flight 
over the waters may be practicable. Therefore, it should be made clear 
what the legal status of waters within the islands is, particularly due to the 
provision of Article 8(2) of the LOSC (Article 5(2) of the TSC) which 
stipulates that “[w]here establishment of a straight baseline ... has the effect 
of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been 
considered as such, a right of innocent passage ... shall exist in those 
waters”.
One recent instance is the new Omani straight baseline system in the 
strait of Hormuz. Following Article 2(c) of its Royal Decree of 10 
February 1981202, Oman issued the Notice of 1 June 1982 describing 
geographical coordinates for application of straight baselines203. This 
Decree mainly led to two main reactions from interested States, namely 
those of Iran (1983) and the United States of America (1991). In its Note 
of 4 February 1983, Iran describes the Omani Note as “the unilateral 
extension of the internal waters and territorial sea of Oman”.204 Relying on 
provisions of Articles 4 and 5 of the TSC and Article 8 of the LOSC205, 
Iran asserts that:
the notification (Omani Note of 1 June 1982) shall not alter the legal 
nature of this area in con n ec tion  w ith  the p a s s a g e  r ig h t o f  the th ird  
c o u n tr ie s ’ s h ip s , th a t  th e y  h a v e  e x e r c is e d  t r a d i t io n a l ly  a n d  
h is to r ic a lly .206 (em ph asis  a d d ed )
The United States of America used the same reasoning for its 
disagreement to Omani straight baselines as it did with regard to the 1977
202Royal Decree o f Oman concerning territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, and exclusive 
Zone, 10 February 1998. Article 2(c) states that Oman will apply straight baselines in certain areas of 
its coast according to the incoming directive for such a purpose. Ibid., p.78.
203The Law o f the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice (No. I), op. cit., pp.80-81. The 
geographical coordinations are described for four sections.
20*Ibid., p.82.
205Article 8(2) o f the LOSC (and also Article 5(2) o f the TSC) provides that “[w]here the establishment 
o f a straight baseline ... has the effect o f enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously 
been considered as such, a right o f innocent passage ... shall exist in those waters”. In this regard, 
Smith writes that “[preservation o f innocent passage carries over pre-existing rights in waters that 
were territorial in nature before the application o f straight baselines”. (emphasis added) Limits in the 
Seas, No. 117, op. cit., p.5.
206The Law o f the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice (No. I), op. cit., p.82.
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North Korea proclamation, that is the baselines should follow the low- 
water line along the coast. The United states of America pointed out the 
legal requirements for application of the baselines and argued that these 
requirement were not met with regard to the Omani coast.207
While the TSC (Article 4(3)) and the LOSC (Article 7(4)) do not 
allow for the drawing straight baselines from and to low-tide elevations208 
except in certain circumstances209, the 1958 Decree of Saudi Arabia 
considers the possibility of the use of low-tide elevations as base points for 
linking straight baselines without referring to these circumstances. The 
provision states “where a shoal is situated not more than 12 nautical miles 
from the mainland or from a Saudi Arabian island, lines [may be] drawn 
from the mainland or the island and along the outer edge of the shoal.”210
Some European countries such as Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Poland 
and Romania are stated to have drawn straight baselines which depart from 
the general direction of the coast.211 While some European countries use 
straight baselines only for parts of their coasts (like the United kingdom 
and the Netherlands), certain European coastal States have drawn straight 
baselines in all or major parts of their coasts. The clear example of the 
latter is Norway whose baseline system was recognised by the ICJ in 
1951.212 The USSR (now Russia) has also applied straight baselines which
207Note o f 12 August 1991, Limits in the Seas. No. 112. op. cit.„ p.24.
208A  low-tide elevation is defined as “a naturally-formed area o f land which is surrounded by and above 
water at low tide but submerged at high tide.” (Art. 11(1) o f the TSC and Art. 13(1) o f the LOSC) 
The difference between a low-tide elevation and an island is that the former is only above sea level at 
low-tide but the latter is always above sea level, even at high tide. The similarity between them is 
both are “naturally-formed area o f land”. For definition o f an island see Art. 10(1) o f the TSC and 
A r t.l2 1 (l)  o f the LOSC. Cf Art.l21(3) with respect to status o f rocks unable to sustain human 
inhabitants or economic life o f their own.
209Whereas the TSC allows the consideration o f low-tide elevations only where there are lighthouses or 
similar installations permanently above sea level thereupon, the LOSC also allows the drawing 
baselines to and from these elevations where it has been generally recognised by international 
community.
210Article 5(c) o f the Decree No. 33 o f 6 February 1958.
211 The Law of the Sea: Practice o f States at the time o f entry into force o f the United Nations Convention 
on the Taw o f the Sea. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office o f Legal Affairs, 
United Nations, New York, 1994, p.121. (Hereinafter The Law of the Sea: Practice o f States) In 1991 
the European Court o f Justice examined the baselines o f the United Kingdom for fisheries purposes in 
accordance with EEC Regulation No. 170/83. The Court held that the application o f low-tide 
elevations by the United Kingdom after the adoption o f the Regulation is not to be taken into account 
for delimitation o f fisheries zone. Accordingly, the existing baselines at the time o f the adoption of 
the Regulation should be taken into account See the Judgement o f the European Court o f 9 July 1991, 
Case C -146/89. Journal Officiel des Communautés Europeenes. 11 July 1991, No. C 201/9.
212For an analysis o f the straight baseline system o f Iceland o f 11 March 1961 and o f 14 July 1972 (the 
revised baseline system) see Straight Baselines: Iceland, Limits in the Seas No.34 (In two series},
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are considered to be extensive. A list of geographical coordinates was 
provided by the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers (7 February 
1984) to apply straight baselines along the coasts located in the Pacific 
Ocean, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea.213 In its Decree of 15 
January 1985, the Council of Ministers provided a new list of geographical 
coordinates for the application of straight baselines along the coasts of the 
Arctic Ocean, the Baltic and the Black Seas.214
Canada has proclaimed the application of straight baselines for parts 
of its coasts in different times - in 1967 for Labrador and Newfoundland, in 
1969 for Nova Scotia, Vancouver and Queen Charlotte Islands, and in 1985 
for the Arctic islands.215 The most controversial Canadian straight 
baselines were those drawn around its Arctic archipelago. (See Map 2.9 
below.) This baseline proclamation faced protests from the United States 
and the European Community.216 Canada does not consider that the 
enclosure of waters inside its Arctic islands is a matter of applying 
archipelagic baselines. It, in fact, justifies its claim on the close relation 
between the Canadian mainland and the islands (particularly because of 
persistent frozen waters) and on historic titles.217
In a protest to the 1985 Canadian claim on the Arctic archipelago, 
the USA particularly stated it cannot accept such claim “because to do so 
would constitute acceptance of full Canadian control of the Northwest 
Passage and would terminate U.S. navigation rights through the Passage 
under international law.”218 (emphasis added) Also the European 
Community did not accept that the Canadian baselines around its Arctic 
coast are justifiable (even by relying on historic title) and accordingly 
reserved the rights of its members “in the waters concerned according to 
international law”.219 The European Community pointed out that:
The O ffice o f Geographer, Department o f State, The United States Government, Washington DC, 
1971 and 1974 respectively. (
213The Law o f the Sea: Practice o f States, op. cit., 1994, p.122.
2U Ibid.
215Limits in the Seas (No.112), op. cit., p.20. All the Canadian claims on the use o f straight baselines 
have been protested by the USA. See ibid., p.25.
216The Law o f the Sea: Practice o f States, op. cit., 1994, p.122.
217See Pharand, Donat, ‘Canada’s Sovereignty over the Northwest Passage’, Michigan Journal -Of 
International Law. Vol.10, No.2, Spring 1989, pp.653-678.
218State Department File No. P86 0019-8641. Cited in Limits in the Seas (No.112), op. cit., p.25 (no.45).
219British High Commission Note No. 90/86 o f July 9, 1986. Cited in Limits in the Seas (No.112), op. 
cit., p.25 (no.46).
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The validity of the baselines with regard to other states depends upon 
the relevant principles of international law applicable in this case (the 
Canadian coast in the Arctic), including the principle that the drawing 
of baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general 
direction of the coast.220
Map 2.9
Canadian Arctic Archipelagic Baselines
Source: Francalanci, Giampiero (ed.), e t a l, Atlas of the Straight 
Baselines - Part 1 : Art.7 of the Convention of the United Nations on 
the Law of the Sea. Giuffre Editore, Milano, 1986, p.28.
V. Conclusion
The existence of a large number of straight baseline systems 
inconsistent with established rules has generally raised a question as to 
what has persuaded States to proclaim such systems where the normal 
baselines should have been employed. As was made clear, coastal States 
prefer to use straight baselines because their application place “the outer 
limit of their various maritime zones fa rth er seaw a rds than oth er m ethods  
o f  d ra w in g  the b a selin e  .” 221 (em p h a sis ad d ed )  In addition, a number of 
interests are involved in persuading coastal States to extend their control
220Ibid.
22Churchill and Lowe, op. c i t p.29.
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over the seas by applying straight baselines.222 The main interests are of 
political, security223, and economic interests. Any of these interests 
individually or a combination of them might be relied upon by claimant 
States to use straight baselines for different purposes.
Although the essential rules on straight baselines were established by 
the ICJ in 1951 and later incorporated into the TSC and the LOSC, these 
rules are not precise enough to prevent derivations thereof.224 As Churchill 
states this inaccuracy gives “a considerable latitude (to coastal States) in 
the way they draw straight baselines.”225 In addition, the rules on straight 
baselines were set up for being used in exceptional cases similar to that of 
Norwegian coast. Notwithstanding, many coastal States have applied 
straight baselines, in whole or in part, along their coasts.226 Accordingly, 
many maritime spaces have been enclosed by national claims that have 
reduced the extent of the free seas and have impacted on the right of 
navigation. (For the development of States’ claims on straight baselines 
over time see Table 2.2 and Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below.)
222For examination of geographical, economic, and historic factors justifying the employment o f straight 
baselines with respect to coastal archipelagos see, for example, Munavvar, Mohamed, Ocean States - 
Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dodrecht, 1995, pp.24-26.
223 Prescott writes that the improper use of straight baselines “is primarily designed to increase the width 
o f the combined zone o f internal and territorial waters for security purposes”. (emphasis supplied) 
Prescott, J. R. V., op. cit., 1987 (Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p.39. It is also added that 
theses baselines are used to obtain an advantageous position in regard to the “common boundaries” 
where there is a need for negotiation among States concerned. Ibid.
224Churchill asserts that the rules on baselines “should be formulated in as precise and objective a way as 
possible, so that two cartographers, asked to draw baselines along a particular stretch o f coast, would 
both arrive at the same result.” Churchill and Lowe, op. cit. , p.26.
225Ibid., p.30. The significant interests of coastal States to proclaim straight baselines in comparison to 
other baseline methods is that “the use o f such lines is likely to place their baseline (and hence the 
outer limit o f their various maritime zone) father seawards than other methods o f drawing the 
baseline.” Ibid., p.29.
226As a consequence o f the lack supervisory authority and of the widespread use o f straight baselines, 
Prescott maintains that “it would now be possible to draw a straight baseline along any section of 
coast in the world and cite an existing straight baseline as a precedent”. Prescott, J. R. V., op. cit., 
1987 (Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p.38. Although it might not be a legal strong basis to rely 
on any other baseline system as a justification for validity o f a new baseline system, Prescott’s view  
indicates the generalisation o f the application o f the straight baselines without paying attention to the 
point that these baselines were supposed to be applied in coastlines with special geographical features.
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Table 2.2
Changes in Number of States Proclaiming Straight Baselines
Over Time*
Year Number of 
States
Year Number of 
States
1935 1 1975 32
1945 1 1985 54
1955 1 1995 61
1965 n • ••
*The figures do not include those States which have not yet delimited their straight 
baselines and not those States which have considered the future application of straight 
baselines. These two groups of States amount to twelve States. Taking into account 
these States, the total number of States claiming straight baseline systems would be 
some 73 States, that is to say more than half of coastal States.
Diagrams of Changes in Straight Baseline 
Claims Over Time
Figure 2.2
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Chapter 3
Delimitation of Single-State Bays 
I. Introduction
This chapter examines the long-standing issue of the delimitation of 
bays in the law of the sea. The focus of this chapter will be on the 
discussion of issues related to the delimitation of bays which are bordered 
by single States (single-State Bays). Many States have extended their 
jurisdiction over adjacent areas through enclosure of certain coastal 
indentations. This chapter will demonstrate how States have relied on 
many means to even enclose more larger bays.
Although the role of the law of the sea has been to regulate the 
delimitation of bays, this regulation is mainly related to those located in 
the coasts of single States. In addition, there are many ambiguities or 
shortcomings in the conventional rules which have paved the way for 
liberal interpretations or discretion by coastal States. Despite these 
problems, the creation of rules on the delimitation of bays has brought 
about a large degree of certainty and uniformity to the enclosure of 
coastal indentations and has prevented any larger enclosure of regular 
bays.
As one author points out, the question of national sovereignty in 
bays has been “one of the unsettled questions in the law of the sea.”1 The 
issue of the delimitation of bays has, in fact, been part of the overall 
problem of competing interests in the law of the sea, those of exclusive 
interests versus inclusive interests.2 This is why it is truly viewed that 
such an issue as part of the issue of the delimitation of internal waters has 
been developed through “the constant and nearly universal contest 
between those who defend the principle of freedom of the seas and those
C orbett, Percy E., The Growth o f World Law. Princeton University Press, Princeton (New Jersey), 
1971, p.72.
2This is due to the different effects created by enclosure or non-enclosure o f bays. As one author writes 
“if a bay can be enclosed by a baseline across its mouth, this is advantageous to the coastal state in that 
it results in an extension o f the territorial sea and means that waters on the landward side o f the closing 
line are internal. If, however, the starting point for measurement o f the territorial sea is the low-water 
mark around the coast o f the bay, the area o f the territorial sea is correspondingly reduced.” Dixon, 
Martin, Textbook on International Law. 2nd Edition, Blacstone Press Limited, London, 1993, p.191.
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who espouse enlarging the exclusive sovereignty of States over coastal 
waters.”3
There have been two elements concerning the delimitation of bays: 
particular element, the exclusive interests of coastal States, and the 
general element, the exclusive interests of other States.4 In this context, 
the role of the law of the sea has been to strike a fair and stable balance 
between these competing interests. The main task has been to find a 
solution which meets the essential interests of coastal States while the 
freedoms of the seas are reasonably protected. The question has been 
whether the interests of costal States had to be modified for the benefit of 
the international community or vice versa. Bouchez suggests three ways 
of approaching the issue, that is:
(a) establishment of general rules for the uniform application in all parts 
of the world through which sovereignty of coastal States is respected;
(b) examination of bays individually on the basis of case by case to meet 
the special interests of coastal States; and
(c) creation of general rules but being flexible to respond to certain cases 
as exceptions to general rules.5
Bouchez argues that the third approach has been supported and put 
into effect by the contemporary law of the sea. He argues that “the 
guiding principle in dealing with claims to bays should be that the general 
element prevails over the particular, although in the interest of an 
equitable solution sometimes the reverse may be preferable.”6
3Strohl, M itchell P., The international Law of Bays. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1963, p.7. As 
Dupuy points out: “The reason why so much interest attaches to a definition o f bays is that their line of 
closure, that is to say, the line which connects the two points of the coasts regarded as terminating the 
two sides o f the indentation constituting the bay, has the effect o f separating two distinct legal space ... 
[internal waters and the territorial sea]. Dupuy, Rene-Jean, ‘The Sea Under National Competence , in 
Rene-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes, A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, V ol.l, Ch.5, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991, p.265.
4Bouchez, Leo J., The Regime o f Bavs in International Law. A. W. Sythoff, Leyden, 1964, p.23.
5Ibid. , pp.25-26. For appraisal o f these approaches see ibid.
6¡bid . , p.26. This is the trend followed by Article 7(5, 3, and 6) o f the TSC. Article 7(6) excludes the 
historic bays for which “the particular element prevails over the general.” Ibid.
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II. General Definition of Bays and Gulfs7
Before discussing the issues related to the delimitation of bays, it is 
useful to provide a general definition of the term “bay”. As will be seen, 
the law of the sea has also introduced a legal definition for this term as a 
legal bay8.
Bays are categorised as one of the geographical features of the 
coastline. They are formed as “the result of erosion activities by ocean 
waves and currents.”9 Shalowitz defines the term “bay” as “a subordinate 
adjunct to a large body of water; a penetration of that large body of water 
into the land; a body of water between and inside of two headlands.”10 
The arbitral tribunal in the North Atlantic Fisheries Case (1910) defined a 
bay in its geographical sense.11 The tribunal said that in a geographical 
sense “a bay is to be considered as an indentation of the coast, bearing a 
configuration of a particular character easy to determine specifically, but 
difficult to describe generally.”12
Although general dictionaries make a distinction between bays and 
gulfs, in practical sense the distinction line is not a clear one. A “bay” is 
defined as “a small indentation of the coast” while a “gulf’ is defined as “a
7Other terms generally used for the coastal indentations include inlets, locks, firths, and estuaries.
8Other terms have also been used to imply the same meaning as that o f legal bays. These terms include 
“juridical bays”, “bona fide  bays”, “true bays” and “actual bays”. A legal bay whose mouth is 
completely closed by the application o f a closing line is called a closed bay (that is a bay whose waters 
are national or interior waters) and a bay which does not fall into the category o f closed bays is called 
open bay: (that is a bay whose waters are part of the territorial sea). Those legal bays which are not 
entirely closed by the use o f permissible line o f 24 nautical miles can be called semi-closed bays. While 
waters behind the twenty-four mile line are internal waters, waters of the bay not covered by such a line 
constitute part o f the territorial sea.
°Wang, James C. F., Handbook on Ocean Politics & Law. Greenwood Press, New York, 1992, p.8.
10Shalowitz, Aaron L., Shore and Sea Boundaries. V ol.l, United States Government Publishing Office, 
Washington D.C., 1962, p.34.
1 !The arbitration award of 1910 was an indication of the fact that “there is no precise relation between the 
concavity o f a bay and the conditions necessary for the extension o f national sovereignty over it.” 
Teclaff, Ludwik A., ‘Shrinking the High Seas by Technical Methods - From the 1930 Hague Conference 
to the 1958 Geneva Conference’, University o f Detroit Law Journal. Vol.39. 1962, pp.669-670. Also 
see Gidel, G., Le Droit International Public de la Mer: he Temps de Eoix, Paris, 3 Volumes, 1932­
1934, Vol.3, 1934, p.543.
12Award o f 7 September 1910, The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (United States o f America/Great 
Britain), Permanent Court o f Arbitration, Reports o f International Arbitral Awards, V o l.l 1, 1910, 
pp.174-202, at 198. [Hereinafter Award of 7 September 1910] The arbitral tribunal also enumerated a 
number o f factors which had to be taken into account in determination o f an indentation as a bay. These 
factors were (a) the relation o f the width o f a bay to the length o f its penetration inland, (b) the 
possibility and the necessity o f its being defended by the State in whose territory the bay is indented, (c) 
the special value which the bay has for the industry o f the inhabitants o f its shores, (d) the distance 
which the bay is secluded from the highways o f nations on the open sea and “other circumstances not 
possible to enumerate in general.” Ibid., p.199.
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large indentation of the coast.”13 In practice, there are cases where small 
indentations are known as gulfs, and indentations with a large size are 
called bays.14 For instance, the area of the Hudson Bay is larger than the 
Gulf of St. Tropez whose entrance is only four kilometres.15 This is a 
problem of terminology and all indentations of coasts are examined on 
their legal merits regardless of their geographical name.16
III. Historical Background of the Issue 
of the Delimitation of Bays17
Classical international law had not resolved the issue of the 
delimitation of bays bordered by single States in a concrete way. 
Although it was part of customary law that true bays could be enclosed 
there were no definite rules to govern the regime of demarcation of bays. 
There was an uncertainty in determination as to what bays could be 
enclosed. This uncertainty lasted until 1958 when the codification of the 
TSC ended the controversy over issues existed in the traditional law of the 
sea concerning the demarcation of bays.
As Strohl writes, history evidences that since early times many 
people settled around coastal indentations.18 Westerman also states that 
the first positive laws on the seas provided protection for such coastal 
areas which were vulnerable against any external attack.19 The first 
recorded document which contained the term “bay” was the treaty 
concluded between the Emperor Charles V and King Francis I on 2 
August 1521.20 However, the early agreements on bays did not provide a
13Brittin writes that “a gulf is distinguished from a bay that it is larger and penetrates deeper into land. 
Brittin, Burdick H., International Law for Seagoing Officers. Fourth Edition, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis (Maryland), 1981, p.78.
14Judge McNair recognised the exclusion o f indentations which constitute landlocked waters from the 
delimitation rule o f the low-water mark, “by whatever name they may be called.” He then pointed out 
that ‘[i]t is usual and convenient to call them “bays”, but what really matters is not their label but their 
shape.” (emphasis added) Dissenting Opinion o f Judge McNair, Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. 
Norway), TOT Reports. 1951, p.163. [Hereinafter ICJ Reports, 1951.]
15‘Historic Bays’, Memorandum by the Secretariat o f the United Nations, U N  Document A/CONF.13/1, 
(Preparatory Document N o .l)  [Original Text: French], 30 September 1957, UNCLOS I, Official 
Records. Vol.I (Preparatory Documents), 1958, pp.1-38, p.2. [Hereinafter the 1957 UN Memorandum]
16For the examination o f the concept o f bays and gulfs in geographical and legal contexts see Bouchez,
op. cit., pp.16-19.
17For the origins o f the issue o f bays in historical context see Strohl, op. cit., pp.8-20. 
l s Ibid., p.20.
19Westerman, Gayl S., The Juridical Bav. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, p.34. 
20Strohl, op. cit., p.8.
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clear definition of this term and they only referred to this term in a vague 
way.
Throughout the seventeenth century to the twentieth century, a 
process of reconciliation between the theory of open seas and closed seas 
was shaping. Part of this process was the range of exclusive rights of 
coastal States and that of inclusive rights of international community in 
certain waters adjacent to land mass of coastal States. Notwithstanding, 
inland waters in general and bays in particular were recognised as being 
completely under absolute sovereignty of coastal States. For example, 
even Grotius, as the defender of the classic theory of mare liberum, 
excluded from the application of the theory “inland seas, bays, straits, and 
as large a sea as can be sighted from land. ... In De Jure Belli et Pads 
(1625) he reiterated that a bay or strait may be occupied by the state 
which owns the land on both sides unless the bay is so large in relation to 
the surrounding land mass that it cannot be considered a part of it.”21
Writers following Grotius argued that, in the case of a deep 
indentation of the coast where there is a close relation between land and 
the body of water within the indentation, the freedom of the high seas 
may not be relied upon since in the case of such indentation “the social, 
economic, and defense interests of the coastal state become paramount.”22 
For example, Cauchy (1862) writes that:
... a state of liberty, of free navigation, of common and indivisible 
enjoyment is the normal, natural, and actual status of the sea just as 
private possession, cultivation, or division constitutes the natural, 
normal, or actual state of land. But this first principle of maritime law 
is transformed and modified w h ere  the se a  a p p ro a ch es  the la n d  a n d  
b e c o m e s  a lm o s t confu se w ith  it. Reasons upon which liberty of the 
open sea is founded no longer apply with the same force to either bays 
or gulfs by which the sea penetrates into the land.23 (em ph asis a d d ed )
The view of Creasy (1876) is also worthy quoting. He maintained that:
Those portions of the sea, which are landlocked, and almost enclosed 
within the territories of a State, which are in te r  fa u c e s  te rra e  ... are 
clearly within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the state whose 
lands gird them round. In the case also of bays, or portions of the sea 
not so completely enclosed, but which is a line drawn from one
21Westerman, op. cit., p.45.
22Ibid., p.46.
23Cauchy, Eugene François, Le Droit Maritime International. Guillaumin, Paris, V o l.l, 1862, p.37.
107
promontory or other excrescence of land to another, the State whose 
territories thus clap these oceanic waters, claims and exercises 
jurisdiction over them.24
In 1877, the [British] Privy Council in the case of Direct United 
States Cable Co. v. The Anglo-American Telegraph Co. advised that “the 
general law of nations, as indicated by the text of writers on international 
jurisprudence” demonstrates that there was “an universal agreement that 
harbours, estuaries and bays landlocked belong to the territory of the 
nation which possesses the shores round them”. However, there was no 
“agreement as to what is the rule to determine what is ‘bay’ for this 
purpose.”25
It was not until nineteenth century that jurists tried to identify the 
juridical nature of bays by distinguishing their waters from those of open 
seas. In the nineteenth century, the distinction was however made by the 
use of such terms as “territorial”, “littoral, or “jurisdictional” waters.26 
In addition, there still existed the problem of the area of waters which can 
be enclosed under the rule established for bays. In fact, due to the 
geographical characteristics of bays as arms of the sea and their close 
relationship with land mass, no limits were primarily placed for the area 
of the waters within bays.27 However, by the introduction of the doctrine 
of territorial waters (now territorial sea), jurists started to lay limits on 
the size of bays which could be enclosed.28 This particularly was 
required since the closing line of bays had been accepted to play the role 
of baseline for the measurement of the territorial sea.29
In accordance with the existing trends in the 1920s, Jessup (1927), 
states that three suggestions were developed with regard to enclosure of 
bays:
24See Creasy, Edward Shepherd, First Platform of International Law. J. Van Voorst, London, 1876, 
pp.232-240
25Quoted in Phillimore, R. J., Commentaries upon International Law. London, 4 Volumes, 1979-1988, 
Vol.I, 1879, pp.289-290. For the judgment o f the Privy Council in case o f Direct United States Cable 
Co. v. The Anglo-American Telegraph Co. see A.C. 394 (1877).
26Westerman, op. cit., p.47. See also the view of Lord Hale in ibid., no.53.
27In fact, there existed then only such inaccurate criteria as the range of vision from one shore to another.
28Ibid.
29By the introduction o f the doctrine o f territorial sea, the clear distinction between internal waters and 
territorial waters (that is the territorial sea) was also achieved.
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(a) the strict application of the three mile limit for the territorial sea to 
the case of the delimitation of bays, that is the method of double range of 
this limit (six miles) as permissible length of the closing line of bays30;
(b) the rule which developed in certain conventions that mouths of 
territorial bays should not be longer than ten miles; and
(c) the headland theory according to which all bays are territorial and 
can be enclosed by drawing a line between headlands, regardless of the 
width of the mouth.31 An example of the application of the headland 
theory is the case of Russia which drew such a line 120 miles long 
between the capes of Swietor and Kanin in the Barents Sea in 1910.32 
Although there was no uniform practice on the maximum permissible 
length of the closing line of a true bay, there was a minimum standard. 
The validity of the twice three-mile limit as a minimum limit was not 
challenged and bays whose mouths were six miles or less were 
undoubtedly considered as territorial.33
The following parts will discuss the trends reflected in (a) the 
opinion of authors, (b) the agreements between States on the issues related 
to the delimitation of bays belonging to single coastal States, (c) views of 
tribunal and judicial bodies, and (d) the international efforts in finalising 
these issues.34
3 0 F o t  example, Oppenheim asserted that bays with an entrance from the sea not more than six miles wide 
are certainly territorial while those that have an entrance too wide to be commanded by coastal batteries 
are certainly not. See Oppenheim, L., International Law. 7th ed., London, 1948, V o l.l, p.458. Jessup 
further states that “[b]y custom, however, and by treaty and in special convention the six mile limit has 
frequently been extended to more than six miles.” Jessup, Philip, The Law o f Territorial Waters and 
Maritime Jurisdiction. G. A., Jennings Co., INC., New York, 1927, p.357.
31 Ibid., pp.355-356 and 358. Jessup further makes a distinction among two groups o f authors who 
favoured the headland theory. Both groups were in common that a line should be drawn from 
promontory to promontory. However, one group (which was composed o f such authors as Azuni, Von 
Liszt, Creasy, and Halleck was in the opinion that the waters seaward the line are part o f the high seas 
while the other group was o f the view that waters outside the line up to three miles are part o f the 
territorial sea and the high seas would fall beyond this limit. Ibid., pp.358-359.
32Gidel, op. cit., Vol.3, p.543.
33Jessup, op., cit., p.358.
34For a detailed examination o f the developments on the treatment o f bays in the historical context before 
the UNCLOS I see Westerman, Chapter III (The Historical Treatment o f Bays), pp. 32-74, where the 
author examines the history o f  general practices with respect to bays from ancient time (including 
Roman practice), to the nineteenth century, and finally to the twentieth century up to 1951 when the 
Fisheries Case was dealt with by the ICJ. Also for navigational, economic aspects o f  bays for the 
periods o f  the Roman Empire, the fall o f Rome to 1800, and from 1800 to 1963 see Strohl, op. cit., 
p p .19-53 ,97-138, and 139-182 respectively.
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1. The Views of Publicists on the Delimitation of Bays:
The Period between 1800 to 1910
The issue of the legal regime for treatment of bays was one of the 
concerns of the publicists in the nineteenth century and it also continued 
to be so in the twentieth century. In the period between 1800 and 1910 
many legal scholars expressed their views on why certain coastal 
indentations should be treated in a special way different from other parts 
of coastlines. They were in agreement that because of close relationship 
between the land and waters within bays35, these coastal indentations could 
be considered as part of national territory of coastal States.36 Meanwhile, 
these scholars were concerned that the unregulated and unilateral 
enclosure of wide indentations might impact on the size of the open seas 
available to all countries.37 This was why a number of methods were 
suggested to restrict the enclosure of coastal indentations to a specific 
limit.
Although some publicists were convinced that bays were susceptible 
of enclosure as part of the territory of a coastal State, they did not 
propose any rule on finding those bays which should be treated so. For 
example, in his book The Law of Nations (1916), Vattel (of Switzerland) 
maintained that “[a] bay, entrance into which can be prevented, may be 
possessed and made subject to the laws of the sovereign” but he did not 
mention what bays were to be subject to national domain.38 Bluntschli (of 
Germany) also argued that “[cjertain parts of the sea are so closely united 
to the land that they ought, in a certain measure at least, be considered as
35Lapradelle o f France (1898), for example, maintained that harbors, roadsteads and bays “form part o f  
what may be called the national sea, in order to express the idea that the waters that penetrate thus 
closely into the land form a body within the territory and are associated with it forming the country. 
Strohl, op. cit., 190.
36For example, Testa o f Portugal (1886) asserted that ports, creeks, and bays which could be defended by 
the cross-fire o f  artillery “belong, under the title o f property to the nation which is mistress o f the 
shore” and “the right o f property gives rise to a right o f domain . . . .” Ibid., pp.193-194. Also Westlake 
(1910) was o f the view that as regards bays “if the entrance to one o f them is not more than twice the 
width o f  the littoral sea enjoyed by the country in question - that is, not more than six sea miles in the 
ordinary case, eight in that o f Norway, and so forth - there is no access from the open sea to the bay 
except through the territorial water o f that country, and the inner part o f the bay will belong to that 
country no matter how widely it may expand.” (emphasis added) Quoted in the dissenting opinion of Dr. 
Luis M. Drago, Grounds for the Dissent to the Award On Question V by Dr. Luis M. Drago, The 
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (United States o f America/Great Britain), Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, Reports o f International Arbitral Awards. Voi. 11, 1910, pp.203-211, at 205. [Hereinafter 
Grounds for the Dissent to the Award On Question V by Dr. Luis M. Drago (1910)]
37For example, Rivier (1896) was o f the view that “[a] gulf, even though surrounded by a single State, is 
a free sea if  its entrance is too wide to be dominated from the shore.” Strohl, op. cit., p.193.
™Ibid., p.188.
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a part of the territory of the adjacent State.”39 He did not provide any 
precise limit for the entrance of a bay but made it clear that an exception 
to the general rule of the liberty of the seas was only possible on serious 
grounds and when the extent of the bay is small.40 (emphasis added)
Notwithstanding, there were scholars who not only argued that bays 
had special geographical character but proposed various ways to 
distinguish eligible indentations for the enclosure purpose from those 
which were too large to be enclosed.41 The problem, however, was that 
some of the suggestions on the delimitation of bays were not of certain 
limit. This uncertainty proved to cause some difficulties in determining 
an indentation as a bay. For instance, uncertain proposals included: 
“those bays which could be defended by cannon” (Cussy of France, 1856), 
“cross-fire of guns” (Testa of Portugal, 1886 and Calvo of Argentine, 
1896), cannon shot rule or range of cannon shot (Hautefeuille of France, 
186842, Kleber of Germany, 1874, Liszt of Germany43, 1907, and 
Despagnet of France, 1910), double range of cannon but not more than 
ten miles (Latour of France, 1889).44 Since there was no uniform 
practice on the method of delimitation of bays, some writers referred to a 
number of ways which could be used in the delimitation of bays. For 
instance, Ortolan of France (1853), inter alia, suggested that bays which 
were not larger than twice range of cannon or those whose entrance may 
be controlled by artillery were qualified to be closed.45 There also existed 
proposals based on specific limits. These proposals were made at the end 
of the nineteenth century or early twentieth century when it became clear 
that there had to be a precise criterion for the maximum width for the 
entrance of those bays which could be qualified as closed bays. The 
proposals included such distances as ten miles (Rivier of Switzerland,
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41In the case o f Direct United States Cable Co. v. The Anglo-American Telegraph Co. (1877), the 
[British] Privy Council referred to different opinions expressed by writers. See Phillimore, op. cit., 
Vol.1, pp.289-290.
42See Hautefeuille, L. B., Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations Neutres , V o l.l, 3rd ed., Paris, 1868, 
p.52.
43Liszt described the cannon shot rule with respect to bays in the following words: “The border o f the 
inner portion o f bays and inlets is determined by drawing an imaginary straight line from headland to 
headland at the width o f the bay where the middle point o f the line can be reached by the cannons placed 
upon both headlands o f the shore.” Strohl, op. cit., p.191.
^ Ibid ., pp.188, 189, 190, and 193.
4^Ibid., p.192. N ys o f Belgium also proposed three distances for the mouth o f those bays susceptible to 
enclosure. These distances were ten miles, 12 miles, and the distance twice cannon range. Ibid., p.191.
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1896 and Schucking of Germany, 1897) and 12 miles (Olivart of Spain, 
1903).46
2. The Limit Adopted for the Territorial Bays in Bilateral 
and Multilateral Treaties in 19th and 20th Centuries
Although States applied different limits for the enclosure of their 
bays, there was a trend in the nineteenth century, which was followed in 
the early twentieth century, to include the ten mile limit for the 
delimitation of bays.47 Many agreements, in particular fisheries 
agreements, were concluded in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries that adhered a limit of ten miles for the delimitation of bays. It 
seems that at that time it was supposed that the ten mile limit would be a 
proper basis for striking the balance between the interests of coastal States 
and those of international community of States. However, the rule was 
not internationally followed to be a rule of international law. This was 
due to the fact that such limits as twelve miles were also used for the 
maximum width of territorial bays.48 The main bilateral and multilateral 
agreements which provided a maximum length of ten miles for the width 
of national bays were:
(a) The 1839 Franco-British Treaty on Fisheries (2 August 1839)49;
46Ibid., pp.191 and 193. Lapradelle o f France (1898) was o f the view that either o f ten mile limit or 
twelve m ile limit could be used. He wrote that “[tjerritorial Sea in its precise sense does not include 
harbors, roadsteads and indentations whose opening upon the open sea is less than 10 or 12 marine 
miles wide.” Ibid., p.190.
47Colombos writes that the six mile limit was extended to ten mile limit in special conventions “in order 
to obviate .... the difficulty o f claims as regards fishery rights in small bays.” Colombos, C. John, The 
International Law of the Sea. Sixth Revised Edition, Longmans, London, 1967, p.178. As regards the 
reasons for adoption o f a ten mile limit for the mouth o f territorial bays, the view o f Judge John Bassett 
Moore is worthy o f attention. Judge Moore held that "... there have been supposed to exist reasons 
both o f convenience and o f safety. The ten-mile line has been adopted [in certain cases] ... as a 
particular rule. The transgression o f an encroachment upon territorial waters by fishing vessels is 
generally a grave offence, involving in many instances the forfeiture o f the offending vessel and it is 
obvious that the narrower the space in which it is permissible to fish the more likely the offence is to 
be committed. In order therefore that fishing may be both practicable and safe and not constantly 
attended with the risk o f violating territorial waters, it has been thought to be expedient not to allow it 
where the extent o f free waters, between the three-mile line drawn on each side o f the bay, is less than 
four miles. This is the reason o f the ten-mile line........” Jessup, op. cit., p.356.
48In practice and by treaty , the principle o f the closing line has been applied to bays whose entrance 
width is ten to twelve miles. Some States also claim wider bays. Brittin, op. cit., p.78.
49Article IX o f the treaty, inter alia, provided that: “It is agreed that the distance o f three miles fixed as 
the general limit for the exclusive right over fishery upon the coasts o f the two countries, shall, with 
respect to bays the mouths o f which do not exceed ten miles in width, be measured from a straight line 
drawn from headland to headland.” Hertslet, L., A Complete Collection o f the Treaties and Conventions 
between Great Britain and Foreign Powers. London, 1840-1925, 31 Volumes, Vol.V, p.89. (Hereinafter 
Hertslet’s Treaties and Conventions)
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(b) Regulations between Great Britain and France, 24 May 184350;
(c) Treaty between Great Britain and France, 11 November 186751;
(d) Agreement between Great Britain and North German Federation 
(British Notice to fishermen by the Board of Trade, November 1868.)52;
(e) Great Britain and German Empire, British Board of Trade, 
December 187453;
(f) The Fisheries Agreement of 1880 between Germany and Denmark54;
(g) The 1882 North Sea Convention (6 May 1882): [Treaty between 
Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands 
for regulating the police of the North Sea Fisheries, May 6, 1882]55;
(h) The 1893 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Spain and 
Portugal (27 March 1893)56; and
50These Regulations were agreed to put into effect the provisions o f the 1839 Convention between 
France and Great Britain. Article II o f the Regulations provided that: “The limits, within which the 
general right o f fishery is exclusively reserved to the subjects o f the two kingdoms respectively, are 
fixed with the exception o f those in Granville Bay at 3 miles distance from the low water mark. With 
respect to bays, the mouths o f which do not exceed ten miles in width, the 3 mile distance is measured 
from a straight line drawn from headland to headland.” Hertslet’s Treaties and Conventions. Vol.VI, 
p.416. Colombos writes that the 1839 Anglo-French Convention, the 1843 Anglo-French Fisheries 
Regulations, and the 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention were denounced by Great Britain in 1964 
when the European Fisheries Convention came into being. Colombos, op. cit., p.179, n o .l.
51 Article I o f the Treaty was as follows: “British fishermen shall enjoy the exclusive right o f fishery 
within the distance of 3 miles from low water mark, along the whole extent o f the coasts o f the British 
Islands. The distance o f 3 miles fixed as the general limit for the exclusive right o f fishery upon the 
coasts o f the two countries shall, with respect to bays, the mouths o f which do not exceed ten miles in 
width be measured from a straight line drawn from headland to headland. The miles mentioned in the 
present convention are geographical miles whereof 60 make a degree o f latitude.” Hertslet’s Treaties and 
Conventions. VolJCII, p.1126.
52The Agreement, inter alia, stated that: “1. The exclusive fishery limits o f the German Empire are 
designated by the Imperial Government as follows: that tract o f the sea which extends to a distance of 3 
sea miles from the extremest limits which the ebb leaves dry of the German North Sea Coast o f the 
German Islands or flats lying before it, as well as those bays and incurvations o f the coast which are ten 
sea miles or less in breadth reckoned from the extremest points o f the land and the flats, must be 
considered as under the territorial sovereignty of North Germany.” Hertslet’s Treaties and Conventions, 
Vol.XIV, p.1055.
53The content o f the notice is the same as the text o f the Agreement o f November 1868 between the two 
countries and the only difference is the words “German Empire” were replaced by the words “North 
Germany”. See Hertslet’s Treaties and Conventions. Vol.XIV, p.1058.
54Fulton, Thomas W., The Sovereignty o f the Sea. William Blackwood and Sons, Edinbourgh, 1911, 
p.652.
55Article II o f  the 1882 North Sea Convention provided that: “II. Les pecheurs nationaux jouiront du 
droit exclusifde peche dans le rayon de 3 miles, a partir de la laisse de basse mer, le long de toute 
Vetendue des cotes de leurs pays respectifs, ainsi que des iles et des bancs qui en dependent. Pour les 
bales le rayon de 3 milles sera mesure a partir d ’une ligne droite, tiree, en travers de la bale, dans la 
partie la plus rapporchee de Ventree, au premier point ou Vouvouerture n ’excedera pas 10 milles.” 
Hertslet’s Treaties and Conventions. Vol.XV, p.794. The same rule was incorporated into the Anglo- 
Danish Convention o f 24 June 1901 with respect to fisheries in the Faeroes Islands and Iceland. 
Colombos, op. cit., p.179.
56Appendix 6 , Fisheries, Article 2: ... “As regards bays the aperture o f which is not more than 10 miles, 
the 6  miles (fisheries zone) may be reckoned from a straight line drawn fro one point to the other.” 
Strohl, op. cit., p.160.
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(i) The 1901 Convention between Great Britain and Demark for 
regulating the fisheries outside territorial waters in the ocean surrounding 
the Farve Islands and Iceland (24 June 1901)57.
3. The Moray Firth Case (1906):
Application of the Ten Mile Limit
Moray Firth is located on the northeast coast of the mainland of 
Scotland. Its mouth is as wide as 73 miles and the depth of the firth 
penetration into land is around 20 miles.58 For centuries local fishermen 
have been involved in fishing inside the bay in a sustainable manner. 
However, the developments in shipping industries and the production of 
very large fishing vessels brought about the concern that the fish stock in 
the Firth would be in danger of depletion if no regulations were made to 
manage its fish resources. The concern over the possible depletion of fish 
resources was also intensified by the fact that many fishing vessels 
registered in Norway were fishing inside the firth, while the ownership of 
these vessels belonged to British citizens. It was in line with these facts 
that the British Parliament enacted the Herring Fisheries Act in 1889. At 
this time, Britain had claimed a ten mile limit for the closing line of the 
Firth from which the three mile territorial sea was measured.
The Moray Firth Case of 1906 (Mortensen v. Peters59) resulted 
from the involvement of a fishing vessel, the Catalonia inside the Firth 
after the enactment of the 1889 Act. The Catalonia was registered in 
Norway and was claimed to be in the three mile territorial sea of Britain 
which was measured from a closing line of ten mile length linking the 
headlands of the Firth. Accordingly, Mortensen, the Captain of the 
vessels, was arrested and put on the trial. One issue was whether the 1889 
Act could apply to foreign ships as well as British ships. The court held
57Article 2: ... As regards bays, the distance o f 3 miles (territorial waters) shall be measured from a 
straight line drawn across the bay, in the part nearest the entrance, at the first point where the width 
does not exceed 10 miles.” Ibid., p.160. Also see the British Order in Council (23 October 1877) where 
the range o f the application o f the order also included bays less than 10 miles wide. Hgrtslgt § Treaties 
and Conventions. Vol.XIV, p.1032. The ten mile limit was also mentioned in the unratified Treaty of 
1888 Between the United States and Great Britain (Article 1) With respect to the ten mile limit, the 
Government o f the United States was of the view that “[t]he width o f ten miles was proposed not only 
because it had been followed in Conventions between many other powers, but also because it was 
deemed reasonable and just in the present case [the case o f the Treaty o f 1888] ... .” Cited in Grounds 
for the Dissent to the Award On Question V by Dr. Luis M. Drago (1910), op. cit., p.210.
58Strohl, op. cit., p.162.
59por the examination o f the case see Hurst, Cecil, ‘The Territoriality o f Bays’, BYIL, Vol.3, 1922­
1923, pp.44 et seq.
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that the English laws would apply not only to British citizens but also to 
foreigners [in the British territory].60 Mortensen rejected that the vessel 
was in the British territorial sea on the basis that Norway was not a party 
to the 1882 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Convention which recognised a 
ten mile limit for enclosure of bays. The court did not accept that such 
fact would prevent it from proceeding. Mortensen was then convicted 
and his appeal was unsuccessful. The court finally held that the whole 
part of the Moray Firth was a bay and the ten mile limit was only an 
“arbitrary and artificial” boundary limit.61
Following the case, many similar incidents involving Norwegian- 
flag vessels occurred in the Firth. Since the captains of the vessels were 
arrested, tried and convicted, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry took 
actions by sending delegates to the British Foreign Ministry to resolve the 
matter. Subsequently, the captains were released and no fines were paid. 
The incidents in the Moray Firth and the following judicial decisions led 
to a discussion in the British House of Lords. In the House the British 
Government expressed that the extent of sovereignty in bays is “an 
unsettled matter” in international law.62 It then held that the court’s 
interpretation of the 1889 Act is inconsistent with international law and 
other States would not easily consider the Moray Firth as a territorial 
bay.63
4. The 1910 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case 
and the Issue of the Delimitation of Bays
The trend to enclose certain bays and to implement the ten mile 
limit for the enclosure of bays was strengthened by the award of an 
international arbitral tribunal in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case 
which is subject of the following examination. The award was an
60Colombos, op. cit., p.183.
61Strohl, op. cit., p.163.
62Ibid. . . .
63Ibid. In another case which occurred in the Bristol Channel, the view expressed by the British Foreign 
Office demonstrated that the Bristol Channel was not entirely located in the domain o f Britain. The case 
arose as a result o f a collision which occurred within the Channel where the distance between the shores 
were 20 miles. The case was brought before a British Court of Appeal in 1927. However, as a result 
o f the view o f the British Foreign Office that the place of the collision did not fall into the British 
domain, the Court agreed that the matter to be decided by the Foreign Office. The Office was possibly 
o f the view that the closing line of the channel would be located where the width o f the channel would 
not be larger than six miles. This British position appears to have been part o f its then policy to 
narrow the claims over bays to the utmost possible. Smith, H. A., The Law and Custom of the Sea, 
Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1948, p .l l .
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important source of analysis of the issue of the delimitation of bays at the 
time when the case brought before the tribunal. In particular, the 
tribunal presented a general definition for those bays qualified as national.
The disputes between United States and Great Britain on fisheries 
around British maritime territories can be traced back to nineteenth 
century. In the history of these disputes a turning point was the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Ghent between these two countries on 
fisheries in Canadian bays in order to end their fisheries conflicts. 
According to this treaty (which was concluded on 20 October 1818) 
American fishermen were permitted to fish in certain waters around 
British maritime territories. Article I of the treaty defined the areas 
where American fishermen could fish. This article stated that “the United 
States hereby renounce forever, any liberty therefore enjoyed or claimed 
by the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, or cure fish on, or within three 
marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks or harbors of His 
Britannic Majesty’s dominions in America and included within the above 
mentioned limits.” (emphasis added)
Although the 1818 Treaty was a step forward to possible settlement 
of fisheries disputes between the United States and Great Britain, it 
proved unsuccessful to put an end to such disputes. In fact, Great Britain 
continued to exclude American fishermen from all bays, no matter how 
wide their mouths were. The British Government’s position was that all 
bays could be enclosed by drawing a line linking the headlands of the bays 
from where the three miles of territorial waters were to be measured 
from. Although the United States protested against the British claims over 
bays, only the Bay of Fundy was excluded from the headland theory in 
1845.64
In the period before the arbitral award in 1910, two cases were 
dealt with under the Claims Convention of 8 February 1853. These cases 
resulted from the capture of two American ships by Britain on the basis 
of the headland theory. In the first case, the Washington, an American 
ship, was seized in the Bay of Fundy64 5 where it was at a distance of ten
64jessup, op. tit., p.365.
65The Bay o f Fundy is from sixty-five to seventy-five miles wide and one hundred thirty to one hundred 
forty miles long. Ibid.
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miles from the British shore.66 In the view of the British Government the 
Bay of Fundy was a “bay” within the meaning of the treaty 1818 and it 
maintained that its jurisdiction would extend to a three mile limit from a 
line drawn from headland to headland on the shores of the bay. This 
contention was rejected on the basis of the following argument:
[The] doctrine of headlands is new, and has received a proper limit in 
the convention between France and Great Britain of 2nd August 1839, 
in which ‘it [was] agreed that the distance of three miles fixed as the 
general limit for the exclusive right of fishery upon the coasts of the 
two countries shall, with respect to bays, the mouths of which do not 
exceed ten miles in width, be measured from a straight line drawn from 
headland to headland.’67
The arbitral tribunal also held that the word “bay” as applied to the 
Bay of Fundy “has the same meaning as that applied to the Bay of Biscay, 
the Bay of Bengal, over which no nation can have the right to assume the 
sovereignty.”68... It has been noted that the British Government itself had 
already abandoned its headland claim in regard to this body of water. 
The second case was that of the Argus, seized for fishing within a fine 
drawn from headland to headland from Cow Bay to Cape North, though 
the schooner was twenty-eight miles from the nearest land. In this case 
two thousand dollars damages were awarded.
A number of other incidents also occurred in the period of 1886 to 
1888 which resulted in seizure of such American vessels as David J. 
Adams, the Everett Steele, the Marion Grimes.69 It was in 1888 that the 
United States of America and Great Britain signed a treaty clarifying that 
as regards bays the three mile limit of territorial waters under the treaty 
of 1818 the ten mile rule would apply, though certain bays were treated 
differently. This treaty did not come into effect since it was not 
ratified.70 It was finally on 27 January 1909 that the Unites States of 
America and Great Britain signed an agreement under the General 
Arbitration Treaty of 4 April 1908 to resolve their disputes on fisheries 
around then British maritime domains.
66For the facts on the Washington Case see Moore, J. B., International Arbitrations (A History and 
Digest o f the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a P arty), 6 Volumes, 
1898, Vol.IV, p.4342. The award on this case can be found in Moore, J. B., A Digest Of International 
Law. Washington, 8 Volumes, 1906, VoU, p.785.





An arbitration tribunal was established by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration at the Hague to deal with the case. Seven questions were 
asked of the tribunal. The fifth question related to the issue delimitation 
of bays in accordance with the Treaty of 1818. The question was ‘[f]rom 
where must be measured the “three marine miles of any of the coasts, 
bays, creeks, or harbours” referred to in the said Article [Article I of the 
Treaty of 1818]?’™
The view of the United States was that the term “bays” was included 
in the treaty as to mean very small indentations which could be 
categorised in the same class as creeks and harbours.71 2 In other words, 
the contention of the United States of America was that the words 
“coasts, bays, creeks or harbours” are used in the 1818 Treaty ‘only to 
express and be equivalent to the word “coast”, whereby the three marine 
miles would be measured from the sinuosities of the coast and the 
renunciation would apply only to the waters of bays within three miles.”73 
The tribunal did not agree with this view on a number of grounds 
including its understanding of the term “bays” in geographical sense.74
However, the British position was that the term “bays” in 
geographical sense means the large indentations which are identified on 
maps.75 Great Britain was also of the opinion that “there was [then] no 
principle of the law of nations under which the meaning [of the term 
“bays”] could be limited to bays of a certain extent only.”76
On the question as to where the closing line should be drawn across 
a bay for the purpose of measurement of the territorial waters (territorial
71Award o f 7 September 1910, op. cit., p.195.
72Jessup, op. cit., p.368
73See Award of 7 September 1910, op. cit., p.198. The United States representative, Mr. Root held that 
there was no question o f the British sovereignty over those bays on the British coasts which were not 
more than six mile wide. However, in his view, bays wider than six miles at the mouth were not to be 
considered territorial bays and American fishermen were entided to fish in these bodies o f waters in 
accordance with the 1818 Treaty. Mr. Root, however, excluded those bodies of waters larger than six 
miles at the mouth to be claimed on the ground of prescriptive rights. Jessup, op. cit., p.368. This 
position seems to have been resulted from the fact that the United States itself had then claimed 
sovereignty over Chesapeake and Delaware Bays on historic bases. The entire argument o f the 
representative o f the United States o f America, Mr. Root, in the North Atlantic Fisheries Case was 
edited by Bacon and Scott and was published in 1917.
74Award o f 7 September 1910, op. cit., p.198.
75Jessup, op. cit., p.368
76Ibid., p.373.
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sea), the tribunal ruled that “[i]n case of bays, the three marine miles [then 
the most applied limit of the territorial sea] are to be measured from a 
straight line drawn across the body of water at the place where it ceases to 
have the configuration and characteristics of a bay.11 At all other places 
the three marine miles are to be measured following the sinuosities of the 
coast.”* 78 (iemphasis added)
It was in line with the existing practice and trend that the arbitral 
tribunal finally recommended, inter alia, to the parties that “[i]n every 
bay ... shall be drawn three miles seaward from a straight line across the 
bay in the part nearest the entrance at the first point where the width does 
not exceed ten miles.”79 This indicates that the tribunal did not find the 
headland theory as an established rule in State practice and recommended 
the specific limit of ten miles for the closing line across a bay. Although 
the tribunal recognised the criterion of the ratio of penetration of body of 
water to the width of the entrance and also suggested a ten mile limit for 
the length of the closing line, it did not lay down any practical formula 
for the determination of an indentation as a true bay.
5. The Views of the International Institutions on 
the Issue of the Delimitation of Bays
A. Institut de Droit International
The Institut de Droit International adopted a set of draft articles on 
the legal regime of the territorial sea at its Paris session in March 1894.
11 As regards the concept o f “configuration o f a bay”, Drago in his dissenting opinion asserted that 
although the arbitral tribunal considered the configuration of a bay as an essential element in enclosing 
a bay, “no rule is laid out or general principle evolved for the parties to know what the nature o f such 
configuration is or by what methods the points should be ascertained from which the bay should lose 
the characteristics o f such.” Grounds for the Dissent to the Award On Question V by Dr. Luis M. 
Drago (1910), op. cit., p. 211.
78Award o f 7 September 1910, op. cit., p.199.
79Ibid. The outcome o f the award of 7 September 1910 was the conclusion o f an agreement between the 
United States o f America and Great Britain on 20 July 1912 in Washington, that is the Agreement 
between the United States and Great Britain Adopting with Certain Modifications the Rules and Method 
o f Procedure Recommended in the Award o f September 7, 1910, o f the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries 
Arbitration. Article 2 o f the Agreement adopted the ten mile rule for the bays contiguous to the 
territory o f the Dominion o f Canada while, in accordance o f the award, it excluded the Baie des 
Chaleurs, the Bay o f Miramichi, the Egmont Bay, S t  Ann’s Bay, Barrington Bay, Chedabucto and St. 
Peter’s Bays, the Mira Bay, and St. Mary’s Bay from the rule. For these bays base points for the 
closing lines are defined in Article. 2 according to the award. It was also asserted that the award did not 
cover Hudson Bay. Ibid., pp.222-226, at 225. It should, however, be pointed out that in 1913 the 
United States Naval war College recommended a line to be drawn across bays “where the distance first 
narrows to twelve miles.” Jessup, op. cit., p.360.
119
Article 3 of this draft was devoted to the issue of the delimitation of bays 
for the purpose of the establishment of the inner part of the territorial 
sea. The Institut was of the view that:
“In the case of bays, the territorial sea follows the sinuosities of the 
coast, except that it is measured from a straight line drawn across the 
bay80 at the place nearest the opening toward sea, where the distance 
between the two shores of the bay is twelve nautical m iles... ”81
The Institut accepted that the baseline of bays should differ from 
the one used for other parts of the coasts and viewed that bays can be 
closed if the width of their mouth would not exceed twelve miles.82 This 
implies that in the view of the Institut an ordinary bay could not be closed 
by a straight line if its mouth is more than twelve miles. With regard to 
this kind of bay, the baseline appeared to be the low-water mark 
following the sinuosities of the coast. In its draft on the territorial sea 
adopted at the Stockholm session in 1928, the Institut maintained the same 
provision in Article 3 of the draft provisions except it changed the 
maximum permissible length of the closing line from twelve miles to ten 
miles.83
B. International Law Association
The International Law Association adopted its draft articles on 
territorial waters at its Brussels session in 1895. Article 3 of this daft 
provisions dealt with the issue of delimitation of bays in the same manner 
as the Institut de Droit International (Article 3, Paris Draft Articles on 
the Territorial Sea, 1894).84 The only difference was that the ILA 
considered a ten mile width as the maximum width for the mouth of bays 
if these coastal indentations were to be enclosed by a straight line.85
80It seems that in practical sense the territorial sea would not follow the sinuosities o f the coast if  it is 
measured from the closing line o f bays. This is because such a line is a straight line which does not
follow the pattern o f the coast . , . .
81 Aft 3  ̂ Règles sur la définition et le régime de la mer territoriale, Annuaire de L Institut. de Droit
international (1894-1895). Vol. 13, p.329.
82xhe twelve-mile limit was adopted by the Institut as the double limit of the breadth o f the territorial sea 
since the Institut in its meeting o f 1894 adopted the breadth o f six marine miles for the territorial sea.
83Stockholm Session o f the Institut de Droit International, August 1928, Annuaire de L Institut de Droit 
Trtffimational, Vol.34, p.755.
84jlA, Report o f the Seventeenth Conference, Brussels, 1895, p.115.
85Also see ILA, Report o f the Thirty-fourth Conference. Vienna, 1926.
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C. American Institute of International Law
The Commission established by the American International Law to 
codify rules of American International Law presented its work (Project 
No. 10) in 1925. Article 6 of this project contained the principle of 
closing line for bays without indicating the maximum permissible width 
for the purpose of enclosing them. However, the provision was clear 
with respect to its application only to those bays located in the coast of a 
single State. In its words, Article 6 provided that:
For bays extending into the territory of a single American Republic the 
territorial sea follows the sinuosities of the coast, except that it is 
measured from a straight line drawn across the bay at the point nearest 
the opening into the sea where the two coasts of the bay are separated 
by a distance of -  marine miles ... ,86
D. Japanese Society of International Law
The Japanese Society of International Law prepared a draft set of 
rules in its 1926 session. As part of this work, a provision was included 
on the delimitation of bays and gulfs. Article 4 of the draft stated that 
“[i]n the case of bays and gulfs, the coasts of which belong to the same 
State, the littoral waters extend seawards at right angles from a straight 
line drawn across the bay or gulf at the first point nearest the open sea 
where the width does not exceed ten marine miles ... .”87 The inclusion 
of a ten mile limit for the width of bays in Article 4 was in agreement 
with Article 3 of the 1895 draft articles of the International Law 
Association.88
E. Remarks on the Work of International Institutions 
Concerning the Delimitation of Bays
As is clear from quotations above, there has been a general 
agreement among international institutions that bays should be treated 
differently from regular parts of the coast due to their close relation with
86a t t t ., Special Supplement. Vol.20, 1926, p.318.
87The 1957 UN Memorandum, op. cit., p.15
88The Third Committee of the Second Hague Peace Conference also recommended a ten mile limit for the 
closing lines o f bays in relation to “the laying of automatic submarine contact mines.” Jessup, op. cit.y 
p.361. See also Report to the Hague Conference o f 1899 and 1907, p.604.
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the land territory.89 It was apparent that special treatment of bays would 
be limited to those bays found in the coast of a single State.90 The main 
divergence of view, however, was on the maximum permissible length of 
the closing line for these water penetrations into the land. In addition, 
one major shortcoming of the texts prepared by the international 
institutions was the lack of any provision to precisely define the concept 
of “bay”.
6. The 1930 Hague Conference on the Codification 
of International Law
The Preparatory Committee of the 1930 Hague Conference (13 
March - 12 April 1930) prepared a set of bases of discussion91, 26 in 
total, on territorial waters.92 These bases of discussion were prepared 
after governments reflected their views in response to the questionnaire 
No.2 (on territorial waters) prepared by the Committee of Experts.93
89See also the work o f the Harvard Law School. Research in International Law (Nationality, 
Responsibility o f States, and Territorial Waters), Harvard Law School, 1929, p.266 (Art.5). Reproduced 
in AJIL. Special Supplement, Vol.23, April 1929, pp.243-380.
90The institutions have also addressed the issue of “historic bays.” See for example Art.3, Règles sur la 
définition et le régime de la mer territoriale, Annuaire de L ’Institut de Droit International (1894-1895), 
Vol. 13, p.329; Stockholm Session o f the Institut de Droit International, August 1928, Annuaire de 
L ’Institut de Droit International, Vol.34, p.755; Art.3 o f the draft articles prepared at the Brussels 
Session o f the ILA (1895), ILA, Report o f the Seventeenth Conference. Brussels, 1895; ILA, Report 
o f the Thirty-fourth Conference. Vienna, 1926, pp.43 and 102; AJIL. Special Supplement. Vol.20, 
1926, p.318; A rt.ll, “project on the Territorial Sea”, submitted to the Seventh International Conference 
of American States, American Institute of International Law, 3 December 1933; Harvard Law School. 
Research in International Law (Nationality, Responsibility of States, and Territorial Waters), Harvard 
Law School, 1929, in AJIL. Special Supplement, Vol.23, April 1929, pp.266 & 268.
91Bases o f Discussion Nos. 7, 8, and 9 were respectively related to the issues o f bays which belong to 
single States, historic bays, and bays located in the coasts o f two or more coastal States. Following 
the submission o f the Bases o f the Discussion to the 1930 Hague Conference, debates were made on all 
points raised by these Bases toward reaching a possible agreement on all related issues.
92In its resolution o f 27 September 1927, the Assembly o f the League o f Nations called the League 
Council to appoint a Preparatory Committee in order to prepare bases o f discussion within the scope of 
the first Codification Conference. The Committee was thus established in accordance with the 
resolution o f 28 September 1927 o f the Assembly of the League of Nations. The Committee examined 
the responses o f governments to the questionaries prepared by the Committee o f Experts. The 
Committee o f Experts was set up in accordance with the resolution o f 22 September 1924 o f the 
Assembly o f the League of Nations to advise the League Council on the questions o f international law 
which were ripe enough to be codified. On the basis o f the work done by the Committee o f Experts, 
The Assembly decided that a conference to be convened to examine three issue for the purpose of 
codification. These issues were: (1) Nationality; Territorial Waters; and (3) Responsibility of States for 
Damage done in their Territory to the Persons or Property of Foreigners.
93The Committee o f Experts adopted seven questionnaires in its session o f January 1926 on certain 
aspects o f international law which in its view were ripe enough to be codified. These questionnaires 
were circulated among States on 29 January 1926. Questionnaire No.2 was devoted to the issue of 
territorial waters. The documents enclosed with the questionnaire were a memorandum o f the rapporteur 
o f the Sub-Committee (Territorial Waters), Mr. Schucking, a draft convention and its amended version. 
As regards bays, the view of the Committee o f experts was “[i]n the case o f bays which are bordered by 
the territory o f a single State, the territorial sea shall follow the sinuosities o f the coast, except that it
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With respect to bays, the question submitted to governments was to 
answer how the territorial sea had to be measured “in front of bays 
(taking into account the breadth of the bay)”, “historic bays”, and “bays 
whose coast belong to two or more States.”94
A . Views of Governments on the Issue of the 
Delimitation of Bays
The views expressed by the governments indicated that there was a 
general agreement that ordinary bays could be enclosed, but the debate 
was about how this enclosure had to be done. In particular, the questions 
of what indentations can be regarded as bays and what had to be the 
maximum permissible width for bays were at stake. Certain governments 
presented their views as follows.95
Australia was of the view that bays may be enclosed where their 
mouth do not exceed six miles, though it expressed its readiness to 
consider the ten mile limit if States were generally prepared to adopt such 
a limit.96 * Belgium referred to “double the limit of breadth to be adopted 
for territorial waters” for enclosing bays, while it suggested three mile 
limit for the breadth of territorial waters. The view of Denmark was that 
“[b]ays not exceeding ten nautical miles in width at their entrance, or 
having islands not more than ten nautical miles apart at their entrance, are
shall be measured from a straight line drawn across the bay at the part nearest to the opening towards 
the sea, where the distance between two shores o f the bay is 12 marine miles, unless a greater distance 
has been established by continuous and immemorial usage.” Article 4, Draft Convention on Territorial 
Waters as Amended by M. Schucking the Rapporteur the Committee o f Experts for the Progressive 
Codification o f International Law in consequence o f the Discussion in the Committee o f Experts, in 
Rosenne, op. cit., Vol.2, Annex, p.411. Jessup described the formula suggested by the Committee of 
Experts as an application o f  the headland theory in “its restricted form.” Jessup, op. cit., p.362. The 
view o f the Committee o f Experts was identical to that o f the Institut de Droit International. See the 
view o f Institut de Droit International above.
94It is asserted that at the time o f the 1930 Hague Conference, the agreement o f  the international 
community on three main issues concerning the delimitation o f bays was a prerequisite for establishing 
international legal rules to fill the gap resulted from the lack o f such rules. These three issues were: (a) 
the issue o f historic bays (those bays which were already claimed by certain States irrespective o f their 
width; (b) the issue o f permissible width o f closing lines for bays other than historic bays; and (c) the 
issue o f establishing a method o f measurement to identify a bay as the one entitle to be enclosed by a 
closing line across its mouth. See Hyde, Charles Cheney, International Law Chiefly As Interpreted 
and Applied bv the United States. Vol. 1, Second Revised Edition, Little, Brown and Company, 
Boston, 1945, p.478. Another issue should be added to this list: the issue o f the delimitation o f bays 
whose mouths belong to two or more coastal States.
95Certain governments also addressed the issue o f historic bays in their replies that will be discussed 
infra.
96Rosenne, Shabtai (ed.), League o f Nations Conference for the Codification o f International Law ri93QL
Vol.2, Oceana Publications INC., Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1975, p.257.
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considered as national waters.”97 Estonia indicated its agreement with the 
formula included into Article 4 of the draft convention prepared by the 
Committee of Experts.98 Finland replied that the formula of the 
Committee was acceptable but “the question of the maximum width 
between the two shores of the bay should be left open, as the settlement of 
this question would depend on the breadth adopted for the territorial 
sea.”99
France listed a number of agreements and conventions which 
applied a limit of ten miles for the width of bays entitled to be enclosed. 
While some documents France was referring to stated that “the baseline 
consists of a straight line from one cape to the other”, other documents 
provided that “the baseline adopted for bays is a straight line drawn 
across the bay in the part nearest the entrance, at the first where the 
opening no longer exceeds ten miles.”100 The former included the 
Fisheries Convention of 2 August 1839 between France and Great Britain 
(Article 9) and the Fisheries Regulations of 24 May 1843 between the 
same countries (Article 2). The latter included the North Sea Fisheries 
Convention of 6 May 1882 (Article II); Article I of the French Law of 1 
March 1888 on fishing in territorial waters, and Article 2 of the Decree 
of 18 October 1912 concerning the application of the Hague Convention 
XIII of 1907. Germany relied on its Prize-Law Regulations to 
demonstrate the German practice with respect to the delimitation of bays 
at the time of the 1930 Hague Conference. These regulations provided 
that “a bay is only regarded as forming part of the inland waters of the 
coastal States provided te width of the entrance does not exceed sic 
nautical miles. ... If the width of the entrance of the bay exceeds six 
nautical miles, the boundary between inland and territorial waters is 
formed by a line drawn within the bay at the point where the width of the 
bay ceases to exceed six nautical miles.”101
Germany also referred to the North Sea Fisheries Convention of 6 
May 1882 which included a maximum three nautical miles for the line 
enclosing a bay for fisheries purposes as follows: “In bays, the zone of 
three nautical miles shall be calculated on the basis of an imaginary
91 Ibid., p.258. 
5)8Ibid.
" ib id .,  p.259.
100 Ibid.
M 'lbid ., p.257.
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straight line drawn in the part of the bay nearest the entrance, from one 
shore to the other, at the place where the width of the entrance no longer 
exceeds ten nautical miles.”102 Great Britain pointed out that the baseline 
with respect to bays is the one which passes across their mouth “from the 
land on one side to the land on the other side” and emphasised that a bay 
had to be “something more pronounced than a mere curvature of the 
coast” and “[t]here must be a distinct and well-defined inlet, moderate in 
size, and long in proportion to its width.”103 While Great Britain was in 
favour of a six mile limit for bays closing lines, it was ready to consider 
the ten mile limit.104
Italy suggested a breadth of twenty miles for the line to be drawn 
across a bay as the baseline.105 Japan expressed its opinion in the 
following words: “In the case of a bay or gulf, the coast of which belongs 
to a single State, the territorial waters extend seawards at right angles 
from a straight line drawn across the bay or gulf at the first point nearest 
the open sea where the distance between the two coasts does not exceed 
ten nautical miles.”106 Japan was of the view that in the case of a bay or a 
gulf whose mouth is larger than ten nautical miles “the territorial waters 
follow the trend of the whole of the coast of the bay or gulf.”107 Latvia 
was in favour of twelve miles (6+6) for the maximum width of a line for 
the purpose of enclosing bays.108 Although Latvia used the term 
territorial waters in reference to waters behind such a closing line, these 
waters are those which are now termed internal waters.
Due to the particular geographical conditions found in Norwegian 
coasts, the response of Norway was different from other governments. 
Expressing that there was no rule in Norway to limit the length of 
baselines, it stated that “all fjords, bays, and coastal inlets [located on 
Norwegian coasts] have always been claimed as part of the Norwegian 
maritime territory, whatever the width at their mouth and no matter 




105Ibid., p.260. Although Italy suggested the twelve mile rule at the 1930 Hague Conference, the Italian 
Law o f 16 June 1912 on regulation of passage of merchant ships had considered the distance o f ten 
miles for the closing lines o f bays. Jessup, op. cit., p.361.




“Skjaergard.”109 In the opinion of the Netherlands, the inner limit of 
bays and sounds was “a line drawn across the bay or sound as near as 
possible to the entrance, at the first point where the width of the bay no 
longer exceed ten nautical miles.’110 Poland, proposing a breadth of 
twelve nautical miles for the bays closing lines, held that “[s]hould the 
shores of a bay opening out into the sea be so close to each other that the 
bay is obviously under the sovereignty of the coastal State, it should form 
part of the territory of that State.”111
Portugal suggested the formula of “at least three times of the 
breadth fixed [at the 1930 Hague Conference] for territorial waters” for 
the closing lines of bays. In the view of Portugal, “[a]ll bays the width of 
which reckoned along a line joining their outermost points is less than at 
least three times the breadth fixed for territorial waters should be 
regarded as part of the territory of the State to which the shores of the 
bay belong.”112 Sweden stated that no Swedish law laid down any limit 
for bays and added that “[t]here is also no international regulation 
generally accepted which provides a maximum breadth [for the bays 
closing lines].”113 South Africa was of the view that the closing lines of 
bays had not to be longer than six miles.114 The United States of America 
did not propose any particular limit for bays but it referred to the ten 
mile limit in the Convention of 2 August 1839 (between France and 
Great Britain) and also to the cases of the Washington and the Alleganean 
with respect to the Delaware Bay and Chesapeake Bay as historic bays to 
which no limit was laid down.115
109Ibid., pp.260-261.
1 ^®Ibid., p.261. The Dutch neutrality proclamation o f 5 August 1914, inter alia, provided that “[a]s 
regards inlets, this distance o f 3 nautical miles [for the coastal waters] is measured from a straight line 
drawn across the inlet at the point nearest the entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not wider than 
10 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude.” Jessup, op. cit., pp.360-361. The 1904 
neutrality proclamation o f the Netherlands, which was issue during the Russian-Japanese war, included 
the same provision. Ibid., p.360.
^ R o se n n e , op .cit., Vol.2, p.261.
n 2 Ibid.
n 3 Ibid., p.262.
114/M . ,  p.257.
115See ibid., pp.258-259. Jessup also refers to Article 2 of the Uruguayan neutrality declaration 4 
August 1914 which , inter alia, provided that “ ... With regard to bays, the distance o f five miles [of 
territorial waters] will be measured along a straight line run across the bay at the point nearest its 
entrance.” Jessup, op. cit., p.362.
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B. The Formula Prepared by the 1930 Hague 
Conference on the Issue of Bays
From the views asserted by governments, it was clear that the 
general rule of low-water mark following sinuosities of coasts would not 
be extended to bays due to their geographical conditions as coastal 
indentations.116 However, no uniform practice was found in the responses 
of the governments as to what was the recognised width for the closing 
lines of bays. There was a divergence of views in this regard, though 
there was a trend towards the ten mile limit. One major concern 
expressed by governments was to distinguish between a mere curvature 
and a true bay.117 This was why the Preparatory Committee stated that it 
was the function of the conference to formulate a certain proportion 
between the breadth of the entrance of a bay and its depth of penetration 
into the coast.118 According to the trends indicated by governments, the 
Preparatory Committee finally designed the Basis of Discussion No.7 as 
follows.
In the case of bays the coasts of which belong to a single State, the belt 
of territorial waters shall be measured from a straight line drawn across 
the opening of the bay. If the opening of the bay is more than ten miles 
wide, the line shall be drawn at the nearest point to the entrance at 
which the opening does not exceed ten miles.119
The Second Sub-Committee of the Second Committee of the 1930 
Hague Conference (Territorial Sea) finally included the same formula in 
its report. In its observations, the sub-committee considered that “[i]n the 
case of an indentation which is not very broad at its opening, such a bay 
should be regarded as forming part the inland waters.”120 The sub­
116One author writes that the trends existed at the 1930 Hague Conference indicated that an straight line 
could be used to enclose bays with certain width. Such rule was described to be “an exception” to the 
general rule that baseline should follow the sinuosities of the coastline. Teclaff, op. cit., p.668.
117Boggs writes that a number of proposals on the configuration o f bays were submitted to the 1930 
Conference. For example, the German proposal was based on “measuring the maximum depth of a bay 
in proportion to its breadth from headland to headland” while the British proposal was to take into 
account “the ratio between average depth and breadth by measuring the area.” Boggs, S. Whittemore, 
‘Delimitation o f the Territorial Sea’, American Journal o f International Law. Vol.24, July 1930, 
p.550.
118Rosenne, op .cit., Vol.2, Observations, p.262.
119Bases o f Discussion Drawn up by the Preparatory Committee, in Rosenne, op. cit., Vol.4, Annex I, 
p.179. The text of the Basis of Discussion No.7 was similar to the draft convention prepared by Mr. 
Schucking (rapporteur of the Committee of experts).
120Bays (Observations), Report of Sub-Committee No.II, in Rosenne, Vol.3, op. cit., p.833. As regards 
the formula, the sub-committee stated that such system o f delimitation o f bays was already 
incorporated into the North Sea Fisheries Convention o f 6 May 1882. Ibid., p.834. The Report of 
the Second Committee (Territorial Sea) of the 1930 Hague Conference, Annex I (‘T he Legal Status of 
the Territorial Sea) has also been reprinted in the AJIL. Vol.24, Supplement, 1930, pp.248-250.
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committee noted the divergence of the views on the length of closing lines 
of the bays and commented that “[m]ost Delegations agreed to a width of 
ten miles, provided a system were simultaneously adopted under which 
slight indentations would not be treated as bays”121 (<emphasis added)
C. The American and French Proposals for 
the Delimitation of Bays
In the 1930 Hague Conference, concerns were raised with respect 
to generalisation of the rules for bays to all indentations into coasts, 
irrespective to the extent of their penetrations into the land mass. These 
concerns mainly originated from the potential effects of enclosure of 
these coastal indentations on reducing the areas of the high seas where 
such freedoms as free navigation and overflight were already being 
exercised. Although the effects of enclosure of bays on the high seas are 
not as significant as the impacts of improper application of straight 
baseline systems, the existence of many indentations around the coasts of 
coastal States necessitated the application of a recognised method to 
exclude those indentations which are not adequately deep.
It was necessary to develop a practical way for distinguishing a real 
bay from a mere curvature. In this regard, the first efforts were made at 
the 1930 Hague Conference and two main suggestions were advanced by 
the United States of America and France.122 Although the merits of both 
methods were identical in nature, the approaches were different. Both 
American and French proposals were based on a mathematical method to 
identify whether an indentation is a bay or only a simple indentation. The 
purpose of defining a bay by a geometric means was to achieve an 
international recognition for a uniform method of delimiting bays. This 
would facilitate the incorporation of a mathematical method into an 
international treaty by which a legal bay can be distinguished from a 
geographical bay.
121Report o f Sub-Committee No.II, in Rosenne, Vol.3, op. cit., p.834. Wang expresses the importance 
o f providing an accurate definition for bays in the following words: “Bays, as a coastal feature, need a 
more precise definition from a legal point o f view because controversies have developed involving 
fishery rights and the historic uses o f the bays by coastal states.” Wang, op. cit., p.8 .
122Dupuy writes that although the 1930 Hague Conference adopted the ratio between the width o f the 
entrance o f a bay and the depth o f penetration into the land as a criterion for finding true bays, no 
agreement was reached on a mathematical definition to establish such ratio. Dupuy, op. cit., p.266.
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The American proposal was based on the application of a method of 
“envelope of the arcs of circles.”123 The formula was in accordance with 
the following procedure:
(a) first step was to draw a straight line across the mouth of the bays 
where the distance between the entrance points is equal to ten nautical 
miles;
(b) second step was to draw an envelope of arcs of circles with a radius 
of one-fourth of the straight line (2.5 miles) from all points on the coast 
of mainland;
(c) third step was to draw a semi-circle whose diameter is equal to one- 
half the length of the straight line (5 miles); and
(d) the last step was to compare the area of waters enclosed within the 
straight line and the envelope of the arcs of circles. If the area enclosed 
within the straight line and the envelope of the arcs of circles exceeded 
the area covered by the semi-circle, the bay would be a true bay and 
waters of the bay would be regarded as interior waters (internal waters). 
Otherwise the waters would be considered as territorial.124 (See the 
following figures.125)
Figure 3.1
An indentation which is considered as a bay based on the American Proposal
Westerman, Gayl S., The Juridical Bay, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1987, p.71.
123For the text o f the Proposal of the Delegation o f the United States o f America [Concerning the 
delimitation o f bays] see Report of Sub-Committee N o .l, in Rosenne, op. cit., Vol.3, p.834.
124Boggs writes that ‘[t]he American proposal avoids the definition of such words as “bay” and “estuary” 
in a geographical sense. It simply undertakes to determine when an indentation o f the coast is 
sufficiently great to regard the waters within the indentation as national waters, which are to be 
separated from territorial waters by a straight line drawn across the entrance.” Boggs, op. cit., p.550. 
The French proposal also lacked a geographical definition of terms “bay” or “estuary”. However, both 
pointed out that the mathematical test had to be applied to a bay the coasts of which belong to a 
single State. The American proposal is attributed to S. W. Boggs who was the head o f the US 
delegation at the 1930 Hague Conference. He was also the Geographer of the US Department of State.
125See also Figures 2 and 3 as part of the United States of America proposed amendments to Bases of 
Discussion Nos.7, 8, 9, and 18.
Figure 3.2
An indentation which is not considered as a bay 
based on the American Proposal
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Westerman, Gayl S., The Juridical Bay, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1987, p.71.
The French delegation proposal (Compromise-Proposal) was 
submitted to the 1930 Hague Conference with a view to providing a 
compromise formula based on a geometric solution. The French proposal 
provided that “In order that an indentation may be properly termed a bay, 
the area comprised between the curve of the coast and its chord must be 
equal to or greater than the area of the segment of the circle the centre of 
which is situated on the perpendicular to the chord in its middle, to a 
distance from the chord equal to one half of the length of this chord and 
of which the radius is equal to the distance which separates this point 
from one end of the curve .”126 The method can be described by 
reference to the Figure 3.3 below as follows.
Figure 3.3
French Proposal
Source: Shalowitz, Aaron, L., Shore and Sea Boundaries. V ol.l, 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1962, p.42.
126Compromise-Proposal o f the French Delegation [Concerning the delimitation of bays], Report of 
Sub-Committee N o .l, in Rosenne, op. cit., Vol.3, p.834. Like the American proposal, French 
proposal suggested a maximum width o f ten miles for the bays closing lines. Ibid.
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The French proposal can be described as follows. OP is the 
perpendicular bisector of DE. OD is the radius of the arc DAE. 
According to the French proposal, DAE is considered as “the border line 
case” .127 Since the area of DCE is larger than the area of DAE, 
according to the French proposal the indentation DAE is regarded as a 
true bay. However, the application of the United States of America’s 
proposal for the same indentation would have an opposite result, that is to 
say DAE would not be qualified as a true bay. There is no doubt that the 
case of the indentation DBE is so clear that under both proposals such 
indentation would be a true bay.128 Accordingly, while waters within the 
segment of DBE are considered as internal waters under both proposals, 
waters within the segment DAE are internal waters under the French 
proposal but part of territorial waters (territorial sea) under the 
American proposal. In general, both proposals would result in the 
enclosure of vast area of waters and would contribute to the extension of 
the territorial seas of coastal States towards the high seas in many cases.
Although the American and French proposals could form bases for 
adopting a system of delimitation for bays, the 1930 Hague Conference 
was unable to codify any rules with respect to the delimitation of bays, 
mainly because it was unsuccessful in resolving another related issue, that 
is to say the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea. However, the 
proposals provided the background for resolution of the issue of 
enclosing bays in the future. In fact, the geometric approach was adopted 
by the ILC which seems to have agreed with the nature of mathematical 
proposals introduced at the 1930 Hague Conference.
Although the governments submitted their views to the 1930 Hague 
Conference on the issue of delimitation of outer limit of internal waters 
and inner limit of the territorial sea, including those on the delimitation 
of bays, no provisions on such delimitation were included in the Final Act 
of the 1930 Hague Conference.129 The provisions included in the Act
127Boggs define “the border line case” as a semi-circle which is used to make a distinction between an 
open bay whose waters are territorial waters and a closed bay whose waters are national waters. 
Boggs, op. cit., p.550.
128Shalowitz, op. cit., pp.41-42.
129Part B. Territorial Sea, Final Act o f the Conference for the Codification o f International Law (Hague- 
1930), in Rosenne, op. cit., Vol.3, pp.867-871. The uncertainty on the method o f delimitation of 
bays continued after the 1930 Hague Conference as States demonstrated different practices. For 
national legislation on this issue after the 1930 Hague Conference see generally Laws and Regulations 
on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (1957). For example, Iceland legislation (Act 
No. 33 o f 9 January 1935 Governing Intoxicating Beverages, Article 5), provided a length o f 12 miles
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were related to the legal status of the territorial sea, including the 
sovereignty of coastal States over territorial seas and the right of innocent 
passage for foreign vessels.
7. The ICJ’s View on the Issue of Bays
In dealing with the Fisheries Case in 1951, the ICJ presented its 
views on certain aspects of delimitation on bays. The Fisheries Case was 
not primarily related to the issue of delimitation of bays. However, this 
issue had to be addressed as part of evaluation of the baseline system used 
by Norway. The reason for addressing the issue of bays was that, in 
applying its straight baseline system, Norway drew straight lines across 
certain indentations of its coasts which in some cases were more than ten 
miles in length. The UK considered this practice as inconsistent with 
international law in existence at that time. The view of the UK was that 
the ten mile limit as the maximum permissible length for the closing line 
had acquired the status of a customary rule of international law applicable 
to all coastal States.130 The ten mile width was not, however, accepted as 
customary rule by the ICJ131 but it was declared that the rule was not a 
general rule of international law.132 In its words, the Court held that:
for the closing line. Ibid., p.147. This length, however, was twenty nautical miles in the Italian 
Legislation (Navigation Code o f 30 March 1942, Article 2: Territorial Sea). Ibid., p.162.
130With respect to different existing practices on the treatments o f bays at the time o f Fisheries Case 
(1951) see Dissenting Opinion o f Judge Read, ICJ Reports. 1951, p.188 and Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge McNair, ibid., pp. 163-166.
131 Judge McNair was in agreement with the ICJ’s view that the ten mile limit did not form part o f a rule 
o f customary law but he pointed out that “the fact that there is no agreement upon the figures does not 
mean that no rule at all exists as to the closing line o f curvatures possessing the character o f a bay; 
and that a State can do what it likes with its bays ... if  any State alleges that this belt [the belt o f the 
territorial sea] ought not to come inside a particular bay and follow its configuration, then it is the 
duty o f that State to show why that bay forms an exception to this general rule [the low-water mark 
rule].” Dissenting Opinion of Judge McNair, ICJ Reports. 1951, p.164.
132At the time o f the Fisheries Case, in addition to bilateral and multilateral treaties among States 
(mainly on fisheries) the following examples of State practice on the length o f the bays closing lines 
with respect to fisheries had been recorded in the United Nations legislative series.
Cuba: six miles (Art.5, Legislative Decree No.704 of 28 March 1936: General Fisheries Statute). 
Denmark: ten nautical miles (Art.l, Order No.29 o f 27 February 1903 respecting the Supervision of 
Fisheries in the Sea Surrounding the Fowe Islands and Iceland outside the Danish Territory. The same 
limit was also mentioned in para.2(l), Decree No.230 o f 29 June 1933 and later in Art.l(2), Notice 
No.292 o f 11 November 1953).
France: ten miles (A rt.ler, Loi ay ant pour objet d ’interdire la peche aux etrangers dans les eaux 
territoriales de France et d'Algerie du l er Mars 1888 comme modifiee par la loi du 30 Mars 1928 et 
par la loi du 16 Avril 1933).
Morocco: 12 miles (Titre l e, Art.2, Reglement du 31 Mars 1919 sur la Peche Maritime modifie par le 
Danir du Juin 1924).
Netherlands (New Guinea): ten nautical miles (General Regulations o f 29 April 1927 for the Hunting 
o f Whales within three nautical miles o f the oasts of the Netherlands Indies, as amended).
Sweden: not wider than 10 minutes o f distance (Royal Order No.282 o f 2 June 1933 on Fishing on 
the Frontier Waters o f Sweden and Denmark).
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... although the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in 
their national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although 
certain arbitral decisions have applied it as between these States, other 
States have adopted a different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule 
has not acquired the authority of a general rule of international law.133
The ICJ further made it clear that even if the ten mile limit were to 
be considered as a rule of customary international law, it would not apply 
to Norway as this country has consistently indicated its disagreement with 
the rule and rejected its applicability to itself in different occasions. The 
Court’s opinion was that “[i]n any event the ten-mile rule would appear to 
be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch a she has always opposed any 
attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.”134
Although the ICJ rejected the ten mile limit as a maximum 
permissible limit for the closing lines of bays, it did not introduce any 
other limit which could be used as the maximum permissible width for a 
legal bay. The lack of any suggestion by the ICJ of a specific limit for the 
bays might have the implication that “there should be no limit on internal 
waters.”135 Another issue which was not addressed by the Court was the 
definition of a bay. Accordingly, the judgment of the ICJ in the Fisheries 
Case did not provide what constitutes a bay and what criteria were to be 
applied in appraisal of a costal indentation as a juridical bay.
Brazil and Ireland also applied the following limits for delimitation o f bays in their customs 
regulations.
Brazil: Maximum 12 miles (Ch. Ill, Regulations Concerning Port Officers Annexed to Decree 
No.5796 o f 11 June 1940).
Ireland: 12 nautical miles (Act No.33 of January 1935 governing intoxicating beverages).
The information on State practice concerning the delimitation o f bays at the time o f the Fisheries 
Case is not limited to the above information. More information are also found in the national 
legislation related to the territorial sea. For example, Iran in its legislation o f 19 July 1934 on the 
delimitation o f the territorial sea and the contiguous zone included a limit o f ten miles for the length 
o f the bays closing lines (Art.2, Loi du 24 Tir 1313 (19 Juillet 1934) relative a la des eaux 
Territoriales et a la Zone de Supervision et de Controle). It seems that although there was no 
consensus on the maximum width of the entrance for bays which could be enclosed, at the time o f the 
Fisheries Case, the ten mile limit was the one which was used more than any other limit.
See Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea. United Nations Legislative Series, 
United Nations, New York, 1956 (pp.24, 464, 468, 471, 476, 497, and 528) and 1957 (79, 146-147, 
535, and 565). Also see Strohl, op. cit., pp.158-161.
133ICJ Reports , 1951, p.131. Also see the Note o f 8 February 1870 o f the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to the French Government where it was stated that “the quite arbitrary distance o f 10 
sea miles ... would not appear to ... have acquired the force o f an international law.” The Norwegian 
Government stated that it “does not rely upon history to justify exceptional rights, to claim areas of 
sea which the general law would deny; it invokes history, together with other factors to justify the 
way in which it applies general rule.” Ibid., p.136.
l3AIbid. , p.131
135Westerman, op. cit., p. 163
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8. International Law Commission and the 
Issue of the Delimitation of Juridical Bays
The Regime of Territorial Waters was one of the fourteen topics 
which were selected by the ILC for codification at its first session136 in 
1949.137 The issue of the delimitation of bays was taken into account in 
the framework of the formulation of rules on territorial waters. In his 
first report to the ILC, Francois (Special Rapporteur) included an article 
on bays which reflected the same formula as presented by the Preparatory 
Committee of the 1930 Hague Conference (see supra).13*
It was the Committee of Experts of the ILC139 which presented a 
definition for a juridical bay on geographical and geometric bases and 
suggested ten mile limit for the closing line of bays. In fact, the 
Committee of Experts, which met in 1953, had a number of questions 
before it.140 The responses from the Committee mainly constituted the 
structure of the formulae on bays which were regulated by the ILC in its 
following sessions, though certain changes were made including the 
permissible limit for the closing line. As regards its suggestion of the ten 
mile limit, the Committee considered that this limit was suggested as 
“being twice the range of vision to the horizon in clear weather, from the 
eye of a mariner at a height of five meters.”141 This limit was included in
136See Eagleton, Clyde, ‘First Session of the International Law Commission’, AJIL. Vol.43, 1949, 
pp.758-762.
137In accordance with Article 13 o f the UN Charter with respect to progressive development and 
codification of international law, the UNGA passed a resolution on 21 November 1947 establishing a 
permanent body which was called the International Law Commission. The UNGA also adopted the 
Commission’s Statute. See UN Document A/519. The Commission is composed o f fifteen members 
who are nominated by governments and elected by the UNGA. The role o f the Commission is to 
contribute to the progressive development and codification o f international law. For the definition of 
the terms “progressive development o f international law” and “codification o f international law” see 
Article 15 o f the Statute o f the Commission.
138See YILC. Vol.II, 1952, p.35 (in French). For English translation see UN Document A/C.6/L.378. 
In the preparation o f his first report to the ILC, Francois had relied upon the work of the 1930 Hague 
Conference on territorial waters. He did so on the ground that there was a general agreement on all 
issues related to territorial waters at the 1930 Hague Conference, except on the issue o f the breadth of 
the territorial sea. See Strohl, op. cit., p.216.
139It was pursuant to the suggestion o f Francois that a Committee o f Experts held sessions from 14 to 
16 April 1953 to discuss technical questions related to the issue o f ¿he delimitation o f bays. The 
members o f this Committee were Francois (the Netherlands), Asplund (Sweden), Boggs (United States 
o f America), Couillault (France), Kennedy (United Kingdom), and Pinke (the Netherlands). Ibid.,
p.218.
140For the questions and the Committee o f Experts’ responses thereto see U N  Document 
A/CN.4/61/Add.I. The questions and responses can also be found in ibid., pp.218-219.
141Report o f the Committee o f Experts (Rapport du Comité d ’Experts) , Annex to the Report o f J.P.A. 
Francois, Special Rapporteur, on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, Fifth Session o f the International 
Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN/.4/61/Add.l, 18 May 1953, YILC. Vol.II, 1953, p.78, B (l).
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the report of 18 May 1953 (Article 6(4)) submitted to the ILC by 
Francois.142 In fact, the Francois’ report of 1953 to the fifth session of 
the ILC was a restatement of the views of the Committee of Experts 
extracted from its meetings in 1953.
In Article 8 of the 1954 draft submitted to the sixth session of the 
ILC, Francois included that waters within the closing line of a bay are 
considered internal waters (para.l). In this draft, the reference to 
historic bays was removed. The mathematical method remained 
unchanged and the ten mile limit was again recommended for the closing 
line of bays.143 The 1954 draft article on bays was not subject to 
discussion at the 1954 session of the ILC. In its seventh session, the ILC 
finally agreed to incorporate a twenty-five mile limit into its draft of 
1955.144 The ILC was of the view that the length of the closing line had 
to be longer than 10 miles in accordance with then existing tendencies of 
States. To this end, the ILC stated that a[a]s an experiment, the 
Commission suggests a distance of twenty-five miles; thus, the length of 
the closing line will be slightly more than the permissible maximum width 
of the territorial sea ... [as then was proposed by the ILC to be 12 
miles].”145 The suggestion of 25 mile limit faced protests from five
142See ibid., U N  Doc. A/CN/.4/61/Add.l. This document was a draft on bays submitted to the fifth 
session o f the ILC after consultation with the Committee o f Experts. The draft article contained seven 
paragraphs as follows: (1) A bay is a bay in the juridical sense, if its area is as large as, or larger than 
that o f the semi-circle drawn on the entrance of the bay. Historical bays are excepted; they shall be 
indicated as such on the maps. (2) If a bay has more than one entrance, this semi-circle shall be drawn 
on a line as long as the sum-total o f the length o f the difference entrances. (3) Islands within a bay 
shall be included as if  they were part o f the water area o f the bay. (4) The closing line across a 
(juridical) bay shall not exceed 10 miles in width, this being twice the range o f vision to the horizon 
in clear weather, from the eye o f a mariner at a height o f 5 meters. In cases o f considerable tidal 
differences the low-water lines shall be taken as the shorelines between which the width o f the bay 
shall be computed. (5) If the entrance o f a (juridical) bay is split into a number o f smaller openings 
by various islands, closing lines across these openings may be drawn, provided that none o f these 
lines exceeds 5 miles in length, except one which may exceed up to a maximum of 10 miles. (6) In 
case the entrance o f the bay does not exceed 10 miles in width, the line inter fauces terrarum shall 
constitute the delimitation between inland waters and the territorial sea. (7) In case the entrance o f the 
bay exceeds 10 miles, a closing line o f this length shall be drawn within the bay. When different lines 
o f this length can be drawn that line shall be chosen which encloses the maximum water area within 
the bay.
143 Article 8 o f the Francois’ Report on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, 4 February 1954, U N  Doc. 
A/CN.4/77, YILC. Vol.II, 1954, p.4. In the preparation o f the 1954 draft, Francois not only took 
into account the report o f the Committee o f Experts but also considered the observations made by 
certain governments. See UN Documents A/CN.4/71 and Add.I and Add.2. Also see Strohl, op. cit.,
pp.220-221.
144Commentary, YILC. Vol.II, 1955, p.36.
145Ibid., p.37.
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States146 and the limit was discussed at the eight session of the ILC in 
1956 and did not gain adequate support..
Many other proposals were put forward suggesting different limits 
for the length of the closing line, including 10 and 12 miles, and even one 
proposal suggested that the closing line should not be limited to any 
specified length.147 Fitzmaurice maintained that the rejection of ten mile 
limit by the ICJ was not to mean that there should not be any limit on 
internal waters and in his view 15 miles would be appropriate length to 
cover those indentions which have configuration of bays.148 Relying on 
the 1910 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, the Czechoslovakian 
delegate was of the view that the application of a mathematical method for 
delimiting of internal waters is not appropriate for all geographical 
situations. The delegate stated that such method should be supplemented 
by other factors such as economic importance of the bay for the local 
people and its distance from international navigation routes.149 
Fitzmaurice, however, was of the view that the economic factor is an 
ambiguous element in delimitation of bays and the closing line is the only 
solution to the issue of delimitation of bays.150 Finally, the limit of 15 
miles gained the support of majority of the ILC at its eighth session and 
this limit was incorporated into Article 7 of the 1956 ILC Draft.151 In 
its commentary, the ILC stated that:
146These States were Brazil, Turkey, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In contrast, 
China was completely in favor o f the 1955 Draft articles, including the 25 mile limit. See the 1955 
Draft Articles, UN Doc. A/CN.4/99. Also see the view of the Norwegian Government, Commentary, 
YILC. 1956, Vol.I, p.190 where this Government argues that the ILC was considering lex frenda in 
proposing 25 mile limit.
147See Commentary, YILC. 1956, Vol.I, pp. 196-197.
u s Ibid., p.192.
149See ibid., pp.191, 193, 195-196.
150Ibid., p.196.
151The 1956 Draft o f the work of the Inter-American Council of Jurists on the delimitation and juridical 
regime o f bays is also worth mentioning. At its fourth plenary session on 3 February 1956, the Inter­
American Council o f Jurists adopted a draft on the legal status of sea areas (Resolution xiii: Principles 
o f  M exico on the Juridical Regime of the Sea). Part E o f the draft was devoted to Bays which 
contained the following paragraphs: (1) A bay is a well-marked indentation whose penetration inland 
in proportion to the width o f its mouth is such that its waters are inter fauces terrae, constituting more 
than a mere curvature o f the coast. (2) The line that encloses a bay shall be drawn between its natural 
geographical entrance points where the indentation begins to have the configuration o f a bay. (3) 
Waters comprised with a bay shall be subject to the juridical regime of internal waters if  the surface 
thereof is equal to or greater than that o f a semi-circle drawn by using the mouth o f the bay as a 
diameter. (4) If a bay has more than one entrance, this semi-circle shall be drawn on a line as long as 
the sum total o f the length o f different entrances. The are of the islands located within a bay shall be 
included in the total area o f the bay. (5) So-called “historic bay” shall be subject to the regime of 
internal-waters o f the coastal State or States. Reprinted in Strohl, op. cit., p.229. This draft did not 
propose any limit for the closing line o f a bay as a juridical bay and it is understood that in the view  
o f the drafters all bays which could satisfy the semi-circle test would be a bay in a legal sense, no 
matter how wide the entrance o f the bay or in other words the diameter o f the semi-circle would be.
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The proposal to extend the closing line to 25 miles had found little 
support; a number of Governments stated that, in their view, such an 
extension was excessive. By majority, the Commission decided to 
reduce the twenty-five miles figures, proposed in 1955, to fifteen 
miles. While appreciating that a line of 10 miles had been recognized 
by several Governments and established by international conventions, 
the Commission took account of the fact that the origin of the 10 mile 
line dates back to a time when the breadth of the territorial sea was 
much more commonly fixed at 3 miles than it is now. In view of the 
tendency to increase the breadth of the territorial sea, the majority of the 
Commission thought that an extension of the closing line to 15 miles 
would be justified and sufficient.152
In addition, the ILC’s 1956 draft (para.l) included both geographical 
and mathematical criteria for the determination of a juridical bay153 
which later constituted the formula incorporated into paragraph two of 
Article 7 of the TSC. However, the limit of fifteen miles in Article 7(3) 
of the 1956 draft was replaced by twenty-four mile limit in accordance 
with the trends in the UNCLOS I. The twenty-four mile limit was 
incorporated into Article 7(4 & 5) of the TSC. Article 10 of the LOSC 
reiterates the same provisions on juridical bays as those incorporated into 
the TSC.15*
9. The UNCLOS I and the Issue of Bays
At the UNCLOS I, the First Committee undertook discussion on 
Article 7 of the 1955 ILC’s draft concerning the delimitation of bays. 
Almost all proposals and discussions which were made at the ILC on the 
length of the bays closing fines were advanced again at the UNCLOS I but 
none achieved essential support.155 In this context, a proposal was 
supported by the delegates of Bulgaria, Poland and the Soviet Union156 
which was strengthened by a similar proposal submitted by the delegate of
152Report o f the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U N G A O R .  V o l . l l ,  
Supplement No.9, UN Doc. A/3159, 1956, pp. 15-16. Most o f the members o f the ILC were o f the 
view that the length o f the closing line o f bays “should be expressed numerically in order to give it 
more exact meaning.” Teclaff, op. cit., p.671.
153See Commentary, YILC. Vol.II, 1956, p.269.
15*It should be noted that the LOSC replaced the word “miles” with “nautical miles” in reference to the 
maximum permissible length for the bays closing lines (24 nautical miles) to provide a more precise 
measurement. See paras. 4  and 5 o f Article 10 o f the LOSC.
155See for example the proposals o f the range o f vision and of ten mile limit, UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/39, 
UNCLOS I. Official Records. Vol.UI, 1958, pp. 144-145. Great Britain proposed to the First 
Committee to consider two changes to Article 7 o f the ILC’s draft: one was to include a paragraph 
clearly stating that the whole article applies only to those bays the coasts o f which belong to a single 
coastal States and another was to reduce the length o f the closing line to ten miles. The First 
Committee adopted the first suggestion but did not agree with the second suggestion. Ibid., p.228.
156UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.1/L/103.
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Guatemala.157 The formula was to extend the limit of the closing line to 
twenty-four miles, which in the view of the supporters, reflected an 
established international practice and was an appropriate limit to 
safeguard vital interests of States. The formula was based on three facts 
that:
(a) the ILC suggested twelve miles for the territorial sea and the formula 
of twice such limit would be reasonable length for the closing line;
(b) the ten mile rule was not recognised internationally; and
(c) the ILC first recommended twenty-five mile limit, even though it 
later replaced it with fifteen mile limit.158
It was at the First Committee of the UNCLOS I (Committee on 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone) that the limit of twenty-four 
nautical miles was finally adopted.159 In the UNCLOS I (as was also the 
case at the ILC), the American and French proposals providing a 
mathematical method to identify an indentation as a legal bay were taken 
into account as a model.160 Considering these geometric systems of the 
delimitation of bays, the UNCLOS I adopted the formula which was 
incorporated into Article 7(2) of the TSC and later reiterated in Article 
10(2) of the LOSC. The purpose of this geometric solution for the 
delimitation of bays was to provide an objective criteria and prevent 
uncertainties which might have stemmed from a subjective approach to 
determining whether an indentation can be considered as a bay. Finally, 
in the formulation of international rules for bays, the UNCLOS I 
considered several interests which have been involved in the developments
157UN  D oc. A/CONF. 13/C.1/L/105.
158U N  D o c . A/CONF.13/39, UNCLOS I. Official Records. Vol.HI, 1958, p.145. Westerman writes 
that none o f economic, defence or any other rationale was raised in the proposals submitted to the 
First Committee on the issue o f the closing line o f bays. It is also stated that “the twenty-four mile 
limitation was proposed as a logical extension o f the twelve-mile limit for the territorial sea, even 
though the logic of such a relationship had never been shown ... “. Westerman, op. cit., pp.167-168.
159The twenty-four nautical mile rule was adopted by a vote o f 31 in favor, 27 against, and 13 
abstentions. IJNCLOS I. Official Records. Vol.3, 1958, p.146. One author points out that the 
twenty-four mile line was adopted by the UNCLOS I “[i]n harmony with broadening claims to 
territorial waters.” Corbett, op. cit., p.73. Dupuy writes that the final solution o f 24 nautical miles 
limit was reproduced in the LOSC “since it amounted to twice the extent o f the territorial sea, fixed at 
12 m iles by the 1982 Convention itself.” Dupuy, op. cit., p.266. The 24 nautical miles limit is the 
maximum, permissible length for the closing lines o f bays. However, as one author points out “States 
are always free to apply baselines o f lesser size.” Bouchez, op. cit., p.303. States are usually 
unwilling to employ a shorter line for bays where they are legally permitted to employ longer lines 
for the enclosure of bays.
160Teclaff, op. cit., p.670.
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of rules for delimitation of bays, attempting to create a balanced legal 
regime for bays which would be able to properly reconcile the then 
existing competing interests.161
IV . Reasons Advanced for the Special Treatment of Bays
There had been reliance on a number of factors in arguing why a 
special method of delimitation had to be created for the delimitation of 
bays, the method which is distinct from the one employed for normal 
coastlines. These factors vary from geographical justification to fiscal, 
customs, economic, security, and environmental interests.162 As early as 
1896 Kent, an American publicist, asserted why certain coastal 
indentations should be enclosed. He presented the following view for 
justifying the American claims over certain coastal areas. Kent 
maintained that:
Considering the great extent of the line of the American coasts, we have 
a right to claim, f o r  f is c a l  a n d  de fen sive  regu la tion s, a liberal extension 
of maritime jurisdiction; and it would not be unreasonable, as I 
apprehend, to assume, for domestic purposes connected with our sa fe ty  
a n d  w e lfa re , the control of the waters on our coasts, though included 
within lines stretching from quite distant headlands, as for instance, 
from Cape Ann to Cape Cod, and from Nantucket to Montauk Point, 
etc.163 (em p h a sis  a d d e d )
In his book (The Principles of International Law, 1913), Lawrence 
(an English writer) relied upon three various bases to justify the 
legitimacy of enclosing certain bays as territorial. Lawrence argued that 
“when a valuable fishery is retained for native fishermen by the assertion 
of sovereignty over a bay of considerable size, or when considerations of 
self-protection or political advantages are prominent ... States insist upon 
and often obtain recognition of their demands, some of which are based 
on very ancient precedent.”164 In the North Atlantic Fisheries Case 
(1910), the arbitral tribunal also maintained that:
161It is stated that the 24 mile rule was suggested after a careful examination o f competing interests and 
reaching the conclusion that “a twenty-four-mile line was optimal and necessary in order to preserve 
the exclusive and inclusive interests o f all states.” Westennan, op. cit., p.169.
162A s regards the motives o f coastal States on which they have laid claims over bays, Bouchez classify 
theses motives into four categories: ( 1) economic factors; (2) strategical and security considerations; 
(3) political factors; and (4) geographical factors. See Bouchez, op. cit., pp.282-296.
163Strohl, op. cit., p.189. Teclaff (1962) was o f the view that there have been three reasons for the 
enclosure o f  bays: “security o f the coastal state; protection o f fisheries; and long usage.” Teclaff, op. 
cit., p.66 8 .
164Strohl, op. cit., p.191.
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the geographical character of a bay contains conditions which concern 
the interests of the territorial sovereign to more intimate and important 
extent than do those connected with the open coast. Thus co n d itio n s  o f  
n a tio n a l a n d  te r r i to r ia l  in te g r ity , o f  d e fen ce , o f  c o m m e rc e  a n d  o f  
in d u s tr y  a r e  a l l  v i ta l ly  c o n c e r n e d  with the control of the bays 
penetrating the national coast line.165 (emphasis added)
In a dissenting opinion in the Fisheries Case (1951), Judge Read 
argued that waters within bays were of territorial nature. He maintained 
that considering waters as part of the open sea “would bring smugglers 
and foreign warships and fishermen into the interior of the coastal State, 
to the prejudice of its security and vital interests.”166
The existing trends of States demonstrated that the three traditional 
interests of geographical, economic, security nature, and the new trend of 
environmental protection constituted the foundations for claims of States 
over waters of bays as territorial. In general, the core of reasoning for 
special treatment of bays is based on the geographical character of bays as 
the projection of waters into the land, creating a maritime area which is 
unique in its extremely close relationship with the land territory. The 
more that waters within bays would have the landlocked character, the 
stronger the argument of geographical character would be. Apart from 
this geographical necessity for the treatment of bays similarly to land 
territory of coastal States, these States have rested their national claims 
upon other reasons to further strengthen the foundations for such special 
treatment. Economic importance of the area of bays for local people, the 
significant role of bays in the national security, and the environmental 
concerns form the most fundamental reasons in the enclosure of bays as 
unique coastal zones.
Bays are economically important for coastal States in different 
ways. However, there are two main reasons for the economic importance 
of bays:
First one is bays are maritime areas providing a means of coastal 
communication and waterborne commerce and trade. It is sometimes
165Award o f  7 September 1910, op. cit., p.196. The arbitral tribunal referred to a number o f elements 
such as the ability o f coastal State concerned to defend its territory, the importance o f bay for the local 
industry among other elements to be taken into account in the determination o f an indentation to the 
coast as a bay. Ibid., p.199.
166Dissenting Opinion o f Judge Read, ICJ Reports, 1951, p.188.
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more economic and convenient for local people to carry their goods and 
products through the waterways within bays than to carry them through 
the land mass. In addition, there are local liners engaging in transferring 
goods and passengers along the coasts of bays. Such an economic activity 
in turn contributes to the economic growth of local areas.
Second, there exist living and non-living resources in the water 
column or on the submerged lands of bays. The exclusive exploitation of 
living and non-living resources of bays will contribute to the development 
of local economy of coastal States or, on a larger scale, to the economy of 
these countries in whole. No doubt the minerals and other non-living 
resources of the sea bed and subsoil of bays are of high economic value. 
However, the rights over fisheries resources were primarily the main 
concern of coastal States in advancing the doctrine of special treatment of 
bays. One of the reasons for this concern was that sea food and fish 
products were the main source of food for local population in many 
coastal countries.
The history of fisheries disputes among coastal States and distant- 
fishing countries clearly reflects that many of these cases occurred in 
coastal areas, particularly within bays. It was for the purpose of 
reserving the fisheries resources for local inhabitants that the doctrine of 
enclosure of bays was further supported. This economic aspect was in 
particular intensified where local dwellers were economically dependent 
on the coastal fisheries resources and where thee was a risk of depletion 
of these resources.167
Security and strategic interests have also constituted another ground 
for the claims advanced by coastal States in enclosing coastal 
indentations.168 The defense and security concern of coastal States can
167For the reasons o f the importance o f bays as natural shelter in the process o f harvesting marine 
sources see Strohl, op. cit., p.26. As regards the use o f economic justification by States to extend 
their sovereignty over the adjacent waters, including those o f bays, one author viewed in 1963 that “... 
it can reasonably be predicted that States will make ever-widening claims to sovereignty over the seas 
when it appears in their economic interest to do so, and under international law the most that can be 
done is for other States to seek a regularization and rationalization o f the claims.” Ibid., p.24.
168A s regards the roots o f economic and security aspects o f bays in the history, Westerman writes that 
“[i]n every era, bays and other internal waters have generally recognised as so vitally interconnected 
with the economic and security interests o f shore inhabitants as to become natural extensions o f the 
land itself and thus susceptible to claims o f exclusive authority by the littoral state. Every era has 
also witnessed opposition on such claims when it was feared that, carried to excess, they would 
impinge upon communal uses o f the oceans.” Westerman, op. cit., p.33.
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clearly be understood by paying attention to the first methods suggested 
for the delimitation of bays such as the range of cannon-shot, the range of 
vision, and the range of artillery on the shore. All these suggestions 
indicate that the concern over bays has originated from the ability to 
defend the country.169 This means that national security and defence 
formed the vital interests of coastal States and one of the main grounds in 
developing claims over bays. Consideration of the water of bays as part of 
the high seas could bring about potential dangers to the security and 
stability of coastal States. This may particularly be the case as a result of 
the presence of foreign warships or foreign submerged submarines in 
strategically located bays, which may be detrimental to the security of 
littoral States.170 Bays with their special geographical character as a deep 
indentation pose a greater security risk than any other part of coastline if 
some areas within them could be considered as the high seas. Bays are 
also used as the base for naval forces of coastal States and the larger the 
bays can be, the more warships can anchor within the bay.171 These 
coastal indentations are also used for naval operations and training.172 In 
general, the claims over bays as enclosed waters prevent the entrance of 
any foreign ship to waters within them without the permission of coastal 
States. In addition, the enclosure of bays has the impact of extending the 
territorial sea towards the high seas. In the territorial sea, coastal States 
still have the power to regulate passage of warships.
One of the most recent reasons added to the arguments of national 
claims over coastal indentations as legal bays has an environmental basis. 
Coastal waters are environmentally among the most vulnerable parts of 
the seas and oceans. This means that marine pollution could cause 
disastrous impacts on the living resources and on the health of local 
inhabitants. Bays are particularly in danger of these impacts. In many 
cases bays contain landlocked waters which are easily affected by
169For the importance o f bays for coastal States from a military point o f view see Strohl, op. cit., p.48.
170Some countries have closed some o f their bays for security reasons not only to foreign warships but 
also to foreign merchant ships. For a list o f these areas and their limits see the Second Report o f the 
ILC on the Regime o f the Territorial Sea, UN Doc. A/CN.4/61 at pp.11-17. An example is the 
United States which has established the areas which are called the Defensive Sea Areas. Strohl, op. 
cit., p.51.
171In this connection, Strohl views that “a bay containing an expanded area o f internal waters is very 
much a matter o f a State’s defense interest” Ibid., p.53.
172Bays are stated to be o f importance for the readiness o f naval forces o f coastal States particularly for 
the following reasons: “providing quiet waters for research and development o f weapons and detection 
equipment actual conduct o f training exercises, calibration of equipment and certain maintenance such 
as degaussing. Ibid., p.53.
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pollutants. No matter what the source of pollution is, the important fact 
is waters within the bays are not resistant against pollution. One of the 
reasons of this vulnerability is the character of waters within the bays as 
landlocked. These waters do not have adequate mobility to transfer the 
whole or part of pollution to the open seas. Living resources, in 
particular those marine resources whose habitats are exclusively in 
marine environment of bays, are most adversely affected by marine 
pollution. All these marine environmental degradations have contributed 
to the creation of modem claims of coastal States for the delimitation of 
bays.
Since one of the sources of marine pollution is ship-based pollution, 
claims over parts of costal waters as bays empower costal States to control 
over foreign ships entering waters of bays under their sovereignty. Bays 
are part of internal waters of coastal States. This means that these States 
have more power over foreign vessels than where these vessels are found 
in the territorial sea. It is why bays are among most claimed maritime 
areas by coastal States. Accordingly, claiming certain indentations as legal 
bays is in the interest of coastal States to protect the marine environment 
of their bays and their living resources. However, States rarely choose not 
to make these claims.
V. Status of Waters within Bays
The history of the international law of bays indicates that for quite 
a long time the legal status of waters within bays uncertain. Once there 
was a discussion as to whether waters within bays of a single State should 
be part of the high seas or part of waters of this State. This controversy 
ended when State practice proved that waters of bays were part of waters 
of coastal States. However, an uncertainty about the nature of waters 
within bays remained to be resolved. The uncertainty was whether waters 
within bays are part of internal waters or territorial waters. Some 
authors clearly believed that waters in a bay were part of internal waters. 
For example, Lapradelle of France (1898), maintained that harbours, 
roadsteads and bays “form part of what may be called the national sea.”173 
However, a number of authors considered that the line across bays was
173/ M . ,  p.190.
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the outer limit of the territorial sea. Examples of these authors are 
Camazza-Amri, Despagnet, and Hall.174
The debate in the British Parliament related to the Moray Firth 
Case is a clear example of uncertainty which existed in elation to the legal 
status within a bay. The debate reflected the view that waters within bays 
constituted part of territorial waters, which also included bodies of water 
now recognised as internal waters. This approach is clear from the 
response of the British Foreign Office to a question asked in the British 
Parliament on 21 February 1907 with respect to the Moray Firth Case. 
The British Foreign Office stated that:
according to the view of the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the Colonial 
Office, the Board of Trade and the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
the term “territorial waters” was deemed to include waters extending 
from the coast line of any part of the territory of a State to three miles 
from the low-water mark of such coast line and the w a te rs  o f  a l l  b a y s , 
th e  e n tra n c e  o f  w h ich  is  n o t m o re  than s ix  m iles , a n d  o f  w h ich  the  
en tire  la n d  b o u n d a ry  fo r m s  p a r t  o f  the te rr ito ry  o f  the sa m e  s ta te ,175 
(em ph asis  a dded )
Basis of Discussion No. 18 in the 1930 Hague Conference clearly 
stated that “[t]he base-line from which the belt of territorial waters is 
measured in front of bays, ports and roadsteads forms the line of 
demarcation between inland and territorial waters.”176 However, there 
were a number of national laws enacted after the 1930 Hague Conference 
that defined territorial waters (the territorial sea) as to include those 
waters behind as well as beyond the closing line of bays. For example, 
Article 5 of the Act No. 33 (1935) of Iceland, inter alia, provided that 
“all that part of bays and inlets lying to landward of a straight line ... and 
the area extending seaward for four miles from that line, shall be deemed 
to be within territorial waters.”177 The Italian legislation of 1942 implied 
that the closing line of bays is the outer limit of the territorial sea.178 The 
Swedish Royal Decree of 1945 defined the Swedish territorial waters as
174McDougal, My res S. and W illiam T. Burke, The Public Order o f the Oceans: A Contemporary 
International Law o f the Sea. Second Printing, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1965, p.311. See 
also Varanger Fjord Case [1933-1934], Ann. Dig. 136 (No. 51).
175See Cobbett, W. Pitt, Cases and Opinions on International Law. 2 Volumes (1922-1924), V o l l ,  
London, p.143.
176Rosenne, op. cit., Vol.4, Annex I, p.1382.
177Act No. 33 o f  9 January 1935 Governing Intoxicating Beverages, Laws and Regulations on the 
Regime o f the Territorial Sea. United Nations Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/6 , United Nations, 
N ew  York, 1957, pp.146-147.
178See Navigation Code o f 30 March 1942, Article 2. Ibid., p.162.
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including lakes, watercourses, canals, harbours, harbour entrances, bays, 
and the territorial sea.179 The Ecuadorian Legislation of 1950 also 
provided that national territorial waters comprise the territorial sea and 
“the inner waters of the gulfs, bays, straits and canals.”180 There were 
also national laws which clearly indicated that waters within bays were to 
be considered as internal waters of coastal States. Examples are Article 6 
of the 1947 Constitution of the Dominican Republic181, the 1948 Act of 
Y ugoslavia182, the 1951 Decree of Bulgaria183, and the 1959 Act of 
Iran184.
The development in approaches towards the issue of the 
delimitation of bays and the nature of waters within bays, from the 
traditional practice to the modern practice, has been clearly shown by 
McDougal and Burke. They write that:
[the closing line] across the indentation was not conceived as separating 
an area of internal waters on the landward side from an expanse of 
territorial sea measured seaward of the line. A ll o f  the w a te rs  on bo th  
s id e s  o f  the ‘d in e ” w ere  re g a rd e d  a s  p a r t  o f  the te rr ito r ia l sea . Latter, 
states generally came to claim, as they continue to do, that the c lo sin g  
line in the in den ta tion  m arks the baselin e  fro m  w hich  the te rr ito r ia l s e a  
b e g in s  a n d  the w a te r s  on the la n d w a rd  s id e  a re  in tern a l w a te r s .185 
(iem phasis ad d ed )
Gradually, more authors drew more attention to the distinction 
between waters within bays belonging to single States and their territorial 
seas. For example, Shalowitz (1962) made it clear that waters within a 
bay have the character of inland waters because “they are situated within 
the body of the land.”186 Also Bouchez (1964) maintained that “[i]f a 
State is entitled to exercise sovereignty over a bay the enclosed water area
179Article 2, Royal Decree No. 31 o f 9 February 1945 Concerning Provisions Related to Navigation in 
Swedish Waters, as Amended. Ibid., p.245.
180Article 3, Civil Code o f 1950. Ibid., p.13.
181 Article 6 , Section II: The Territory, Constitution o f the Dominican Republic o f 1947, as Amended. 
Ibid., p.12.
182Article 3 o f Act o f 1 December 1948 Concerning the Coastal Waters o f the Federal People’s Republic 
o f Yugoslavia. Ibid., p.313.
183Para. 2, Decree o f 10 October 1951 Concerning the Territorial and Inland Waters o f the People’s 
Republic o f Bulgaria. Ibid., p.80.
184Article 6 , Loi du 12 Avril 1959 (22.1.1338) Modifiant la loi Determinant les Limites des Eaux 
Territoriales. National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous ZQD£> 
thp Continental Shelf, the High Seas, and to Fishing and Conservation o f the Living Resources Qf the 
Sea. United Nations Legislative Series, U.N. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, United Nations, New York, April 
1970, pp.88-89, at 89.
185McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.311.
186Shalowitz, op. cit., p.220, no.28.
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has the status of internal waters. In other words, the water are involved 
does not constitute part of the high seas, and is not subject to the principle 
of the freedom of the Seas.”187 It became clear that waters behind the 
closing line were an integral part of internal waters of these States. As 
McDougal and Burke have asserted, State Practice and national legislation 
gradually indicated a clear picture that waters within the closing lines 
have no other status but being part of internal waters, like any other 
maritime areas within baselines in general.
It was the TSC which finally put an end to the uncertainty about the 
legal nature of waters within bays belonging to a single State. Article 
7(4) of the TSC (Article 10(4) of the LOSC) provides that the waters 
which are entirely enclosed by the closing line of a bay are considered “as 
internal waters.” Also the provision of Article 5(1) of the TSC (Article 
8(1) of the LOSC under the heading “Internal waters”) can be relied upon 
in recognition of the legal nature of waters within juridical bays. This 
article states that “[wjaters on the landward side of the baseline of the 
territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State.” This 
provision extends to the waters within legal bays because the bays closing 
lines are classified among baselines of the territorial sea.
VI. Analysis of Article 7 of the TSC (Article 10 of the 
LOSC): Rules on the Enclosure of Waters within Bays
After the work of the ILC on different aspects of the legal regime 
of the territorial sea, including its delimitation aspects, the UNCLOS I 
adopted the definition suggested by the ILC in identifying legal bays. 
This definition was then incorporated into the TSC and was later 
maintained in the LOSC.188 The main purpose of introducing a precise 
definition for a legal bay was to prevent unjustified enclosure of certain 
areas of coastal waters as bays which would deprive international 
community from having access to areas in which they enjoy inclusive 
interests.189
187Bouchez, op. cit., p.15
188Article 7(1) o f the TSC (Article 10(1) o f the LOSC) makes clear that the provisions on the 
delimitation o f bays relate “only to bays the coasts o f which belong to a single State.”
189It should be noted that the enclosure o f true bays is a right and not an obligation. This means any 
State may wish to establish the method o f low-water mark with respect to the baseline within bays. 
In general, however, no State appears to have excluded itself from enjoying the right to enclose its 
bays in accordance with the international positive law.
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1. Definitional Criteria in Identifying Legal Bays
Definitional criteria for identifying juridical bays are provided in 
Article 7(2) of the TSC (Article 10(2) of the LOSC). According to this 
provision, a bay is defined as:
a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to 
the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked waters and constitute 
more than a mere curvature of the coast.190 An indentation shall not, 
however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger 
than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the 
mouth of that indentation.191
This definition of a juridical bay is made upon two main criteria: 
the geographical criterion and mathematical criterion.192 The first part 
of the definition reflects the geographical test and the second part of the 
definition reflects the geometric test. The geographical criterion is 
applied to assist in finding that an indentation is not a mere curvature of 
the coast. To find whether an indentation is a mere curve or a true bay 
from a geographical viewpoint, three guidelines are suggested.
• Firstly, the indentation should be “well-marked”.
190Shalowitz states that this part o f the definitional criterion o f a legal bay “sets forth the important 
concept o f landlocked waters, or waters situated within the body o f the land, for an indentation to 
qualify as a bay.” Shalowitz, op. cit.f pp.218-219. Prescott writes that ‘[t]he reference to a bay being a 
well-marked indentation and more than a mere curvature o f the coast convey the same message.” 
Prescott, J. R. V., The Maritime Political Boundaries o f the World. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 
1985, p.51. For example, Prescott mentions that the Brunei Bay is a well-marked indentation while 
there is a gentle curve in the east o f Tanjong Baram which cannot be considered a bay under the TSC’s 
definition o f a bay. Ibid.
191The above-mentioned definition o f a bay was first suggested by the ILC to the UNCLOS I and was 
then incorporated into Article 7(1) o f the 1956 ILC draft articles. Article 7 o f the 1956 ILC Draft was 
reprinted in Strohl, op. cit., p.224. It is emphasised that “[t]his definition [definition o f “bay” in 
Article 7(2) o f the TSC and Article 10(2) o f the LOSC] is purely legal and is applicable only in 
relation to the determination o f the limits o f maritime zones. It is distinct from and does not replace 
the geographical definitions used in other contexts.” The Law o f the Sea - Baselines: An Examination 
o f the Relevant Provisions o f the I Inited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Office for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law o f the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1989, p.50.
192In its commentary, the ILC maintained that the provision on the definition o f a bay established “the 
conditions that must be satisfied by an indentation or curve in order to be regarded as a [legal] bay.” 
See the ILC’s Commentary on Draft Article 7, YILC. Vol.II, 1956, p.269. (Hereinafter ILC’s 
Commentary on Draft Article 7, 1956) In the United States v. Louisiana Case (Louisiana Boundary 
Case, 1969), the Court disagreed with the Louisiana’s view that it is sufficient for a bay to only 
satisfy the semi-circle test to be considered as a bay. The Court described the semicircle test as “a 
minimum requirement” and held that other requirements should be met. These requirements, among 
others, are that an indentation should be well-marked and to enclose landlocked waters. United States 
v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case, 1969), 394 U.S. 11, p54. 22 L Ed 2d 44, p.79.
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• Secondly, the ratio of the depth of the penetration to width of the 
indentation should be such that the indentation is surrounded by land 
mass, except in its mouth.
• The third element is that the indentation should contain landlocked 
w aters.193 The third element is, in fact, associated with the second 
element in the sense that if the indentation has a deep penetration into the 
land, it will probably contain landlocked waters.
Although the geographical criterion gives an overall evaluation of 
an indentation as a bay or as a mere curve, it is unable to provide a final 
solution in the cases where there are different views as to whether a 
particular indentation is to be considered a bay or a mere curve.194 Such 
determination has significant effect since there are different legal regimes 
for the delimitation of internal waters and the territorial sea on the basis 
of the nature of the indentation. For these reasons, a mathematical 
criterion was designed to give a more precise and practical solution in the 
cases of uncertainties over the legal nature of a coastal indentation. The 
mathematical method was in a sense introduced to prevent any abuse by 
coastal States in enclosing mere curvatures of the coast.195
The essence of the mathematical criterion is the application of a 
semi-circle test.196 This quantitative formula is used to accurately find 
the character of an indentation on a mathematical basis for legal purposes. 
To apply the semi-circle test, the first step is to draw a line across a bay
193As one author points out the conventional provisions present no guidance to find how landlocked an 
indentation should be to be distinct from a mere curve. Shalowitz, op. cit., p.219. As one author 
points out the term “landlocked waters” should be interpreted liberally because this term in its literal 
meaning implies that a bay should have “an entrance channel from the sea that is curved in such a 
manner as to enter upon a body o f water that is truly landlocked.” If only this literal meaning is taken 
into account a few bays in the world will fall into the meaning. Examples o f the bays which may 
satisfy the character o f landlocked waters are the Purvis Bay (Solomon Islands); The Gulf o f Corinth 
(Greece); Trandheimfjord (Norway); Galveston Bay (Texas); The North Gulf o f Evvoia (Greece);the 
Port Philip Bay (Australia); and the Lake Maracaibo (Venezuela). Strohl, op. cit., p.56.
194The ILC was aware o f this problem that it provided a geometric solution. In fact, in its commentary 
view, the ILC stated that: “(3 ) ... The majority [of the ILC] considered that it was not sufficient to lay 
down that the waters must be closely linked to the land domain by reason o f the depth o f penetration 
o f the bay into the mainland, or otherwise by its configuration, or by reason o f the utility the bay 
might have from the point o f view o f the economic needs o f the country. These criteria lack legal 
precision. (4) The majority o f Commission took the view that the maximum length o f the closing 
line must be stated in figures and that a limitation based on geographical or other considerations, 
which would necessarily be vague, would not su ffice ....” (emphasis added) ILC s Commentary on 
Draft Article 7, 1956, op. cit., p.269.
195This view  was explicitly expressed by the ILC when it commented that the provision on the 
definition o f a legal bay “was calculated to prevent abuse.” Ibid.
196As Prescott asserts in a strict legal sense the semi-circle test “should only be applied after it has been 
decided that the bay is a well-maiked indentation.” Prescott, op. cit., 1985, p.53.
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which links the natural entrance points on the shores.197 Then a semi­
circle whose diameter is the line drawn across the bay will be drawn 
within the bay. If the area of water within the bay is as large as, or 
larger than, the area of the semi-circle, the bay will be a juridical bay 
which then will be subject to other provisions on the delimitation of bays. 
The area of an indentation or a bay for the purpose of comparing its size 
with the semi-circle is defined as the water area “lying between the low- 
water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low- 
water mark of its natural entrance points.”198 If there are islands located 
within an indentation, they are included as part of the water area within 
the indentation.199
When it becomes clear that an indentation, which satisfies the semi­
circle test, may be described as a legal bay, then the rules on the enclosure 
of bays apply to it. The question as to whether a legal bay may entirely 
or partially be enclosed depends on the distance between natural entrance 
points on the shores of such bay. If this distance is not longer than 24 
nautical miles, then a closing line200 up to maximum 24 nautical miles 
may be drawn between low-water marks on the shores to enclose the 
whole area of the bay.201 In this case, all waters within the bay are parts
197As Brown writes, at this stage “the length o f the line drawn across the mouth o f the indentation 
(whether, in particular, it is more or less than 24 miles) and the size o f the area enclosed by the line 
are irrelevant.” Brown, E. D., The International Law of the Sea. V ol.l: Introductory Manual, 
Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1994, p.28.
198Article 7(3) o f the TSC (Article 10(3) o f the LOSC).
1 " A rtic le  7(3) o f  the TSC (Article 10(3) o f the LOSC). As early as 1930, the Swedish Government, 
inter alia, asserted that “islands situated at the entrance of a bay should also be regarded as forming part 
o f the bay.” Part o f Reply o f the Swedish Government to the Questionnaire 2 o f the Committee of 
Experts (1926), Rosenne, op. cit., Vol.2., p.262. In its “Observations” to the Basis o f Discussion 
N o.6 , the Preparatory Committee o f the 1930 Hague viewed that “where islands belonging to the 
coastal State lie at the entrance o f a bay, the breadth o f the opening o f the bay is to be measured from 
the coast to the island or from one island to another.” Rosenne, op. cit.., Vol.2., p.263. Strohl states 
that the provision o f Article 7(3) o f the TSC (Article 10(3) of the LOSC) “would appear to favor the 
littoral State in converting bay waters into internal waters.” Strohl, op. cit., p.61. In the United 
States v. Louisiana Case (1969), the United States Supreme Court stated that the purpose o f the 
provision o f Article 7(3) o f the TSC is to prevent islands within bays to defeat the semi-circle test by 
consuming areas o f the indentation.” United States v. Louisiana (1969), 394 U.S. 11, p.53. 22 L Ed 
2d 44, p.78. Edeson views that permanent harbour works should also be taken into account as part o f 
the indentation for the purpose o f the application o f the semi-circle rule. For reasons on such 
interpretation see Edeson, W. R., ‘Australian Bays’, Australian Yearbook of International Law, 
Vol.5, 1968-1969, pp.5-54, at 37.
200Closing line is defined as “the line marking the boundary between internal waters o f a bay and the 
marginal bet [territorial sea]. It is used where the boundary is drawn between the natural entrance 
points.” Strohl, op. cit., p.70. It is also maintained that straight baseline is applied for the same 
purpose as the closing line for bays but the closing line is used to distinguish between the boundary 
when drawn with respect to a juridical bay with the boundary created by the straight baseline. Ibid.,
p.71.
201Article 7(4) o f the TSC (Article 10(4) o f the LOSC).
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of the internal waters of the coastal State.202 Where the distance exceeds 
the limit of 24 nautical miles, a line with the length of 24 nautical miles 
will be drawn across the bay “in such a manner as to enclose the 
maximum area of water that is possible with a line of that length.”203 In 
this case a question arises as to whether the area enclosed by a line of 24 
nautical miles should also satisfy the semi-circle test.204 It seems that no 
such a requirement exists since no conventional rule provides the double 
application of the semi-circle test with respect to an indentation as a legal 
bay. It should also be added that the use of 24 mile line in the case of 
bays whose mouths are larger than 24 miles does not always follow the 
fact that such a line should link one headland to the other. This means 
that in some cases there only exists a need to find one natural entrance 
point on the shore as a terminus point while the other basepoint is not 
located on the other shore but on the water within the bay. This applies if 
no closing line with the length of 24 nautical miles can be constructed by 
linking two points on the shore. In a sense, in such cases the 24 mile line 
is independent of the rule to adjoin two natural entrance points.
The rules discussed above can be better understood by examining 
different indentations. The following figure shows the application of the 
semi-circle test for various types of coastal indentations, from an slight 
one to a landlocked one. The cases illustrated are hypothetical, and in 
most cases the bays are not circular, but these cases can be applied by
202This is because a legal bay can be excluded from application o f the normal low-water mark rule and a 
deviation from this rule can be justified.
203Article 7(4) o f the TSC (Article 10(4) o f the LOSC). It was the ILC which first suggested that if  the 
mouth o f a legal bay is wider than the maximum permissible width (in its draft fifteen miles), the 
closing line should be drawn in a way to cover as much water as possible to be enclosed. In this 
connection, the ILC commented that this rule will in practice be applied to the cases where it is 
possible to draw more than one closing line of the same length across the mouth but on different parts 
o f the shores. See Commentary, YILC. Vol.II, 1955, p.37. Also see Report o f the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly, IJNGAOR. V o l.l l ,  Supplement No.9, U N  Doc. A/3159, 
1956, p.16. In short, there are three stages for identifying an indentation as a legal bay. The 
indentation should first meet the definitional criterion. Secondly, it should com ply with the 
measurement rules. Finally, it should be enclosed by a closing line o f maximum 24 nautical miles in 
length.
204Shalowitz argues that in the case o f bays whose mouths are larger than 24 miles, that part o f the bay 
which is enclosed with a line o f 24 miles should also meet the requirement o f the semi-circle test. 
See Shalowitz, op. cit., pp.220 and 222-223. For a discussion o f this issue and the opposite view see 
Westerman, op. cit., pp.170-175. For opposite view see Edeson, op. cit., pp.41-42. With respect to 
the relevance o f the issue to Australia, Edeson writes that: “The question could become important to 
Australia as the Gulf o f Carpentaria has the configuration o f a bay but considerably exceeds the 
maximum width . A 24 mile baseline drawn within the Gulf under paragraph 5 [of Article 7 o f the 
TSC] to enclose the maximum area of internal waters conceivably may not satisfy the semi-circle test 
Ibid., p.42.
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analogy to real geographical circumstances around coastlines.205 Part A 
of the figure indicates a landlocked bay which is almost completely 
surrounded by the land mass while part B of the figure demonstrates a 
slight indentation of the coast. In fact, these two indentations are the 
extreme examples of coastal indentations from a mere curve to a very 
deep indentation. In the case A the indentation is obviously a legal bay 
and the indentation in the case B is obviously a non-legal bay. Thus the 
former can be described as “a closed bay” and the waters within this bay 
are considered inland or internal waters while the latter is a clear example 
of “an open bay”. There are also indentations which place between the 
extreme cases of A and B. For example, the indentations in the cases of E 
and D are respectively regarded as a non-juridical bay and a juridical bay. 
The case C illustrates an indentation exactly with the size of the semi­
circle and is also considered as a bay in law because it is as large as the 
semi-circle.
Figure 3.4
The application of the semi-circle test to various 
coastal indentations
Source: Shalowitz, Aaron, L., Shore and Sea Boundaries, V ol.l, 
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1962, p.35.
205Shalowitz is in opinion that “considering the nature of the problem [problem of delimitation o f bays] 
and the infinite variety o f coastlines and indentations that might be encountered, no mathematically 
perfect method is possible. The semicircular method avoids an arbitrary solution and affords at least a 
rational approach to the inland waters problem.” Shalowitz, op. cit., p.41. The view of McDougal 
and Burke is worthy o f mention. They are o f the view that although the application o f the semi-circle 
formula “may contribute to attaining a fairly uniform characterization o f indentations , it does not 
permit account to be taken o f particular instances which fail to fall within the formula but which 
nevertheless might properly, because o f the intensity of genuine exclusive interests , be claimed as 
internal waters.” McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.330.
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If a bay does not meet the geographical and mathematical 
requirements, it will not be a legal bay under Article 7 of the TSC 
(Article 10 of the LOSC), irrespective of the width of its entrance. 
Therefore, the bay would not be a legal bay and its waters are not internal 
waters over which coastal States have exclusive sovereignty. If, however, 
the mouth of the bay is more than 24 nautical miles and the bay cannot be 
enclosed by a closing line of 24 nautical miles in length, the waters inside 
the bay may have two separate legal status. Those waters covered by the 
closing line will be internal206 and the other parts of the bay will be part 
of the territorial sea (up to 12 nautical miles from the low-water mark) 
where there is the recognised right of innocent passage for foreign ships, 
even though the area may not be of interest for international shipping. 
This right is reserved for peaceful passage.
As is clear, in the case of bays whose mouths are larger than 24 
nautical miles and meet the semi-circle test, a line is drawn within the 
bays to enclose the entire bays or some portion of them207. This line is 
termed “straight baseline” in Article 7(5) of the TSC (Article 10(5) of the 
LOSC). It appears that the term “straight baseline” was used by the 
drafters of the TSC to distinguish between the line which is drawn in the 
case of bays larger than 24 nautical miles in width and the closing line 
which is employed to enclose bays with maximum 24 nautical miles in 
width.208 However, the use of the term “straight baseline” in the context 
of delimitation of bays can cause confusion with the straight baseline 
systems which are used in the case of deeply indented and cut off coasts or 
coasts with fringing islands.209 Although in both cases the baselines are 
used for the purpose of separating internal waters from the territorial sea, 
they are two different methods of delimitation designed for different 
coastal features. To resolve this problem of terminology and to avoid the 
confusion caused by the use of similar term, one author suggests the term
206Churchill and Lowe state that “around the unclosed part o f the bay the baseline will be the low-water 
mark (unless any o f the features that justify a different baseline are present).” Churchill, R. R., and A. 
V. Lowe, The Law o f the Sea. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983, pp.31-32.
207This is in the cases where there are no other base points on the shores to construct a 24 nautical mile 
closing line and the geographical circumstances are in a way that the bay cannot be enclosed by a line 
with the maximum length o f 24 nautical miles.
208Compare Article 7(5) o f the TSC (Article 10(5) o f the LOSC) where the term “straight baseline” is 
used with Article 7(4) o f the TSC (Article 10(4) o f the LOSC) where the term “closing line” is used.
209See Strohl, op. cit., p.71.
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“boundary line” to replace the term “straight baseline”.210 By doing so, 
Article 7(5) of the TSC (Article 10 (5) of the LOSC) would read :
Where the distance ... exceeds twenty-four miles, an in te rn a l w a te r s  
b o u n d a ry  lin e  of twenty-four miles shall be drawn within the bay in 
such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is possible 
with a line of that length.
2. Tributary Bays and the Application 
of the Semi-Circle Test
One issue concerning the calculation of the semi-circle created by a 
closing line is whether the areas of tributary bays or subsidiary bays can 
be taken into account as part of primary bays.211 This issue was addressed 
in the United States v. Louisiana Case (Louisiana Boundary Case) which 
was brought before the United States Supreme Court in 1969.212 
Louisiana believed that Outer Vermilion Bay and Ascension Bay in its 
coasts were true bays. Louisiana argued that in the case of applying the 
semi-circle test to Outer Vermilion Bay, the area of Vermilion Bay had 
also to be included. It also expressed the same view concerning the 
Barataria Bay-Caminada Bay complex as part of the Ascension Bay.213 
Only by taking the above-mentioned areas into account, Outer Vermilion 
Bay and Ascension Bay could satisfy the semi-circle test. The United 
States Government agreed that certain tributary waters may be taken into 
account for the purpose of the semi-circle test but it did not agree that “all 
tributary waters are so includible.”214 It asserted that Vermilion Bay and 
Barataria Bay-Caminada Bay could be includible because in its view they 
were “wholly separate from the outer body of water and linked only by 
narrow passages or channels. The Court finally reached to two different 
conclusions about the status of Outer Vermilion Bay and Ascension Bay.
210Westerman, op. cit., p.162.
211Shalowitz writes that “[i]n the application o f the semi-circle rule to an indentation containing pockets, 
coves, or tributary waterways, the are o f the whole indentation (including pockets, coves, etc.) is 
compared with the area of a semi-circle.” Shalowitz, op. cit, p.219.
212The case was among a series o f cases which brought before the Supreme Court o f the United States of 
America as a result o f disputes between the federal government and many state governments over 
submerged lands. In the United States v. Louisiana Case (1969) the issue was over the baseline from 
which the three mile limit o f submerged lands of Louisiana had to be measured.
213United States v. Louisiana (1969), 394 U.S. 11, pp.48-49. 22 L Ed 2d 44, pp.76-77. Louisiana 
argued that the phrase “between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation” in Article 7(2) 
o f the TSC means “to follow the low-water line wherever it goes, including into other indentations, in 
drawing the perimeter o f the primary bay.” United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969), pp.50-51. 
22 L Ed 2d 44, p.77.
214United States v. Louisiana (1969), 394 U.S. 11, p.51. 22 L Ed 2d 44, p.77.
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While the Court considered that Outer Vermilion Bay was neither a bay 
nor part of a larger bay, it held that the water area of Ascension Bay 
“does include the Barataria Bay -Caminada Bay complex and therefore 
meets the semi-circle test.”215
The United Nations Study on the issue of baselines, among other 
things, addressed the issue of tributary or subsidiary bays in the 
application of the semi-circle bays. The study maintained that if the 
shoreline of subsidiary bays forms part of the low-water mark and is part 
of penetration of the sea into land, “there appears to be no reason why it 
should not be counted as part of the area of the bay.”216 The following 
figure illustrates an example where a subsidiary bay may be taken into 
account as part of the main bay. Although in this example, the main bay 
itself satisfies the semi-circle test, in some cases the subsidiary bays play a
determining role in recognising a bay as a juridical one.
Figure 3.5
An example of a tributary bay
JANUARY 1989
Source: The Law of the Sea - Baselines: An Examination of the 
Relevant Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea. Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law the Sea, United Nations, 
New York, 1989, p.31.
3 . The Issue of Identifying Natural Entrance Points of Bays
Although the conventional provisions on the delimitation of bays 
provide that the closing lines of bays should link “the natural entrance
2l5United States v. Louisiana (1969), 394 U.S. 11, p.52. 22 L Ed 2d 44, p.78. The Court stated that 
the Barataria Bay - Caminada Bay complex (as inner bays) ‘were separated from larger Ascension Bay 
only by the string o f islands across their entrances.’ Ibid.
216The Law o f the Sea - Baselines, op. cit., pp.28 & 30. It seems that New Zealand has taken into 
account the area o f the tidal Onoke Lake for the purpose of satisfying the semi-circle test to enclose 
Palliser Bay as a legal bay. Ibid., p.41, no. 19.
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points”217 on shores of bays218, there are no guidelines as to what points 
on the shore should be considered as natural entrance points.219 The lack 
of any guidelines in the TSC and the LOSC may lead coastal States to 
choose points on the shores of bays in a manner: (a) to enclose bays which 
do not normally fall in the category of legal bays; or (b) in a manner to 
enclose more waters within the closing line where bays can be classified 
as legal bays but can be enclosed by drawing a more proper closing line 
choosing appropriate points as natural entrance points. These practical 
problems may in practice result in the enclosure of more parts of the high 
seas and so limit navigation rights of foreign ships to innocent passage.
In this connection, the case of Post Office v. Estuary Radio220 is 
worthy of examination. In this case, the English Court of Appeal was 
asked to determine natural entrance points for the Thames estuary. The 
importance of this determination was to find whether the Thames estuary 
is a legal bay. There was a dispute as to where the natural entrance points 
are located. Two different series of points on the shores were put before 
the Court that would lead to two different outcomes. While Estuary Radio 
was of the view that Ordordness and the North Foreland were to be 
considered as the natural entrance points of the Thames estuary, the Post 
Office claimed that the natural entrance points were the Naze and 
Foreness.221 The result of the use of the points suggested by Estuary 
Radio was that the Thames estuary would not satisfy the semi-circle test 
and therefore would not be qualified as a legal bay to be enclosed. In
217Natural Entrance points are defined as “the points at which the coastline can most reasonably be said 
to turn inward to form an indentation or bay.” Strohl, op. cit., p.68.
218The other terms which are used for implying the same meaning as the entrance points are boundary 
points, termini at headlands and landmarks. The term headland, in common usage, mean “a land mass 
having considerable elevation, something that the navigator can see from offshore . However, in the 
context o f  the law o f te sea a headland can be considered as “the point o f maximum extension o f a 
portion o f  the land into water; or a .point on the shore at which there is an appreciable change in 
direction o f the general trend o f the coast” Shalowitz, op. cit., pp.63-64.
219Prescott mentions Mabo Harbour on Malaita in the Solomon Islands and Gwadar W est Bay on the 
coast o f  Pakistan as examples o f bays which have well-marked points. Prescott, op. cit., 1985, p.53. 
It is stated that i f  an indentation qualifies the geographical criterion incorporated into Article 7(2) o f 
the TSC that is to say if  an indentation is a well-marked one, and if  it contains landlocked waters, and 
i f  it is more than a mere cure, then “the bay will almost inevitably have natural entrance points, 
which are easily discernible.” Strohl, op. cit., p.62.
220ri967] 1 W.L.R. 847. In this case, the Post Office was attempting to indicate that pirate broadcasung 
was operated within the Thames Estuary as part o f the territory o f the UK and accordingly subject to 
the provisions o f the W ireless Telegraphy Act 1949. The issue o f the rivers and creeks flowing into 
the indentations or forming estuaries as part o f the area to be considered for the area o f the indentations 
was also addressed in the Post Office v. Estuary Radio Case. See ibid., pp.847-848 and also Edeson,
op. cit., 1968-1969, pp.38-39. . . .
221 [1967] i  W.L.R. 848-849. Ordordness and the North Foreland points were located more landward
than the Naze and Foreness points. Edeson, op. cit., 1968-1969, p.38.
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contrast, the application of the points proposed by the Post Office would 
lead to the conclusion that the Thames estuary would be categorised as a 
legal bay and accordingly could be enclosed. The Court finally agreed 
with the view of the Post Office 222and the Thames estuary was 
considered to fall into category of legal bays as it could thus satisfy the 
requirement of the semi-circle test.223
The issue of uncertainty in finding natural entrance points of a bay 
was also raised in the case of United States v. Louisiana (1969). In this 
case, one dispute was on the line drawn across the East Bay by Louisiana. 
The United States Government did not recognise this line on the ground 
that ‘the area within East Bay enclosed by Louisiana’s proposed line does 
not constitute a bay because there is no “well-marked indentation” with 
identifiable headlands which encloses “landlocked” waters.’224
The uncertainty of determining natural entrance points in a number 
of possible cases is addressed in the United Nations study on baselines. 
The study states that “it is not clear how to identify the natural entrance 
points of a bay. Some bays will possess a number of points which might 
be used225, some will have only one natural entrance point226, and others 
may possess smoothly curved entrances227 on which no single point is 
distinguished.”228 (See the following figures illustrating examples of real 
cases.) In the case of a bay indicated on Figure 3.6 (a), coastal
222The Court’s view  was expressed after the examination o f related maps and the evidence presented by a 
group o f  cartographers, hydrographic surveyors and specialist navigators. Ibid., p.43.
223 [1967] 1 W .L.R. 848. The difficulty in finding the natural entrance points in certain cases is even 
intensified where there is no agreement on the most appropriate points for the termini o f the closing 
lines. For example, Churchill and Lowe view that neither the points suggested by the Estuary Radio, 
nor those proposed by the Post Office would be regarded as natural entrance points. Churchill and 
Lowe, op. cit., p.32.
224United States v. Louisiana (1969)a, 394 U.S. 11, p.54. 22 L Ed 2d 44, pp.79. The United States 
Supreme Court did not present its view on the question as to whether the designated portion o f the 
East Bay were in consistent with the requirements pointed out by the Federal government. However, 
the Court generally expressed that these requirements should be met if  an indentation is to be 
considered as a bay. Ibid.
225For example, in the case o f Wanderer Bay on Guadalcanal in the Solomon islands there are six senes 
o f entrance points which produce six different possible closing lines. Prescott, op. cit., 1985, pp.53­
54. . .
226Examples o f  bays falling into this category are Port Waitangi on Chatham Island in the south Pacific 
Ocean, Encounter Bay in South Australia, Saint Helena Bay in Cape Province o f South Africa, and 
W alvis Bay in southwest Africa. Ibid., pp.54-55. .
227An example o f  these kinds o f bays is Baie Anarua on the coast o f Rapa Iti in French Polynesia. Ibid.,
pp.55-56. , «* . r . .
228The Law o f  the Sea: Baselines, op. cit., p.28. The study also comments that: A number o f tests
have been proposed for objectively identifying natural entrance points. Some may find those tests 




The issue of natural entrance points of a bay
Figure 3.7
Wanderer Bay, Guadalcanal
(b) A bay with only one entrance point*
Source: Prescott, J. R. V., T he M aritim e  
Political Boundaries o f the World. Methuen & 
Co. Ltd., London, 1985, p.54.
Figure 3.8
Gulf of Cutch in India
(c) A bay with no definite entrance points*
♦Source: The Law o f the Sea - Baselines: An. 
Fv^mination o f the Relevant Provisions o f the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Se a  Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of 
the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1989, p.30.
Source: Strohl, Mitchell. P., The International 
T aw o f Bavs. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 
1963, p.63.
Figure 3.9
Baie Anarua, French Polynesia
Political Boundaries o f the World, Methuen 
& Co. Ltd., London, 1985, p.55
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States are usually willing to enclose more waters within the bay if the bay 
meets the requirement of the semi-circle test and all closing lines do not 
exceed 24 nautical miles.
With respect to bays whose entrance points are not clear, the 
method suggested by Shalowitz can be used as a solution. Shalowitz’s 
method is to find the entrance point on the shore of a bay which is 
rounded or smooth. In his words, “[w]here the headland is of 
considerable extent with a gently rounded and featureless shore, a 
satisfactory solution may be reached by bisecting the angle formed by a 
line coinciding with the general trend of the low-water mark along the 
open coast and a line coinciding with the general trend of the low-water 
mark along the bay or tributary waterway. Where this bisectrix intersects 
the low-water mark will be the point sought.”229 (See Figure 3.10 
below )
Figure 3.10
Method of determining natural entrance points of a bay
Source: Shalowitz, Aaron L., Shore and Sea Boundaries. V o l.l,
United States Government Printing Office, Washington D. C., 1962, 
p.64.
It appears that Shalowitz’s method can be used for either (a) bays 
with only one clear entrance point while the other point is not clear due to 
geographical character of the shore as shown in Figure 3.6(b)230, or (b)
229Shalowitz, op. cit., pp.64-65. The basis o f Shalowitz’s method is on the fact that “[t]he shores o f the 
headlands are formed by two different groups o f forces - those o f the ocean and those o f the estuary or 
tributary waterway. The points sought [for the termini o f headlands] are where the shores resulting 
from thee forces meet. Therefore, each terminus of the headland-to-headland line is taken as a point at 
the outermost extension o f the headland from which it is drawn.” Ibid., p.64.
230If in such a case the Shalowitz’s method is not responsive, the method suggested by Edeson can be 
used. Edeson suggest the following solution for the cases where there is a clear headland on one side 
o f a bay while the other side presents a gentle curve. He states that in such cases the solution is “to
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bays with no clear and definite entrance points on either shore as 
indicated in Figure 3.6(c).
4 . The Issue of the Delimitation of 
Multi-Mouthed Indentations
One issue which should be considered is related to the case where 
there are islands within the mouth of an indentation, that is to say the 
issue of multi-mouthed bays.231 The question is whether these bays are 
susceptible to enclosure if they meet the requirements of a legal bay with 
a single mouth or they are not to be enclosed at all. The solution is found 
in Article 7(3) of the TSC (Article 10(3) of the LOSC) which provides 
that “[w]here, because of the presence of islands, an indentation has more 
than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn on a line as long as the 
sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different mouths.”232 This 
means all bays are subject to the semi-circle test, no matter whether they 
are single or multi-mouthed bays. The only difference is the way the 
length of the diameter on which the semi-circle is drawn is calculated on 
different basis.233
As indicated above, the rules of Article 7 are not strictly used in the 
case of bays with islands in the mouth. These rules have been made 
flexible by considering the sum of the length of the mouths between the 
islands. In fact, the drafters were of the view that “the presence of islands 
at the mouth of an indentation tends to link it more closely to the 
mainland, and this consideration may justify some alteration in the ratio
draw the closing line from the clearly marked headland to the nearest point o f land on the opposite 
shore, or, if  that line is greater than 24 miles, then to draw a baseline within the bay so as to enclose 
the maximum area o f  internal waters in accordance with paragraph 5 [of Article 7 o f the TSC].” 
Edeson, op. cit., 1968-1969, p.43.
231 An example o f bays with islands on their mouths is Narragansett Bay, Rhose Island. Strohl, op. cit.,
p.60.
232One writer argues that the provision “is not free o f ambiguity and raises the question as to whether the 
sum o f the widths o f the several entrances may exceed the length o f the closing line” or whether this 
total sum o f the widths should comply with the maximum limit o f 24 nautical miles. Shalowitz, op. 
cit., p .220. It seems that in the case where the sum total o f the widths is wider than 24 nautical 
m iles, a line should be drawn landward o f the mouth o f the bay where the width does not exceed 24 
nautical miles. See Brown, op. cit., 1994, p.30. See also Shalowitz’s interpretation which suggests 
that the maximum limit for the closing line should be applied to both single-mouthed bays and multi­
mouthed bays. Shalowitz, op. cit., p.221. Shalowitz also states that if  the total sum o f the entrances 
o f  an indentation would exceed 24 nautical miles, the indentation would not be a legal bay on the 
ground o f islands located at its mouth. In this case, the indentation “would have to be tested by the 
rule for indentations wider than the closing line.” Ibid., p.222.
233 Strohl points out that in the case o f a multi-mouth bays how lines are to be drawn “can make a 
significant difference in the total numerical value o f ... [the] closing line, with which the area o f the 
bay is to be compared.” Strohl, op. cit., p.60.
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between the width and the penetration of the indentation.”234 It is in line 
with these justifications that Westerman writes that “the strict 
geographical and mathematical requirements set forth under paragraph 
two [Article 7 of the TSC] are relaxed for multi-mouthed bays.”235 In 
some cases a bay which is a multi-mouthed bay would not be a legal bay if 
no island or islands were not located in its mouth. This is because the total 
length of the mouth would be less in the case of a multi-mouthed bay in 
comparison to the same bay if it were a single-mouthed bay. 
Accordingly, the diameter of the semi-circle would be smaller in the case 
of a multi-mouthed bay compared with a bay with the same size but 
without islands in its mouth. Whatever the justification has been for 
making such a rule for multi-mouthed bays, the recognition of this rule 
has contributed to the enclosure of more areas of waters as internal 
waters. If such a provision were not be included in the conventions on 
the law of the sea, the pattern of maritime zones of the coastal States 
concerned would change and less waters would be subject to the legal 
regime of internal waters. In addition, the ILC presented a comment 
which was not taken into account by the UNCLOS I in the codification of 
the provisions of the TSC. The ILC’s view was that in the case of a 
multi-mouthed bay ‘islands at the mouth of a bay cannot be considered as 
“closing” the bay if the ordinary sea route passes between them and the 
coast.”236 (emphasis added)
One issue which arises from the existence of the fringing islands 
across the mouth of a bay is what the status of these islands would be 
where they are not completely on a direct line across the mouth of the 
bay.237 (See the following figures) For example, if these islands are 
slightly located seaward of the mouth whether it is still possible to take 
the islands into account in the enclosure of the mouth of a bay.238 The 
provision of Article 7(3) of the TSC appears to include only the islands 
which are located across the mouth of a bay239 but as one author points
234Paragraph 2, ILC’s Commentary on Draft Article 7, 1956, op. cit., p.269.
235W esterman, op. cit., p.179. A lso Shalowitz asserts that the rules for the delimitation o f  bays were 
liberalised in the case o f  multi-mouthed bays. Shalowitz, op., cit., pp.220-221.
236Paragraph 2, ILC’s Commentary on Draft Article 7, 1956, op. cit., p.269.
237Even when the islands are on a direct line between two shores, drawing lines to or from these islands 
on the direction o f mouth would touch the islands in a way that part o f them w ill be inside the bay 
and the other part will be in outside the bay.
238See, for example, Edeson, op. cit., 1968-1969, p.40.
239For example, the view o f  the United States Supreme Court in the United States v. Louisiana Case 
(1969) is useful to note. The Louisiana’s contention was that in the cases o f islands located outside 
die mouth o f  the bay, the closing lines were to be drawn “between the mainland headlands and the
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out “nature has not seen fit to arrange islands in a convenient line across 
bays.”240 The following figures demonstrate the impact of the location of 
islands on the method of the drawing the closing line.241 In case (a), it is 
obvious that the proper closing line is to link the headlands by a direct 
line (as indicated). In case (b), there are two possible way to draw the 
closing line: (i) to link the headlands by a direct line, or (ii) to draw a line 
from a headland to the island and then from the island to the other 
headland. Shalowitz suggests that in case (b) the appropriate closing line 
would be the latter line.242
Figure 3.11
Islands within and outside a bay
(a) The island is situated within the bay. (b) The island is situated outside the bay
Source: Shalowitz, Aaron, L., Shore and Sea Boundaries. V ol.l, United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1962, p.225.
5. The Issue of Islands as Headlands of Bays
One issue in the delimitation of certain bays is whether islands can 
constitute the headlands of bays. This issue mainly arises in the cases 
where a bay is either formed by two islands or by the mainland and an 
island. The law of the sea conventions do not provide any explicit
seaward-most points on the islands.” In response, the Court held that Article 7(3) says that ‘“across 
different mouth” not across the most seaward tips of islands.’ United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 
(1969), p.55. 22 L Ed 2d 44, pp.79-80.
240Strohl, op. cit., p.60.
241 It should be noted that ‘Article 7(3) o f [the TSC] clearly distinguishes between islands which, by 
creating multiple mouths, form a part o f the perimeter o f the bay and those which, by their presence 
wholly “within” the bay, are treated as part o f its water area.’ The view of the United Supreme Court 
in the United States v. Louisiana Case (1969), 394 U.S. 11 (1969), p.60. 22 L Ed 2d 44, p.82.
242Shalowitz, op. cit., p.225. It is clear that this suggestion is in favor o f coastal State because it 
extend the area o f the internal waters o f bays, no matter how slight this extension may be. Also the 
United Nations Study on the issue o f baselines views that Article 10(3) o f the LOSC is not limited to 
islands located across the mouth of a bay. The study suggests that “islands might lie seawards o f the 
direct line between the natural entrance points and still qualify under the terms o f article 10. It is then 
a matter o f judgement to decide when such islands lie too far seawards to be considered as forming 
mouths o f the bay.” The Law of the Sea - Baselines, op. cit., pp.30-31.
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provision to include these cases.243 In the United States v. Louisiana Case 
(1969), the federal government was of the opinion that according to the 
TSC a bay is an indentation into land and it cannot be formed by islands 
located on the coast. It argued that a true bay is only open in its mouth 
and because of the opening between mainland and islands the indentation 
lacks the character of a true bay as enclosing “landlocked waters”.244 The 
United States Supreme Court, however, was of the view that neither 
Article 7 of the TSC or any other provision of this Convention prohibits 
the use of coastal islands as headlands. The Court held that the existence 
of the geographical fact that there is an opening between islands and the 
mainland would not deprive the waters enclosed by islands and mainlands 
from being considered as “landlocked.”245 Although it may be argued 
that islands are able to form natural entrance points for bays created by 
two islands or the mainland and an island, certain factors should be taken 
into account in adopting certain islands as qualified for the purpose of 
delimitation of such bays. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court 
enumerated a number of factors to be considered in appraisal of certain 
coastal islands as headlands of bays. The Court stated that:
While there is little objective guidance on this question [question of 
islands as headlands] to be found in international law, the question 
whether a particular island is to be treated as part of the mainland would 
depend on su ch  f a c to r s  a s  i ts  s ize , its  d is ta n c e  f r o m  the m a in lan d , the  
d e p th  a n d  u tility  o f  the in terven in g  w a ters , the sh a p e  o f  the is lan d , a n d  
i ts  r e la t io n s h ip  to  th e  c o n fig u ra tio n  o r  c u rv a tu re  o f  th e  c o a s t .246 
(em p h a s is  a d d ed )
243In the United States v. Maine (1985), the Supreme Court o f the United States held that “[t]here is 
nothing in the Convention [TSC] or in the Submerged Lands Act [1953 Act o f USC] that indicates 
whether islands may or may not be treated as extensions o f the mainland for the purpose o f forming a 
headland o f  a juridical bay.” United States v. Maine (Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case), 469 
U .S. 504 (1985), p.515. 83 L Ed 2d 998, p.1007.
244United States v. Louisiana (1969), 394  U.S. 11, pp.60-61. 22 L Ed 2d 44, pp.82-83. The federal 
governm ent stated that only a line can be drawn from the mainland to an island if  the line is 
continued from the other side o f the island to reach the other part o f  mainland. In this case, the 
closing line is a link between one part o f the mainland the other part o f the mainland. Prescott, op. 
cit., 1985, p.56.
24^United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969), p.61. L Ed 2d 44, p.83. In the Raptis v. South 
Australia Case (1976) concerning the maritime limits o f South Australia, the Australian High Court 
approved that islands can constitute natural entrance points o f bays. For the case see 15 ALR 223 
(1977).
246United States v. Louisiana (1969), 394 U.S. 11, p.66. 22 L Ed 2d 44, p.85. Bearing in mind these 
factors and other relevant criteria the Special Master was asked by the Court to examine whether the 
islands designated by Louisiana as headlands o f bays were ‘so integrally related to the mainland that 
they are realistically part o f the “coast” within the meaning o f the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone.’ Ibid. This approach was reaffirmed in the United States v. Maine (1985). The 
Supreme Court also did not agree with the federal government that the islands should be treated as 
headlands “only in a few narrow situations.” The Court held that “the proper approach is to consider 
each case individually in determining whether an island should be assimilated to the mainland.” 
United States v. Maine (1985), 469 U.S. 504, p.517. 83 L Ed 2d 998, pp.1008-1009.
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In the U.S. v. Maine Case (1985), there was also a question as to 
whether Long Island could be regarded as an extension of the mainland in 
order to constitute a headland. (See Figure 3.13 below.) This question 
had to be answered before determining whether Long Island Sound and 
Block Island Sound could create a juridical bay. As the United States 
Supreme Court stated “unless Long Island is considered to be part of the 
mainland and provides one of the headlands, neither Long Island Sound 
nor Block Island Sound satisfies Article 7’s [of the TSC] requirements.”247 
It finally adopted the opinion expressed by the Special Master in 
considering Long Island as a headland. The Court relied upon two 
factors to consider the Long Island as part of the mainland and to 
subsequently conclude that the Long Island Sound is a juridical bay. The 
factors were the general configuration of the Long island and the 
character of the channel on the western side of the island as a very 
narrow waterway.248
According to Prescott, there are four possible situations where the 
existence of islands may lead to formation of particular bays. These 
situations are:
(a) where a bay is formed by two islands on the coast (an example is the 
coast of Finnmark Kaloyo and Seiland);
(b) where an island is located near the mainland in a way which creates a 
bay249 (an example is the Fraser Island creating the Hervey Bay on the 
coast of Queenslands in Australia, and another example is the Long Island 
Sound on the coast of New York created as a result of the existence of the 
Long Island);
(c) where the existence of an island within an indented coast creates two 
coastal indentations (an example is Menivai Bay in the Santa Cruz Islands 
which is created by the Tevaii Island); and
247United States v. Maine (1985), 469 U.S. 504 , p.514-515. 83 L Ed 2d 998, p.1007.
248united  States v. Maine (1985), 469 U.S. 504, pp.517-519. 83 L Ed 2d 998, p.1009. A lso see the 
Louisiana v. Mississippi Case where the Court held that the peninsula o f St. Bernard form an integral 
part o f  the Louisiana’s coast. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, pp.45-46. 50 L Ed 913.
249Strohl mentions the case o f a bay where there are a string o f islands along a gentle curve. An 
example o f  this kind o f bay is the Buzzards Bay in Massachusetts. Strohl, op. cit., p.60.
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(d) where the existence of the island on the coast may result in the 
extension of a bay (an example is the Graciosa Bay in the Santa Cruz 
Islands which is extended by the existence of the Black Rock and Te Motu 
Islands).250 These four situations are illustrated below.
Figure 3.12
The impact of certain coastal islands on the creation of bays
Source: Prescott, J. R. V., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World. 
Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1985, p.58.
The United Nations Study on the issue of baselines confirmed the 
lack of provision in the LOSC for the question an island as a headland. It 
referred to two cases where islands may be considered as headlands: 
where an island forms one side of a bay and where an island extends a 
bay. (See the following figures) The study states that in these cases “it 
might be justifiable to use a point on the island as one of the natural 
entrance points.”251
250See Prescott, op. cit., 1985, pp.59-60. In the United States v. Maine Case, the federal government 
disagreed with the Special Master’s recommendation that Long Island be regarded a part o f the 
mainland. The position o f the federal government was that the view o f the Supreme Court in the 
United States v. Louisiana Case (1969) had to be interpreted restrictedly. It asserted that an island 
should only be treated as a headland: ‘When the island is separated from the mainland by a genuine 
“river”; when the island is connected to the mainland by a causeway; when the island ids connected to 
the mainland by a low-tide elevation; or when, as in die Louisiana Boundary Case, the shoreline is 
deltaic in nature.” United States v. Maine (Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case), 469 U.S. 
504 (1985), p.517. 83 L Ed 2d 998, p.1008.
251 Law o f the Sea - Baselines, op. cit., p.31.
Figure 3.13
Long Island (New York, United States of America)
An example where an island is located on one side of a bay
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Source: The Law o f the Sea - Baselines: An Examination o f the Relevant Provisions 
o f the United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea. Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1989, p.32.
Figure 3.14
Graciosa Bay (Santa Cruz Islands)
An example of a bay extended by the existence of coastal islands
Source: Prescott, J. R. V., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the 
World. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1985, p.58.
6. Some O ther Issues Concerning the Delimitation of Bays
A single straight line cannot be employed to enclose two or more 
coastal indentations. For any indentation, except in the case of multi­
mouthed bays, there should be only one closing line, if the indentation is
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to satisfy the established rules on identifying a legal bay.252 This is 
because in most cases the enclosure of two or more indentations is only 
possible by drawing a quite long line. Such a lengthy line has more 
impact on the inclusion of the high seas as part of the waters under the 
authority of coastal States than the impact which a short line may have 
upon the high seas and its freedoms.
Attention should also be paid to Article 7(6) of the TSC (Article 
10(6) of the LOSC). This provision excludes the application of rules on 
legal bays to the locations where according to Article 4 of the TSC 
(Article 7 of the LOSC) straight baselines are employed.253
252McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.329.
253See Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.31. The TSC (Article 7(6)) and the LOSC (Article 10(6)) also 
exclude historic bays from the application o f their rules on the delimitation o f bays and allow  
extension o f sovereignty over larger bays if  it is substantiated that there is a historic title over these 
coastal indentations, irrespective o f the width o f their entrance. Although Article 7(6) o f the TSC 
(Article 10(6) o f the LOSC) excludes historic bays from the general rules governing the delimitation 
o f single-State bays, it does not provide a definition for an historic bay. In 1951, the ICJ held that 
‘[b]y “historic waters” are usually meant waters which are treated as internal waters but which would 
not have that character were it not for the existence of an historic title.’ Fisheries Case (UK v. 
Norway), ICJ Reports, 1951, p.130. However, the ICJ did not explain what the criteria are for the 
establishment of historic titles to adjacent waters. It should be noted that historic bays are a particular 
category o f historic waters. “Historic bays” are, in fact, the most common bodies o f waters which 
have been claimed on an historic basis. So far codification efforts to provide the definition and 
requirements o f historic waters and bays have failed. See, for example, discussion on the issue of 
historic bays in the 1930 Conference, in Rosenne, op cit., Vol.2, pp. 257-262, Vol.4., Annex I, 
pp.1390-1391 and 1393, and Vol.4, Annex II, p.1394; Y IL C . 1956, Vol.II, pp.257 and 269; 
IJNCLOS I. Official Records. V ol.m , 1958 pp.17, 68, 69, 74, 145, 241, and 252; and UNCLOS III. 
Official records. Vol.II, pp.101-102, 104, 106-108, 111, and UNCLOS III. Official Records. Vol.V, 
1977, p.202 (the Colombian proposal). The Committee o f Experts for the 1930 Hague Conference 
recommended that an Internal Waters Office to be established in order to register all bays validly 
claimed as historic. This was proposed to prevent the formation o f any more historic title over bays. 
The office was never established. Now, historic waters and bays are subject to the rules o f customary 
international law for their delimitation. In assessing whether a State has acquired historic title to an 
adjacent maritime area, it should be determined: (1) whether the claimant State has exercised 
sovereignty over a bay or a maritime area claimed as historic; (2) whether the exercise o f sovereignty 
by the claimant State over the bay or the maritime area continued over a reasonable period o f time; and 
finally and most importantly (3) whether other States have acquiesced in the claim o f the claimant 
State over the bay or the maritime area as historic. In particular, see the UN studies on historic waters 
and bays - ‘Historic Bays’ (Memorandum by the Secretariat o f the United Nations, U N  Document 
A/CONF.13/1, (Preparatory Document N o .l), 30 September 1957, UNCLOS I. Official Records. 
V ol.l (Preparatory Documents), New York, United Nations, 1958. pp.1-38) and ‘Juridical Regime of  
Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays’ (Study Prepared by the Secretariat o f the United Nations, 
Document A/CN.4/143, YILC. Vol.2, United Nations, New York, 1962 pp.1-26). These documents 
examine State practice, arbitral and judicial decisions, codification projects and the opinion o f writers 
on the definition and requirement o f historic waters and bays. Also see the US cases dealing with the 
issues related to the concepts o f historic waters and bays. These cases include: Islands Airways Inc. v. 
Civil Aeronautics Board 235 Federal Supplement (USA) 990, at 1007 (1964); United States v. State 
o f California (Decided 17 May 1965), 381 U.S. 139,14 L Ed 2d 296 [1966]; United States v. State o f  
California (SupplementalDecree, 31 January 1966, 3 8 2 U .S .4 4 8 ,1 5 L E d 2 d 5 1 7  [1966] (ForReport 
o f Special Master on the dispute between the US Federal Government and the State o f California see 
57 ILR (1980) 54.); United States v. State o f Louisiana et al (Decided 8 March 1969), 394 U.S. 11, 
22 L Ed 2d 44 [1970]; United States v. Florida (Decree, Issued 24 May 1976), 425 U.S. 7 91 ,48  L Ed 
2d 388 (1977); United States v. State o f Alaska (Decided 23 June 1975), 422 U.S. 184, 45 L Ed 2d 
109 [1976]; United States v. Maine et al (Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case) (Decided 19
166
Notwithstanding, some argue that in some parts of the coast, it may be 
possible to use straight baselines to enclose waters larger than the area 
enclosed by the closing line. One basis of this view seems to be the ILC’s 
view that “should straight baselines be drawn covering the coast of the 
bay, the special rules relating to bays would no longer be applicable.”254 
The correctness of this interpretation seems to be questionable.255
It appears that the provision is simply making a distinction between 
a straight baseline and a closing line, each one being employed for certain 
areas of coastlines. This interpretation is confirmed by a publicist who 
distinguished the two regimes of delimitation in the following words: 
“[w]hile both regimes result in the delimitation of the baseline separating 
internal and territorial waters, Article 4 [of the TSC] is much broader in 
concept and more inclusive in scope than Article 7 [of the TSC], which is 
limited to a single geographic feature.”256
VII. Rules Governing the Delimitation of Bays: Extension of
National Jurisdiction and Impacts on the Free Seas
The trend of coastal States in increasing maritime areas under their
control can be easily understood by the content of rules adopted for the
delimitation of bays.257 The effects of these rules on the reduction of the
high seas and on the scope of free navigation and other freedoms of the
high seas have been the main impacts on the rights of international
community. One of the main features of such trend is reflected in the
recognition of 24 mile rule. Westerman views that:
the twenty-four-mile limitation ... is merely arbitrary, a manifestation 
of the desire of many coastal states to  g a in  the g r e a te s t  a m o u n t o f  
s o v e re ig n ty  o v e r  w a te r  a re a s  w h ich  h a d  p re v io u s ly  been  c o n s id e r e d
February 1985), 469 U.S. 504, 83 L Ed 2d 998 [1987]; US v. Louisiana et al. (Alabama and 
Mississippi Boundary case) (Decided 26 February 1985), 760 U.S. 93, 84 L. Ed. 2d 73 [1985], 86.
254U N  D o c . A/CONF.13/C.1/L.104, UNCLOS I. Official Records. Vol.III, 1958, p.147. However, the 
ILC’s comment on Article 7 o f its 1956 draft indicates a different approach to the issue. In relation to 
the semi-circle test as part o f the definition of a legal bay, the ILC expressed that such a provision 
“was necessary in order to prevent the system of straight baselines from being applied to coasts whose 
configuration does not justify it, on the pretext o f applying the rules for bays '’ (emphasis added) 
ILC’s Commentary on Article 7(10) o f the 1956 DLC (¿aft. YILC. Vol.II, 1956, p.269.
255See McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.312. Also see the view of the United States Supreme Court in 
the United States v. Louisiana Case (1969) in Knight, Gary, and Hungdah Chiu, The International 
T aw  o f the Sea: Cases. Materials, and Readings. Elsevier Applied Science, London, 1991, p .l 14. ^
256$ee Fitzmaurice, Gerald, ‘Some Results o f the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly. V o l.8 ,1959, p.73.
257In this line, Strohl asserts that : “Since sovereignty over a bay ... has gradually come to have a 
quality more absolute than that o f the marginal belt, an assertion o f such sovereignty appears 
especially attractive.” Strohl, op. cit., p.24.
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h ig h  s e a s  ... [I]t cannot be denied that the ru le  is  a  re f le c tio n  o f  a  
g e n e r a l  te n d e n c y  a m o n g  s ta te s  to  a p p r o v e  a n  e v e r  in c r e a s in g  
so ve re ig n ty  o v e r  a d ja cen t w a te rs  a n d  the resou rces  w hich  th ey  p ro v id e .
(<em ph asis  a d d e d )25*
The main point of delimiting maritime areas of coastal States is to 
gain a reasonable balance between the inclusive interests of international 
community and exclusive interests of coastal States.258 59 In general, the 
potential impacts of claims of coastal States to establish the baselines, 
including the closing line of bays, are on the inclusive interests of 
international community.260 As one source pointes out, the most obvious 
examples of these interests are navigation, flight, and exploitation of 
resources which may be influenced by the claims of States to enclose sea 
areas through the application of baselines.261
The case of bays has in particular led to the conversion of large 
areas of the seas into internal waters or the territorial sea.262 The 
practical impact of such change in the legal regime of waters on the right 
of navigation is quite clear because coastal States enjoy certain powers in 
the territorial sea, including those of regulatory rights and the right to 
exclude foreign ships in certain circumstances. These powers are much 
stronger in internal waters to the extent that costal States have absolute 
sovereignty over these waters, which are not even subject to the right of 
peaceful passage.263
258Westennan, op. cit., p.169.
259Although the provisions o f Article 7 o f the TSC appear to be in the interests o f coastal States in the 
final analysis, they can be justified because o f the close relation o f waters within bays to the land 
territory o f coastal States. Westerman maintains that the purposes o f the international community in 
the creation o f rules on the uses o f the seas, including bays, have been : “to define the rights o f the 
parties, to reduce the likelihood o f conflict, to provide guidelines for mariners, thereby ensuring that 
those who use the oceans for navigation and fishing with certainty determining their location with 
respect to the reach o f coastal power, and to make an equitable allocation o f ocean space and resources 
which may serve both the exclusive and inclusive interests o f all states.” Ibid., pp.30-31.
260Such an impact exists because o f the recognition o f a special method for the delimitation o f bays, that 
is the application o f closing line rule. As Strohl writes: “Since the closing line o f a bay is 
recognised as part o f the system of baselines, the nation State asserting sovereignty over a bay extends 
its marginal belt seaward and thereby gains a qualified sovereignty over an additional area o f what was 
previously high seas.” Strohl, op. cit., p.24.
261McDougal and Burke, op. cit.,, p.317.
262It should be noted that the extension o f baselines towards the sea has the effect o f the enlargement of 
internal waters while moving the territorial sea towards the sea. However, the extension o f the 
territorial sea breadth has only the effect o f enlargement o f territorial sea where there is a right of 
peaceful passage for foreign ships.
263As regards one o f the main reasons for the extension o f national domains through claims to baselines, 
McDougal and Burke express the following view: “Claims to extend coastal competence primarily for 
control over access, more generally, would focus attention more intensely upon the coastal interests 
alleged to warrant greater control over navigation.” Ibid., p.319. This is why they maintain that
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The analysis of the developments in the delimitations of bays from 
nineteenth century clearly shows that the creation of new rules in the law 
of the sea in one way or another has enlarged water areas of bays as 
internal waters.264 In other words, the conventional rules have presented 
definitional rules in a way which resulted in the extension of coastal States 
sovereignty over bays in various parts of the world. In particular, the 
final adoption of a closing line of 24 nautical miles has impacted on the 
enclosure of considerable parts of the seas as waters under national 
authority.265 Also the provisions of Article 7 of the TSC (Article 10 of 
the LOSC) include some indications which permit the enclosure of more 
possible waters as parts of bays. In this connection, the following 
examples can be mentioned:
(a) taking islands within bays into account as part of the area of bays for 
the purpose of application of the semi-circle test;
(b) excluding islands across bays from being considered in calculation of 
the maximum length of 24 nautical miles; and
(c) the wording of Article 7(4) of the TSC (Article 10(4) of the LOSC) 
in applying a line of 24 nautical miles, i.e. “in such a manner as to enclose 
the maximum area of water that is possible with a line of that length.”266
In addition, certain shortcomings or ambiguities in the provisions 
may lead to either liberal interpretation of the provisions by coastal States 
or to delimitation of some indentations or similar coastal features on the 
discretion of these States. Examples of these shortcomings and ambiguities 
are:
(a) the lack of a provision as to what constitutes “natural entrance 
points”;
“[methods o f delimitation ought... to take into account the practical necessities o f effective navigation 
and seamanship.” Ibid., p .318.
264This has in fact resulted from State practice because “[c]oastal States would like to include in their 
internal waters certain extensive maritime spaces which would thereby withdrawn from the regime of 
innocent passage o f foreign ships.” Dupuy, op. cit., p.266.
265This is because, as one author points out, the distance o f 24 nautical miles is “large enough to cover a 
great many cases.” Ibid.
266This is an example where the TSC and the LOSC clearly encourage the extension o f coastal States 
waters towards the seas and oceans.
169
(b) uncertainty as to whether islands can form a bay or can be taken into 
account as a headland; and
(c) ambiguity as to whether certain bays can be enclosed under the rules 
on the straight baseline systems.
The delimitation of bays has had undeniable implications for 
freedom of the high seas. As far as navigation is concerned, the enclosure 
of bays has had effects on the areas available for a right of passage, in 
two main ways:
(a) whether by enclosure of the areas within bays which have been 
important for international navigation267; or
(b) by the movement of internal waters and the territorial sea further 
towards the high seas.268
The extent of the latter impact can be illustrated in the following 
figure. As a result of the definition of a bay provided by the TSC (which 
was reiterated in the LOSC) the number of bays falling into the category 
of legal bays increased, and the areas of internal waters widened in a 
number of other bays. The following figure (Moray Firth) is an example 
of the impact of the TSC on the enclosure of bays where the effect of the 
24 nautical mile closing line and the 12 nautical mile territorial sea on the 
enclosure of more areas of water is clearly demonstrated.
267In the cases o f bays where there has already been a right o f peaceful passage for international 
community, the enclosure o f bays does not affect such right. The basis for this contention is Article 
5(2) o f the TSC (Article 8(2) o f the LOSC) whose application can be extended to bays. According to 
this provision, “[w]here the establishment o f a straight baseline ... has the effect o f enclosing as 
internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right o f innocent passage ... 
shall exist in those waters.” See Strohl, op. cit., p.26.
268The range o f this effect depends on the length o f the closing line used for enclosing a bay. As it is 
pointed out “the longer the line which may be drawn, the longer is the area included within internal 
waters and the further seaward the outer limit o f the territorial sea.” McDougal, and Burke, op. cit., 
p.328. Even there are some cases where the opening o f a bay is narrow but because it widens into 




(The impact of the 24 nautical mile closing line and the 12 nautical mile 
territorial sea on the enclosure of more areas of water)
A A  — 24-mile closing line.
B L M B  — Outer limit of 3-mile marginal belt using 24-milc closing line.
A 'A '  — io-mile closing line.
B L N O M B  -  Outer limit of 3-mile marginal belt using 10-mile closing line. 
C S T C  — Outer limit of 12-mile marginal belt using 24-mile closing line.
----------Line inter fauces terrae, as described in Moray Firth Case of 1906.
X  -  Site of alleged offense of Emmanuel Mortenson in Moray Firth Case of 1906.
Strohl, Mitchell P., The International Law of Bays, Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague, 1963, p.73.
There have been two main categories of bays whose sovereignty 
status has undergone remarkable change as a result of the TSC. The first 
category includes those bays which were considered among juridical bays 
before the adoption of the TSC but whose areas of internal waters have 
been enlarged by the application of Article 7 of the TSC. The second 
category contains those bays which could not have been considered bays 
before the TSC, but whose waters have entirely become internal as a 
result of the TSC. Bays which have fallen into these two groups of bays 
have been illustrated in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below.
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Table 3.1
Bays whose areas of internal waters were increased as a result of the 
application of Article 7 of the TSC (1958)
1. Tasman Bay, New Zealand 17. Saronikos Kolpos, Greece
2. Spencer Gulf, Australia 18. Lakonikos Kolpos, Greece
3. St. Vincent Bay, Australia 19. Golfo de Tadefoura, French Somalilande
4. Vansittart Bay, Australia 20. Baie de Levrier, French West Africaf
5. Maccluer Gulf3, Dutch New Guinea*5 21. Delagoa Bay, Mozambique
6. Labuk Bay, North Bomeoc 22. St. George’s Bay, Canada^
7. Darvel Bay, North Borneo^ 23. Liverpool Bay, Canada*1
8. Rogay Bay, Philippines 24. Yakuta Bay, Alaska
9. Gulf of Martaban, Burma 25. Norton Bay, Alaska
10. Skagafjiord, Iceland 26. Cook Inlet, Alaska
11. Skjalfandi, Iceland 27. Baia do Marajo, Brazil
12. Pistilfjord, Iceland 28. Golfo de Uraba, Colombia
13. Aarbus Bugt, Denmark 29. Kara Bay, USSR (Russia)
14. Bristol Channel, England 30. Gulf of Cutch, India
15. Thames Estuary, England 31. Gulf of Cambay, India
16. The Jade, Germany
(a) Or Teluk Berau.
(b) Now part of Irian Jaya (Indonesia).
(c) Now part of Malaysia.
(d) Now Part of Malaysia.
(e) Gulf of Tadjoura, now part of Djibouti.
(f) Now Mauritania.
(g) In Newfoundland.
(h) In Northwest Territories.
The words Bugt (Danish), Kolpos (Greek), Golfo (Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese), 
Baie (French), Baia (Portuguese, similar to Italian) seem to be equivalents to the terms 
“bay” and “gulf’.




Bays which came under the regime of juridical bays as a result of 
incorporation of Article 7 on bays into the TSC (1958)
1. Huraki Gulf, New Zealand 23. Baia de Setubal, Portugal
2. Gulden Bay, New Zealand 24. Golfo dell’Asmara, Sardinia, Italy
3. Van Dieman Gulf, Australia3 25. Golfo di Galiari, Sardinia, Italy
4. Exmouth Gulf, Australia15 26. Golfo di Napoli (Bay of Naples), Italy
5. King Sound, Australia 27. Messinakos Kolpos, Greece
6. Goodenough Bay, Papua New Guinea 28. Corisco Bay, French Equatorial Africa*1
7. Wide Bay, New Britain, U.S.A. 29. False Bay0, Republic of South Africa
8. Astrolabe Bay, Papua New Guinea 30. George Bay, Nova Scotia, Canada
9. Bumei Bay, Borneo0 31. Cape Cod Bay, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
10. Gulf Alaminos, Philippines 32. Bahia de Banderas
11. Lagonay Gulf, Philippines 33. Ensenada de la Broa, Cuba
12. Sibuguey Bay, Philippines 34. Bahia Camerones, Argentina
13. Suraga Wan, Japan 35. Gulf of Iskenderum, Turkey
14. Uchiura Wan, Japan 36. Sea of Azov, U.S.S.R. (Russia)
15. Toyama wan, Japan 37. Bay of Cancale, France
16. Nemuro Wan, Japan 38. Bay of Chaleur, Canada
17. Tokchok Kundo, South Korea 39. Conception Bay, Canadaf
18. Kinchow Wan, Manchuria 40. Miramichi Bay, Canada
19. Baie de Kompong Som, Cambodia 41. Trinity Bay, Canada
20. Ao Ban Don, Thailand 42. Chesapeake Bay, U.S.A.
21. The Wash, England 43. Delaware Bay, U.S.A.
22. Lubecker Bucht, Germany
(a) The increase in the areas of internal waters as a result of islands in the mouth of the 
Gulf, (b) The increase was resulted from the geographical characteristic of the Gulf as a 
multi-mouthed bays, (c) Now part of Malaysia (Sabah), (d) The Equatorial Africa was 
dissolved in 1958. (e) The False Bay is now known as Valsbaai. The Corisco Bay is 
presently located between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, (f) In Newfoundland.
The words Wan (Japanese), Kundo (Korean), Bucket (German), Baie (French), Ao 
(Thai), Baia (Portuguese, similar to Italian), Golfo (Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese), 
Kolpos (Greek), Bahia (Spanish) appear to be equivalents to the terms “bay” and “gulf’.
It should be noted that some bodies of waters mentioned in the above table were claimed 
as historic bays before the codification of new rules on bays (Article 7 of the TSC) and 
subsequently fell under the legal regime of juridical bays as a result of the adoption of the 
24 mile limit for bays closing lines Examples of these bodies of water are Sea of Azov, 
Bay of Cancale, Bay of Chaleur, Conception Bay, Miramichi Bay, Chesapeake Bay, and 
Delaware Bay.
Source: Strohl, Mitchell P., The International Law of Bavs, Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 1963, p.66.
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It is also useful to find out how large a maritime area within an 
indentation may be enclosed by a semi-circle with the maximum diameter 
of 24 nautical miles. To do so, a mathematical calculation should be 
undertaken. The mathematical formula for the calculation of the area of 
a circle is as follows: S= k r 2 ( In this mathematical formula (7c) 
approximately equals 3.14 and (r) is radius of the circle and (S) is the 
area covered by the circle.) Accordingly, the area of a semi-circle would 
be calculated by the following formula: S= k r 2 / 2. Therefore, for a 
semi-circle with a diameter of 24 nautical miles the radius would be 12 
nautical miles and the maritime area covered by such semi-circle would 
be S= 3.14 • (12)2 / 2. The final result is approximately 226 square miles. 
If a nautical mile is considered equivalent to 1852 meters, the area 
approximately would be 775,432,696 square meters. These figures clearly 
indicate how the adoption of a semi-circle test with a maximum diameter 
of 24 nautical miles has resulted in the enclosure of vast areas of the seas 
and their inclusion of these areas into internal waters of coastal States.
Another problem which has arisen from the enclosure of larger 
bays and the extension of the territorial sea is the problem mariners have 
in finding the position. It is important for navigators to determine 
whether they are navigating in the high seas, the exclusive economic zone, 
the territorial sea, or in internal waters. As far as the delimitation of 
bays is concerned, knowledge of the location of boundary line between 
internal waters and the territorial sea is important because coastal States 
have different rights over foreign ships in these waters. It is, therefore, 
important for mariners to find where their ships are located because of 
the existence of jurisdictional zones from internal waters to the high 
seas .269 As a result of enclosure of larger bays, mariners have 
encountered more difficulties in finding their positions in relation to the 
coasts, even though there have been technological developments in 
navigational equipment used by mariners (such as the use of radar and 
electronic aids).270 Although coastal States have used some navigational 
aids, this equipment is mainly used to warn the mariners about dangers to 
navigation, or to guide them to follow a specific route or channel.
269For the examination o f navigation problems for mariners which may arise from the delimitation of 
bays see Strohl, op. cit., pp.31-47.
270As Strohl points out “as the boundaries o f the marginal belt and internal waters are moved to seaward, 
making it more difficult for mariner to fix accurately his position the mariner may find himself 
confronted with the choice o f remaining even farther out at sea or incurring greater risk o f arrest (in the 
case o f fishermen) by reason o f imperfect navigation.” Ibid., p.39.
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Accordingly, navigational aids (such as lighthouses and buoys) were not 
primarily installed for indicating the boundaries of jurisdictional zones, in 
particular the boundary between internal waters and the territorial sea. 
Most coastal States are not willing to use signs for their jurisdictional 
zones because of the high cost involved. This is particularly the case for 
those States with longer coastlines and wider maritime zones. However, a 
practical assistance to mariners may be provided by illustrating enclosed 
bays on maps for mariners.
V III. Conclusion
In general, coastal States have been granted the right of sovereignty 
over larger bays by the new developments in the law of the sea and State 
practice. However, States were not left free to delimit bays at their 
discretion.271 Certain legal requirements were defined in the convention 
on the law of the sea to prevent unnecessary enclosure of large areas of 
water.272 In particular, the adoption of a mathematical formula ended 
legal uncertainties as to what forms a juridical bay. An indentation 
should satisfy these requirements before becoming qualified as a juridical 
bay. Although many bays were enclosed by the new rules, there are still 
many other bays which are unable to satisfy the semi-circle test, even by 
the use of a 24 nautical miles line. The only way for enclosing these bays 
is on the basis of “historic title”.273 However, claims over bays as historic 
ones have not been without controversy and in modern days it is rare to 
find historic claims over bays which have not been protested by other 
States.274 As a result of adoption of a closing line with the maximum
271 This is particularly due to the fact that “[t]he determination o f what constitutes a “bay” and the 
location o f the baseline in the bay quite obviously affect the extent o f the sea area left open to 
navigation and to fishery exploitation.” (emphasis added) McDougal, and Burke, op. cit., p.329.
272It is in line with this objective that one author asserts: “The question must be asked whether every 
bay in the legal sense falls under the sovereignty of the coastal State. The answer must be in negative 
in order to prevent that the sphere o f the operation of the principle o f the freedom of the seas would be 
seriously limited.” Bouchez, op. cit., p.23.
273For the views o f arbitral and judicial courts on acquisition o f a historic title over land areas (which can 
be used in the case o f historic title to maritime areas) see Grisbadama Case, IJNRIAA, Vol.XI, 1909, 
at 161; Chamizal Arbitration . AJIL. Vol.5, 1911, at 782; Palmas Island Arbitration Award, 
IJNRIAA. Vol.II, 1928, reproduced in AJIL. Vol.22, 1928; Clipperton Island Case, IJNRIAA, 
Vol.II, 1931 (p.1105), reproduced in AJIL. Vol.26, 1932, pp.390 et seq-,Legal Status o f Eastern 
Greenland Case, PCIJ. Ser. A/B, No.53, 1933; Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, ICJ ReflQrfo 1953; and 
Rann ofKutch  Arbitration, 7 ILM 633 (1968 ).
274For bays to which States have claimed historic title see the 1957 UN Memorandum, p.3 (no.4), and 
pp.9-10, Jessup, op. cit., pp.383-439, and Colombos, op. cit., pp. 186-188 (for bays in North 
Atlantic). For the examination o f the Soviet Union’s claim to Peter The Great Bay as historic see 
Strohl, op. cit., Chapter Eight (Peter The Great Bay, A Current Issue), pp.332-367, and Scovazzi, T., 
‘Developments Concerning Soviet Straight Baselines’, International Journal o f Estuarine and Coastal
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length of 24 nautical miles, a considerable number of bays claimed as 
historic fell under the category of juridical bays.275 Examples of these 
bays are Sea of Azov (Russia), Bay of Cancale (France), Bay of Chaleur 
(Canada), Conception Bay (Canada), Chesapeake Bay (USA), and 
Delaware Bay (USA).276 In these cases, it is clear that coastal States
Law. Vol.3, 1988, pp.37-43. On Chinese claim to the Pohai Bay on the basis o f historic title see 
Cheng, B., ‘Communist China and the Law of the Sea’, ATIL. Vol.63, 1969, pp.47 et seq, at 61. For 
the Chinese claim to Pohai Bay as historic see also Cohen, J. A. and H. Chiu, People’s China and 
International Law: A Documentary Study. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1974. For the 
examination o f the Canadian claim to Hudson Bay on an historic basis see Strohl, op. cit., Chapter 
Six (Hudson Bay, A Case Study), pp.233-250. For discussion on the claim o f Canada to certain 
bodies o f waters in Arctic and to the Arctic Archipelago see Pharand, Donat, ‘Historic Waters in 
International Law with Special Reference to the Arctic’, University o f Toronto Law Journal, Vol.XXI, 
1971, pp.1-14; Pharand, Donat, Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp.113-130; and Pharand, Donat, ‘Canada’s Sovereignty over the Northwest 
Passage’, Michigan Journal o f International Law, Vol.10, Spring 1989, pp.653-675, particularly 
pp.655-660. For discussion on the claim of Libya to the Gulf o f Sidra on the basis o f historic title 
see: Spinnato, John M., ‘Historic and Vital Bays: An Analysis of Libya’s Claim to the Gulf of 
Sidra’, Ocean Development and International Law. Vol.13, N o .l, 1983, pp.65-85; Francioni, 
Francesco, ‘The Status o f the Gulf o f Sirte [Sidra] in International Law’, Syracuse Journal o f  
International Law and Commerce. V o l.ll ,  No.3, Winter 1984, pp.311-326; Blum, Yehuda Z., ‘The 
Gulf o f  Sidra Incident’, Current Developments, AJIL. Vol.80, 1986, pp.668-677; and Ahnish, Faraj 
Abdullah, The International Law o f Maritime Boundaries and the Practice o f States in.Jhs 
Mediterranean Sea. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, Ch.7 (A Case Study: The Libyan Claim over the 
Gulf o f Sert [Sidra]), pp.194-251, specially pp.246-251. For the details on the incident o f 19 August 
1981 (between Libya and the USA in the Gulf of Sidra) see 27 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 31, 
181-182 (1981). For the examination of the Italian historic claim to the Gulf o f Taranto see Ronzitti, 
N., ‘Is the Gulf o f Taranto an Historic Bay?’, Syracuse Journal o f International Law and Commerce, 
V o l.l l ,  1984. For the same conclusion, and Fusillo, M., ‘Baselines for Delimiting the Territorial 
Sea’, Italian Yearbook of International Law. V o l.3 ,1977, pp.570 et seq. For analysis o f the Tunisian 
claim to the Gulfs o f Gab£s and Tunis on historical basis see, e.g., Gioia, Andrea, ‘Tunisia’s Claims 
over Adjacent Seas and the Doctrine o f “Historic Rights’” , Syracuse Journal o f International Law and 
Commerce. V o l.l l ,  No.3, Winter 1984, pp.327-376. Also see The Law of the sea: Practice o f States 
at the time o f entry into force o f the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Division for 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1994, pp.122 and 172; and Roach, 
J. Ashley and Robert W. Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims. Second 
Edition, Volume 27 o f the series o f Publications on Ocean Development, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague, 1996, pp.31-55.
275Westerman states that “[m]ost indentations previously considered historic bays have become judicial 
bays under the generosity o f the twenty-four-mile rule.” Westerman, op. cit., p.30.
276Also among these bays are a number o f Australian bays which were mentioned in the 1957 UN  
Memorandum. These bays include Buckingham Bay (20 miles), Blue Mud Bay (15 miles), Van 
Diemen Gulf (16 miles) in Northern Territory; Broad Sound (15 miles); Upstart Bay (10 miles); 
Moreton Bay (10 miles) in Queensland; Coffin Bay (12 miles), Streaky Bay (14 miles) in South 
Australia; Oyster Bay (15 miles); Storm Bay (13 miles) in Tasmania; and Exmouth Gulf (13 miles), 
Roebuck Bay (14 miles), and Shark Bay (14 miles) in Western Australia. There were three bays 
mentioned in the Memorandum whose mouth exceed 24 nautical miles. These are Hervey Bay (38 
miles) in Queensland, Spencer Gulf (48 miles) and Investigator Strait with St. Vincent’s Gulf (28 
m iles) in South Australia. See the 1957 UN Memorandum, op. cit., p.8 . However, Professor 
Charteris, relying on the letter o f 26 April 1936 from the Secretary o f the Australian Navy Office in 
Melbourne, refers to only four Australian bays as historic - Van Dieman Gulf (Northern Australia), 
Moreton Bay (Queensland), Exmouth Gulf (Western Australia), and Shark Bay (Western Australia) 
which now fall into category o f legal bays by the inclusion o f 24 mile closing line in the TSC and 
the LOSC. Charteris, A. H., Chapters on International Law. Law School, University o f Sydney, 
Sydney, 1940, p.99, no.l. Australia has recently claimed Anxious Bay, Encounter Bay, Lacepede Bay, 
and Rivoli Bay as historic. For analysis o f the Australian claims on an historic basis over certain bays 
see O’Connell, D.P., ‘Problems o f Australian Coastal Jurisdiction’, BYIL, Vol.35, 1958, pp.233-
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concerned prefer to rely on the principle of juridical bays rather than 
insisting on their historic claims which require more restricted standards 
in convincing international community to recognise such claims.277
243; Bouchez (1964), op. cit., pp.228-229; Edeson, W. R., ‘Australian Bays’, Australian Yearbook of 
International Law. Vol.5, 1968-1969, pp.5-54; Edeson, W. R., ‘The Validity o f Australia’s Possible 
Maritime Historic Claims in International Law’, The Australian Law Journal. Vol.48, January- 
December 1974, pp.295-305; O’Connell, D. P., ‘Bays, Historic Waters and the Implications o f A. 
Raptis & Son v. South Australia’, The Australian Law Journal. Vol.52, January-December 1978, 
pp.64-71; Kaye, S. B., An Examination of Australia’s Maritime Boundaries. LLM Thesis, Faculty of 
Law, University o f Sydney, March 1994, pp.173-192; and Reicher, Harry, Australian International 
Law: Cases and Materials. The Law Book Company Limited, North Ride (NSW), 1995, pp.312-316 
(including the Note o f the USA Embassy (7 April 1991) to the Australian Department o f Foreign 
Affairs on the Australian claim to historic title over Anxious Bay, Encounter Bay, Lacepede Bay, and 
Rivoli Bay) and pp.318-323 (A. Raptis & Son v. South Australia Case, High Court o f Australia 
(1977), 138 CLR 346.).
277At present, historic waters and bays are governed by customary international law. According to 
customary rules developed and established through State practice, arbitral and judicial tribunals and the 
opinion o f publicists, there are three main elements in the formation o f historic titles to maritime 
areas. These constituent elements of an historic title are: (a) the exercise o f sovereignty, (b) the 
continuity o f this sovereignty over sufficient period o f time, and (c) acquiescence from other States. In 
certain recent claims to bays on an historic basis, there has also been a reference to vital interests of 
States in advancing the claims. Although such vital interests as significant economic and strategic 
interests strengthen the claims which were validly consolidated through history, most publicists state 
that vital interests per se do not constitute sufficient basis for developing an historic title to mantime 
areas. The burden o f proving the existence o f the foregoing requirements is upon the claimant State. 
These requirements clearly demonstrate that the rules for proving historic titles are strict. For the 
definition and examination o f constituent elements o f historic waters and bays see Gidel, op. cit., 
Vol.3 (1934); Bourquin, Maurice, 'Les Baies Historiques’ in Mélanges Georges Sauser-Hall. Facultés 
de Droit des Universités de Genève Neuchâtel, Geneva, Switzerland, 1956; Strohl (1963), op. cit., 
pp.251-331 (Ch.7: The Concept of the Historic Bay); Bouchez (1964), op. cit., pp.199-302 (Ch.IV: 
Historic Bays); Blum, Historic Tides in International Law. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965, 
pp.241-342 (Ch.VI: Judicial Aspects Specifically Related to the Formation of Maritime Historic 
Titles); Colombos (1967), op. cit., p.180-188; Pharand, Donat, “Historic Waters in International Law 
with Special Reference to the Arctic”, University o f Toronto Law Journal, Vol.XXI, 1971, pp.1-14; 
O ’Connell, D . P., The International Law o f the Sea, V o l.l, Edited by: I. A. Shearer, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1982., pp.417-438 (C h .ll: Historic Waters); Goldie, L. F. E., Historic 
Bays in International Law - An Impressionistic Overview’, Syracuse Journal o f International Law and 
Commerce . V ol.l 1, 1984, pp.211-273; Scovazzi, Tullio, “Bays and Deeply Indented Coastlines: The 
Practice o f South American States’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol.26, No.2, 1995, 
pp.161-174, at 163-165. The following cases also include discussion on the legal nature of historic 
titles to maritime areas and conditions for the formation of these titles: The North Atlantic Coast 
Fisheries Case (United States o f America/Great Britain), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards. V o l.ll ,  1910, pp.173-202 (also see dissenting opinion o f Dr. Luis M. 
Drago, ibid., pp.203-211.); Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), IC.T Pleadings, Oral Arguments and 
Docum ents. Vol.l, pp.556 and 564 et seq; Vol.II, pp.621, 643, 645-646, 654, 302; and Vol.III, 
p.462; Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), ICJ Reports. 1951, pp.121 (paras.5 & 11), 122 (para.9(a)), 
123, 127, 130-131, 133, and 136-139; Individual opinion of Judge Alvarez, ibid., pp.145-153, at 151­
152* Separate opinion o f Judge Hsu Mo, ibid., pp.154-157, at 157; Dissenting opinion o f Judge 
McNair, ibid., pp.158-185, at 164-166; and Dissenting opinion o f Judge Read, ibid., pp.185-206, at 
188 & 191; English Channel Continental Shelf Case (UK/France), Decisions o f the Court of 
Arbitration o f 30 June 1977 and 14 March 1978, Mise, No.15, Cmnd. 7438, p.91 (para.188); 
Continental Shelf Case (Tunisia/Libya), ICJ Reports. 1982, p.74; Gulf o f Maine Case (Canada/USA), 
JÇT Reports. 1984, para. 130; and Case Concerning the Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute 
(El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Reports. 1992, pp.588-605 (paras.384-412.) and 
Dissenting Opinion o f Judge Oda , ibid., pp.735-747 (Part II: “Bay” or “Historic Bay”: Legal 
Concepts under the Law of the Sea, paras.7-26).
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Chapter 4
Delimitation of Multi-State Bays
I. Introduction
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the issue of delimitation 
of bays was one of the complex issues in the law of the sea which was 
subject to extensive debate among States since early this century. It was in 
the UNCLOS I that States finally reached agreement on a set of rules to 
govern the delimitation of bays. Although these rules were incorporated 
into the TSC for the first time, they were to be applied only to single­
State bays, that is bays which were bordered by a single State.1 No rules 
were included to clarify the uncertainty over the issue of the delimitation 
of multi-State bays. This uncertainty resulted in a divergence of views 
among States, and publicists become divided on this issue. The issue was, 
in fact, left to be governed by the status quo and the customary 
international law. The main problem, however, was the uncertainty which 
existed in customary international law with respect to the issue of the 
delimitation of multi-State bays.2 Although there is a prevailing trend 
with respect to the status of multi-State bays, there seems that efforts 
should be made to codify uniform rules governing the delimitation of 
these bays.
II. General Rules Governing the Multi-State Bays
Although there are long established rules governing the 
delimitation of single-State bays, there is no general contractual provision 
governing bays with several coastal States (and also historic bays3). Why 
are single-State bays and multi-State bays subject to different legal rules? 
McDougal and Burke consider two factors which distinguish a single-State 
bay from a multi-State bay: (a) although a multi-State bay is an 
indentation which penetrates into the land mass “the political boundaries
1 Article 7 o f the TSC and Article 10 of the LOSC. The latter repeats the language of the former.
2The case o f historic bays also presents similar difficulties, though these bays are subject to different 
rules.
3According to Article 7(6) o f the TSC and Article 10(6) of the LOSC, the provisions o f these Articles 
"do not apply to so-called 'historic' bays". Claims to historic bays not only include bays located in a 
single State but may include bays shared with more than one coastal State. The number of claims in the 
former case is much higher than the latter one.
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are such that the land territory does not compose one political entity”4; 
and (b) a multi-State bay is “very likely to be used for international 
transport” whether in the case of a foreign ship heading to a port of one 
of the riparian States, or travel within the bay from one riparian State to 
another.5 In addition, Strohl is of the view that the fundamental difference 
between a single-State bay and a multi State bay is that in the case of a 
single-State the littoral State “exercises sovereignty erga omnes” while in 
the case of a multi-State bay, the bordering States “are, by their 
geographical proximity, forced to share the shores of the bay.”6
The discussions on multi-State bays indicate that two issues 
constitute the core of debates on their legal aspects: (a) whether multi­
State bays are susceptible to enclosure as is the case with legally qualified 
bays belonging to a single State; and (b) if multi-State bays cannot be 
enclosed on the basis of normal legal rules for bays bordered by a single 
State, whether multi-State bays can be claimed by their respective coastal 
States on the ground of historic title.7 It should be noted that these two 
issues arise mainly in the case of those multi-State bays which are not 
covered by territorial seas of bordering States. Although no closing line 
is used in these cases, the waters of these multi-State bays are subject to 
the legal regime of the territorial sea where there is a right of innocent 
passage. This means coastal States have almost full range of sovereignty 
over portions of these bays up to the boundary line (which is usually a 
median line), subject to recognition of the right of peaceful passage of 
foreign ship.
4In this connection, Strohl writes that “[b]y reason o f the differences in geography, natural resources, 
economy, and political structure, the bay in question may be of greater importance to one o f the littoral 
States than to another: one might have a port elsewhere and the other State might have its only port on 
the bay in question. One State may be sovereign over most of the shore line while another is sovereign 
over very little. One State may have a rich hinterland and the other a very poor one. The two or more 
State may, respectively, pursue policies that are antithetical.” Strohl, Mitchell P., The International Law 
o f Bavs. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1963, p.372.
5McDougal, Myres S. and William T. Burke, The Public Order o f the Oceans: A Contemporary 
International T .aw o f the Sea. Second Printing, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1965, p.438. With 
respect to the second factor, McDougal and Burke are of the view that “no single state o f those 
surrounding an indentation can be considered competent to incorporate all the area as internal waters, or, 
for that matter, as territorial sea. “ They add that”[n]or should any factional group of these states be 
permitted to combine to claim these waters at the expense o f another adjacent state.” Ibid. This latter part 
o f their view seems to refer to the case o f the Gulf of Aqaba where once access to the open seas through 
such Gulf was denied to Israel by the other coastal States bordering either side o f the Gulf.
6Strohl, op. cit., p.372. As regards o f the problems which may rise with respect to a multi-State bay 
which may never arise in relation to a single-State bay. See ibid.
7As Bouchez views the main question which concerns the multi State bays is “whether and to what extent 
it is desirable to limit the operation o f the principle of the freedom of the seas” within these bays as well 
as within those bays claimed on historic title. Bouchez, Leo J., The Regime of Bays in International 
Law. A. W. Sythoff, Leyden, 1964, p.15.
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In general, bays with several coastal States are now considered as 
not being part of internal waters, though there have been different 
viewpoints among jurists and learned institutions on this issue. For 
example, Jessup was of the view that a bay with more than one coastal 
State "is clearly not a part of the high seas, and is properly considered by 
the bordering states as their common property."8 Oppenheim did not 
consider these bays as a common property of the coastal Sates and wrote 
that "all gulfs and bays enclosed by the land of more than one littoral 
State, however narrow their entrance may be, ... are in time of peace and 
war open to vessels of all nations."9 The Harvard Law School Research 
on Territorial Waters contained a provision that "[w]hen the waters of a 
bay or river-mouth which lie within the seaward limit thereof are 
bordered by the territory of two or more states, the bordering states may 
agree upon a division of such waters as internal waters ... ."10 (emphasis 
added) The American Institute of International Law also held the view 
that the "territorial sea follows the sinuosities of the coast, unless there 
exists a convention to the contrary."11
According to a study undertaken for the UNCLOS I, A Brief 
Geographical and Hydrographical Study of Bays and estuaries the Coast 
of Which Belong to Different States, there are more than forty multi-State 
bays in the world.12 Multi-State bays with two bordering States are more 
common than those belonging to more than two States. The greater the 
number of coastal States around a multi-State, the more complex the legal 
situation within the bay may be. Examples of multi-States bays with two 
coastal States bordering the bays are Lough Foyle (between Ireland and 
the United Kingdom), the Bay of Figuier (between France and Spain), 
and Passamaquoddy Bay (between Canada and the USA)13. Examples of
8Jessup, Philip C., The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction. G. A. Jennings Co., Inc., 
New York, 1927, p.476.
9Oppenheim, L., International Taw. V ol.l.-Peace, Seventh Edition, Edited by: H. Lauterpacht, 
Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1948, pp.460-461. Similar views have also been presented by the 
contemporary authors. For example see, McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.441, Churchill, R. R., and A. 
V. Lowe, The I>aw of the Sea. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983, p.33, and Wang, James 
C. F., Handbook on Ocean Politics & Law. Greenwood Press, New York, 1992, p.9.
10McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.441.
11 Ibid., p.442.
12“For information on various multi-State bays and estuaries see the survey made by Kennedy for the 
UNCLOS I. Kennedy, R. H., ‘A Brief Geographical and Hydrographical Study o f Bays and estuaries the 
Coast o f Which Belong to Different States’, Document A/CONF. 13/15, UNCLOS I. Official Records. 
V o l.l, pp.198 et seq. In addition to bays, the Study also included cases which are categorised as rivers 
and estuaries rather than being classified as bays. An example is the case o f the River Schelde whose 
shores belong to the Netherlands.
13Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.33.
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multi-State bays with more than two coastal States are the Gulf of Fonseca 
(El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, where the headlands are 
controlled by El Salvador and Nicaragua), and the Gulf of Aqaba14 
(between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, where the headlands 
are controlled by Egypt and Saudi Arabia). (For a list of multi-State 
bays see Table 4.1.)
The study undertaken on bays bordered by several States also 
included the case of bays where one of the coastal States has no shore on 
the headlands where the bay connects to the territorial sea or the high 
seas. In addition to the Gulf of Fonseca and the Gulf of Aqaba, the study 
showed that these bays include: (a) The Tanga Lagoon bordered by 
Ghana and The Ivory Coast where the latter controls the headlands; (b) 
Chetumal Bay in Central America bordered by Honduras and Mexico 
where the latter controls the headlands.15
The Bay of Fundy is another example of multi-nation bays. It is 
bordered by Canada and the United States of America. Although the 
Canadian coast covers most of the entire shores of the bay, a limited area 
of its coastline belongs to the United State of America. However, these 
States each control one of the two headlands. In the case of Washington 
(an American ship which was seized by a Canadian patrol ship within the 
Bay of Fundy, ten miles from the Canadian shore on 10 May 1843) the 
main question was to find whether the Bay of Fundy is a territorial bay 
or part of the high seas. Since the Claims Commission established under 
the Anglo-American Convention of 8 February 1853 could not resolve 
the dispute, the case was referred to an umpire, Mr. Joshua Bates, to 
present the final opinion.16 The umpire referred to the fact that one of the 
headlands is located in the territory of the United States of America, and 
the bay is not entirely surrounded by the Canadian land territory. In 
concluding his arguments in finding the Bay of Fundy as part of the high 
seas, the umpire relied on two main facts: (a) the large size of the bay, 
which prevents claiming the bay as a restricted body of waters; and (b) 
the existence of two States bordering the bay, even though one only
14In its eighth report as the special rapporteur (1956), Francois considered the case o f the Gulf o f Aqaba 
as an exceptional case and possibly unique. However, Strohl asserts that although the case o f multi­
State bays where one bordering State has no control over headlands is not very common and is an 
exceptional case, such a case is not unique to any o f such particular bays. Strohl, op. cit., p.375.
15Kennedy, op. cit., pp.198 et seq.
16Strohl, op. cit., p.381.
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Table 4.1
Bay/Gulf/Estuary Bordering States Continent Bay/GulfTEstuary Bordering States Continent
Bay o f Figuier 
(Hendaya)
Spain and France Europe Gulf o f Trieste Italy and Croatia Europe
Bay o f Gwuttur Persia and 
Pakistan





Bay o f San Juan 
del Norte (on the 
Caribbean Sea)
Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua America Honduras Bay
Honduras and 
Guatemala America
Chetumal Bay Belize and Mexico America Jdefjord Sweden and 
Norway
Europe
Dixon Entrance Alaska (USA) and 
Canada
America Khor Abdullah Iraq and Kuwait Asia
Dollart The Netherlands 
and Germany
















Africa Long Foyle Irish Republic and 
Northern Ireland
Europe




Africa Macäo Area Macào and China Asia









Estuary o f Tana 
or Tendo River











Canada and the 




Canada and the 
United States of 
America
America




Jordan, and Saudi 
Arabia
Asia
Salinas Bay (on 
the Pacific coast)
Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua America





San Juan del Fuca 
Strait
Canada and the 
United States of 
America
America
Gulf o f Menton France and Italy Europe Viro Lachti Area Finland and 
Russia
Europe




America Wester Schelde The Netherlands 
and Belgium
Europe





Travemunder Reede, Bay of Kleh, Sibuko Bay, Cowie Bay, Deep Bay, and Mirs Bay.
Source: Bouchez, Leo J., The Regime of Bavs in International Law, A. W. Sythoff, Leyden, 1964,.118­
170. For State practice concerning the above-mentioned multi-State bays and some other bays see ibid.
It should be noted that political geography of the world has changed after 1964 (when Bouchez wrote his 
book). Accordingly, some o f the said multi-States bays are presently located in the territory o f one State. 
For example, the Sibuko bay is now part o f the Philippines and falls into the category of single-State 
bays This is also the case with respect to Deep Bay and Mirs Bay (between Hong Kong and China) after 
returning Hong Kong to China. In addition, bays such as Green Bay (between American States of 
Michigan and Wisconsin), Mississippi Sound and Lake Borgne (between American States of Mississippi 
and Louisiana) are part o f the USA and do not fall into the categories of multi-State bays because the 
American States are not independent countries.
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controls a small portion of the shores of the bay.17
Strohl considers the Gibraltar Bay as those belonging to two States 
(Spain and Britain) since Britain seized the Rock (Gibraltar) as part of the 
shore of the bay in 1704.18 This bay is about five miles wide at its mouth 
between Europa Point and Camero Point. The bay is as deep as six miles. 
The main ports on the shores of the bay are the Spanish port of Algeciras 
and the British port of Gibraltar.19 The bay is not included among the 
forty-eight bays mentioned by Kennedy in his study on bays with several 
States.
III . The Issue of the Multi-State Bays at the 1930 Hague
Conference for the Codification of International Law
At the 1930 Hague Conference, the issue of multi-State bays was 
not discussed by many States.20 However, it seems that the issue was 
addressed more than at any other future conferences especially designed 
for the codification of rules on the law of the sea. Those which presented 
their views on the issue of multi-State bays at the 1930 Hague Conference 
took different positions as to what should be the rule for the baseline of 
these bays. Two main approaches were: (a) territorial waters should be 
measured from a low-water mark along the coast of States bordering a 
multi-State bay; and (b) a multi-State bay may be enclosed, regardless of 
the width of its mouth, and the waters within the bay should be divided 
among bordering States. As far as freedom of the seas are concerned, 
these views would produce different results. It is clear that these views 
primarily concerned those multi-State bays which were not overlapped by 
territorial waters of bordering States. Some States referred to the method 
of delimitation for those multi-State bays which were, wholly or partly, 
overlapped by territorial waters of States bordering such bays.
17Ibid., p.382. For a more detailed information on the case see Moore, J. B., International Arbitrations, 
V oU V , 1898, pp.4342-3, and Moore, J. B., Digest o f International Law. V ol.l, 1906, pp.785-787.
18The British rule over Gibraltar was ceded to Britain in accordance with Article X of the Treaty of Peace 
and Friendship between Spain and England in July 1713. The British rule over Gibraltar was later 
confirmed by the following treaties between the two countries. These treaties included the Treaty of 
Sevill (1729), te Treaty o f Aix-La-Chapelle (1748), and the Treaties of Paris (1763 and 1783). Strohl, 
op. cit., pp.385-386.
19TTie geographical information on the Bay of Gibraltar was extracted from ibid., pp.383.
20Article 4  o f the Draft Convention on Territorial Waters as Amended by M. S chucking the Rapporteur 
had, inter aliai, provided that “[i]n the case of bays which are bordered by the territory of two or more 
States, the territorial sea shall follow the sinuosities of the coast.” Rosenne, op. cit., Vol.2, Annex, 
p.411.’
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Denmark favoured the enclosure of multi-State bays. It was of the 
view that “[t]he waters of bays whose coasts belong to two or more States 
must be divided among those States, either according to the general rule 
of international law, or, it may be, by treaty. The ten-mile rule does not 
apply automatically in such a case.”21 On the other hand, Latvia was of 
the opinion that “[w]hen the coasts of a bay belong to more than one State, 
the territorial waters should follow the sinuosities of the coast or be fixed 
by conventional means.”22 Japan also took the position that “[i]n the case 
of a bay or gulf the coast of which belongs to two or more States, the 
territorial waters follow the trend of the coast according to the general 
rule.” Considering three nautical mile as the breadth of territorial 
waters, it added that “[i]n those portions of such bay or gulf where the 
distance between the two coasts does not amount to six nautical miles, the 
dividing line between the respective territorial waters shall, as a rule, be 
the middle line measured from the two coasts.”23
Based on the replies of the governments to the issue of the 
delimitation of bays, the Preparatory Committee of the 1930 Hague 
Conference stated that “[w]here two or more States touch the coast of a 
bay, the Government replies are ... in favour of the method of measuring 
the breadth of territorial waters from the line of low-water mark along 
the coast.”24 Accordingly, the Committee proposed the following basis of 
discussion for the issue of the delimitation of multi-State bays.
Basis of Discussion No.9
If two or more States touch the coast of a bay or estuary of which the 
opening does not exceed ten miles, the territorial waters of each coastal 
State are measured from the line of low-water mark along the coast.25
During the 1930 Hague Conference, there were again different 
views on the method of delimitation of bays bordered by more than one 
State. In response to the above basis of discussion, Denmark suggested 
that the reference to “ten miles” should be replaced by “six miles or less” 
and where this is the case, the multi-State bay would be under the
21Rosenne, Shabtai (ed.), Teague of Nations Conference for the Codification o f International Law I193QL 




25Ibid., Vol.4, Annex I, p.179.
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exclusive authority of the coastal States bordering the bay.26 It further 
stated that the provision would not affect those multi-State bays which had 
already been delimited by existing treaties between States concerned.27
The Delegation from Great Britain and Northern Ireland also 
suggested the removal of “ten miles” from the Basis of Discussion No. 9 
and proposed that the following paragraph to be added to its content: 
“Where the width at the opening of the bay is less than twice the breadth 
of the belt of territorial waters, the territorial waters of each coastal State 
shall in principle extend as far as the median line.”28 Iceland also 
suggested that a similar paragraph be added to the text of the Basis of 
Discussion No. 9.29 The Delegation from the United States of America 
proposed that in the case of multi-State bays where the delimitation of 
territorial waters would result in “a small area of high sea” within the bay 
and wholly surrounded by territorial waters, this area would have the 
legal status of territorial waters of bordering States.30
Since the discussion on multi-State bays did not concern many 
States, only a few States addressed the issue, and no definite rule resulted 
from the limited discussion on the issue. Although the Sub-Committee II 
of the Second Committee of the 1930 Hague Conference included in its 
report a provision on bays which belong to a single State31, the report did 
not include any provision on the issue of multi-State bay.32 The 
Conference, subsequently, left the issue to be governed by customary 
international law, but this customary law was not reflective of a uniform 
treatment of multi-State bays.33
26Observations and Proposals Regarding the Bases of Discussion Presented to the Plenary Committee by 





31See Report o f Sub-Committee No.II, ibid., Vol.3, pp.833-834.
32This is also the case regarding historic bays. Judge Oda regarded the lack o f reference to multi-State 
bays in the report o f the Sub-Committee o f the Second Committee as indicating that multi-State bays 
should follow “the general rule whereby the territorial sea of each riparian State is measured from the 
State’s own coastline.” He added that “the lack of reference to a historic bay in those draft articles [in 
the report] was presumably due to the difficulty of generalizing historical elements that could have 
justified giving the status o f a bay to certain coastal configurations which would otherwise not be 
regarded as bays because o f their larger measurement at the mouth.” Dissenting Opinion o f Judge Oda 
in the Case Concerning the Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador / Honduras: 
Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Reports. 1992, pp.732-761, at 742. (Hereinafter Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Oda, ICJ Reports. 1992.)
33Dupuy wrote that problems related to multi-State bays are associated with the nature o f relations 
between the coastal States. Such a relationship is reflected in the practice o f these States. He adds that
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IV. The UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea: The Lack 
of any Concrete Solution for the Problem of Multi-State 
Bays In Positive Law
None of the ILC34, the UNCLOS I3*, and the UNCLOS III 
presented any definite answer to the question of legal status of bays 
surrounded by two or more States.36 This is why no provision on multi­
State bays exists either in the TSC or the LOSC. McDougal and Burke 
believe that the content of the existing conventions on the law of the sea 
and the failure to provide provisions for these sort of bays, supported the 
idea that "the several states indented by a bay are not regarded as 
authorized jointly to claim these areas as internal waters as a single state 
could do in the same circumstances."37 Accordingly, the baseline in these 
bays is the low-water mark from which the maritime zones of the States 
bordering the bays are measured.38 The lack of any special provision in 
the TSC and the LOSC applying to the multi-States bays may also mean 
that the multi-nations bays cannot be enclosed by the enclosure of their 
mouths.39 These bays are similar to the enclosed/semi-enclosed seas, in
“[e]ven when they are not engaged in conflict, the coastal States may experience difficulties in 
apportioning the waters o f the bay among themselves.” Dupuy, Rene-Jean, ‘The Sea Under National 
Competence’, in Rene Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes, A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, V ol.l, 
Ch.5, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991, p.267. As a general rule, all littoral States have 
the freedom of access to the bay, whether for the purpose of leaving the bay towards the high seas or 
vice versa. In the case of Gulf of Aqaba, Egypt and Saudi Arabia as the States located at the entrance 
attempted to deprive Israel from having access to the high seas through the Gulf of Aqaba, while a right 
o f innocent passage for Jordan was not denied. This was the case until 1967 when Egypt and Israel 
signed the peace treaty o f 26 March 1979 by which the Strait of Tiran at the entrance o f the Gulf of 
Aqaba was recognised as international waterway. The case of Gulf of Aqaba is an example how the 
nature o f relationship between littoral States of a multi-State bays my affect the state of affairs in these 
bays. It is no longer possible for some littoral States bordering such bays to exclude the other littoral 
bays.
34In its report o f 1956, the ILC attributed the lack of any draft article on the delimitation o f multi-State 
bays to the lack o f data on the issue and of sufficient time to deal with the issue. See YILQ, 1956, 
Vol.II, p.269, para.7. However, as Prescott points out, no definite solution for this issue has so far 
been included in any international convention on the law of the sea. Prescott, J. R. V., The Man time 
Political Boundaries o f the World. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1985, p.51.
35Although the Kennedy’s Study on multi-State bays was available at the time o f the UNCLOS I , no 
provision wad adopted to determine how multi-State bays should be treated. It seems that the 
UNCLOS I followed the view of the ILC that there were no sufficient data to present a definite rule for 
the issue o f the delimitation o f multi-State bays.
36At the UNCLOS II, the main discussions were focused on the issues o f the breadth o f the territorial sea 
and the fisheries zone. No debate was made on the issue of the multi-State bays.
37McDougal and Burke, op. cit., pp.442 & 443.
38Some commentators explicitly stated that "if more than one state were involved (with respect to bays) 
the territorial sea must be delimited from the coastline of the indentation. Ibid., p.441.
39Dixon states that bays with several States "may not be capable of enclosure under customary law, 
unless a local custom or treaty between the neighbouring states establishes otherwise. Dixon, Martin, 
Textbook on International Law. Blackstone Press Limited, London, 1990, p.136. Dixon considers the 
possibility that a multi-States bay can be enclosed, if the littoral States would agree to do so. Also, 
Brownlie is o f the opinion that the provision of Article 15 of the 1982 Convention (Article 12(1) of 
the 1958 Convention), is applicable to the bays bordered by two or more States. Brownlie, Ian,
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some aspects, such as right of navigation40, delimitation, marine 
environmental concerns, and security interests.
The bays enclosed by more than one State would only fall under the 
sovereignty of coastal States concerned if it is recognised that these bays 
are historic waters.41 This particularly has been the case concerning the 
Gulf of Fonseca. However, the question as to whether a multi-State bay 
can be qualified as a historic bay is controversial. When a bay with 
several coastal States is categorised as a historic bay, a number of 
questions arise concerning the establishment of a mechanism for 
enforcing authority of the coastal States in the bay. There are three 
possible alternatives.
• The first one is to divide the maritime area into different parts, 
each one belonging to one State. In this case, the problem is the method 
which should be applied to divide the area. A number of relevant factors, 
including special geographical circumstances, should be taken into account 
to ensure that the delimitation of the bay leads to equitable consequences.
• The second one is to establish a system of common sovereignty and 
jurisdiction {condominium) in the entire areas of the bay. This requires 
the creation of competent authority or committee composed of 
representatives of the coastal States bordering the bay. Undoubtedly, 
there should be an agreement among the coastal States that provides 
essential matters such as the scope of functions and legal status of such an 
authority or committee.
Principles o f Public International Law. Fourth Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p.191. The 
provision refers to the application o f the median line for the delimitation o f the territorial sea o f the 
opposite and adjacent States. This provision excludes its scope where there are historic rights, or 
special circumstances, or where there is an agreement between opposite or adjacent States.
40In the Case Concerning the Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute, the ICJ, inter alia, stated that 
“an enclosed pluri-State bay presents the need of ensuring practical rights o f access from the ocean for 
all the coastal States; and especially so where the channels for entering the bay must be available for 
common user, as in the case o f an enclosed sea.” Case Concerning the Land, Island, and Maritime 
Frontier Dispute (El Salvador / Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), ICJ Reports, 1992, pp.351-618, at 
590. (Hereinafter ICJ Reports. 1992.)
41 At the request o f the Secretariat o f the United Nations and at the time o f the First United Nations 
Conference on the Law o f the Sea, a list of forty-eight bays and estuaries the coasts of which belong to 
different States was prepared by Commander R. H. Kennedy. This list includes the Gulf o f Fonseca, 
the Gulf o f  Paria, the Gulf o f Aqaba, the Hong Kong Area, and the Gulf o f Trieste. This list does not 
seem to be comprehensive since Strohl places the Bay of Fundy and the Bay o f Gibraltar in the same 
category. Knight, Gary, and Hungdah Chiu, The International Law of the Sea; Cases. Materials, and 
Readings. Elsevier Applied Science, London, 1991, p.133.
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• The last alternative is to subject the bay to two different mechanism 
of sovereignty: individual sovereignty; and joint sovereignty. This means 
the coastal States may agree to have exclusive limits to a certain distance 
from the coasts, and to have a common dominium over the maritime area 
beyond the exclusive limits of the coastal States. The coastal States are 
sovereign in all aspects related to their exclusive limits. However, the 
control of the common area should be exercised by a joint authority or 
committee of the coastal States.
V . Analysis of the Rights of Navigation in Multi-State Bays
There has been no uniform practice of States concerning the 
treatment of waters within multi-States bays and legal scholars have 
presented different views on the issue. However, the main trend which 
now prevails is that these bays are normally not under the control of 
bordering States unless waters within these bays fall into the legal regime 
of territorial seas. By the extension of territorial seas to twelve nautical 
miles, more multi-State bays are covered by territorial seas. Since there is 
not yet any conventional rule concerning recognition or rejection of 
sovereignty of States bordering multi-State bays, it is useful to examine 
the rights of navigation for coastal States and other States in two 
situations:
(i) where sovereignty of States bordering multi-State bay is recognised 
with respect to all waters within these bays even where they include the 
EEZs or the high seas; and
(ii) where such sovereignty is rejected where central areas of multi-State 
bays are part of the EEZs or the high seas.42
In both cases, the following part of the chapter will examine the 
navigational issues with respect to two situations:
• where there are only two bordering States both controlling the 
headlands (most of multi-State bays fall into this category); and
• where there are more than two bordering States one of which has no 
control over the headlands.
42por discussion o f navigational rights within multi-State bays see also Bouchez, op. c i t pp.174-175 
and 177-181.
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1. Where States are entitled to enclose a multi-State bay
In this case, coastal States concerned are permitted to enclose a 
multi-State bay and assume sovereignty over entire waters within it. The 
recognition of this sovereignty means that there will be no EEZs or high 
seas routes within the bay, even though the size of the bay is wider than 
double breadth of the territorial sea. The status of waters within the bay, 
therefore, will be subject to the legal regime of internal waters or that of 
the territorial sea in exceptional cases.
If there are only two bordering States and both are located at one 
side of the entrance, there would not generally be any navigational 
problem hindering their access to the high seas. These States may decide 
not to divide the bay into two sections and instead they may assume joint 
sovereignty over the bay. Having joint authority implies that they have the 
equal rights of navigation in all parts of the bay, including through main 
navigational routes. The entry into the bay by foreign ships is regulated 
by the bordering States, which should reach agreement on this regulation. 
If the bay is made divided, no navigational problem arises where the 
navigational route is situated in the middle of bay. In other words, the 
main mechanism for division of the bay is a median or equidistance line 
(or both, where the coasts are not only opposite but are also adjacent in 
some areas of the bay).43 Thus, both States may share the same route 
equally to access the high seas. The problem is whether there is a right of 
access by a State to the waters of the other State if the essential 
navigational route is located in these waters. It seems that such a State 
should be entitled to use the navigational route in waters of the other 
States on the basis of the principle of free communication. Foreign ships 
should respect the rules of entry to the waters of the bay which have been 
regulated by the bordering States for either part of the bay. Where the 
essential navigational route exists in the waters of one bordering State, 
foreign ships should observe rules laid down by this bordering State for 
the use of the route. In any event, foreign ships require permission from 
bordering State(s) to enter into the bay to anchor at a port.
If the bay is bordered by more than two States, at least one of 
which does not own one of the headlands, the status of waters within the 
bay again depends on whether the bay is made subject to joint authority,
43For discussion o f the issue of the delimitation o f a multi-State bay see ibid., pp.188-198.
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or is divided among bordering States. As far as access to the high seas is 
concerned, the main difficulty affects the bordering State in the central 
part of the bay, which does not have direct contact with the high seas. 
Ships of this State usually need to cross the waters of the State or States 
located at the entrance to reach the high seas. Bouchez suggests that all 
bordering States may have free access to the high seas, if the waters of the 
bay are divided so that these States can have sovereignty over part of the 
entrance. For example, if the bay is surrounded by three States, Bouchez’s 
suggestion is illustrated in the following figure. To what extent this 
suggestion may work depends on the relations between bordering States, 
and on the degree to which the suggestion will satisfy the interests of these 
States.
Figure 4.1
Navigation through a Multi-State Bay
Source: Bouchez, Leo J., The Regime of Bays in International Law. A. 
W. Sythoff, Leyden, 1964, p. 178.
If bordering States are entitled to joint sovereignty over the bay, 
there exists a question as to whether: (a) they have joint sovereignty over 
all parts of the bay; or (b) they exercise independent sovereignty over the 
bay up to a certain distance from their coast and they have only shared 
control over waters in the central part of the bay (as is the case with 
respect to the Gulf of Fonseca).
If littoral States have shared sovereignty over entire waters of the 
bay, the waters within the bay are regarded as internal waters of these 
States and these States have navigational rights through these waters to 
access the high seas. Accordingly, the littoral State, which is not located at 
either side of the opening of the bay, will not be isolated from the high 
seas. The littoral States should set up uniform rules for entry of foreign 
ships into the bay, to avoid practical problems. Foreign ships should 
acquire prior permission for entry into the bay either by a general
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agreement with a littoral State (or all littoral States) or on the basis of 
case by case.
Where the status of the bay is such that riparian States have 
independent sovereignty over waters adjacent to their coasts and have 
joint authority in the central part of the bay, navigation will still occur in 
the bay without any problem. For example, if there are three riparian 
States, the bay will have four sections: three sections are exclusive waters 
of riparian States and the central section includes waters belonging to all 
riparian States. The existence of central part, where all riparian State 
enjoy equal rights, removes any possible navigational problem for 
riparian States, particularly for the one which does not have the privilege 
of controlling one of the headlands. In general, riparian States will 
regulate the access of foreign ships through the central part of the bay and 
the entry of these ships into the exclusive waters of each riparian State is 
subject to conditions establish by this State.
If the bay is divided among bordering States, a number of 
navigational problems would be created, in particular for the States not 
having a headland at the entrance.44 Since waters of the bay have the 
status similar to that of internal waters, there is no primary right of 
navigation, including the right of innocent passage. It is apparent that 
littoral States controlling the headlands normally encounter no difficulty 
with respect to navigation. However, the State without a headland may 
experience problems if its navigational needs are not met. The principle 
of free communication is the foundation for meeting the navigational 
needs of this State. As Bouchez argues, there are three reasons why such 
a State is entitled to navigation through waters of the other littoral States 
to access the high seas.45
The first reason is based on Article 3 of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas. This Article, among others, provides that 
“[i]n order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on the equal terms with 
coastal States, States having no sea-coast should have free access to the
44jt should be noted that the main purpose o f enclosing a multi-State bay is to give the status o f internal 
waters to this bay, except in exceptional cases where the status is assimilated to that o f the territorial 
se a  Here the examination is based on the main trend which regards waters within a multi-State bay 
entitled to enclosure as internal waters o f riparian States.
45See ibid., pp.178-181.
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sea.” 46 Bouchez asserts that when land-locked States have a right of free 
access to the high seas, a coastal State bordering a multi-State bay but not 
located at the entrance, should a fortiori be entitled to free access to the 
high seas.
The second reason is based on an analogy with the provision of 
Article 5(2) of the TSC (Article 8(2) of the LOSC). This Article provides 
that where a new straight baseline system is established while the waters 
within this new system have already been part of the territorial sea, the 
right of innocent passage will apply in these enclosed waters. Bouchez 
asserts that this provision applies if a multi-State bay is divided among 
littoral States, one of which has no direct access to the high seas. In other 
words, the enclosure of a multi-State bay by drawing a line between its 
headlands is similar to the enclosure of coastal waters by straight 
baselines. Where there is a new claim enclosing the entrance of a multi­
State bay, a right of innocent passage will apply in the waters enclosed by 
the closing line. This means that there is a guarantee of access to the high 
seas for the State not having a headland at the entrance.47
The third reason is based of “the right of servitude.”48 This right 
was primarily developed with respect to land territory but it was later 
extended to maritime areas as well.49 For example, the rights of 
navigation of Finland through the River Neva were guaranteed before the 
1939-1940 war between Finland and Russia occurred. In addition, the 
rights of navigation of Costa Rica through San Juan River (over which 
Nicaragua possesses sovereignty) were ensured by the Canas-Jerez Treaty 
(15 April 1858)50 and the judgment of 30 September 1916 of the CACJ.
46Part X  o f the LOSC is devoted to the right o f access of land-locked States to and from the sea and 
freedom o f transit (Articles 124-132.). In particular Article 125(1) states that landlocked  States shall 
have the right o f access to and from the sea for the purpose o f exercising the rights provided for in this 
Convention including those relating to the freedom of the high seas and the common heritage o f 
mankind.”
47The same argument may be extended to the case o f foreign ships. If a right o f innocent passage is 
going to survive in the waters o f the bay, foreign ships can exercise this right to cross the bay before 
entering internal waters o f each littoral States. Foreign ships normally exercise this right after getting 
permission from one o f the littoral States to enter its internal waters to anchor at one o f its ports.
48Brittin defines the term servitude as “[a] right by which a thing is subject to certain use or enjoyment 
by another person [or State].” Brittin, Burdick H., International Law for Seagoing Officers. Fourth 
Edition, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1981, p.460.
49See, for example, Viill, F. A., Servitudes In International Law. 2nd ed., London, 1958.
50This Treaty was concluded between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Article 6 of the Treaty, inter alia, reads: 
“The Republic o f Nicaragua shall have exclusive dominion and the highest sovereignty over the waters 
o f the San Juan River from their issue out o f the lake to their discharge into the Atlantic; but the 
Republic o f Costa Rica shall have in those waters perpetual rights o f free navigation from the said 
mouth o f the river up to a point three English miles below Castillo Viejo, for purposes o f commerce
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The CACJ held that u[i]t is clear, therefore, that the ownership which the 
Republic of Nicaragua exercises in the San Juan River is neither absolute 
nor unlimited; it is necessarily restricted by the rights of free navigation, 
and their attendant rights, so clearly adjudicated to Costa Rica.”51 
Therefore, it can be argued that where a State bordering a multi-State is 
not at the entrance, the right of passage to access the high sea and vice 
versa should be granted to such State on the ground of the right of 
servitude.
2. Where States are not entitled to enclose a multi-State bay
This bay should be subject to the normal rules of the law of the sea 
for delimitation of maritime zones. Accordingly, the baseline for this bay 
is the low-water mark on coastline. The navigational rights depend on the 
size of a multi-State bay and the location of bordering States. Littoral 
States may claim sovereignty over the waters of these bays under the 
concept of territorial seas, but they may not enclose these bays and claim 
their waters as internal.
Bordering States have sovereignty over waters of the bays, if the 
bays are covered by territorial seas of littoral States. This is consistent 
with the current law of the sea and legal scholars have recognised this 
sovereignty. In this case, if there are only two littoral States which own 
the entrance, ships of either State have the right of innocent passage in the 
territorial sea of the other State. This is particularly a matter of necessity 
where essential navigational routes are located in the territorial sea of 
another State.52 Ships of the littoral States have the same right where they 
are heading from a national port to a port of the other State. When 
exercising this right of passage, these ships make themselves subject to the 
absolute sovereignty of the other State when they enter its internal waters.
... The vessels o f either country may touch at any part of the banks of the river where the navigation is 
common without paying any dues except such as may be established by agreement between the two 
Governments.” See the decision o f the Central American Court o f Justice (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), in 
Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, AJIL V o l.ll ,  1917, pp.181-229, at 192­
193.
51See Vdll, op. cit., pp.151-152.
52Bouchez states that there are direct and indirect communications between all coastal States within 
multi-State bays and the high seas. He writes that “[t]here is direct and free communication, if ships 
navigating from the coastal State to the high seas and vice versa do not have to pass through the 
territorial sea o f one o f the other coastal States. On the other hand, if ships must navigate through the 
territorial sea of one o f the other coastal States situated on the bay in order to reach the high seas, there 
is only indirect communication.” He adds that “passage through the territorial sea o f the other coastal 
State may be necessary if the navigable channel runs through the territorial sea o f the other.” Bouchez, 
op. cit., p.174.
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It is clear that ships of littoral States have no difficulty in using the 
territorial seas of their respective States to reach a port or heading the 
high seas. Foreign ships have also right of innocent passage through 
waters of either State. Foreign ships exercise the right of innocent passage 
to reach ports of littoral States and are subject to full authority of a 
littoral State in its internal waters.
There is also another case about multi-State bays whose entrance 
overlapped by territorial seas of littoral States but there is also another 
coastal State which is not located at the entrance. A question, then, arises 
as to what are navigational rights of this State through the entrance. The 
principle of free access to the high seas (principle of free communication 
with the high seas) is the main basis of the navigational rights for a State 
which is cut off the high seas by maritime zones of other States, including 
territorial seas. In the above-mentioned situation, the concept of free 
communication is reflected in the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial seas of the littoral States controlling the headlands.
It is true that the law of the sea has permitted coastal States to 
temporarily suspend the right of innocent passage in certain areas of their 
territorial seas.53 However, such suspension by States controlling the 
headlands of a multi-State bay should not affect the access routes to a State 
which does not have control over the entrance of this bay. This is a 
corollary of the principle of free communication which prohibits taking 
any measure which may hinder free access to the high seas. Bouchez also 
relies on the provision of Article 16(4) of the TSC54 guaranteeing a 
continued right of innocent passage for the States not being at the 
entrance. This Article provides that innocent passage through straits used 
for international navigation between two parts of the high seas or one part 
of the high seas and the territorial sea of a foreign State must not be 
suspended. By analogy, Bouchez maintains that the case of a multi-State 
bay, with one State not being located at the entrance, is similar though the 
entrance of a bay is not as narrow as a strait. Bouchez, therefore, asserts 
that “[i]f it is not permitted to suspend the right of innocent passage in the
53Article 16(3) o f the TSC and Article 25(3) of the LOSC.
54See also Part III (Straits Used for International Navigation) of the LOSC in general and its Articles 
38(1) and 45(2) in particular.
195
case of straits, it is a fortiori prohibited to suspend that right in the case 
of [multi-State] bay.”55
If the entrance of a multi-State bay is considerably larger than the 
double breadth of the territorial sea, the problem of overlapping of 
territorial seas does not occur. This means that there would be a route of 
EEZs or the high seas in the central parts of the entrance where littoral 
States do not have authority to restrict navigation and overflight. In this 
situation, there would be no difficulty for the exercise of right of 
navigation. It is evident that there exist three navigational regimes in the 
waters of this bay: (a) freedom of navigation and flight in the EEZs or 
the high sea parts of the bay; (b) the right of innocent passage in the 
territorial sea of the riparian States; and (c) passage through internal 
waters of riparian States under the conditions regulated by these States.
In conclusion, whether or not a multi-State bay is susceptible to 
enclosure, navigational rights of littoral States and international 
community are not affected. Although the scope and nature of the right 
of passage through multi-State bays vary depending on recognition or 
non-recognition of enclosure of these bays, these bays have never been 
closed to local or international navigation. The case of Gulf of Fonseca 
(examined infra) is a typical example of multi-State bays where 
navigational rights have been guaranteed.
V I. Claiming Multi-State Bays on the Basis of Historic Title
Given that multi-nation bays are not subject to enclosure under the 
rules codified for single-nation bays, may bordering States rely upon 
historic title to enclose certain multi-State bay? Two studies of the United 
Nations have briefly examined this issue. The 1957 UN Memorandum 
pointed out that the previous studies by the League of Nations, learned 
institutes, and the ILC only considered the issue of historic titles 
concerning single-nation bays. The Memorandum contains a few cases 
which (except with respect to the Gulf of Fonseca) reflected the idea that 
multi-State bays are not susceptible to enclosure by any means, including 
by reference to historic title. Even in the case of the Gulf of Fonseca, the 
Memorandum stresses that although the CACJ recognised the historic 
character of the Gulf, it “does not attribute to ... [the waters within the
55Bouchez, op. cit., p.181.
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Gulf] the characteristics of internal waters; rather it tends to class them as 
territorial sea.”56 This case to be of exceptional character and is the only 
gulf bordered by several States which acquired recognition of its historic 
character by the CACJ (1917) and the ICJ (1992).
As Blum points out the decision in the case of Gulf of Fonseca was 
not followed in any other similar cases. In fact, none of claims made by 
bordering States of multi-State bays on historic title became successful. 
For example, in the case of Gulf of Aqaba, a historic claim was made by 
Arab States bordering the Gulf for the main purpose of cutting off the 
access of Israel to the high seas though the Strait of Tiran towards the Red 
Sea.57 It was in 1957 when Saudi Arabia claimed the Gulf of Aqaba as a 
closed sea.58 However, this claim was challenged by a number of States. 
States such as the USA, France, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Canada indicated their opposition to the historic 
claim made to the Gulf of Aqaba particularly because of its effect on the 
rights of navigation.59 Although Egypt joined Saudi Arabia in claiming 
the Gulf of Aqaba as historic and as a closed sea without any right of 
navigation for Israel, the claim proved to be unsuccessful and the 1967 
Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel weakened the basis of the claim. 
The 1957 UN Memorandum does not mention the Gulf of Aqaba as a 
historic bay.
In addition, Article 16(4) of the TSC also extend the right of non- 
suspendable innocent passage to straits which link the high seas to the 
territorial sea of a foreign State. This provision was particularly 
incorporated into the TSC to guarantee the right of Israel to have access 
to the high seas through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran.
56‘Historic Bays’, Memorandum by the Secretariat of the United Nations, UN Document A/CONF.13/1, 
(Preparatory Document N o .l)  [Original Text: French], 30 September 1957, UNCLOS I. Official 
Records. V ol.l (Preparatory Documents), New York, United Nations, 1958, p.27.
57For the discussion o f this issue see Strohl. op. cit., pp.389-397.
58For the statement of the representative of Saudi Arabia concerning the Gulf o f Aqaba, see UNGAQR> 
12th Session, 1957, Plenary Meeting, p.233, and IJNGAOR, 14th Session, Sixth Committee, 1959, 
pp.227 et seq. The same claim was also made in the UNCLOS I. See UNCLOS I. Official Records. 
Vol.III (First Committee), 1958, p.3.
59 See T TNG APR. 11th Session, 1957, Plenary Meeting, pp.1277-1278, 1280, 1284, 1287, 1288, 1296, 
1303. For example, France asserted that “the Gulf of Aqaba, by reason partly of its breadth and partly of 
the fact that its shores belong to four different States, constitutes international waters.” Ibid., p.1280. 
The USA also states that it “believes that the Gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation 
has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access 
thereto.” Ibid., p.1277-1278. The Gulf of Aqaba is about six mile wide at its entrance and include two 
narrow channels as a result of the existence of the two islands o f Tiran and Sanafir in the mouth o f the 
Gulf.
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Hypothetically, the Gulf of Aqaba could be claimed as historic, if all four 
littoral States had claimed the Gulf as historic, taking into account the 
interests of all bordering States, whether at the entrance or in the central 
parts of the Gulf.60 Even this claim would not have been guaranteed 
success under the general rules governing multi-State bays.
A number of justifications may be found in certain cases on the 
question as to why multi-State bays cannot claimed as historic. One 
justification concerning certain single State bays for being qualified as 
historic is that these bays are not linked to any foreign nation.61 Multi­
State bays lack this character.62 This rationale was also taken into account 
by the Second Court of the Commissioners of Alabama Claims in the case 
of Alleganean  (1885). As part of its reasoning in favour of the 
Chesapeake Bay as historic, the Court held that “[Chesapeake Bay] is 
entirely encompassed by ... [the territory of the United States] ... It cannot 
become an international commercial highway; it is not and cannot be 
made a roadway from one nation to another.”63 In the case of multi-State 
bays, these areas of waters do constitute a roadway from one nation to 
another or to the high seas. This is due to this fact that Blum comments 
that “multinational bays have generally come to be regarded as parts of 
the open sea, except the marginal belt to which each of the littoral States 
is entitled in accordance with the general rules of international law.”64 It 
should be noted that if a bay is not large enough to contain an area of the 
EEZ or the high seas and accordingly it is overlapped by the territorial 
seas of littoral States65, the bay is subject to the legal regime of the
60In 1957, the Secretary State o f the United States o f America, Mr. John Foster Dulles, stated in a news 
conference that “[i]f the four littoral states which have boundaries upon the gulf [of Aqaba] should all 
agree that it should be closed, then it could be closed.” News Conference Statement o f 19 February 
1957, Department o f State Bulletin. No.36, January-June 1957, p.404.
61 See the view of the United States Attorney-General, E. Randolph, in the 1973 case resulted from the 
capture o f British vessel Grange by the French frigate L ’Embuscade. Moore, Vol.I, 1906, op. cit., 
pp.735-739.
62Blum writes that “one o f the major considerations which permit a given [single-State] bay to be turned 
into an historic bay is the fact that by its incorporation into the national domain o f the littoral State no 
harm is done, or is likely to be done, to another State and that the rights o f such a State are not affected 
thereby.” Blum, Yehuda Z., Historic Tides in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965,
p.270.
63Moore, Vol.IV, 1898, op. cit., pp.4332-4341, at p.4339.
64Blum, op. cit., p.270.
65In such cases, the delimitation o f territorial seas within bays will be subject to the provisions o f 
Article 12(1) o f the TSC (Article 15 of the LOSC) where the median line (with respect to opposite 
coasts) and the equidistance line (with respect to adjacent coasts) are the methods o f delimitation in 
normal circumstances. The provision, however, recognises that deviation from these methods may be 
made where there are special circumstances or historic titles.
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territorial sea. In this case, although the bay is not part of the high seas, it 
is not part of internal waters either.
In the case of Washington (1843), the umpire was asked to decide 
whether the capture of this American Ship by a British vessel in the Bay 
of Fundy was lawful.66 To answer this question, the umpire needed to 
decide whether the Bay of Fundy was a British Bay. The umpire 
concluded that the bay is not British because “[o]ne of the headlands of the 
Bay of Fundy is in the United States, and ships bound to Passamaquoddy 
must sail through a large space of it.”67
Despite the views asserted in these cases and those reflected in the 
1957 UN Memorandum, the 1962 UN study presents a new approach. 
The study is entitled “Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including 
Historic Bays”6* This study was also undertaken by the Secretariat of the 
UN following a request by the ILC to prepare a more comprehensive 
research on the issue of historic waters, including historic bays. The 
study examined two cases: (a) where littoral States agree that the bay is 
historic; and (b) where littoral States do not in agree with respect to the 
nature of waters within a bay as historic waters.
In the first case (the 1957 UN Memorandum), the study showed 
that if all littoral States agree that a bay is historic, the bay may be 
regarded as historic in the same manner as a single-State bay may be 
claimed as historic.69 Then, all requirements for proving the historic 
nature of a single-State will apply to such a multi-State bay claimed as
66See McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p.441.
67Moore, Vol.IV, 1898, op. cit., pp.4342 et seq, at p.4344. Referring to the decision made in the case 
o f Washington, Dana presented his view to the Halifax Fishery Commissioners (which was set up by 
the Washington Treaty o f 1871 between Great Britain and the United States o f America). Dana 
maintained that “the real ground [for the decision in the case o f Washington] was that one o f the 
headlands belonged to the United States, and it was necessary to pass the headland in order to get to one 
o f the ports o f the United States.” See Phillimore, R. J., Commentaries upon International Law, Third 
Edition, Butterworths, London, Vol.I, 1879, pp.287-289. FauchiUe also presented the similar view. 
He wrote that the principal basis o f the arbitral award in defining the bay of Fundy as an open bay was 
that “its coasts do not all belong to a single State; one of its headlands is situated in the territory of the 
United States, the other in the territory o f Great Britain [now part of Canada].” Fauchille, Paul, TtqM. 
de droit international public. Vol.I, Part n, Paris, 1925, p.384.
^Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, A study undertaken by the Secretariat of 
the United Nations, 6 March 1962, Document A/CN.4/143, YILC, 1962, Vol.2, pp.1-26. (Hereinafter 
the 1962 UN Study)
69Ibid., p.21 .
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historic.70 Therefore, riparian States should indicate that they have 
peacefully exercised continuous sovereignty over the bay for a long 
period, without opposition from other States. This is what has been 
considered to be the case concerning the Gulf of Fonseca but this case is 
not to be extended to other geographically similar bodies of water. The 
study seems to have considered that any multi-State bay can be claimed as 
historic if bordering States jointly lay a claim over the bay by historic 
title. However, it is not the mere claim of littoral States which determines 
the status of a multi-State bay as historic. The mere claim produces 
nothing. These States should substantiate the historic character of a multi­
State bay. As one of the most important factors in recognising a historic 
claim over a body of water, it should be demonstrated that all interested 
States have not opposed such claim.71 In the current status of the law of 
the sea, it does not appear that new claims on historic bases may be made 
successfully over multi-State bays. This is because the main trend towards 
these bays is to maintain the status of their waters as free for international 
navigation. Accordingly, it will not be surprising if these claims prove 
void.72 *
Concerning the second case (the 1962 UN study), the study rejected 
any possibility of claiming a multi-State bay as historic, where littoral 
States are not in agreement concerning the status of waters within the bay 
as historic waters, no claim can be laid over the bay as historic. The study 
is flexible in advancing a historic claim over a multi-State bay only if all 
littoral States agree that the bay is historic. In general, opposition from 
one or two States may be regarded as not having significant adverse effect 
on establishing a historic claim over a body of water like a single-State 
bay, if other foreign States have acquiesced. However, it is not the case 
with respect to a multi-State bay, if the persistent opposition comes from 
one or more littoral States against the claim laid over such bay by the 
other littoral States. This is because in assessing whether affected States
70The study states one problem which in the case of a multi-State bay arises is “whether sovereignty over 
the bay must during the required period have been exercised by all the States claiming title or whether it 
is sufficient that during that period one or more of them exercised sovereignty over the bay.” Ibid.
71Gidel states that even where all littoral States are in agreement to enclose a multi-State bay, it is not 
legally possible to enclose the bay unless other States recognise such enclosure or at least acquiesces to 
it. Gidel, Gilbert, I* Omit International Public de la Mer en Temps de Paix, Paris, Vol.3, 1934,
p.604.
72Blum writes that “it would be far more in accordance with the prevailing concepts o f modem maritime 
international law if the waters surrounded by more than one littoral State would be considered as falling
ex definitions outside the category of historic bays, and if the waters beyond the marginal belts o f each 
o f the littoral States were regarded as part of the high seas.” Blum, op. cit., p.310.
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have shown tolerance towards historic claim over a multi-State bay, the 
opposition of some littoral States against the historic claims by the other 
littoral States is of “great if not decisive importance.”73
V II. Case Study: The Case of the Gulf of Fonseca
The Gulf of Fonseca is a typical example of a bay which represents 
two characteristics. It is geographically classified as a multi-State bay, 
while it is also categorised as a historic bay. The Gulf of Fonseca is 
located on the Pacific coast of central America and is surrounded by the 
three countries of El Salvador in the north-west, Nicaragua in the south­
east, and Honduras in the central part of coasts within the Gulf. El 
Salvador and Nicaragua own the headlands of the Gulf, and Honduras is 
located in the central part of the Gulf without headlands.74 (See Map 4.1 
below.) The mouth of the Gulf is slightly more than nineteen miles 
wide75 and is fifty miles long.
Map 4.1
The Gulf of Fonseca
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Source: Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salvdor/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening, ICJ Reports, 1992, p.587.
74Honduras has approximately a coastline of forty miles in the Gulf of Fonseca. Strohl, op. cit., p.376.
75This width is where the two headlands of the Cosiguina Point on the mainland of Nicaragua and the 
Amapala Point on the mainland of El Salvador are used as natural entrance points of the Gulf of 
Fonseca. Colombos, C. John, The International Law of the S..ea, Sixth Revised Edition, Longmans,
London, 1967, p.188.
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Until 1821 Spain had authority and control over the Gulf of 
Fonseca.76 Then this authority over the Gulf was transferred to the 
Federal Republic of Central America that lasted until 1839 when the new 
three States of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras (as the successor 
States) formed the new coastal States around the Gulf.
The Gulf of Fonseca has been subject to a decision of the Central 
American Court of Justice77 (Republic of El Salvador v. Republic of 
Nicaragua, March 9, 1917).78 The question was whether the Gulf could 
be considered as historic waters and, if so, whether the Gulf had to be 
divided among the three coastal States or the Gulf was indivisible and had 
to be subject to the common dominium (joint ownership). The case was 
brought before the Court as a result of the conclusion of the Bryan- 
Chamorro Treaty of 5 August, 1914 between the USA and Nicaragua.79 
According to Article II of the Treaty, the USA was granted a right to 
establish a naval base in the Nicaraguan coast in the Gulf of Fonseca for 
ninety-nine years.80 This Treaty was challenged by El Salvador81 by 
arguing that the Treaty would affect the interests of other littoral States of 
the Gulf and, and as far as the Gulf was concerned, Treaty should have 
been concluded with the consent of all the three littoral States.82 The 
reasoning of El Salvador was that the Gulf was a historic bay, like other 
claimed historic bays such as Chesapeake and Delaware Bays. The 
problem was that the Gulf was not bordered by a single State. El Salvador 
argued that the existence of the three littoral States did not change the
76Strohl, op. cit., p.376.
77The Central American Court o f Justice was set as a result of the Central American Peace Conference at 
Washington on 20 December 1907.
78The text o f the decision of the Court (English Translation) is found in "Judicial Decisions Involving 
Questions o f International Law," AJIL, V o l.ll, 1917, pp.674-730.
79For information on the preparation o f the Treaty see Flinch, George A., ‘The Treaty with Nicaragua 
granting Canal and other rights to the United States’, AUL> V ol.10 ,1916, pp.344-351. The text of the 
Treaty can be found in International Law Documents. U.S. Naval War College, 1924, pp.31-34.
80Nicaragua gave a right to the USA, for a period o f ninety-nine years, to establish, operate, and 
maintain a naval base at such place on the territory of Nicaragua bordering upon the Gulf of Fonseca as 
the Government o f the United States may select." (Article II of the Bryan-Chamoro) The Treaty was 
also optional for the extension. In addition, the USA was granted a right to build a inter-oceanic canal. 
Jessup, op. cit., p.398. Jessup refers to two other names used for the Gulf o f Fonseca. These are the 
Gulf o f Amapala and the Gulf o f Conchagua. Ibid.
81 Jessup states that the grants given to the USA by Nicaragua faced opposition of both El Salvador and 
Costa Rica and they asked the Central American Court o f Justice to declare the nullification of the 
Treaty. Ibid. Honduras also protested against the Treaty. See, for example, Gonzales, Salvador R., 
‘Neutrality o f Honduras and the Question of the Gulf of Fonseca’, AUL, V o l.1 0 ,1916, pp.509-544.
82The 1914 Treaty came to the end in 1971 and the USA never established the naval base in the Gulf of 
Fonseca. Prescott, op. cit., 1985, p.254.
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status of the Gulf as a historic bay since these States had once been "a 
single international political entity."83
Nicaragua accepted the nature of the Gulf as "closed or territorial 
bay", but it stated that it was the small size of the Gulf which gave the 
territorial nature to this maritime area, not the historic rights over the 
Gulf.84 The Court held that the Gulf of Fonseca "belong[s] to the category 
of historic bays and to be possessed of characteristics of a closed sea."*5 
The Court also stated that the Gulf was "property belonging to the three 
countries that surround it."86 Nonetheless, the Court provided a three 
mile limit from the coast for the waters of each littoral States in 
accordance with the practice of the bordering States.87 Only the area 
beyond the three mile limits were undivided in which common 
jurisdiction was accepted. The Court indicated that one of the effects of 
common ownership of the Gulf (condominio) is that none of the coastal 
States could "lawfully alter, or deliver into the hands of an outsider, or 
even share with i t , the use and enjoyment of the thing held in common" if 
it did not obtain the consent of other two countries.
In regard to the reasons for possession of the Gulf by its littoral 
States, the Court ruled:
[I]t combines all the characteristics or conditions that the text writers on 
international law, the international law institutes and the precedents have 
described as essential to territorial waters, to wit, secular or immemorial 
possession accompanied bv anim o dom ini both peaceful and continuous and 
hv acquiescence on the part of other nations, the special geographical 
configuration that safeguards so many interests of vital importance to the 
economic, commercial, agricultural and industrial life of the riparian States 
and the absolute, indispensable necessity that these States should possess the
83Jessup, op, cit., p.399. As regards to the use of the term “territorial waters” by the Central American 
Court o f Justice in referring to the body o f water inside the closing line but beyond the three-mile 
maritime limits, the ICJ’s view is note worthy. The ICJ commented that the Central American Court 
o f Justice referred to “territorial” not to mean territorial sea but to present that those waters “were not 
international and were on historical grounds claimed a titre de souverain by the three coastal States. 
TCJ Reports. 1992, p.604.
84AUL, V o l.ll ,  1917, p.705.
*5Ibid., p.707. The ICJ viewed that by “closed sea” the Central American Court “seems to mean simply 
that it [the Gulf o f Fonseca] is not part of the high seas, and its waters are not international waters.
ICJ Reports, 1992, p.591. .
86This was the opinion o f the majority of Judges, composed of Medal, Oreamuno, Castro Ramirez, and
Bocanegra. However, Judge Guttierez Navas stated that "the ownership of the Gulf of Fonseca belongs, 
respectively, to the three riparian countries in proportion. Jessup, op. cit., p.400. See also AI.IL,
V o l.l l ,  1917, p.716. . _ , *
87Although a limit o f three miles was considered as the area of exclusive sovereignty o f each coastal 
State, a right o f innocent passage through this maritime area was granted to the other coastal States on 
a mutual basis. ICJ Reports. 1992, p. 590.
203
Gulf fully as required by these primordial interests and interest of national 
defence.88 (em phasis added)
The Court, by considering the three factors of geography, history 
of the Gulf, and the vital interests of the littoral States, concluded that El 
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua are co-owners of waters of the Gulf, 
"except as to the littoral marine league which is the exclusive property of 
each.(littoral State).”89 This marine league limit applies to the mainland 
and islands within the Gulf as well. The decision of the Court did not 
meet any adverse reactions from non-littoral countries and it was 
recognised in practice.90
Although the Court granted historic title to the Gulf of Fonseca, it 
recognised the right of innocent passage (the right of uso inocente) within 
the Gulf for all nations.91 This primarily seems to be in contrast with the 
normal legal status defined for internal waters, including juridical bays 
and those bays claimed on historic grounds, where no right of innocent 
passage exists. However, as the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Land, 
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute pointed out rules and principles on 
bays belonging to a single State do not necessarily apply to a bay which is 
a pluri-State bay and is also an historic bay. The ICJ, in particular, 
referred to the right of navigation within the Gulf and held that:
the Gulf being a bay with three coastal States, there is a need for 
shipping to have access to any of the coastal States through the main 
channels between the bay and the ocean. That rights of innocent 
passage are not inconsistent with a regime of historic waters is clear, 
for that is precisely now the position in archipelagic internal waters and
88A.TIL. V o l.ll ,  1917, p.705. To give authority to its judgement, the Central American Court o f Justice 
referred to the Arbitral Award of 7 September 1910 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the North 
Atlantic Fisheries Case and the comments made by Dr. Drago in relation to question V put before the 
arbitral tribunal. ICJ Reports, 1992, pp.591-592.
89AJIL. V o l.ll ,  1917, p.694. The Central American Court of Justice also recognised that each of the 
three coastal States has the right to exercise police power for fiscal and national security purposes in an 
area o f 9 miles beyond the exclusive limits of the coastal States. ICJ Reports. 1992, p.595.
90With reference to the 18 February 1914 note of the Department o f State of the USA in response to the 
protest o f El Salvador, the Court argued that the note was a recognition o f common sovereignty of the 
coastal States in the Gulf o f Fonseca. See also ICJ Reports. 1992, p.593. The note, inter alia, 
contained that “[i]n your protest [Honduras’ protest] the position is taken that the Gulf o f Fonseca is a 
territorial bay whose waters are within the jurisdiction o f bordering States. This position the 
Department is not disposed to controvert.” Strohl, op. cit., p.378, no.7. It should be also mentioned 
that Article 7 o f the 1950 Constitution o f El Salvador contains a provision which provided that “[t]he 
Gulf o f Fonseca is an historic bay subject to a special regime.” Laws and Regulations on the Rsguns 
frg Te rrito ria l Sea. United Nations Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (December 1956), United 
Nations Publication, New York, 1957, p.14.
91A TIL. V o l.ll ,  1917, p.715.
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indeed in former high seas enclosed as internal waters by straight 
baselines.92
The ICJ reconfirmed this approach in another part of its 1992 
judgment on the bases of “historic reasons” and “practical necessities.” 
To indicate the necessity of rights of navigation for either coastal States 
or third States wishing to access a port of any bordering State of the Gulf 
of Fonseca, the ICJ argued that:
Since the practice of the three coastal States still accepts that there are 
the littoral maritime belts subject to the single sovereignty of each of the 
coastal States, but with mutual rights o f innocent passage, there must 
also be rights of passage through the remaining waters of the Gulf, not 
only for historical reasons but because of the practical necessities of a 
situation where those narrow Gulf waters comprise the channels used 
by vessels seeking access to any one of the three coastal States. 
Accordingly, these rights of passage must be available to vessels of 
third States seeking access to a port in any one of the three coastal 
States; such rights of passage being essential in a three-State bay with 
entrance channels that must be common to all three States. The Gulf 
waters are therefore, if indeed internal waters, internal waters subject to 
a special and particular regime, not only o f joint sovereignty but o f  
rights o f passage.93 (emphasis added)
Despite the recognition of the Gulf of Fonseca as a historic bay 
which cannot be divided, El Salvador and Honduras disputed their 
maritime delimitation.94 This dispute arose due to the existence of a 
number of islands in adjacent areas to the coasts of these countries and 
within the Gulf. A boundary line was already drawn within the Gulf by a
92ICJ Reports. 1992, p.593. As far as navigation rights are concerned, the view o f Honduras is also 
noteworthy. It prefers the idea o f “community of interests” instead o f the “condominium”. To support 
its argument, Honduras relied on the judgement of the PCU in the case o f the Territorial Jurisdiction of 
the International Commission of the River Oder (1929) where the Court held that “[when] a single 
waterway traverses or separates the territory of more than one State ... a solution o f the problem has 
been sought not in the idea o f a right o f passage for upstream States, but in that o f a community of 
interest o f riparian States.” The Court further elaborated that “[t]his community interest in a navigable 
river becomes the basis of a common legal right [communaute de droit], the essential features o f which 
are the perfect quality o f all riparian States in the user of the whole course of the river and the exclusion 
o f any preferential privilege o f any one riparian State in relation to the others.” Territorial Jurisdiction 
o f the International Commission of the River Oder Case, Judgement No. 16, PCIJ Series A. No.23. 
1929, p.27. Also see ICJ Reports. 1992, p.602.
93Ibid., p.605. Cf Judge Oda’s opinion where he stated that “[u]nder the contemporary concept o f the law 
o f the sea, the sea-waters adjacent to the coasts of States are either territorial sea or, otherwise, internal 
waters. There cannot be any other category for such offshore sea-waters.” Dissenting Opinion o f Judge 
Oda, ICJ Reports. 1992, p.734. In another part of his dissenting opinion Oda asserted that the decision 
o f the ICJ in establishing a three mile maritime limit for each of the three coastal State is not 
consistent with the legal nature o f a historic bay as internal waters. Ibid., p.750.
94Due to the geographical features o f the Gulf of Fonseca, the ICJ emphasised that “mere delimitation 
without agreement on questions o f passage and access would leave many practical problems 
unresolved. It is not easy to conceive o f a satisfactory final solution without participation of all three 
States together in the creation o f a suitable regime, whether or not including delimitation of separate 
areas as internal waters.” ICJ Reports. 1992, p.603.
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joint commission between Nicaragua and Honduras in March 1900.95 
(See Map 4.2 below.) However, El Salvador and Honduras could not 
resolve their differences and submitted their boundary disputes, including 
maritime boundary within the Gulf, to the ICJ on 11 December 1986 for 
settlement.96
Map 4.2
The 1900 Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Fonseca 
(Honduras - Nicaragua)
Source: Prescott, J. R. V., 1985, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the 
World. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, p.255.
A Chamber of the ICJ which dealt with the Case Concerning the 
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute accepted the status of the 
Gulf of Fonseca as a historic bay, consistently with the judgment of the 
CACJ in 1917. In line with the common dominium of the three littoral 
States, the Chamber rejected the division of the Gulf among these States.97 
The case was finally concluded by the judgment of the ICJ in 1992. The 
ICJ endorsed the legal status of the Gulf of Fonseca as defined by the 
1917 judgment of the CACJ and issued, inter alia, the following 
judgement on 11 September 1992:
95Prescott, op. cit., 1985, p.254. Honduras still considers the 1900 boundary line as valid. However, 
Nicaragua and El Salvador are in the opinion that the Gulf is indivisible. Ibid.
96Knight and Chiu, op. cit., p.134.
97The Chamber did not regard the 1917 decision of the Central American Court of justice "as res judicata 
since Honduras had not been a party to those proceedings and Nicaragua was only an intervener in the 
present proceedings." Strake Qc, J.G., Introduction to International Law, Tenth Edition, 1989, 
Butterworths, London, p.174, no. 10.
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the Gulf of Fonseca is an historic bay the waters whereof, having 
previously to 1821 been under the single control of Spain, and from 
1821 to 1839 of the Federal Republic of Central America, were 
thereafter succeeded to and held in sovereignty by the Republic of El 
Salvador, the Republic of Honduras, and the Republic of Nicaragua, 
jointly, and continue to be so held, as defined in the present Judgment, 
but excluding a belt, as at present established, extending 3 miles (1 
marine league) from the littoral of each of the three States, such belt 
being under the exclusive sovereignty of the coastal State, and subject 
to the delimitation between Honduras and Nicaragua effected in June 
1900, and to the existing rights o f innocent passage through the 3-mile 
belt and the waters held in sovereignty jointly; the waters at the central 
portion o f the closing line o f the G ulf that is to say, between a point on 
that line 3 miles (1 marine league) from Punta Amapala and a point on 
that line 3 miles (1 marine league) from Punta Cosiguina, are subject to 
the joint entitlement o f all three States o f the G u lf8 unless and until a 
delimitation o f the relevant maritime area be effected . . ."  {emphasis 
added)
Generally, multi-State bays are not considered to have the 
characteristic of a historic bay under the customary law. In cases where 
historic titles over certain bays were subject to debates, these bays were 
entirely within the territory of one coastal State.98 *100 However, the 
existence of this fact did not prevent the ICJ from confirming the historic 
status of the Gulf of Fonseca in accordance with the 1917 judgment of the 
CACJ. In fact, the ICJ was convinced that before 1839 when the Gulf of 
Fonseca was bordered by only a single State (the Federal Republic of 
Central America), the Gulf acquired the status of a historic bay and its 
disintegration into three States did not change the historic status of the 
Gulf. In its words, “there seems no reason in principle why a succession
98 As regards the concept o f condominium, the ICJ gave the example o f joint jurisdiction o f France and 
Spain in the Baie du Figuier under the 1879 Declaration on the Atlantic boundary between France and 
Spain. The Declaration considered three sections in the bay for jurisdiction purposes, “/a troisième 
formant des eaux communes.” ICJ Reports. 1992, p.600. Judge Oda in his dissenting opinion asserted 
that the case o f the Baie du Figuier cannot be used as a precedent for the Gulf o f Fonseca because there 
was an agreement between France and Spain on the condominium in the Baie du Figuier while no 
agreement has ever concluded among the three riparian States o f the Gulf o f Fonseca. He added that the 
mouth o f  the Baie du Figuier is a bout 3,000 meters wide which means that “it could by tiie mere 
distance criterion have been under the jurisdiction o f either State [France and Spain]. Dissenting 
Opinion o f  Judge Oda, ICJ Reports. 1992, pp.754-755.
"TCJ Renorts. 1992, pp.616-617. A s regards the issue of the delimitation o f maritime zones o f the three 
States bordering the Gulf o f Fonseca, the Court held that “the closing line o f the Gulf constitutes the 
baseline o f  the territorial sea; the territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone o f El 
Salvador and those o f Nicaragua off the coasts of those two States are also to be measured outwards 
' from a section o f the closing line extending 3 miles (1 marine league) along that line from Punta 
Ampala (in El Salvador) and 3 miles (1 marine league) from Punta Cosiguina (in Nicaragua) 
respectively; but entitlement to territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone seaward of 
the central portion o f the closing line appertains to the three States o f the Gulf, El Salvador, Honduras 
and Nicaragua; and that any delimitation of the relevant maritime areas is to be effected by agreement on 
the basis o f international law.” Ibid., p.617.
100Prescott, op. cit., 1996, p.12.
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should not create a joint sovereignty where a single and undivided 
maritime area passes to two or more new States.”101 The ICJ referred to 
the 1962 United Nations Study to support its view that certain multi-State 
bays may fall into historic bays if certain conditions exist. As regards the 
issue of multi-State bays and historic titles, the Study asserted that “[i]f all 
the bordering States act jointly to claim historic title to a bay, it would 
seem that in principle what has been said ... regarding a claim to historic 
title by a single State would apply to this group of States.”102
Judge Oda in his dissenting opinion in the Case Concerning the 
Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (1992), however, argued 
that there has been no rule in international law which permits a claim 
over a multi-State bay103 on any grounds, including on historic basis.104 
Judge Oda was of the view that the Gulf of Fonseca is no exception and 
accordingly it may not be enclosed by reliance on historic title. Judge 
Oda did not agree with the findings of the CACJ and those of the majority 
of the judges of the ICJ on the legal status of the Gulf of Fonseca as a 
historic bay on the ground that the findings are inconsistent with 
traditional and contemporary law of the sea.105 In fact, the main 
argument of Judge Oda was that any reference to the Gulf of Fonseca as a 
historic bay was after the 1917 judgment of the CACJ106, a judgment 
which was, in his view, based on the mere views of the judges and was not 
a proper decision in accordance with the traditional and contemporary 
law of the sea.107 He asserted that the 1957 and 1962 Studies of the UN 
Secretariat have also relied on the same judgment and have given the Gulf 
of Fonseca “a somewhat special treatment without offering any
101ICI Reports. 1992, p.598.
102The 1962 U N  Study, op. cit., p.21, para.147.
103See also Kwiatkowska, B., ‘Judge Shigeru Oda’s Opinions in Law o f the Sea Cases: Equitable 
Maritime Boundary Delimitation’, German Yearbook of International Law. 1993.
104Dissenting Opinion o f Judge Oda, ICJ Reports. 1992, p.745. Judge Oda, further, stated that waters of 
a multi-State bay cannot be considered as internal waters and be divided among riparian States. He 
argued that such an approach “is tacitly confirmed by the absence o f any provision concerning the 
delimitation or division o f internal waters either in the 1958 or the 1982 Conventions; the internal 
waters o f one State cannot abut the internal waters of another State.” Ibid., p.746.
105In his comment on the decision o f the CACJ concerning the status o f waters within the Gulf of 
Fonseca, Gidel was o f  the view that the CACJ’s opinion was inconsistent with normal rules 
governing historic bays. Gidel asserted that the CACJ “attributes to the waters o f  the gulf the 
characteristics not o f internal waters, which their status as historic have normally required, but o f the 
territorial sea. This is a truly remarkable departure from the logical rules governing historic bays.” 
Gidel, op. cit., Vol.II, p.627.
l06Ibid., p.748.
M lb id .,  p.750.
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sufficiently convincing reasons.”108 As regards the positions of the parties 
to the case before the ICJ, Oda stated that they have only relied upon the 
1917 judgment of the CACJ109 and they have not demonstrated that there 
are ‘any established rules governing a “historic bay” bordered by the land 
of two or more States.”110
Judge Oda then defined what in his view is the legal status of waters 
within the Gulf of Fonseca. He stated that the practice of States in Latin 
America after the Second World War indicated a trend towards a 12 mile 
limit for the territorial sea. It should, however, be noted that many of 
Latin American States favoured a much larger limit of 200 miles for their 
territorial seas. As far as the littoral States are the Gulf of Fonseca 
concerned, Honduras currently claims a 12 mile territorial sea while El 
Salvador and Nicaragua (situated on the headlands of the Gulf) claim a 
200 mile territorial sea. As a universally adopted limit for the territorial 
sea, Judge Oda considered the 12 mile limit as the basis for the case of the 
Gulf of Fonseca and argued that the legal status of the Gulf’s waters can 
be defined as follows:
the Gulf of Fonseca must now be deemed to be totally covered by the 
territorial seas of the three riparian States ... [Accordingly] ... the 
waters within the Gulf of Fonseca now consist of the territorial seas of 
three riparian states, without leaving any maritime space beyond 12- 
mile distance from any part of the coasts.111
Thus Oda concluded that Honduras and foreign ships enjoy the 
right of innocent passage to and from the Pacific Ocean through 
overlapping territorial Seas of El Salvador and Nicaragua under the
l0*Ibid., pp.748-479. . .
109According to Oda, the practice o f the riparian State of the Gulf of Fonseca in the early this century 
indicates that they claimed one league for their territorial seas and a distance of 4 leagues for exercising 
their police powers. Ibid., p.757. See, for example, the 1860 Civil Code o f El Salvador in U N  
ST/LEG/SER.B/1, p.71, the 1933 Navigation and Maritime Act o f El Salvador in ibid, and also UN  
ST/LEG/SER.B/6, p.126, and the 1906 Civil Code of Honduras in UN ST/LEG/SER.B/1, p.71.
110Dissenting Opinion o f Judge Oda, ICJ Reports. 1992, p.749. Oda also referred to die period when 
Spain (until 1821) and the Federal Republic o f Central America (until 1839) had certain authority oyer 
the Gulf o f  Fonseca. According to Oda, although Spain and the Federal Republic o f Central America 
may have exercised certain control powers over the waters of the Gulf, there is no evidence to indicate 
that “at times prior to 1821 or 1839 Spain or Federal Republic o f Central America had any control m 




protected right by international law of innocent passage in the territorial 
sea o f other States.112
As a general rule, it appears that the view of Judge Oda reflects the 
position of multi-State bays in international law. There is no ground in 
international law upon which a multi-State bay can be enclosed, whether 
on historic reason or any other justification. However, the case of the 
Gulf of Fonseca is mentioned by many jurists as an exception to the 
general rule due to its particular circumstances from Oppenheim 
(1920)113 to Brown (1994)114. The ICJ confirmed the 1917 judgment of 
the CACJ since it was of the view that there was adequate evidence to 
qualify the Gulf of Fonseca as a historic bay at the time it was first under 
the control of a single authority, whether Spain (until 1821) or later the 
Federal Republic of Central America (until 1839). The basis of the ICJ’s 
view was the principles governing the concept of State succession, that is 
to say according to such concept “territorial sovereignty passes from one 
State to another State.”115 In the case of the Gulf of Fonseca, the 
territorial sovereignty passed from the Federal Republic of Central 
America in 1839 to the three riparian States of El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua.
Although there might be different approaches on the legal status of 
the waters within the Gulf, there would not be any change on the nature 
of the rights of navigation through the Gulf. A right of innocent passage 
of ships belonging to the riparian States or other States is protected either 
under the established practice of the riparian States or under the regime 
of the territorial sea.
112Ibid., p.760. As far as maritime areas outside the closing line of the Gulf is concerned, unlike the 
ICJ, Oda was o f the view that due to geographical location of Honduras, it cannot lay claim over the 
territorial sea, the EEZ, and the continental shelf outside the closing line. He, however, emphasised 
that “Honduras is fully guaranteed access to the high seas of the Pacific Ocean outside the Gulf of 
Fonseca by the unchallenged concept o f innocent passage through the territorial seas o f the two 
neighbouring States both within and without the Gulf “ (<emphasis added) Ibid. Although Honduras 
has its own EEZ on the Atlantic coast, Oda does not exclude the possibility o f considering it as a 
geographically disadvantaged State in the Pacific side to participate in the exploitation o f surplus of 
living resources in the EEZs o f El Salvador and Nicaragua under the provisions o f the LOSC (Art. 
69(1), A rt 70(1), and Art. 70(2)). Ibid., p.761.
113Oppenheim, L., International Law, 3rd ed., London, 1920, para.192, no.4.
114Brown op. cit., 1994, p.31. Brown is in the opinion that “[u]nder international customary law (and, 
it would seem, under the two Conventions, since they qualify neither the normal baseline rule nor the 
bays rule in this respect), the presumption must be that the normal baseline rule applies. Although 
one such bay, the G ulf o f Fonseca, has been recognised as an exception to this rule, it was on the 
basis that it constituted a historic bay.” Ibid.
H 5f r i  Reports, 1992, p.598
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There seem to be no other multi-State bays which have the same 
circumstances as the case of the Gulf of Fonseca. Accordingly, the 
exceptional case of the Gulf of Fonseca should not be taken into account 
as a precedent for other multi-State bays.116 This is particularly due to the 
impact of such claims on the free seas. Although the rights of navigation 
were guaranteed in the whole area of the Gulf of Fonseca in accordance 
with the concept of innocent passage, there may be no guarantee that new 
claims on the enclosure of multi-State bays do not make the rights of 
navigation subject to more restrictive rules.
VIII. Conclusion
The law of the sea has not yet codified any rules on the issue of 
multi-State bays. This has, in turn, resulted in uncertainty as to whether 
the determination of the status of waters within these bays should be left 
to the littoral States concerned, or whether there should be international 
rules for delimitation of these bays. In particular, there has been a debate 
on the establishment of a balance between the exclusive rights of States 
bordering multi-Stare bays and the inclusive rights of international 
community. In addition, the scope of rights of littoral States surrounding 
multi-State bays have been subject to extensive debate. The main issue 
has been the status of navigation through waters within multi-State bays, 
whether by ships belonging to the littoral State not located at the entrance, 
or by foreign ships.
The prevailing trend is that multi-States bays may not be enclosed 
and claimed as internal waters. In fact, the status of their waters is 
determined by their size; whether they are wider than double the breadth 
of the territorial sea (24 nautical miles) or not. The waters of multi-State 
bays are subject to the legal regime of the territorial sea if they are 
wholly covered by territorial seas of littoral States. If they are wider 
than 24 nautical miles, they may also include the EEZs and the high 
seas.117 Accordingly, the rights of navigation, whether for littoral States
116It appears that Churchill and Lowe are o f the view that it is still possible for certain multi-State bays 
to be claimed as historic as they write that [exceptionally it may be possible for the riparian States to 
show that the position is different by reason o f historic title”, even though they only refer to the case 
o f the G ulf o f  Fonseca as an example. Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.33. This view is, however, 
questionable under the general rules of international customary law governing historic bays and waters.
117Multi-State bays also contain internal waters behind the low water mark along the coast or behind 
straight baselines, if  certain circumstances exist along the coast to justify the use o f strait baselines.
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of multi-State bays or for foreign ships, are guaranteed under the 
concepts of innocent passage or freedom of navigation under the legal 
regimes of the EEZ and the high seas.
Chapter Five








In the framework of the law of the sea, there are two main categories 
of archipelagos1: coastal archipelagos (adjacent archipelagos) and mid­
ocean archipelagos (outlying or oceanic archipelagos).2 These archipelagos 
have similar geographical definition since both are composed of groups of 
islands. The only physical difference between them is mainly related to 
their geographical location. While coastal archipelagos are situated in 
close distance to coastlines of mainlands, mid-ocean archipelagos are not 
groups of fringing islands and are mainly far away from mainlands 
spreading out over vast areas of the seas and oceans. As Evensen (1957) 
pointed out “geographical characteristics of all these archipelagos vary 
widely”.3 Evensen considering an archipelago as a formation of two or 
more islands (islets or rocks) writes that:
(archipelagos) vary as to the number and size of the islands and islets 
as well as with regard to the size, shape and position of the 
archipelagos. In some archipelagos the islands and islets are clustered 
together in a compact group while others are spread out over great 
areas of water. Sometimes they consist of a string of islands, islets 
and rocks forming a fence or rampart for the mainland against the 
ocean. In other cases they protrude from the mainland out into the sea 
like a peninsula or a cape, like the Cuban Cays or the Kays of 
Florida.4
lThe word “archipelago” is stated to have originated from the Greek term “aegeon pelagos” which means 
a sea studded with islands. The Aegean Sea has derived from this term. Kwiatkowska, Barbara, and 
Etty R. Agoes, Archipelagic State Regime in the light of the 1982 UNCLOS and State Practis e, 
Netherlands Cooperation with Indonesia in Legal Matters, Bandung, April 1991, p.61, no.2.
2In addition, there are island States which are not archipelagic States but have used straight baseline 
system to link smaller islands to their principal island. Examples o f these island States are Madagascar 
and Iceland. O ’Connell, D. P., The International I^w  of the Sea. V ol.l, Edited by: I. A. Shearer, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1982, p.236. One question then arises as to what the difference is between an 
island State and a mid-ocean archipelago from geographical perspective. The difference is, from a 
geographical point o f view, merely one o f degree: the comparison is between a principal island and its 
satellites, and a number of islands o f similar size which form a group”. Ibid.
3Evensen Jens, ‘Certain Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation o f the Territorial Waters of 
Archipelagos’, UN Doc. A/CONF/13/18, Preparatory Document No.15, in UNCLOS L Official Records, 
V o l.l, 1958, pp.289-302, at 290. (Hereinafter Preparatory Document No.15)
4Ibid.
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Therefore, the geographical distinction of coastal archipelagos and 
mid-ocean archipelagos can be better understood by the definitions of these 
notions as introduced by Evensen. While coastal archipelagos are “those 
situated so close to a mainland that they may reasonably be considered part 
and parcel thereof’, mid-ocean archipelagos are “groups of islands situated 
out in the ocean at such a distance from the coasts of firm land as to be 
considered as an independent whole rather than forming part of or outer 
coastline of the mainland”.5 Meanwhile, it is argued that with respect to 
outlying archipelagos, it is the factor of adjacency which plays an 
important role and ‘if the islands, islets, or rocks are located a considerable 
distance from one another, then the inter-island waters are hardly 
“adjacent” to the land.’6 Despite their literally geographical similarity, 
coastal and mid-ocean archipelagos are legally treated differently and there 
are special legal regimes for them.
Although the issue of the coastal archipelagos was dealt with by the 
ICJ in the Fisheries Case (1951), there was no reference to the issue of the 
mid-ocean archipelagos in this case.7 As a general rule incorporated into 
the LOSC, the baseline of islands located in the oceans (in all areas of the 
seas not in vicinity of coasts) is drawn in a manner similar to the coasts of 
mainlands.8 In parts of the coast of these islands where the coastline is 
smooth and straight, the low-water mark is the recognised baseline. 
However, if there is a true bay in the coast of these islands, the closing 
lines can be drawn across the mouth of these bays in accordance with 
provisions of Article 10 of the LOSC (Article 7 of the TSC) on the
5Ibid. Evensen (1957) gave some examples o f these archipelagos. For example, the coasts o f Finland, 
Greenland, Iceland., Sweden, Yugoslavia, Alaska, and Canada were mentioned as those containing 
coastal archipelagos. As regards the mid-ocean archipelagos, the Faeroes, Fiji Islands, Galapagos, 
Hawaiian Islands, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Solomon Islands, and the Svalbard archipelago were 
given as instances. Ibid., pp.290-291. It should be noted that the new law of the sea has established 
rules that prevent some States from employing archipelagic principles. This means that such 
archipelagos (whether part o f a continental State or an island State) as Japan, Hawaiian Islands, the 
Faeroes, Galapagos are not legally considered as archipelagos to be subject to special legal regime for 
mid-ocean archipelagos.
6Hodgson, R. D., and L. M. Alexander, Towards an Objective Analysis of Special Cuvtmistflnces - Bays, 
Rivers. Coastal and Oceanic Archipelagos and Atolls, Occasional Paper No. 13, Law o f the Sea Institute, 
University o f Rhode Island, Rhode Island, April 1972, p.45.
7The reason for the lack o f provisions for mid-ocean archipelagos in the classical international law rests 
on the fact that “traditional international law of the sea, both customary and codified, was designed to 
deal with [maritime spaces of] continental masses, not with groups of mid-ocean archipelagos. Anand, 
R P ., ‘Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in International Law: Theory and Practice , Indian Journal Qf
jfltpmational Law. V o l.1 9 ,1979, p.228.
8Article 121(2) o f the LOSC provides that ”... the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf o f an island are determined in accordance with provisions of 
this Convention applicable to other land territory”. (emphasis added)
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enclosure of juridical bays. Other geographical features located around 
coastlines of islands will also be treated in the same manner as the coasts of 
mainlands for the purpose of drawing baselines. In addition, it appears that 
straight baselines might be drawn with respect to those parts of the islands 
which are deeply indented. Although islands with irregular coastlines 
might be qualified for the application of straight baselines, there has been a 
question as to whether these islands could be connected by straight lines. 
This question is particularly related to those islands forming mid-ocean 
archipelagos. Although there are some States consisting only of mid-ocean 
islands, there are other States which possess mainland as well as mid-ocean 
islands. This fact raised a question that if special provisions were to be 
accepted for the baselines of mid-oceans archipelagos whether these 
provisions could be applied to all mid-ocean archipelagos or only to those 
which constitute the whole territory of a State (known as an archipelagic 
State).
II. Historical Background and Development of 
the Issue of Mid-Ocean Archipelagos
An historical examination of the problem of groups of islands 
located in the oceans shows that different aspects of these islands were 
considered in the gradual process of developing the concept of the mid­
ocean archipelago (which was first known as a group of islands). Aspects 
such as unity of these groups of islands and the sovereignty of island States 
constituted the initial concerns over scattered islands in the seas.
One of the classic examples of claims over waters within outlying 
islands can be found in the history of the Kingdom of Hawaii with respect 
to the Hawaiian Islands. It was in 1846 that King Kamehameha III claimed 
its authority over the component islands and over their territorial waters up 
to one marine league (three nautical miles).9 It was also declared that:
The marine jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Islands shall also be 
exclusive in all the channels passing between the respective islands
9 Another example is the Royal Proclamation o f Tonga which was issued by King Tubou I in 1887. This 
proclamation included “all islands, rocks, reefs, foreshores and waters’ within defined co-ordinates as 
part o f Tongan territory. Bowett, D. W., The Legal Regime o f Islands in International Law. Dobbs 
Ferry, New York, 1979, Ch.4 (Archipelagos), p.95.
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and dividing them, which shall extend from Island to Island.10 (See  
M ap 5.1 below.)
Map 5.1
The enclosure of waters within the Hawaiian Islands based on 
the Proclamation of the King of Hawaii on 16 May 1854
Source: Francalanci, G. and T. Scovazzi, Lines in the Sea. Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers,, Dordrecht, 1994, p.9.
In addition, it was in the nineteenth century that the issue of 
sovereignty over “clusters of coastal reefs and cays” was addressed. The 
issue was particularly raised with respect to “the cays of Florida and Cuba 
and the reefs and banks of the Bahamas and Bermuda”.11 The main trend 
towards these scattered islands and geographical features was to develop 
the concept of unity which could only be guaranteed by linking islands 
together.
Further, the first indications of an understanding of the special 
characteristics of mid-ocean archipelagos can be found in some treaties in 
early this century and in some international bodies since the 1920s. For 
example, the Treaty of 1902 on the Faeroe Islands between Denmark and
10Schmitt, Robert E. et al, The Hawaiian Archipelago: Defining the Boundaries o f the State, Working 
Paper No.16, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1975, p.63. The 1846 Act was confirmed by the 1950 
Privy Council Resolution and the 1984 and 1977 Neutrality Declarations of the King o f Hawaii. Ibid., 
p.66. In 1964, the USA took the position that the component islands o f Hawaii have their own 
territorial sea expressing that the waters beyond these territorial seas are the high seas. Ibid., p.64. 
Further, in the same year (1964), the issue of the legal nature of the waters between the Hawaiian 
Islands was subject o f a judicial decision by a Court of Appeals. In the case of Island Airlines v. Civil 
Aeronautics Board, the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit Court rejected the archipelagic status for 
the Hawaiian Islands on the ground that the recognition of the Islands as an archipelago would lead to 
encroachment upon large areas o f the high seas. O’Connell, D. P., ‘Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in 
International Law’, BYIL. V o l.4 5 ,1971, pp.1-77, at 45.
n O’C onnell, op. cit., 1982, pp.237-238. See also O’Connell, op. cit., 1971, p.2.
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Britain, the 1920 Treaty of Paris on the Spitsbergen Islands, and the 
Convention of October 20,1921 on the Aaland Islands situated in the Baltic 
dealt with groups of Islands ("the mid- ocean islands").12 These agreements 
recognised the special characteristic of the group of islands as independent 
units. Although they were related to sovereignty and fishery matters, they 
did not contain any reference to application of a particular baseline for the 
group of islands.13
This historical background indicates that the initial concerns on mid­
ocean archipelagos were related to the baselines and the territorial seas of 
these archipelagos. Non-governmental organisations did not deal with 
other aspects concerning mid-ocean archipelagos, such as the issues of 
sovereignty of archipelagic states and navigation through and within these 
archipelagos. These issues were left to be resolved when the concepts of 
“mid-ocean archipelagos” and “archipelagic States” were developed and 
recognised.
1. International Institutions and the 
Issue of Mid-Ocean Archipelagos
The issue of mid-ocean archipelagos formed one of the bases of 
academic discussion in non-governmental organisations such as the 
International Law Association, the American Institute of International Law, 
and the Institute of International Law (the Institut de Droit International) 
since 1920s. The discussion on the issue of mid-ocean archipelagos then 
was addressed by governmental forums but was not finalised until the 
UNCLOS III. The following is an overview of the efforts made by the 
learned societies to tackle the issues related to groups of islands.
A. In s titu t d e  D ro it In tern a tio n a l
The first discussion on the problem of territorial sea of the 
archipelagos was undertaken within the Institut de Droit International 
(French Institute of International Law) at its Hamburg meeting in 1889, 
nearly one century before the resolution of the issue in the UNCLOS III
12Dallmeyer, Dorinda G., and Louis De Vorsey, Jr., Rights to Oceanic Resources; Deciding and Drawing 
M aritime Boundaries. M. Nijhoff, Dodrecht, 1989, pp.129-130.
13For classical history o f the issue o f mid-ocean archipelagos (particularly in nineteenth century) see 
O’C onnell, op. cit., 1971, pp.1-4.
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and inclusion of Part IV (Archipelagic States) into the LOSC. However, 
the first studies were focused on the territorial sea of the archipelagos 
belonging to coastal States. No provision was proposed for States which 
entirely consisted of a series of islands, that is to say archipelagic States. It 
was in this context that in 1927 the Fifth Committee of the Institut 
presented its proposal for the group of islands belonging to a costal State 
as follows:
Where a group o f islands belongs to one coastal State and where the 
islands o f the periphery o f the group are not further apart from each 
other than the double breadth of the marginal sea (now territorial sea), 
this group shall be considered a whole and the extent o f the marginal 
sea shall be measured from a line drawn between the uttermost parts 
o f the islands.14 (unofficial translation)
The proposal was that the maximum distance between islands had to 
be equal to double breadth of the territorial sea, if a group of islands was to 
be qualified for the rule incorporated into the proposal. However, it was 
not clear what was the recognised breadth of territorial sea. As far as the 
Institut was concerned, at the time of proposal, the limit of six nautical 
miles was accepted for the territorial sea. Although the special treatment 
for the archipelagos described in the proposal was apparent, even general 
recognition of the rule would not be sufficient for uniform implementation 
of the proposal. This is because the uniform implementation of the 
proposal would depend upon the international resolution of the issue of the 
breadth of territorial sea, which was not resolved until the UNCLOS III.
It was in 1928 (the Stockholm Conference), that is only within one 
year after the first proposal, that the Institut introduced a reviewed formula 
for the mid-ocean archipelagos belonging to continental States. At the 
Stockholm Conference, a relative majority was in favour of the three 
nautical mile limit against the six nautical mile limit for the territorial sea. 
The new proposal was stricter than the first one as it reads:
W here archipelagos are concerned, the extent of the marginal sea 
shall be measured from the outermost islands or islets provided that 
the archipelago is composed o f islands and islets not further apart 
from each other than twice the breadth o f the marginal sea and also 
provided that the islands and islets nearest to the coast o f the 
mainland are not situated further out than twice the breadths o f the 
marginal sea.15 (unofficial translation)
14Evensen, Preparatory Document No. 15, op. cit., 1958, p.291.
l5Ibid.
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B. International Law Association
The initial discussion about the territorial sea of archipelagos in the 
International Law Association (ILA) dates back to 1892 (15th Conference, 
Genoa) when the report submitted to the Institut de Droit International 
constituted the core of primary discussion on the issue.16 This discussion 
was followed at the 1895 Brussels Conference17 and later in the 1912 Paris 
Conference18. In the 1924 Stockholm Conference of the ILA, two draft 
articles were prepared by the “Neutrality Committee” and by Professor 
Alvarez (who played the role of the Chairman for the Committee). The 
Committee’s draft articles - The Laws of Maritime Jurisdiction in Time of 
Peace , did not provide any provision on the territorial sea of archipelagos. 
However, Professor Alvarez (a Chilean jurist) addressed the issue in his 
separate draft articles. He was of the view that groups of islands which 
constitute an economic and political entity should be considered as a group 
for the purpose of the demarcation of their territorial waters.19 Article 5 of 
his draft articles was devoted to islands and archipelagos:
As to islands situated outside or at the outer limit of a State’s 
territorial waters, a special zone of territorial waters shall be drawn 
around such islands according to the rules contained in article 4 
(where it was mentioned that the breadth of the marginal sea was six 
nautical miles from low-water mark).
Where there are archipelagos the islands thereof shall be considered a 
whole, and the extent of the territorial waters laid down in article 4 
shall be measured from the islands situated most distant from the
centre of the archipelago.20 (unofficia l transla tion)
Although the issue of archipelagos once again was discussed in the 
1926 Vienna Conference in the context of the starting line of the territorial 
sea, the consequent draft convention prepared by the ILA did not include 
any provision on the issue.21
16see Report o f the 15th Conference o f the ILA, Genoa, 1892, pp.182 et seq.
H gee Report o f the 17th Conference o f the ILA. Brussels, 1895, pp.102 et seq.
18see Report o f the 27th Conference o f the ILA. Paris, 1912.
19Dupuy, Rene-Jean, ‘The Sea Under National Competence’, in Rene-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes, A 
pfanHhook on the New Law o f the Sea. V o l.l, Ch.5, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dodrecht, 1991,
p.270.
20Evensen, Preparatory Document No. 15, op. cit., 1958, p.291.
21see ppport o f the 34th Conference o f the ILA. Vienna, 1926, pp.40 et seq.
220
C. American Institute of International Law
As part of its project No. 10 (National Domain), the American 
Institute of International Law (AIIL) addressed the issue of archipelagos. 
In Article 7 of the project, it is stated:
In case of an archipelago, the islands and keys composing it shall be 
considered as forming a unit and the extent of territorial waters 
referred in article 5 shall be measured from the islands farthest from 
the centre of the Archipelago.22 23
Unlike the 1927 proposal of the Institut de Droit International, the 
above article does not contain any clause to limit its application to only 
archipelagos belonging to coastal States. This might be considered that in 
the view of the AIIL the rule included into Article 7 could be applied to 
mid-ocean archipelagos. However, no reference was made to maximum 
permissible distance between islands within archipelagos.
D. The Harvard Research in International Law
In 1929, the Harvard Research in International Law prepared a draft 
convention on territorial waters. This draft convention did not, however, 
suggest any rule for the purpose of delimitation of the territorial sea of 
archipelagos. The only reference to the issue was in the comments made to 
Article 7 of the draft convention which provided that the territorial sea of 
an island (three mile limit) would be measured in the same manner as the 
mainland. In relation to islands and archipelagos, the Harvard Research 
comment on Article 7 was as follows.
In any situation where islands are within six miles of each other the 
marginal sea will form one extended zone. No different rule should 
be established for groups of islands or archipelagos except i f  the outer 
fringe o f islands is sufficiently close to form  one complete belt o f  
marginal seas?53 (emphasis added)
22a j il . Special Supplement 20,1926, pp.318-319.
23AXIL, Special Supplement 23,1929, pp.241-276.
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2. The 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification 
of International Law24
The views of governments submitted to the Preparatory Committee 
of the 1930 Hague Conference showed that there existed no uniform 
approach towards the issue of baselines for islands and groups of islands.25 
There was no dispute that islands can have their own territorial waters but 
two questions needed discussion.
The first question was where a number of islands are close to each 
other or to the mainland, what principle governs the baselines for territorial 
waters. Some States argued that territorial waters of islands had to be 
established in “ordinary way.” Others argued that where the islands or the 
islands and the mainland are sufficiently near each other, they form a unit 
on the basis of geographical facts and “[their] territorial waters must be 
determined by reference to the unit and not separately for each island; there 
will thus be a single belt of territorial waters”.26
The second question was what the legal status of waters between a 
group islands or between the island and the mainland would be, if they 
would be considered as a unit. There were two different opinions in this 
regard. Some States asserted that the waters have the legal status of inland 
water. However, the majority of governments considered the waters are 
territorial waters and subject to rules for the legal regime of territorial 
waters.27 It is evident that “[t]he first opinion [was] based on the interests
24The issue o f archipelagos was also addressed by Schucking (German jurist), who was a member o f the 
Committee o f Experts. In his view, archipelagos were to be considered as a whole and their territorial 
waters were to be measured from “the islands most distant from the centre o f the archipelago.” See 
League o f Nations Document C-196. M -7 0 .1927. V.. p.72. See also AJIL, Special Supplement No.20, 
1926, p.142. As an initial proposal, the Expert Committee o f the 1930 Conference proposed that mid­
ocean archipelagos be considered as independent units. This proposal faced different reactions. Some 
States did not recognise the unity characteristic of mid-ocean archipelagos. The United Kingdom and 
the United States of America rejected the application of straight baselines around the mid-ocean. Some 
States adopted the unity o f these archipelagos but proposed that the distance between islands should be 
limited. Others considered that if  geographical characteristics make it appropriate to treat mid-ocean 
archipelagos as units, there should not be any maximum distance restriction between islands. These 
divergent opinions demonstrate that, at the 1930 Conference, the issue o f mid-ocean archipelagos was 
very controversial and there was no uniform approach on this issue. Amerasinghe, C. F., ‘The Problem 
o f Archipelagos in the International Law of the Sea’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol.23, Part 3, July 1974, p.541.
25Observations to the Basis o f Discussion No.12, in Rosenne, Shabtai (ed.), League Qf Nations 
Conference for the Codification o f International Law \19301. Vol.2, Oceana Publications INC., Dobbs 




of the coastal State; the second [was] more favourable to freedom of 
navigation.”28
The final text put forward for the discussion in the 1930 Hague 
Conference was a formula which indicated a compromise of different 
views as to the issue of baselines of islands and the legal nature of waters 
surrounded by these baselines. The Preparatory Committee suggested that 
the following formula to form the basis of discussion among participants 
on the issue. It proposed that:
In case of a group of islands which belong to a single State and at the 
circumference of the group are not separated from one another by 
more than twice the breadth of the territorial waters, the belt of 
territorial waters shall be measured from the outermost islands of the 
group. Waters included within the group shall also be territorial 
waters.
The same rule shall apply as regards islands which lie at a distance 
from the mainland not greater than twice the breadth of territorial 
waters.29
The compromise formula recognised the concepts of coastal and 
mid-ocean archipelagos, but this recognition was limited to those satisfying 
the requirement of interconnection. Accordingly, those groups of islands 
separated by a distance more than “twice limit of territorial waters” were 
not eligible to be considered as a unit. The formula also raised a question 
as to what would be the limit of “twice the breadth of territorial waters”. 
This question was part of a general discus on the issue of the maximum 
permissible breadth for the territorial sea, for which the 1930 Hague 
Conference provided no resolution. Although the Second Sub-Committee 
of the 1930 Hague Conference deal with, among others, the issue of 
territorial waters of archipelagos, it was not able to introduce any concrete 
solution for the problem, and it finally decided not to draft any provision 
on the issue. In its Report No. n, the Second Sub-Committee only defined 
the concept “island” and confirmed that each island can create its own 
territorial waters. The Report did not propose a provision on the baseline 
issue of groups of islands and the matter was not discussed in the plenary 
meetings of the conference. However, the following “Observations with 




With regard to a group of islands (archipelago) and islands situated 
along the coast, the majority of the Sub-Committee was of opinion 
that a distance of 10 miles should be adopted as a basis for measuring 
the territorial sea outward in the direction of the high sea. Owing to 
the lack of technical details, however, the idea of drafting a definite 
text on this subject had to be abandoned. The Sub-Committee did not 
express any opinion with regard to the nature of waters included 
within the group.30
Although the 1930 Hague Conference was not successful in 
advancing rules governing groups of islands (archipelagos), the main 
failure of the conference was its inability to develop a convention which 
could contain established rules on the law of territorial waters. As far as the 
issue of groups of islands were concerned, the conference’s efforts were 
focused on those groups of islands belonging to “a single State”. This term 
can be extended to continental States as well as those which are now 
known as archipelagic States. However, it does not seem that the idea of 
archipelagic States had any merits at the time of the 1930 Hague 
Conference. This means that the term “a single State” was used to refer to 
a continental State which enjoyed sovereignty over a group of islands 
located quite far away from the mainland and could not be considered as 
part of the mainland. Notwithstanding, the modern rules on the law of 
archipelagos were established to govern States made up wholly of one or 
more archipelagos. The same rules do not apply to the mid-ocean 
archipelagos of continental States. In addition, the use of word ’’single” 
was to exclude the situation where several States claimed sovereignty over 
islands in an archipelagic formation.
3. International Law Commission
In the ILC, the issue of baselines of islands and a group of islands 
was discussed as part of general discussion on various legal aspects of the 
territorial sea. As its Special Rapporteur, Professor J. P. A. Francois (who 
also worked as the Rapporteur for the Second Committee (Territorial Sea) 
of the 1930 Hague Conference) prepared a set of three reports on “The 
Legal Regime of the Territorial Sea”. The first report (4 April 1952)3* and 
the second report (19 February 1953)32, inter alia, included draft provisions
30Report o f Sub-Committee No.II, in Rosenne, Vol.3, op. cit., p.835.
31Document A/CN.4/53 (in French), YILC Vol.II, 1952, pp.25-43.
^D ocum ent A/CN.4/61 (in French), YILC, Vol.II, 1953, pp.57-75.
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on the issue of islands and a group of islands located along the coast33, and 
also contained a provision on isolated islands.34 However, his third report 
(4 February 1954)35 was of more relevance to the issue of outlying 
archipelagos since it introduced a set of principles for baselines and 
territorial sea of these archipelagos. Draft Article 12 (Groups of Islands) in 
the third report provided that:
1. The term ‘groups of islands’, in juridical sense, shall be determined 
to mean three or more islands enclosing a portion of the sea when 
joined by straight lines not exceeding five miles in length, except that 
one such line may extend to a maximum of ten miles.
2. The straight lines specified in the preceding paragraph shall be the 
baselines for measuring the territorial sea. Waters lying within the 
area bounded by such lines and the islands themselves shall be 
considered as inland waters.
3. a group of islands may likewise be formed by a string of islands 
taken together with a portion of the mainland coastline. The rules set 
forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall apply p a r i  p a ssu .36
For the purpose of enclosing outlying archipelagos by special 
baselines, the above draft article (para.l) developed certain criteria in 
identifying a group of islands as an outlying archipelago in a legal sense. It 
required that the following criteria had to be met before application of an 
archipelagic straight baseline system:
( a )  the group of island had to be formed by at least three constituent 
islands; and
(b) the maximum distance between islands had to be five miles, except in 
one case where the maximum distance could be ten miles.
The second criterion limited the length of straight lines. It also 
limited the maximum distance between constituent islands. Although the 
draft article laid down limitations on the length of straight base lines of the
33For example see Articles 5(2) (where Francois considered the enclosed waters as inland waters) and 10 
o f the first report.
34For example Article 9 of the second report provided that each island can have its own territorial sea. 
According to this Article, an island is and area of land which is surrounded by water and is 
permanently above water at high water mark. This is the same provision adopted by the Second Sub­
committee o f the 1930 Hague Conference. See Report of Sub-Committee No.II, in Rosenne, Vol.3, 
0p  cit f p.835. Draft Article 10 of the ILC provided similar provision on the territorial sea of islands. 
YILC. Vol.II, 1956, p.270.
35Document A/CN.4/77 (in French), YILC. Vol.II, 1954, pp.1-7.
36English Version of Draft Article 12, in Evensen, Preparatory Document No.15, op. cit., p.293.
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archipelagos, it did not provide any restriction as to the maximum 
permissible number of these baselines. As Francois proposed (para. 2), the 
legal status of waters enclosed by the straight lines would be subject to the 
legal regime of inland waters.
In the Commentary on its Draft Article 10 for the UNCLOS I on the 
territorial sea of islands, the ILC relied on the same difficulties that the 
1930 Hague Conference faced to justify the lack of any draft provision on 
the delimitation of archipelagos. As regards groups of islands, the ILC 
commented that:
Like the Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law 
of 1930, the Commission was unable to overcome the difficulties 
involved. The problem is singularly complicated by the different 
forms it takes in different archipelagos. The Commission was 
prevented from stating an opinion, not only by disagreement on the 
breadth of the territorial sea, but also by lack of technical information 
on the subject... 37
Although the draft articles prepared by the ILC for the UNCLOS I 
contained no provision on mid-ocean archipelagos, the issue of coastal 
archipelagos was adequately dealt with (as was discussed in relation to the 
straight baselines). Despite the lack of any provision on the issue of 
delimitation of archipelagos in the draft articles of the ILC, a study (which 
was undertaken in 1957) addressed the issue. The study was on the issue 
of archipelagos: Certain Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation of the 
Territorial Waters of Archipelagos.3* This study was undertaken by the 
Norwegian Jurist Jens Evensen (the 1957 Preparatory Document on the 
Issue of Archipelagos). The study examined the works of international 
bodies and jurists, State practice in relation to coastal and outlying (mid­
ocean) archipelagos, and the ICJ’s decision in the 1951 Fisheries Case.39 
Since the study presents an overview of the issue on the eve of the 
UNCLOS I, it would be useful to examine the findings of the study. This 
would assist to understand the main issues existed in relation to mid-ocean 
archipelagos at the time of the UNCLOS L
37Commentary o f Draft Article 10 (paras 3 & 4), Report o f the ILC on Its Eighth Session (23 April - 4 
July 1956), Doc. No.9 (A/1319), YILC. Vol.n, 1956, p.270.
38Evensen, Preparatory Document No.15, op. cit., pp.289-302.
39The study was ready at the time o f UNCLOS I as a “Preparatory Document” and could be a basis for 
codification o f some provisions on the issue of mid-ocean archipelagos. It seems, however, that the 
time was not yet ripe for inclusion of special rules on mid-ocean archipelagos into an international 
agreement.
226
4. The 1957 Preparatory Document on the Issue of Archipelagos
The purpose of preparing the 1957 Preparatory Document was to 
present the existing trends and practices over the issues of the baselines and 
territorial seas of archipelagos, whether coastal or mid-ocean archipelagos. 
At the time of the preparation of his study on the issue of archipelagos 
(1957), Evensen reached a conclusion that there were no “hard and fast 
rules” to govern the delimitation of territorial waters of archipelagos.40 
This was attributed to the fact that State practice and international bodies 
presented “little or no guidance” on the governing principles of 
international law in relation to the territorial waters of archipelagos 
(including mid-ocean archipelagos).41
Despite uncertainties in State Practice and in the work of 
international bodies towards the issue of the delimitation of mid-ocean 
archipelagos, Evensen held that “the only natural and practical solution” 
for the issue of the delimitation of the territorial waters of out-lying 
archipelagos is to consider them as a unit and then draw straight baselines 
around “the outermost points of the constituent islands, islets and rocks”.42 
Accordingly, he suggested that where a mid-ocean archipelago belongs to a 
single State, this archipelago “may reasonably be considered as a whole” 
and its territorial sea can be measured “from the outermost points of the 
outermost islands and islets of the archipelago”.43 While recognising such 
a baseline system for out-lying archipelagos, Evensen considered a number 
of criteria for proper establishment of such system as follows.44
(a) although a State concerned has discretion to draw the archipelagic 
straight baselines with due consideration to “practical needs and local 
requirements”, such delimitation would also have “international law 
aspects”;
40Ibid., p.301.
AlIbid., p.300. . . .
42Ibid., p.302. As far as outlying archipelagos were concerned, the study did not make a distinction 
between continental States and those wholly constituted by islands. This might imply that rules 
proposed for application to mid-ocean archipelagos might also extend to those belonging to continental 
States. As a consequent o f developments in the law of the sea, it is now argued that the established 




(b) the territorial sea created by the archipelagic straight baseline system 
should be more or less dependent upon “the land domain of the 
archipelago”;
(c) when viewed as a whole, the baselines applied to enclose the 
archipelagos “must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general 
direction of the coast of the archipelago”;
(d) although there was no maximum limit for the length of the baselines, 
the application of “exorbitantly long baseline, closing vast areas of sea to 
free navigation and fishing, was contrary to international law”45 (emphasis 
added);
(e) the legal status of the waters enclosed as internal waters generally 
depends on the close link between the land domain of the archipelago and 
the enclosed waters taking into account the geographical configuration of 
the archipelago, and also realising that each case should be examined 
individually with due attention to such factors as historical and economical; 
and
(f) where enclosed waters can be considered as internal waters and where 
they also contain a strait, these waters would be ‘subject to the rules of 
international law governing “straits” established for the benefit of free 
navigation and innocent passage of foreign ships'. (<emphasis added)
5. The Declarations of The Philippines and Indonesia46
In 1955 and 1957, the archipelagic States of the Philippines and 
Indonesia respectively announced for the first time their intention to
45It is argued that the inconsistency with international law in such cases is due to the fact that “there will 
not be a sufficiently close dependence between the land domain and the water areas concerned”. Ibid.
46Although the Philippines and Indonesia claimed a developed form of the archipelagic concept in the 
1950s, preliminary archipelagic claims can be traced back to the second half o f the nineteenth century. 
For example, following the 1854 Neutrality Proclamation of the Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands, 
Hawaii employed straight line connecting its constituent islands. See Whiteman, Maijorie, Digest Qf 
International Law. Vol.4, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1965, at p.277. Also, 
when the Fijian Islands came under the control of the UK through a treaty in 1874, the treaty included 
the coordinates defined for the land territory as well as waters and reefs. Marston, Geoffrey, 
‘International law and ”mid-ocean” archipelagos’, Armales d ’Etudes Internationales 1973, pp.177-178. 
Further, in 1887 the King of Tonga placed claims on land and water within a series o f defined 
coordinates. The Maidive Islands also claimed a territorial sea on the same ground. See Limits and 
Status o f  the Territorial Sea. Exclusive Economic Zones, Fishery Conservation Z ones a p lJhs 
Continental Shelf. Legal Office, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1975, p.9 & 13. In 
addition, the Philippine claim on historical title over its territorial waters is made on reliance on the 
1898 Paris Treaty, the 1900 Treaty between the USA and Spain, and the 1930 and 1932 Agreements 
between the USA and the UK which contain geographical coordinates for the areas o f waters. See 
Whiteman, op. cit., Vol.4, p.283. Although not being an archipelagic State, Ecuador has treated the 
Galapagos Islands as a unit since 1938 and has drawn straight baselines linking the outermost points of 
the outermost islands within the Galapagos Islands. Presidential Decrees o f 1938 and 1951, in ibid.,
p.276.
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enclose waters inside their archipelagos by drawing straight baselines 
around the archipelagos.47 Although the judgment of the ICJ in the 1951 
Fisheries Case related to the coasts where there are islands in their 
immediate vicinity, the claims of the Philippines and Indonesia were based 
on the I d ’s judgment and also on the view of the ILC, which suggested 
that special rules to be adopted for the baselines of oceanic archipelagos.48 
In its 1955 declaration (which also found its expression in the 1960 
Philippine Act), the Philippine government, inter alia, declared that:
all waters around, between and connecting the different islands 
belonging to the Philippine Archipelago49 irrespective of their widths 
or dimensions are necessary appurtenances of its land territory, 
forming an integral part of the national or inlands waters, subject to 
the exclusive sovereignty of the Philippines.50
Following the 1955 Declaration of the Philippines, the Indonesian 
government issued a declaration on 13 December 1957 (the Djuanda 
Declaration) for the same purpose.51 The basis of the declaration is made 
upon the “territorial unity” and upon the “protection of resources”. The
47The Philippines and Indonesia incorporated the content of their declarations of 1955 and 1957 in then- 
national legislation in 1960 and 1961 respectively. Churchill, R. R., and A. V . Lowe, The Law of the. 
Sea. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983, p.91. For an analysis of the 1960 baseline system 
o f The Philippines see Straight Baselines: Philippines, Limits in the Seas, No,32, Office of the 
Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State, Washington DC, 
1971. It should be noted that this analysis was made before the UNCLOS III where the concepts of 
archipelagic Stases and archipelagic baselines were adopted. Prescott writes that the use of 
archipelagic baselines by Indonesia and The Philippines “might well have served as a model for the 
rules contained in Article 47 (of the LOSC) which govern length of individual segments o f the 
archipelagic baselines and the permitted ratio o f water to land contained within the baselines”. 
Prescott, Victor, The South China Sea: Limits of National Claims, MIMA, Kuala Lumpur, 1996, pp.8-
9.
48Dupuy, op. cit., p.270-271. Brownlie maintains that it is arguable to consider that the use of 
archipelagic straight baselines is “only a further application, to special facts, of principles of unity and 
interdependence inherent in the Fisheries case.” Brownlie, Ian, Principles Qf Public International Law, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 193.
49The Philippine archipelago is composed of 7104 islands which are located on either side of a triangle 
formed by the three islands o f Luzon in the North, Palawan in the Southwest, and Mindanao in the 
Southeast Kwiatkowska and Agoes, op. cit., p.16.
50Note o f 12 December 1955, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Laws and RegulatlonS-Qn 
thP Regime o f t h P  Te rrito ria l Sea. United Nations Legislative and Administrative Series, Vol.6, 
ST/LEG/SER B/6, United Nations, New York, 1957, p.39. The declaration was in form of a note 
verbale dated 7 March 1955. This note verbale was issued by the Permanent Mission of the 
Philippines to the United Nations in response to the Secretary-General communication, LEG 292/WUl 
of 3 February 1955. See Document A/CN. 4/99 in YILC, VoL II, 1956, pp.69-70. Reproduced in the 
Philippines Yearbook of International Law, V o l.3 ,1974, pp. 168-170. The Philippines also for the first 
time proposed the “archipelagic notion” to the ILC in 1955. Tsangsubkul, Phiphaf ASEAN and M  
T aw of the Sea. Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1982, p.6
5 Government Declaration Concerning the Water Areas of Indonesia, 13 December 1957, reprinted in 
Syatauw J J. G., N p w I v  Established Asian States and the Development of International Uw_, 
Niihoff The Hague, 1961, pp.173-174. The Indonesian Declaration faced protests from Australia, 
France,' the UK, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the USA but Russia considered the 
Indonesian claim as consistent with international law. O’Connell, op. cit., 1971, p.39.
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declaration invalidated the “Territorial Sea and Maritime Districts 
Ordinance of 1939 (Official Gazzette, 1939, no. 442, Art.l, para.l)” which 
provided that each constituent island of Indonesia has its own territorial 
waters.52 Thus, the Indonesian Government declared that:
all waters surrounding, between and connecting the islands 
constituting the Indonesian state53, regardless of their extension or 
breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and 
therefore, parts of the internal or national waters which are under the 
exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian State. ... The delimitation of 
the territorial sea (the breadth of which is 12 miles) is measured from 
baselines connecting the outermost points of islands of Indonesia.54
The Indonesian Government stressed that its land, waters and people 
are inseparably linked to each other: “the survival of the Indonesian nation 
depended on the unity of these three elements.55 The Indonesian 
Government also asserted that Indonesian waters should not be considered 
"pockets of so called 'high seas', open to activities which might endanger
52Before the 1957 Declaration of the Indonesian government, Indonesia in particular and other regional 
countries followed the practice established by European colonial powers with respect to the use of the 
seas. Although the indigenous people o f the Pacific and Indian Oceans region had practised the 
concept o f freedom of the seas as a principle o f the Asian maritime law, the European influence over 
the region brought with itself the notion of mare clausum. This particularly was promoted by Portugal 
to prevent other European countries to have access to the East Indies. However, such approach over 
the seas was confronted by the Grotius’s theory of mare liberum which later found more support in the 
region and other parts of the world. The concept of mare liberum was the dominant approach over the 
seas in the region and maintained unchanged until the archipelagic state doctrine was introduced and 
followed by certain island States in the region, including Indonesia and the Philippines. For example, 
before the introduction of the doctrine Indonesia applied a three mile limit for the territorial waters of 
its constituent islands, which was measured from the high-tide lines. (Ordinance o f 18 April 1939 
Concerning the Territorial Sea and Maritime Domain) All waters beyond such a limit were regarded 
as the high seas. Draper, Jack A., ‘The Indonesian Archipelagic State Doctrine and Law of the Sea: 
“Territorial Grab” or Justifiable Necessity?’, International Lawyer, V o l.ll, N o .l, Winter 1977, p.145.
^Indonesia consists of 13,677 islands of which 6000 islands are inhibited from Sumatra in the west to 
Irian Jaya (western New Guinea) in the east Ibid., p.144.
54The Declaration also included that “[ijnnocent passage o f foreign ships in these internal waters is 
granted as long as it is not prejudicial to or [does not] violates the sovereignty and security of 
Indonesia.” See Syatauw, op. cit., pp.173-174. The declaration admitted the right of innocent passage 
in the newly established Indonesian internal waters provided that such a passage was not “prejudicial to 
or violates the sovereignty and security of Indonesia.”
55Wang, James C. F., Handbook on Ocean Politics & Law. Greenwood Press, New York, 1992, p.46. 
Although the Soviet Union supported the Indonesian claim, the ‘archipelago principle developed by 
Indonesia faced protests from maritime States with significant interest in free navigation, particularly in 
South East Asia (including Indonesia). These States included the United States, Great Britain, 
Australia, the Netherlands, and Japan. See Keesine’s Contemporary Archives, 1-8 March 1958, 
o 16043 Due to the importance of sea routes within archipelagos in the South East Asia for Australia 
and Japan, these States would be more affected by the enclosure o f archipelagic waters and the 
consequent system of unregulated control over navigation through these archipelagos.
230
the Country’s unity, security, and territorial integrity".56 The 1957 
Indonesian Declaration was followed by the 1960 Indonesian Act.57
At the time, these unilateral claims lacked any support on a legal 
basis and were necessitated on historical, geographical, economic, 
political, and security reasons.5* This was why these two States were 
seeking to achieve legal justification for their baseline system in United 
Nations conferences on the law of the sea.
6. The UNCLOS I and the Issue of Mid-Ocean Archipelagos
In the UNCLOS I (1958), the Philippines and Indonesia insisted on 
codification of special provisions for delimitation of mid-ocean 
archipelagos. They endeavoured to convince maritime powers that the 
drawing of straight baselines around their archipelagos is essential for 
preservation of the entity and unity of their archipelagos.59 During the 
UNCLOS I the Philippines suggested the following formula to be included 
in the works prepared by the ILC for the discussion:
The method of straight baselines shall also be applied to archipelagos, 
lying off the coast, whose component parts are sufficiently close to 
one another to form a component whole and have been historically 
considered collectively as a single unit. The baselines shall be drawn 
along the coast of the outermost islands, following the general 
configuration of the archipelago. The waters within such baselines 
shall be considered as internal waters.60
56Wang, op. cit., p.46. . . .  .
57‘Act Concerning Indonesian Waters’ (Act No.4), 18 February 1960. Reprinted in Straight Baselines. 
Indonesia, Limits in the Seas. No.35. Office o f the Geographer, Washington D.C., 1971, pp.1-2. The 
Act contains a preamble and four articles.
58Although economic motives were o f importance for archipelagic States in pursuing a new and special 
baseline system, the recognition o f the KHZ eliminated these motives. This led to the belief that the 
principal motives o f archipelagic States in enclosing waters within their constituent islands were 
security motives. In this connection, O’Connell (1982) writes that “the possibilities o f degradation of 
the freedom o f  passage have been enhanced because security interests tend to demand control o f  
shipping generally, while economic interests would tend towards the control o f only certain types o f 
vessels”. O ’Connell, op. cit., 1982, pp.236-237.
59Wang, op. cit., p.46. In fact, the 1957 Declaration of Indonesia which referred to the concept of 
“territorial unity” made clear that the position drawn in the declaration will be followed in the 1958 
Geneva International Conference on the Law of the Sea.
60U.N. D oc. A/CONF.13/C.1/L.98, UNCLOS I Official Records. Vol.HI (First Committee), 1958, p.239. 
A few other similar proposals on the issue o f the baselines o f groups o f islands were submitted to the 
UNCLOS III by Yugoslavia and Denmark but were finally withdrawn. The main reason for such 
withdrawal was the need for undertaking more studies on the issue. See U .N . D oc. 
A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L.59, UNCLOS I Official Records. Vol.III (First Committee), 1958, pp.162 (para.29), 
163 (paras.40-41), and 227. In a response to a Yugoslav proposal to extend the application o f straight 
baselines to groups o f  scattered islands, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice viewed that such application “would 
enclose huge areas o f water wholly out o f proportion with the land area.” Ibid., p.162 (para.38).
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The Indonesian delegate at the UNCLOS I also referred to several 
factors which required the Indonesian Government to proclaim the 
archipelagic concept. The Indonesian delegate stated:
Indonesia consists of some 13,000 islands scattered over a vast area.
To treat them as separate entities each with its own territorial waters, 
would create many serious problems. Apart from the fact that the 
exercise of state jurisdiction in such an area was a matter of great 
difficulty, there was the question of the maintenance of 
communication between the islands.
If each of Indonesia’s component islands were to have its own 
territorial sea, the exercise of more effective control would be made 
extremely difficult. Furthermore, in the event of an outbreak of 
hostilities, the use of modem means of destruction in the interjacent 
waters would have a disastrous effect on the population of the islands 
and on the living resources of the maritime areas concerned . This is 
why the Indonesian government believes that the seas between and 
around the islands should be considered as forming a whole with the 
land territory, and that the country’s territorial sea should be measured 
from baselines drawn between the outermost points of the outermost 
islands.61
The archipelagic concept was against the interests of those States 
which had essential benefits from maintaining the areas of the high seas as 
large as possible.62 In the UNCLOS I maritime powers argued that the 
drawing of straight baselines around the mid-ocean archipelagos would 
result in converting a large area of the high seas and waters of some straits 
into internal waters.63 They stated that such a result might mean that would 
be no right of navigation through waters inside the archipelagos, because 
there would not exist a right of navigation through internal waters. In 
particular, the representative of the United States expressed the following 
view on the issue.
If you lump islands into an archipelago and utilize a straight baseline 
system connecting the outermost points of such islands, and then draw 
a 12 mile area around the entire archipelago, you unilaterally attempt 
to convert into territorial waters or possibly even internal waters, vast
61Statement by the Indonesian delegate, Subargo, at the 15th meeting o f the First Committee o f the 
UNCLOS 1 ,14 March 1958.
62A s O ’Connell points out “if  the enclosure o f archipelago by means o f straight lines” was to be 
considered “as a particular application in unconventional circumstances o f the vaseline principle 
designed for complex continental coastlines” the maritime areas enclosed would be considered as 
internal waters and “the territorial sea drawn on the outer side o f the closing lines would then be the 
only area subjected to a right of innocent passage.” O’Connell, op. cit.y 1971, p.69.
63For example see UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol.III, 1958, p.25.
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areas of the high seas formerly free used for centuries by the ships of 
all countries.64
In response to these concerns, some proposals were submitted to 
maintain the right of international community to navigate through waters 
which would be enclosed by archipelagic straight baselines.65 These 
proposals included a right of innocent passage through the enclosed waters 
to ensure that the use of a new baseline system for mid-ocean archipelagos 
would not deprive international community of the right of peaceful 
passage. As one author writes that the right of innocent passage through 
the enclosed waters was suggested in line with the study undertaken by 
Evensen on the issue of archipelagos for the UNCLOS I.66 Although 
Evensen found that an outlying archipelago could be enclosed as a whole 
by the application of straight baselines around the archipelago and the 
enclosed waters could be described as internal waters, he emphasised that 
the right of innocent passage would apply within the archipelago where 
there is an international waterway. In his words,
where the waters of such an archipelago [an archipelago belonging to 
a single State] form a strait, it is in conformity with the prevailing 
rules of international law that such a strait cannot be closed to traffic 
[as there would be a right of innocent passage therein].67
The maritime powers did not consider that innocent passage, 
whether through a strait within an archipelago or through other parts of 
interisland-waters, is an adequate guarantee for navigation through waters 
within mid-ocean archipelagos. The UNCLOS I succeeded in reaching 
agreement on straight baselines for special geographical characteristics, 
including coastal archipelagos. However, disagreements on the legal status 
of waters within mid-ocean archipelagos prevented the UNCLOS I from 
obtaining adequate support for the establishment of a special legal regime 
for their delimitation. Since no compromise was made in the UNCLOS I
64In a press release during the UNCLOS I. Press Release No. 3 o f the United States Delegation, 11 
March 1958. Cited in Ngantcha, Francis, The Right o f Innocent Passage and the Evolution of. the 
International T aw of the Sea: The Current Regime of Tree’ Navigation in Coastal Waters of.Tfaffll 
States. Printer Publishers, London, 1992, p.37 (no. 147).
^ UNCLOS I. Official Records. Vol.IU, 1958, pp.172 et seq.
66Ngantcha, op. cit., p.27.
67Evensen, Preparatory Document No.15, op. cit., p.302. As regards to the question o f identifying a 
waterway as a strait, Evensen commented that “[w]here a water passage is to be considered a strait or 
not, must be decided in each specific case. Though no definition is universally accepted, a strait is 
usually defined as a water passage connecting two stretches o f open sea with the territorial waters o f a 
State”. Ibid. However, Evenson refers to the ICJ Judgement in the Corfu Channel Case where certain 
criteria were applied by the ICJ for definition o f a water way as an international strait
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on the issue of archipelagic straight baselines, the TSC does not contain 
any provision on mid-ocean archipelagos.68 Accordingly, the regime of 
islands was considered to be applicable to those islands located within a 
mid-ocean archipelago. The territorial sea and other maritime zones of 
every individual island were to be measured from low-water mark along 
the coast of the island or from a closing line in case of a well-marked 
indentation (juridical bays). This analysis is confirmed by the provision of 
Article 10(2) of the TSC which states “[t]he territorial sea of an island is 
measured in accordance with the provisions of these articles (that is the 
other articles of the TSC regarding the delimitation of the territorial sea of 
mainlands).” This is confirmed by the position of the UK Government in 
1958 when it maintained:
Article 10 of the Territorial Sea Convention gives each island its own 
territorial sea and affords no justification for the practice, in 
connection with archipelagos or group of islands, of joining them up 
by base-lines from which the territorial sea is measured in a seaward 
direction, all the waters behind the baselines and within the group of 
islands becoming internal waters.69
After the failure of the UNCLOS I to adopt provisions on mid-ocean 
archipelagos and in the eve of the UNCLOS II, Indonesia enacted 
legislation reflecting the notion of archipelagic baselines and treating 
waters enclosed thereby as national waters.70 The Indonesian Act, Act 
Concerning Indonesian Waters (Act No.4), was adopted on 18 February 
I960.71 The Act included the concepts introduced by the 1957 Indonesian 
declaration. It provided that the Indonesian waters are composed of its
68Evensen was o f the view that “in answering the question as to what rules of international law govern 
the concrete delimitation of the territorial waters of an archipelago”, such principles of international 
law as the rules “governing bays and fjords, the straight baseline system governing heavily indented 
coastlines, the rules governing international straits, the rules governing the territorial waters of isolated 
islands, (and) the principle o f the freedom of the seas ... must constantly be borne in mind”. Ibid., 
p.291.
69[British] Report on the First United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Mise. No.15 (1958), 
Cmnd. 584, p.7. Cited in Brown, E. D., The International Law of the Sea, Vol.l: Introductory Manual, 
Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1994, pp.102 and 124 (no.6).
70Due to the lack o f any special provision on the baselines limits o f the territorial sea o f mid-ocean 
archipelagos in the TSC, Indonesia did not sign or ratify this Convention while it ratified the other three 
1958 Geneva Conventions on the high seas, the continental shelf, and fishing and conservation of the 
living resources o f the high seas in late 1961 (Law No. 19 Concerning Ratification o f Three 1958 
Geneva Conventions on the Law o f the Sea, 6 September 1960). Draper, op. cit., p.147. Likewise, the 
Philippines did not become a party to the TSC. Bowett, op. cit., p.94. In addition, ocean States, in 
general, viewed the provision o f the TSC regarding separate territorial sea for each island as 
“destructive o f their integrity.” Anand, op. cit., p.229.
71For the text o f the Indonesian Act see Whiteman, op. cit., p.284. The Act was also reprinted in 
International Boundary Study. N o.35. Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
U.S. Department o f State, Washington D.C.
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territorial sea and the internal waters (Article 1(1)) and described the 
Indonesian internal waters as those waters lying within the straight 
baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands (Article 
1(3)).72 The Act also extended the territorial sea of Indonesia to 12 nautical 
miles (Article 1(2)). Article 3(1) of the Act guaranteed the right of 
innocent passage in Indonesian internal waters created by the application of 
the aforementioned straight lines, but added that such a passage shall be 
regulated by “Government Ordinance (Article 3(2)).”73
The archipelagic concept was again discussed in the UNCLOS II. 
However, there were no detailed discussions of the issues related to mid­
ocean archipelagos in the UNCLOS II and these issues were left 
unresolved.74 Pursuant to the failure of the UNCLOS II in achieving its 
objectives (determination of extents of the territorial sea and the fisheries 
zone) and the lack of adequate support for the concerns of archipelagic 
States, the Philippines also enacted its legislation, An Act to Define the 
Baselines o f the Territorial Sea of the Philippines, on 17 June 1961.75 
According to the Preamble of the 1961 Philippine Act, the waters between 
the Philippine Islands, “irrespective of their width or dimension”, were 
considered as “necessary appurtenances of the land territory”, thus 
“forming part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines”. This is 
reiterated in Section 2 of the Act which provides: “All waters within the 
(Philippines) baselines ... are considered inland or internal waters of the 
Philippines.”
72According to Article 1(2) o f the Act, in the case of straits whose width is less than 24 nautical miles 
and are not bordered only by Indonesian coasts, “the outer limit of the Indonesian territorial sea shall be 
drawn at the middle of the strait.”
73The Act provided that the right o f innocent passage of foreign ship was subject to prior notification. 
However, the Government Regulation N o.8 (1962) stated that “prior notification is not required if the 
right o f innocent passage is exercised through the designated sea lanes.” Wisnumurti, Nugroho, ‘Some 
Impacts o f the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea on Maritime Jurisdiction: An Indonesian 
Perspective’, in John P. Craven et al (eds.), The International Implications o f Extended Maritime 
Jurisdiction in the Pacific. Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute 
(3-6 August 1987, Honolulu), The Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, 1989, p.46.
74It is stated that the issue o f mid-ocean archipelagos was nor resolved at the UNCLOS I and the 
UNCLOS II, “owing to the continuing disagreement on the delimitation o f the breadth o f territorial 
waters in general”. Dupuy, op. cit., p.271. For the responses of the United States Government to the 
Philippine and Indonesian archipelagic claims see Whiteman, op. cit., Vol.4, pp.283-291.
75Republic Act No. 3046 o f 17 June 1961. An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea o f the 
Philippines, National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the 
Continental Shelf, the High Seas and to Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea. 
United Nations Legislatives Series, ST/ LEG/SER.B/15, United Nations, New York, April 1970, 
pp. 105-106. (Hereinafter UN Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/15) The Philippine baseline enclosed the Sulu 
Sea and such international straits as Surigao Strait, Sibutu Passage, Balabac Strait, and Mindoro Strait. 
Bowett, op. cit., p.94.
235
Relying on the Treaties of 10 December 1898 (Article III) and of 7 
November 1900 between the United States and Spain and the Treaty of 2 
January 1930 between the United States and Great Britain, the Act states 
that “the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is 
determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the 
outermost islands of the archipelago”.76 The Philippine baselines were 
defined under Section one of the Act which was amended by the Act of 18 
September 1968.77 Section 1 of the new Act provides that the Philippine 
baseline system is as defined in this Act.
7. The Issue of the Mid-Ocean Archipelagos and the UNCLOS III: 
Final Resolution of a Long-Standing Issue
The UNCLOS in was another opportunity for archipelagic States to 
insist on incorporating provisions on archipelagic straight baselines in the 
new Convention on the Law of the Sea.78 In the Conference, some other 
newly independent States (such as Fiji and Mauritius, Tonga, and the 
Bahamas) joined the Philippines and Indonesia and formed the archipelagic 
States group. The support given to the notion of archipelagic system was 
resulted from the emergence of a number of independent States in the 
period between the UNCLOS I and the UNCLOS III, some of which were 
States consisting entirely of islands or groups of islands. This led to the 
formation of a group with common interests, Le. the group of archipelagic 
States, in the UNCLOS IE.79 These States submitted a series of provisions 
on the notion of mid-ocean archipelagos as early as the 1973 Caracas
76Preamble o f the 1961 Act o f the Philippines, UN Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, op. cit., p.106.
77Republic Act No. 5446 o f 18 September 1968. An Act to Amend Section One o f the Republic Act 
Numbered Thirty Hundred and Forty Six, Entitled “An Act to Define the Baselines o f the Territorial 
Sea o f the Philippines”. UN Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/15, op. cit., p.106-111.
78In 1972, namely before the first session o f the UNCLOS III was held in Caracas, the four archipelagic 
States o f the Philippines, Indonesia, Fiji, and Mauritius organised a meeting in Manila to further a 
common stance in the UNCLOS III. Dupuy, op. cit., p.271. In 1973 these States issued a declaration 
containing archipelagic principles. The revised version of the declaration (particularly regarding the 
passage through archipelagic waters) was later submitted to the UNCLOS III. Burke, William T„ 
Contemporary Law of the Sea: Transportation. Communication and Flight. Occasional Paper Series 
No.28, Law of the Sea Institute, University o f Rhode Island, Kingston, 1975, p.6 .
79Brown writes that the existence o f four factors paved the way for adoption o f some provisions on the 
mid-ocean archipelagos in the UNCLOS III: (a) increase in the number o f independent archipelagic 
States and their concern for the inter-island integrity; (b) the sympathy o f developing countries with 
archipelagic States most o f which fell into category o f developing countries; (c) the existing escalation 
in territorial sea claims; and (d) reconsideration of right of navigation through territorial seas and 
international straits as a result o f international claims over territorial seas which consequently raised the 
question o f status o f mid-ocean archipelagos. Brown, E. D., Passage through the Territorial Sea. Straits 
TToprt for international Navigation and Archipelagos. University College, London, December 1973, 
p.34.
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session of the UNCLOS III which became the basis of discussion on the 
issue.80 In particular, Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines 
submitted a draft provisions on archipelagos to the UNCLOS III on 9 
August 1974.81 Most parts of the draft provisions were incorporated into 
Part IV (Archipelagic States) of the LOSC. This includes partial 
incorporation of Article 2(1) of the draft into Article 47(1) of the LOSC 
which provides that “[a]n archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic 
baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying 
reefs of the archipelago ...
As a consequence of the negotiations during the UNCLOS III, the 
parties concerned were prepared to make a compromise on a special regime 
for mid-ocean archipelagos. Maritime powers were prepared to accept the 
archipelagic baseline system (which was later called archipelagic baselines) 
if the rights of navigation and overflight through waters inside the 
archipelagos were guaranteed.82 In the view of maritime powers, such 
guarantees had to be extended to both commercial and government ships 
and aircraft.83 The involvement of competing interest groups over the issue
80For example see documents A/AC.138/SC.II/L.15 of 14 March 1973 (Reprinted in ILM, Vol.XII, 1973, 
pp.581 et seq) and A/AC.138/SC.II/L.48 on archipelagic principles which were submitted to the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses o f the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits o f National 
Jurisdiction in 1973. The principles were reflective o f the three main aspects o f the archipelagic 
concept: (a) recognition o f the right o f archipelagic States to draw special straight baselines termed as 
“archipelagic baselines”; (b) recognition o f sovereignty o f archipelagic States over archipelagic waters, 
the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof, and the superjacent airspace; and (c) recognition o f the right of 
innocent passage through archipelagic waters, including through designated sea-lanes.
8 * Draft Articles relating to Archipelagic States, Document A/CONF.62/C.2/L.49. UNCLOS IIL Official 
Records. Vol.II, p.226. See also ibid., p. 260 et seq. See also the UK proposal which were submitted 
to meet the interests of maritime powers. The proposal suggested a maximum length o f 48 nautical 
miles for archipelagic baselines and the maximum ration o f 5:1 for the area o f water to land. It also 
proposed the exercise o f the right o f innocent passage in the archipelagic waters and the right of 
passage through internationally used routes located within archipelagos to be governed by the legal 
regim e o f  passage through straits used for international navigation. See UN Document 
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.44.
8 2 A s  regards the concerns o f maritime powers over the issue o f mid-ocean archipelagos, two are of 
importance: (a) their interests in seeking as little limitation as possible to the right o f navigation 
through archipelagic waters; and (b) the abuse o f archipelagic regime by coastal States possessing 
archipelagos. Dupuy, op. cit., p.271. In contrast, archipelagic States were struggling to achieve a new 
legal regime for archipelagic waters different from that of the high seas. For example, Indonesia has 
always been concerned that “the status o f marine areas in the international sea lanes or sea routes 
within the archipelagic waters cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to high seas.” This was why 
Indonesia proposed the phrase “the right o f navigation” in Article 53 o f the ICNT to substitute the 
phrase “the freedom of navigation” through archipelagic waters. Tangsubkul, op. cit., p.53.
83In the view o f the USA, the freedom of navigation and overflight is a requirement for “maintaining a 
stable and peaceful international order.” US Delegation Briefing Book. Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law o f the Sea, June-August 1974, Department o f State. Maritime powers are 
particularly concerned about mobility o f their naval forces. They considered that the adoption o f 
archipelagic concept may endanger the efficiency o f their naval forces, specially if such concept would 
represent that submerged passage is forbidden in archipelagic waters which also includes some 
important narrow waterways. For example, the USA has expressed that four straits out o f five straits
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of the mid-ocean archipelagos made one to suggest that the issue “revived 
the fundamental debate between the champions of State sovereignty over 
maritime spaces and the proponents of freedom of navigation and 
overflight”84. It was due to the adoption of two regimes of passage through 
waters inside the archipelagos (Le. innocent passage and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage) that the use of straight baselines to enclose waters inside the 
archipelagos (which was later called archipelagic waters) was finally 
accepted. This became possible due to the concessions made to establish a 
balance between interests of the parties concerned (mainly archipelagic 
States and maritime powers) that consequently made a compromise on the 
special provisions concerning mid-ocean archipelagos possible. Thus, the 
agreement on the issue of mid-ocean archipelagos was achieved as part of 
the ’package deal' nature of the LOSC.
III. Legal Definition of the Terms “A Mid-Ocean Archipelago” 
and “An Archipelagic State”
Although the employment of archipelagic baselines by archipelagic 
States was recognised at the UNCLOS El, one important task was to define 
the concepts of “mid-ocean archipelagos” and “archipelagic States”.85 The 
definition of these terms is important in order to decide which States may 
construct archipelagic baselines. The first article (Article 46) of Part IV of 
the LOSC {Archipelagic States) is devoted to the definition of the notions 
of ’’archipelago” and “archipelagic State”. According to Article 46 (a) of 
the LOSC an archipelagic State is:
a State constituted w h o lly  by one or more archipelagos and may
include other islands.86 {em ph asis added)
which are strategically important for passage o f its SSBNs fall under the sole control o f Indonesia or a 
joint control by Indonesia and one neighbouring country. See Osgood, Robert E., National Security. 
Toward a National Ocean Policy: 1976 and Bevond. US Government Printing Office, Washington 
D.C., 1976.
84Dupuy, op. cit., p.271.
85The LOSC does not refer to terms as "coastal archipelagos" and "mid-ocean archipelagos". However, 
these terms have been used to provide a distinction between fringing islands along the coasts and 
groups o f islands located in the oceans. This distinction is essential since the LOSC provides a new  
special regime for mid-ocean archipelagos.
86The definition indicates that a State can be qualified as an archipelagic State, even such State is 
constituted only by one archipelago. An archipelagic State may also consist o f  one or more 
archipelagos while it has also control over some other individual islands which do not fall under the 
archipelagic principle. It is clear that the archipelago is itself composed o f a number o f islands. 
Accordingly, a State comprising of only an island, whatever its size might be, is not practically within 
the scope o f archipelagic States. In addition, the definition provided in Article 46(a) excludes coastal 
archipelagos belonging to a continental State. This is because continental States are not constituted
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Following the definition of an archipelagic State, Article 46(b) 
provides the definition for an archipelago87 which forms the foundation of 
an archipelagic State. The provision states that an archipelago is:
a group of islands, including parts of islands88, interconnecting waters 
and other natural features w hich  a re  so  c lo se ly  in te r re la te d  that such 
islands, waters and other natural features form a n  in tr in s ic  
g e o g r a p h ic a l , e co n o m ic  a n d  p o l i t ic a l  e n tity , or which h is to r ic a lly  
have been regarded as such.89 (em ph asis added)
It is important to take these definitions into account when deciding 
whether a State may be included among archipelagic States for the purpose 
of the LOSC.90 Although archipelagic States are given special rights in 
enclosing a large area of maritime spaces91, certain obligations are also 
imposed upon them. Despite the differences among archipelagic States and 
coastal States (non-archipelagic States), they have certain common rights 
and duties which are the resulted from their geographical locations as 
maritime nations.
IV. The Enclosure of Internal Waters of Mid-Ocean Archipelagos
Archipelagic States are not limited to the use of archipelagic 
baselines. They may also use closing lines across the mouth of rivers, bays 
or ports located on each individual island within archipelagos, thus creating
wholly by one or more archipelagos. According to one estimate, some between twenty-five to thirty 
States may fall into definition o f an archipelagic State. Wang, op. cit., p.48.
87In 1957, Evensen defined the term archipelago as “a formation of two or more islands (islets or rocks) 
which geographically may be considered as a whole”. Evensen, Preparatory Document No. 15, op. cit., 
p.290. This definition was provided from a geographical viewpoint.
88It seems that the incorporation o f “including parts o f islands” was necessitated by the fact that a few 
archipelagic States on one hand enjoy full sovereignty over certain islands, and on the other exercise 
partial sovereignty with respect to some other islands. For example, one part o f Indonesia is New  
Guinea which is western part o f the main island bordered by Papua New Guinea on the eastern side.
89This provision emphasises that a group of islands, as a whole, should either constitute intrinsically a 
geographical, economic, and political unit to be considered as an archipelago or historically have been 
considered an archipelago. As a result, if  a group of islands does not qualify these characteristics, it 
may not be regarded as an archipelago. The provision does not contain restrictions on the number o f  
islands in each group. Moreover, an archipelagic State can have islands outside its archipelagic system 
which are governed by the general legal regime for individual islands.
90It is estimated that “there are 35 archipelagic states which could be considered to meet the definition of 
Article 46”. Prescott, op. cit., 1987 (Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p.46. However, it is not 
sufficient to be qualified as an archipelagic State for the purpose o f the LOSC, if an island State does 
not comply with all requirements incorporated into Article 47. This is particularly true with regard to 
the requirement o f the proportion o f land to water area. This means that if a State is geographically 
considered as an archipelagic State, it is not an archipelagic State for legal purposes, if  the ratio of land 
to water area does not fall between the ratios o f 1:1 and 1:9.
91Dupuy writes that the concept o f archipelagic States “constitute the most remarkable phenomenon of 
the explosion o f sovereignties which, starting from islands, are spreading over the oceans and over vast 
expanses o f maritime space”. Dupuy, op. cit., p.269.
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water areas under the legal regime of internal waters.92 Accordingly, two 
main baseline systems might be used with respect to mid-ocean 
archipelagos - one which encloses internal waters of archipelagic States 
and one which encloses archipelagic waters of these States - each with 
their own distinct legal regime. In the case of those islands located outside 
of archipelagic system, the baseline system would be created under the 
legal regime of islands in general93, which essentially is the same as the 
system employed for creating internal waters of each single island inside 
mid-ocean archipelagos.
It is obvious that in creating internal waters, archipelagic States 
should comply with the established rules in drawing baselines across bays, 
rivers, and harbours or ports.94 For example, bays existing in the coasts of 
islands within archipelagos should qualify as legal bays in accordance with 
provisions of Article 10 of the LOSC (Article 7 of the TSC) to be enclosed 
by a closing line (limited to a maximum of 24 n.m.). The provisions do not 
apply to historic bays. However, if an archipelagic State claims a bay on 
historic title, that State must substantiate the validity of its claim under the 
established rules on historic claims.
Although it was accepted that archipelagic States may use special 
straight baselines to join "the outermost points of the outermost islands and 
drying reefs of the archipelago"95, some requirements were regarded to be 
met with respect to these straight baselines. In other words, archipelagic 
States do not have an absolute right to draw archipelagic baselines. 
Although these requirements restrict discretion of archipelagic States in 
drawing archipelagic baselines, they standardise these baselines. As a
92A s has been set out by provisions o f Articles 9 (mouths o f rivers), 10 (bays), and 11 (ports). It is stated 
that so far “The Philippines and Indonesia have not created any internal waters within their archipelagic 
waters by drawing closing lines across the mouths o f bays, rivers or ports”. Prescott, op. cit., 1996, p.9.
93Part VIII o f the LOSC is headed “Regime of Islands” which only contains one article (Article 121) 
with three paragraphs. Article 121(2) provides that “the territorial sea, contiguous zone, the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf o f an island are determined in accordance with the provisions 
o f the Convention applicable to other land territory”. (emphasis added) As a requisite for demarcation 
o f the maritime zones o f islands, baselines should be drawn. For this purpose, similar rules to coasts of 
mainland may be used for the determination o f baselines o f islands. It should be noted that Article 
121(3) excludes rocks unable to sustain human habitation or economic life o f their own from creating 
the exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
94Article 50 (Delimitation o f Internal Waters) o f the LOSC provides that “[w]ithin its archipelagic 
waters, the archipelagic State may draw closing lines for the delimitation o f internal waters, in 
accordance with articles 9 (Mouths o f Rivers), 10 (Bays) and 11 (Ports).” The wording “may” implies 
that the use o f the closing lines is optional for archipelagic States and they may choose to employ the 
low-water mark for enclosing their internal waters.
^A rticle 47(1) o f the LOSC.
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result, there are some bases to be used in assessing validity of archipelagic 
baseline systems.
V. Essential Conditions Required in the Drawing 
of Archipelagic Baselines
As was indicated, the UNCLOS III was an international forum in 
which a wide range of compromises was made between participating States 
to guarantee its success towards concluding a new and single treaty on the 
law of the sea for universal application. One of these essential 
compromises made at the UNCLOS III was a product of the discussion on 
the application of special straight baseline with respect to mid-ocean 
archipelagos - a new baseline system known as archipelagic baselines. In 
fact, the adoption of the concept of archipelagic States was a result of the 
evolution of the new law of the sea.
Although the legal foundation of archipelagic baselines was set up in 
the UNCLOS IH, the use of these baselines was not left to the discretion of 
archipelagic States. Certain rules were considered to ensure the proper 
application of archipelagic baselines.96 These rules were particularly 
incorporated into the LOSC to avoid unreasonable exclusion of freedoms 
of the high seas, most importantly navigation and overflight.97 For 
example, the following figures demonstrate how the employment of 
archipelagic baselines has resulted in the enclosure of much wider area of 
oceans in comparison to the use of normal baseline for offshore or mid­
ocean islands. As the figures show, those black areas are the additional 
areas of the territorial sea that archipelagic States can get from the 
recognition of the archipelago concept.
96As Brown clarifies “the quality o f being an archipelagic State is not sufficient in itse lf’ to enable an 
oceanic State to employ archipelagic straight baselines and “treat the enclosed waters as archipelagic 
waters.” Such a State should comply with rules in Articles 47 o f the LOSC to entitle to enclose 
archipelagic waters. Brown, op. cit., 1994, p.108.
97A s one author points out “most objections to the archipelagos’ claims” were made “because o f the 
threat to freedom of navigation.” This is because “[important shipping lanes pass between member 
islands o f several archipelagos, including Indonesia and the Bahamas.” Andrew, Dale, ‘Archipelagos 
and the law o f the sea: Island straits states or island-studded sea space?’, Marine Policy. Vol.2, January 
1978, p. 50 (also no.27).
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Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2
Examples Illustrating the Impact of the Application of Archipelagic Baselines 
on the Enclosure of Additional Areas of the Seas.
Source: Hodgson, R. D., and L. M. Alexander, Towards an Objective Analysis of 
Special Circumstances - Bays. Rivers. Coastal and Oceanic Archipelagos and 
Atolls, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, Occasional Paper 
No. 13, April 1972, pp.50-51.
Article 47 of the LOSC is specifically devoted to the issue of the 
archipelagic baselines. It sets out certain requirements in the employment 
of the archipelagic baselines. Some of these requirements are special in 
respect of archipelagic baselines and others are similar to those applied to 
assess the correctness of straight baselines drawn around coastal 
archipelagos (as embodied in Article 7 of the Convention). These 
requirements are six in total which are discussed here.
The first requirement is that the main islands of the archipelago 
should be included within archipelagic baselines.98 This requirement is 
based on the geographical characteristics of mid-ocean archipelagos, while 
such characteristics do not exist in coastal archipelagos. The term "the 
main islands" is not quite clear.99 The LOSC does not provide any 
definition for "main islands of an archipelago". It is obvious that the
98Article 47(1) o f the LOSC.
" T h e  UN study on baselines states that “[f]or different countries the main islands might mean the largest 
islands, the most populous islands, the most economically productive islands, or the islands which are 
pre-eminent in an historical or cultural sense.” The Law of the Sea - Baselines: An Examination o f the 
Relevant Provisions o f the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1989, p.35.
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largest islands are usually considered in this category.100 However, in some 
cases when the size of some islands are close to each other, a question 
arises as to what criteria are to be taken into consideration for identifying 
the main islands. It would appear that economic, political, and 
demographic factors are relevant factors to this identification. Prescott 
considers a number of geographical, economic, and historical and cultural 
factors in identifying the main islands. As he views:
The ‘main’ could apply to the largest islands, the m o s t p o p u lo u s  
islands, the islands which are m o s t e c o n o m ic a lly  p r o d u c tiv e  or the 
islands which are p re -e m in e n t in an h is to r ic a l o r  cu ltu ra l s e n s e .101 
( I ta lics  su p p lie d )
The second requirement has been set up on mathematical basis. It is 
one of the special criteria in recognising the legal validity of existing 
archipelagic baselines. The requirement concerns the ratio of the water 
area to the land area within archipelagic baselines. This requirement along 
with the third requirement represent the importance of two factors which 
should be in existence before an oceanic archipelago becomes entitled to 
enjoy a special legal regime. These two factors are “adjacency and 
integration.” This is why it is argued that “[s]ome degree of adjacency and 
integration should be exhibited among different islands before they define 
an archipelago.”102 The ratio of water to land is laid down to assist in 
finding whether there is the element of integration among the constituent 
islands of a mid-ocean archipelago During the UNCLOS III, the United 
Kingdom suggested that the maximum ratio of water to land should be five 
to one.103 The United Kingdom’s proposal did not contain a minimum ratio 
of water area to land area.104 Article 47(1) of the LOSC provides minimum 
ratio of 1:1 and maximum ratio of 9:1 for the ratio of water area to land
100For example, according to Dubner, Indonesia is composed of six main islands and 13, 661 smaller 
islands totalling 13, 667 islands. The main islands include Sumatra (164,000 sq. miles); the Greater 
Sunda Islands consisting o f Java and Madura (51,000 sq. miles); Borneo (72% o f this main island, 
namely 208,000 sq. miles, is part o f Indonesia and also known as kalimantan); Sulawesi (formerly 
Celebes, 73, 000 sq. miles) with the Lesser Sunda (Nusa Tenggara) Islands and the Maluhu Islands 
(Moluccas); and New Guinea (the western part with the area o f 159, 375 sq. miles, also known as West 
Irian and Man Barat). Dubner, Barry Hart, The Law of Territorial Waters o f Mid-Ocean Archipelagos 
and Archipelagic States. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976, p.62.
101 Prescott, J. R. V., ‘Straight and Archipelagic Baselines’, in Gerald Blake (ed.), Maritime Boundaries 
^nd Ocean Resources. Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1987, pp.46-47.
102Andrew, op. cit., p. 47.
103Dupuy, op. cit., p.272.
104Ryan, K.W., International Law in Australia. Second Edition, The Law Book Company Limited, 
Sydney, 1984, p.411.
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area.105 Therefore, the area of water enclosed by archipelagic baselines 
should be at least equal to the area of the land. The maximum ratio has 
been considered to prevent unilateral extension of the archipelagic waters, 
but it is not apparent what has been the basis for incorporating the 
minimum ratio. The result of such a ratio is that if an island State does not 
geographically qualify the requirement of minimum ratio, it will not be 
considered as an archipelagic State. As examples, the ratio of water area to 
land area regarding the Philippines and Indonesia is estimated at 1.2:1 and 
1.8:1 respectively.106
The incorporation of minimum and maximum ratios of 1:1 and 9:1 
with respect to the proportion of water to land prevented certain countries 
being regarded as archipelagic States. Although some of these countries 
might geographically be deemed as archipelagic countries in a broad sense, 
they are not recognised as archipelagic countries from the law of the sea 
perspective. There exist some fifteen countries which are located in ocean 
spaces but are not qualified as legal archipelagic States since the area of 
water enclosed by the application of archipelagic baselines to the area of 
land is less than 1:1. According to Prescott, these countries are Australia, 
Cuba, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Madagascar, Malta, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, 
and Western Samoa.107 (See, for example, maps of Madagascar and 
Malta below.) There are also some other countries which are archipelagos 
from a geographical perspective but they do not satisfy the maximum limit 
of the ratio of water to land, that is to say the employment of archipelagic 
baselines for these countries would lead to the enclosure of water area nine 
times larger than land area. Tuvalu, Mauritius108 and Kiribati are in this
105Article 47(7) o f the LOSC provides that "[f]or the purpose of computing the ratio o f water to land 
under paragraph 1, land areas may include waters lying within the fringing reefs o f islands and atolls, 
including that part o f a steep-sided oceanic plateau which is enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain of 
limestone islands and drying reefs lying on the perimeter o f the plateau." Prescott states that this 
provision was incorporated into the LOSC for the benefit o f The Bahamas. Prescott, op. cit., 1987 
(Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p.47.
106Churchill, R. R., and A. V. Lowe, The Law o f the Sea. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
1983, p.93. The land area o f Indonesia amounts to 735, 267 square miles or 1,904, 345 square 
.kilometres. The area o f waters within the Philippine archipelagic baselines is 328,345 square miles. 
A lso maximum length and width o f the Philippine archipelago are 1152 miles and 668 miles 
respectively.
107Prescott, op. cit., 1987 (Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p.47. Notwithstanding Cuba (Verbal 
Note o f 13 November 1985 to United Nations) and Trinidad and Tobago (Archipelagic Waters and 
Exclusive Economic Zone o f 11 November 1986) have employed archipelagic baselines.
108Following its 1970 legislation, Mauritius has employed straight baselines and has accordingly 
enclosed large areas o f water as internal waters. The 1977 Maritime Zones Act No. 13 with the 1984 
Government Notice No. 199 indicate that Mauritius has used “ordinary straight baselines”. 
Notwithstanding, the 1987 Report o f the Secretary-General on the Law o f the Sea (UN Doc.
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group.109 However, these island States have claimed archipelagic status 
(See Table 6.1). This is also the case with regard to Trinidad and Tobago. 
Map 5.2 Map 5.3
Madagascar’s Baseline System Malta’s Baseline System
Source: Francalanci, Giampiero (ed.), e t a l, Atlas of the Straight Baselines - Part 
1: Art.7 of the Convention of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea. Giuffre 
Editore, Milano, 1986, pp.93 (Madagascar) and 95 (Malta).
The third requirement also has a mathematical nature and is another 
special criterion in evaluating archipelagic baselines. It relates to the 
maximum possible length for archipelagic baselines.110 The requirement 
has been taken into account to ensure that the element of adjacency exists 
among the component islands within a mid-ocean archipelago. In the 
UNCLOS III, efforts were made to provide a restriction on the length of the
A/42/688, at 6, para. 10) contains that Mauritius has applied the concept o f archipelagic state in its 
legislation. Kwiatkowska and Agoes, op. cit., pp.2-3 &62, no.10.
1 ̂ Prescott, op. cit., 1987 (Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p.47. Tuvalu, however, proclaimed the 
use o f archipelagic baselines in 1983 (Maritime Zones (Declaration) Ordinance, 1983 - National 
Limits o f Jurisdiction). See also the 1983 Maritime Zones Declaration and Act of Kiribati.
110At the UNCLOS III, archipelagic States were in opposition to restrict the archipelagic concept by the 
application o f numerical methods such as establishing a maximum limits for archipelagic baselines or 
a maximum distance between constituent islands. For example, the Philippines was o f the view that 
application of these methods is inconsistent with the objectives of the archipelagic principles. See UN  
Document A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.53, pp.63-64. Fiji also stressed that “... differences o f opinion had 
arisen over attempts to apply additional tests, such a the distance between the islands or the land-to- 
water ratio, which would have the effect o f nullifying the very validity of the established criteria of 
geographical, political and economic unity.” Ibid., p.64. In fact, at the UNCLOS III the prospective 
archipelagic States were in favour of a non-numerical approach such as the consideration o f the notion 
o f adjacency. Brown, op. cit., 1994, p . l l l .  However, it was Indonesia that suggested two numerical 
methods for drawing archipelagic baselines in order to ensure the inclusion o f the archipelagic 
concept in the LOSC. In its draft articles on mid- ocean archipelagos submitted to Geneva Session of 
the UNCLOS III (17 March - 9 May 1975), Indonesia introduced two mathematical criteria for 
establishing valid archipelagic baselines: the maximum length of 100 nautical miles (except for 5% of 
the total number o f the baselines for which the maximum length would be 125 nautical miles; and the 
establishment o f the ratios o f water to land between 1:1 to 9:1. Introducing such ratios by Indonesia 
was in line with its view that the water area o f an archipelagic State should exceed its land area. 
Draper, op. cit., pp.153-154.
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archipelagic baselines to prevent further conversion of the high seas into 
waters which are now defined as of archipelagic waters. Countries such as 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands suggested that the 
length of the archipelagic baselines should not increase more than twofold 
the breadth of the territorial sea.111 The United Kingdom also proposed 
that a maximum of 48 miles is applied as a criterion for maximum length 
of archipelagic baselines.112 It is in this context that Article 118(2) of the 
Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT), which was prepared by the 
Second Committee of the UNCLOS III, contained the limit of 80 miles as 
the maximum length for archipelagic baselines.113 It also provided that "an 
unspecified percentage" of archipelagic baselines might have a length as 
far as 125 miles.114
Article 47(2) of the LOSC now allows a maximum length of 100 
nautical miles for archipelagic baselines and adds that"... 3 per cent of total 
number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up 
to a maximum length of 125 miles."115 The purpose of inclusion of these 
limitations on the length of archipelagic baselines are said to “rule out 
certain island groups, such as Micronesia, which are made up of very small 
atolls, separated by great distances. Such groups require long baselines to 
join the member islands and enclose relatively huge areas of water.”116 The 
Indonesian archipelagic baseline system includes 196 lines five of which 
have lengths ranging 100 to 125 miles and the remaining 191 lines are less 
than 100 miles.117 In practice, the mathematical criterion is not always 
easy to follow precisely. For example, the result of considering 3 per cent
^ D u p u y , op. cit., p.272.
112Ryan, op. cit., p.411.
113 Article 119(2) o f the 1976 Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) included the same limit of 80 
miles. However, unlike the ISNT, the RSNT provided that “up to one per cent o f total number of 
baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed ... [the length of 80 nautical miles], up to a maximum 
length o f 125 nautical miles.” The full text of the RSNT can be found in Report o f the Australian 
Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Fourth Session (New 
York), 15 March to 7 May 1976, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976, 
Appendix J.
114Greig, D. W., International Law. 2nd edition, Butterworths, London, 1976, p.193.
115Prescott describes this rule as having “superficial exactness”. Prescott, op. cit., 1987 (Straight and 
Archipelagic Baselines), p.46. The UN study on baselines points out that “[s]ince there is no 
restriction on the number o f segments a country can draw, and since the more segments used the 
closer the system is likely to be to the general configuration of the archipelago, it will usually be 
possible to adjust the number o f segments to secure the necessary number o f very long baselines.” 
The Law of the Sea: Baselines, op. cit., p.35.
116Andrew, op. cit., p. 47, no.8 .
117Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.94. Wisnumurti writes that “[i]n some places, the lengths o f some of 
the [Indonesian] straight baselines have to be adjusted to conform with the rule on the maximum 
length o f straight baselines provided in Article 47 paragraph 2 [of the LOSC].” Wisnumurti, op. cit., 
p.46.
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of the 196 archipelagic straight baselines of Indonesia is 5.88. 
Accordingly, the five Indonesian baselines, which exceed more than 100 
miles but are less than 125 miles comply with the above provision.118 (The 
Indonesian archipelagic baselines are illustrated below.)
Map 5.4
Indonesia’s Archipelagic Baselines
Source: The Law of the Sea: Practice of Archipelagic States. Office for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1992 , pp.52-53.
The Philippine baseline system also consists of 80 lines of which two 
have a length between 100 and 125, and one line is 140 miles, and 77 lines 
are less than 100 miles.119 Two lines are bigger than 100 miles but less 
than 125 miles which conforms 3 per cent of 80 lines (namely 2.4 percent). 
However, the Philippines has employed a line in the Gulf of Moro which is 
140 miles in length.120 Accordingly, this line is not considered to be in 
accordance with Article 47(2) of the LOSC because it exceeds the 
maximum length 125 miles.121 (See the Philippine archipelagic baselines 
below.)
118The UN study on baselines states that “it is easy to calculate that systems with 2 to 33 segments may 
not have any individual lines more than 100 nautical miles long while systems with 167 to 199 
segments may include 5 lines with lengths greater than 100 nautical miles.” The Law of the Sea: 
Baselines, op. cit., p.35.
119Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.94.
120Prescott, op. cit., 1996, p.9. According to Prescott, the 1990 draft Bills Numbers 232 and 206 o f the 
Senate o f The Philippines included an amendment to its archipelagic baselines “to reduce the longest 
baseline in the Gulf of Moro to 119.98 nm, 5 nm shorter than the maximum limit”. Ibid.
121 Since the Philippines ratified the LOSC on 8 May 1984, it has been obliged to remove its existing 
inconsistent rules and laws with the Convention. This was why Bill No. 206 was submitted to the 
Philippines Senate in order to make necessary adjustment on its baselines for their conformity with 





Source: The Law of the Sea: 
Practice of Archipelagic 
States. Office for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the 
Sea, United Nations, New 
York, 1992, p.83
The next issue is how to treat the result if it is not a whole number. For 
example, if the result is 5.45 or 5.55 should it be treated as 5 or 6? The 
above provisions do not contain any answer to this problem and it is open 
to different interpretations. It seems that the figures from 5.5 to 5.99 can 
be considered as equal to 6 and those between 5.01 to 5.49 may be 
regarded as equal to 5. Although it may appear that in practice the problem 
might not be of essential importance, the consequence might be 
considerable given the fact that one extra archipelagic baseline line with a 
maximum length of 125 nautical miles might be employed.122 This would, 
in turn, result in the enclosure of more areas of the high seas.123 124
The fourth requirement has been embodied in Article 47(3) of the 
LOSC. It emphasises that M[t]he drawing of such baselines [archipelagic 
baselines] shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general 
configuration of the archipelago."12* (emphasis added) In this connection
1220 ’Connell asserts that “the inherent subjectivity” in such a percentage basis for longer archipelagic 
baselines “is clear from the fact that any claimant could, by merely multiplying the basepoints, 
achieve the required percentage. O’Connell, op. cit., 1982, p.257.
123 Although unlike straight baselines the LOSC establishes a maximum length for archipelagic baselines, 
it does not contain any provision on the number of archipelagic baselines which may be employed by 
archipelagic States.
124This provision is similar to Article 7(3) of the LOSC concerning straight baselines which are used in 
coastlines with special geographical conditions, including coastal archipelagos. Article 7(3) reads that 
"[t]he drawing o f straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general 
direction of the coast...." (emphasis added) It also provides that"... the sea areas lying within the 
lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal
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one argues that ‘[w]hether most archipelagos have an ascertainable 
“configuration” may be doubted.’125 Accordingly, there is a need to 
identify an international authority which is competent to examine the above 
requirement in regard to each archipelagic baseline system.126
The fifth requirement is that archipelagic baselines must not "... be 
drawn to and from low tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar 
installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on 
them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance 
not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest island."127
Article 47(5) of the LOSC contains the last requirement. It provides 
that an archipelagic State should not draw archipelagic baselines "... in 
such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or the exclusive economic 
zone the territorial sea of another State".128 One example appears to be the 
effect of the Indonesian baseline system on the territorial sea of 
Singapore.129 Notwithstanding, Churchill and Lowe state that because "it is 
doubtful whether Singapore would have been able to generate an exclusive 
economic zone"130, the Indonesian baseline system seems to be 
permissible.131
Besides the above requirements, the LOSC imposes a duty on 
archipelagic States to prepare maritime charts or lists of geographical co­
ordinates of points with respect to their archipelagic baselines.132 It also 
requires these States to "... give publicity to such charts or lists of 
geographical co-ordinates ..." and to "... deposit a copy of each such charter
waters.” Legal basis o f the provisions of Article 7(3) is the judgement of the International Court of 
Justice in the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) in 1951. ICJ Reports, 1951, p.133.
125Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.94.
126 As it is the case withe respect to the existing straight baselines which was already pointed out in the 
analysis on the issue.
127Article 47(4) o f the LOSC. Compare with provision of Article 7(4) of the LOSC which reads that 
”[s]traight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar 
installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on them or except in instances 
which the drawing o f baselines to and from such elevations has received general international 
recognition ." (emphasis added)
128This provision is similar to the provision of Article 7(6) of the LOSC which reads that ”[t]he system 
o f straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut off the territorial sea of 
another State from the high seas or an exclusive economic zone ." (emphasis added)
129Churchill and Lowe, op. cit.y p.94.
M°Ibid.
131Ibid.
132 Article 47(8) o f the LOSC.
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or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.133 Article 47(6) of 
the LOSC also reserves existing rights and all other legitimate interests of 
an immediately adjacent neighbouring State, ”[i]f a part of the archipelagic 
waters of an archipelagic State lies between two parts of [that State]...
Although the requirements have created a framework for the 
construction of legitimate archipelagic baselines, no doubt the use of these 
baselines would have an exponential effect on the enclosure of ocean 
spaces. This is why it is acknowledged that the notion of mid-ocean 
archipelagos introduces “the most remarkable case of the appropriation of 
maritime spaces”.134
VI. Reasons for Establishing a Special Regime 
for Mid-Ocean Archipelagos
In supporting their doctrine of archipelago principle, island States 
(now known as archipelagic States) relied upon a number of reasons to 
justify their clams.135 These States expressed that their claims are based on 
geographical, historical, political, economic, security, environmental, 
cultural, and customs reasons. Due to their different geographic and geo­
political situations, the significance of any of these reasons vary from one 
island State to another. However, island States were all of the view that 
these essential reasons necessitated the recognition of a special legal 
regime to enable them to enclose waters located within their archipelagos. 
The reasons for archipelagic claims appear infra.
1. Geographical Reasons
Geographical factors are the essence of archipelagic claims. In fact, 
it is the geography of archipelagos which has in a practical sense resulted 
in emerging the doctrine of linking islands to one another.136 In the case of 
coastal archipelagos, it is the element of adjacency that justifies the
133 Article 47(9) o f the LOSC.
134Dupuy, op. cit., p.273.
135As Andrew states the interests and rationale of archipelagic States in introducing the concept of 
archipelago principle are based upon “a variety of considerations: geography, history, economic 
dependency, national security and concern for the environment.” Andrew, op. cit., p.47.
136This is why it is argued that it is particular geographical configuration o f archipelagic States “which 
serves as the basis for their other particular interests, namely their economical, socio-political, 
ecological and environmental interests. Munavvar, Mohamed, Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of 
the, Sea. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995, p.29.
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integration of these islands with mainlands. However, there is no such a 
geographical characteristic in the case of mid-ocean archipelagos which are 
located independently from mainlands, though the element of adjacency 
also plays an important role in the legal definition of these archipelagos. 
Despite the fact that outlying archipelagos vary, they are similar in the 
sense that their component islands are all linked by interconnecting or 
insular waters. This interconnection makes the archipelagos geographical 
units which are surrounded by waters as integral part of the archipelagos. 
This is why it has been asserted that “the real essence of an archipelago is 
the concept of a self-contained and relatively compact group, not a loose 
congeries of islands dotted over a large extent of sea.”137
Since the emergence of the doctrine of archipelago principle, 
archipelagic States have argued that waters within their islands are 
inseparable parts of their territory as these waters are geographically more 
integrated into their islands than any other land formation, including 
mainlands.138 The Philippines in its Declaration of 1955 stated that “all 
waters around, between and connecting the different islands belonging to 
the Philippine Archipelago ... are necessary appurtenances of its land 
territory ...”.139 (emphasis added) The 1957 Indonesian Declaration also 
considered the interconnecting waters within constituent islands of the 
Indonesian archipelago as constituting “integral parts of the territory of the 
Indonesian state.”140 These examples demonstrate how geographical 
realities were relied upon by archipelagic States to support their doctrine 
of archipelago principle.
2. Historical Reasons
Archipelagic States have been attempting to put their claim on a 
historical basis arguing that their constituent islands have been historically
137Fitzmaurice, G., ‘Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly. V o l.8 ,1959, p.88.
138Munavvar, op. cit., p.28.
139UN Legislative Series ST/LEG/SER.B/6,1957, op.cit., p.39.
140See Syatauw, op. cit., pp.173-174. At the UNCLOS III, Indonesia referred to the Indonesian term 
“tanah air” which is used as an equivalent to the word “fatherland”. The term “Tanah air” means 
“land-water”. This indicates “how separable the relationship is between water and land to the 
Indonesian people. The seas to our mind, do not separate but connect islands. More than that, these 
waters unify our nation.” UNCLOS III. Official Records. Vol.I, United Nations, New York, 1975, 
p.187.
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considered as a single unit.141 The element of history is not limited to 
archipelagic claims and it has been used with respect to many claims in the 
law of the sea, such as those related to historic waters. As part of their 
argument, archipelagic States relies on historical considerations to 
strengthen their claims.142 However, not all archipelagic States were able 
to demonstrate the existence of a long term treatment of their archipelagos 
as a single unit, even though they have used such expressions as “time 
immemorial”.
In its 1955 Declaration, the Philippines, inter alia, referred to some 
treaties for the basis of its claim as having the element of long passage of 
time.143 The Philippines declared that “... water areas embraced within the 
lines described in the Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898, the Treaty 
concluded at Washington D.C., between the United States and Spain on 7 
December 1900, the Agreement between the United States, and the United 
Kingdom of 2 January 1930, and the Convention of 6 July 1932, between 
the United States and Great Britain as reproduced in section 6 of 
Commonwealth Act No. 4003 and Article 1 of the Philippine Constitution, 
are considered as maritime territorial waters of the Philippines ...”.144 To 
support its claim, the Philippines also referred to Article III of the Paris 
Treaty of Peace (10 December 1889) between Spain and the United States 
which defined the territory of the Philippines as “the archipelago known as 
the Philippine Islands and comprehending the islands lying within the 
following described lines ... [namely lines defined in the Treaty by 
reference to a series of latitudes and longitudes].”145
141While Andrew holds that “[historical precedent provides little objective basis for using the 
archipelago principle”, Munavvar does not agree with this view and writes that “[historical precedent 
is a strong argument in the case o f smaller ocean islands with numerous islands which are closely 
integrated and do not have very wide expenses of sea or passages between their islands that are use for 
international navigation.” See Andrew, op. cit., p. 48 and Munavvar, op. cit., p.29.
142It is stated that archipelagic States may claim their island groups as a single political unit on the basis 
o f historical evidence, putting aside the factor of adjacency. However, it raises the question as with 
whom the burden of proof of such historic claims rests. Hodgson, op. cit., p.46. It seems apparent 
that in case o f historic claims the burden of proof rests with the claimant State.
143It is viewed that “[t]he Philippines rely to a great extent upon historical justification for the 
delimitation o f the extent of heir maritime domain.” O’Connell, op. cit., 1971, p.30.
144See UN Doc.A/2934, 1955, pp.52-53. O’Connell views that “[ajlthough the Note verbale o f 1955 
founded the Philippine claim on the interpretation of the Treaty of Paris, and thus on the argument that 
Spain had sovereignty over the waters which is alleged to have conveyed to the United States, there is 
no historical evidence of an assertion, or exercise, of jurisdiction over the relevant waters by either 
Spain or the United States.” O’Connell, op. cit., 1971, p.29.
145See Munavvar, op. cit., p.30.
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The Indonesian proclamation did refer to history. Following the 
1957 Indonesian Declaration, the preamble of the 1960 Indonesian Act, 
without demonstrating any historical evidence, expressed that “since time 
immemorial the Indonesian archipelago has constituted one entity.”146 To 
justify the use of archipelagic baselines, Micronesia has also made its 
claims, among others, on the existence of “political entities” in its 
component islands before the arrival of the European explores.147
At the UNCLOS II, the delegate of the Philippines, Senator 
Tolentino, stated that the Philippine archipelago since time immemorial has 
been a single unit and under a single sovereignty, whether at the time of 
Spanish dominance or under the Republic of the Philippines. At the 
Caracas session of the UNCLOS HI, the delegate of the Bahamas made its 
statement on an historical basis to justify the jurisdiction of Bahamas over 
a wide maritime areas. This delegate stated that “[tjhose areas of shallow 
waters had historically been regarded as parts of the territory of the 
Bahamas: a grant encompassing the banks as well as the islands and the 
cays, had been made to the Lord Proprietors by King Charles of 
England.”148 {emphasis added) Also at the UNCLOS III Tonga referred to 
the 1887 Proclamation by King Tupou I arguing that the proclamation 
established the boundaries of Tonga “by reference to the sea instead of by 
reference to the land.”149 Further, it stated that the lack of protest to such 
delimitation of Tongan island and the passage of time had established a 
legitimate basis for enclosing waters within the Tongan archipelago. As 
the Tongan delegate asserted:
... neither in 1887, when the proclamation had been made, nor in 
1971, when it had been circulated to all states members of the Sea-bed 
Committee, had there been any hint of criticism of its purport, for 
although it constituted a departure from the law of nations as framed 
in Europe, it had been legitimized by the very rules of that system by 
virtue of the passage of time.150
As is clear, historical considerations have constituted part of the 
arguments of archipelagic States. They claimed that their archipelagos 
have always been considered as a single unit in their history. It should be
146See Syatauw, op. cit., p.175.
147Nakayama, Masao, and Fredrick Ramp, Micronesian Navigation. Island Emnires and Traditional 
Concents of Ownership of the Sea. Saipan, Mariana Islands, 1974, p.64.




noted that the element of history is not adequate evidence for claims in the 
law of the sea. However, States have realised that history plays an 
essential role in supporting their claims, if they are able to indicate the 
existence of such an element.
3. Political Reasons
Political reasons are part of the arguments presented by archipelagic 
States to gain sympathy from other States in recognition of a special legal 
regime for delimitation of mid-ocean archipelagos. The essence of 
political rationale lies in the element of unity of scattered island forming an 
archipelago. The integration of islands as a single unit has been regarded 
as a necessity for the idea of one nation within the concept of archipelago. 
In fact, the unity of islands within archipelagos has been an important 
factor in advancing the doctrine of archipelago principle. As one writer 
points out “the very fact of statehood and the need to contain centrifugal 
tendencies and cement the elements of the nation together were being put 
forward as circumstances demanding a special regime for the waters of the 
archipelagic State.”151
In 1973, the Philippine delegate stressed the element of unity for mid­
ocean archipelagos as necessity. This delegate asserted that
That essential element of unity formed the basis of the desire of an 
archipelagic State to p rese rv e  its iden tity  as one State a n d  one n a tion , 
for otherwise an archipelago might be splintered into many islands as 
composed it, with the consequent fragmentation of the nation and the 
State.152 (em phasis added)
At the Caracas session of the UNCLOS III (1974), the Philippine 
delegate (Minister Arturo Tolentino) argued that the essence of the 
archipelagic concept is “the dominion and sovereignty of the archipelagic 
State within its baselines, which were so drawn as to preserve the territorial 
integrity of the archipelago by the inseparable unity of the land and water 
domain.”153 This delegate then added that such an essence of the 
archipelagic concept should be taken into account in the establishment of a 
legal regime for archipelagos. In addition, at the closing session of the
151 Brown, op. cit., 1994, p.109.
152UN Document A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.73, p.10.
153^ n  OS TIT. Official Records. Vol.II, at 264, para 65. Also see paras.61-62 & 66.
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UNCLOS III, the Cape Verde Delegate stated that its country “consider 
that recognition by the Convention of the concept of archipelagic State is a 
major achievement for the protection of the legitimate interest in preserving 
the unity and integrity of its territory.”154
The political element reflects the idea of preserving the unity of the 
constituent islands of an archipelago as a whole. Consideration of this 
element of unity is of significance in building up a nation whose territory 
consists of islands separated by marine spaces. It appears that at the 
UNCLOS III many States were aware of the importance of the political 
element of unity for archipelagic States and were prepared to meet this 
need of archipelagic States while the interests of international community 
were also preserved in the interconnecting waters in the archipelagos.
4. Economic Reasons
Regardless of physical geography, history, or political motive, the 
element of economic dependence has formed the basis of one of the main 
arguments in favour of archipelagic concept.155 Archipelagic States have 
argued that their people living in a large number of islands are 
economically dependent on the living and non-living resources existing in 
and under sea.156 This is particularly confirmed by the fact that “major 
industries of archipelagic states are marine based.”157 They have 
maintained that “they are almost totally dependent on the surrounding 
marine environment, unlike continental nations which have resources on 
their land territory.”158
154Statement by Ambassador Jose Jesus of Cape Verde, UNCLOS III. Official Records. Vol. XVII, at 
62, para. 125.
155Munavvar holds that [b]esides being a unifying factor between the islands, the sea also offers a great 
potential source for the economic development of the archipelago and the we being o f its people.” 
Munavvar, op. cit., p.33.
156 As part o f findings of a survey on oceanic islands, it is stated that these islands “are seldom well 
endowed with resources: land, minerals and other stores of energy, fresh water, flora and fauna, all 
tend to be limited in amount and variety.“ McEachem, John and Edward L. Towle, Ecological 
Guidelines for Island Development. Morges: International Union for Conservation o f Nature and 
Natural Resources Publications, 1974, p.14. Sir Albert Henry, the representative of the Cook Islands 
at the UNCLOS III, focusing on the component islands of the Cook Islands asserted that “[t]he land 
mass was small;; and there were no minerals or similar products which could be used commercially to 
develop the economy. ... The sea provided the only source of protein, the bulk of food, and a small 
income from pearl shell and fish.” UNCLOS III. Official Records. V ol.1,1975, p.200.
157Munavvar, op. cit., p.31. For example, the economy of Maldives is basically dependent on two 
sectors: fishing and tourism. Ibid.
158Andrew, op. cit., p.48. Fiji, the Bahamas and Mauritius had expressed their essential need to have 
exclusive access over fisheries resources in waters around their islands. Ibid.
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The Philippines has claimed exclusive interests in exploitation of the 
fisheries and other biological resources found in waters surrounding the 
Philippine islands.159 It has argued that the marine resources are not 
sufficient to respond to the need of its local population and foreign 
countries whose citizens are involved in fishing within waters around the 
Philippine islands.160 In addition, the 1955 Philippine Declaration clearly 
included the objectives of “protection of its fishing rights, conservation of 
its fishery resources ...” among the purposes for creating an archipelagic 
system.
Indonesia also emphasised the importance of fisheries resources for 
inhabitants of archipelagos whose survival considerably depends on these 
resources. It, particularly, expressed that:
our people are very much dependent on marine resources and 
fisheries, especially those which have a close connection with the 
shelf and the land. Our fisheries are basically subsistence type of 
fisheries, and fish is an important source of protein.161
Archipelagic States primarily focused on the biological resources for 
their economic development. However, they later advanced their economic 
argument to include non-living resources (such as minerals and petroleum) 
arguing that the exploitation of these resources is essential for their 
economic growth.162 In particular, they claimed that there is a need to have 
exclusive control over the marine resources to exclude other countries 
(mostly industrialised and technically developed countries) to access these 
resources. This exclusion was motivated by the marine technological gap 
between developed countries and archipelagic States belonging to 
developing countries.163 Maritime developed countries enjoy a high 
standard of marine technology enabling them to exploit living and non­
159 O’Connell, op. cit., 1971, p.31.
l60Ibid.
161 Anand, op. cit., p.240.
162For example, the Philippine Proclamation of 20 March 1968 was issued to reserve all the resources in 
the continental shelf o f the Philippines, covering the maritime area within the geographical co-ordinates 
defined by the 1898 Treaty of Paris. Bowett, op. cit., pp.103-104. Also Indonesia issued an proclamation 
on 17 February 1969 claiming exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction over the continental shelf in and 
around its archipelago. See O’Connell, op. cit., 1971, p.42.
163For example, Indonesia pointed out that the involvement of advanced fishing countries, with access to 
modem techniques, in exploitation of living resources in and around archipelagos “made us afraid that 
there was just no possibility of having an equal opportunity.” This was why archipelagic States were 
struggling to make resources within their archipelagic waters subject to their exclusive jurisdiction. 
Anand, op. cit., p.240.
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living resources more efficiently. This imbalance in marine technology led 
to concerns among archipelagic States to guarantee their exclusive rights 
over the resources within their archipelagos by enclosing waters therein.
At the UNCLOS El, archipelagic States developed their economic 
argument in the context of the discussion on the new international 
economic order by which the wealth of the world will be distributed more 
equitable. They maintained that “their future depended in large measure 
on the utilization of the sea and the exploitation of its resources and 
claiming that new rules must be worked out in order to safeguard what they 
considered relevant to their vital interests and rights.”164
The economic argument of archipelagic States appears to have had a 
positive effect on advancing the doctrine of archipelago principle. Since 
these ocean States were (and still are) greatly dependent on whatever the 
marine environments have to for their economic development, such 
reliance on marine resources was a cause for gaining some sympathy from 
other States. Accordingly, the element of economy played a constructive 
role in strengthening the foundation of the doctrine of archipelagic concept.
5. Security Reasons
The security and strategic reasons have been at the core of the 
concerns of archipelagic States in introducing the doctrine of archipelagic 
notion.165 The security reason consists of two aspects: internal security and 
external security.166 These internal and external securities have impacts on 
one another. In particular, the existence of adequate internal security 
within archipelagos has an effect on the stability of archipelagos and enable 
them to better cope with the threats to their security from external sources.
164Dupuy, op. cit., p.271.
165Anand views that security reason has been the most important reason for advancing the archipelagic 
principle. Anand, op. cit., p.240. Andrew, however, is of the view that “... security is only one o f the 
motivations for the archipelagic claim of sovereignty: other interests are equally salient.” Andrew, op. 
cit., p.49. In general, it is more accurate to say that: while some factors may be of more significance 
for certain archipelagic States, other factors may be more essential for the other archipelagic States. 
For example, O’Connell writes that [t]he motives for the policies o f the Philippines and Indonesia 
were in the first instance strategic... But in the cases of the other aspirants, due to their geographical 
situations and absence of serious security problems, the motivation is exclusively economic ... .” 
O’Connell, op. cit., 1982, p.254.
166As Anand points out the security reason developed by archipelagic States is not “necessarily security 
from military attack by a hostile power, but for protecting ... coastal areas from illegal landing by 
aliens and smuggling o f goods.” Anand, op. cit., p.240.
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The newly established archipelagic States have formerly been under 
colonial regimes. These States have been experiencing some internal 
security problems which resulted from a variety of reasons.167 These States 
are mostly composed of a number of ethnic and social groups which are 
difficult to integrate. Since the independence of archipelagic States there 
have been conflicts among these groups that have led to unrest in these 
countries, endangering the internal security of these States and affecting 
their external security.
For example, in the early years of independence Indonesia faced an 
internal security problem which came from separatists on Celebes, Java, 
and Sumatra islands.168 It was not easy for the central government to 
handle this security problem for two reasons. First, the lack of adequate 
authority over these islands because of the high seas pockets separating the 
islands from the capital island. Secondly, these movements could be 
supplied with military equipment by external sources169, particularly 
because the central government had no power over interconnecting waters 
of the islands which were parts of the high seas.170 The Philippines has 
also experienced some unrest171 causing difficulties for its government to 
encounter the security problem.
Since the introduction of the archipelagic principle it has been clear 
that the security interest has been one of the main interests for archipelagic 
States. For instance, the 1955 Philippine Declaration contained the 
following purposes for establishing an archipelagic regime:
... [the waters within the Philippine islands are maritime territorial 
waters of the Philippines] for purposes of protection of its fishing 
rights, conservation of its fishing reserves, enforcement of its revenue 
and anti-smuggling laws, defence a n d  secu rity , a n d  p ro te c tio n  o f  such  
in te re s ts  a s  the P h ilip p in es  m ay d eem  v ita l to  its  n a tio n a l w e lfa re  a n d  
se c u r ity , without prejudice to the exercise by friendly foreign vessels
167Among causes which result in security instability in archipelagos the followings are mentioned: 
militant political contentions, secessionist ambitions, economic crisis, problems associated with 
migrant labour or political refugees, and human right issues. Munavvar, op. cit., pp.33-34.
168Anand, op. cit., p.241. One views that [t]he notion that the seas separating the major Indonesian 
islands are high seas not subject to national jurisdiction ... was perceived to lend support to the 
separatist claims for autonomy or sovereignty.” Draper, op. cit., p.144.
169This has particularly taken place on unguarded coastlines o f the islands o f such countries as Cuba, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines in the past few decades. In the past few years Seychelles and Maldives 
have had similar experience. Munavvar, op. cit., .34.
170See Andrew, op. cit., p.48.
171 Anand, op. cit., p.241. A reference is also made to Papua New Guinea where there is an ongoing crisis 
o f secession by Bougainville which is a resource rich province o f Papua New Guinea. Munavvar, op. 
cit., p.34.
258
of the right of innocent passage over these waters.172 ( em ph asis  
a d d e d )
Further, in response to the protests made by some maritime powers 
to the archipelago principle proclaimed by Indonesia in 1957, Indonesia 
emphasised the importance of the archipelagic regime for efficient 
maintenance of its security.173 It asserted that by keeping the status quo 
concerning the waters between islands of archipelagos, it would be difficult 
for foreign vessels to find out whether they are in the high seas or national 
waters. In particular, activities of vessels in conflict within the high sea 
parts of archipelagos may have adverse effects on these archipelagos. In its 
words, Indonesia asserted that:
In case of war between two parties, with their battle-fields moving to 
and fro on the high seas between Indonesian Islands, our unity would 
be threatened.174
It was for the importance of security interests that such archipelagic 
States as Indonesia and the Philippines required prior authorisation for the 
passage of warships after advancing the doctrine of archipelago 
principle.175 In some cases, the Philippines refused to permit the passage of 
foreign warships which impacted on the passage of these ships within the 
routes between Australia and South-East Asia.176 Indonesia also closed 
certain areas of its waters to foreign ships (including warships) as a result 
of conflict with the Netherlands over West Irian in 1958.177
The internal and external security issues challenging archipelagic 
States were among the reasons for the idea of archipelagos as single units. 
This was particularly favoured to protect “national integrity” and “internal 
security”.178 Even after the recognition of the archipelagic concept and its 
incorporation into the LOSC, certain archipelagic States are still concerned
172See U N  Doc. A /2934 ,1955, pp.52-53.
173In the declaration Indonesia had provided that “[i]nnocent passage o f foreign ships in these internal 
waters [archipelagic waters] is granted as long as it is not prejudicial to or does not violate the 
sovereignty and security o f Indonesia.” Rogers, P. E. J„ Midocean Archipelagos in International I ,aw. 
Vintage Press, New York, 1981, p.63.
174 Syatauw, op. cit., p.184.
175 As Andrew views Indonesia and the Philippines have particularly been “adamant that free passage of 
warships through their waters may threaten their security.” Andrew, op. cit., p.48. See also Report of 
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee. Thirteenth Session, 18-25 January 1972, p.216.
176See O’Connell, op. cit., 1971, pp.32-36.
177Bowett, op. cit., p.99.
178Anand, op. cit., p.241.
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about the protection of strategic and security interests.179 This is why these 
States have been attempting to control passage through archipelagic waters. 
Although the security concerns of archipelagic States are understandable, 
the right of international community for peaceful passage through 
archipelagic waters should be respected in accordance with the LOSC.
6. Environmental Reasons
Environmental reasons have been among new arguments of 
archipelagic States for backing their claims on enclosing waters within 
their archipelagos.180 The marine environmental concerns of archipelagic 
States especially arose following a number of accidents which occurred in 
waters around their mid-ocean islands.181 In particular, incidents caused by 
supertankers and ships carrying hazardous substances brought about the 
need for more control over these vessels to prevent serious marine 
pollution in archipelagic waters. Discharge of oil by ships, dumping of 
waste, and spiling hazardous substances into the seas have been the main 
sources of marine pollution in mid-ocean archipelagos.182
The marine ecosystem of mid-ocean archipelagos is very fragile and 
it is vulnerable to any pollution, particularly chemical pollution. Many of 
mid-ocean archipelagos are formed by coral reefs and islands. Although 
corals are not completely living creatures, they are not totally dead and 
would react against any harmful substance to marine life like oil 
pollution.183 In fact, pollution “could well destroy the coral.”184 In 
addition, it is pointed out that because of the random configuration of 
islands in an archipelagic, “pollution sources are more likely to stay within
179For example, n its Declaration upon signing and ratifying the LOSC, Cape Verde declared that the 
Convention “recognises the right o f coastal States to adopt measures to safeguard their security 
interests, including those relating to the innocent passage of warships through archipelagic waters.” 
Kwiatkowska and Agoes, op. cit., p.15.
180Hodgson, op. cit., p.46.
181 Andrew, op. cit., p.48. See also Syatauw, op. cit., p.110. The marine environmental concerns of 
archipelagic States have mainly cause because of the carriage of considerable amount o f oil through 
their archipelagos. For example, ninety percent of oil supply to Japan are carried through Indonesian 
archipelagic waters that is not without risk of oil pollution. Rogers, op. cit., p.121.
182As O’Connell writes “[a]rchipelagos are particularly susceptible to damage from discharge of oil or 
the dumping waste, partly because o f their geography and partly because many archipelagic groups 
are composed o f coral islands.” O’Connell, op. cit., 1982, pp.254-255.
183 As O’Connell states “[c]oral islands are not dead land-masses, even if  the polyps that formed them are 
dead. The areas o f  intersection o f land and sea are subject to incessant biological and chemical 
reaction, whereby the land is preserved from ultimate destruction.” O’Connell, op. cit., 1971, p.54.
184Bowett, op. cit., p.104, no.92. The Bahamas, Fiji, and the Maldives are examples o f coral 
archipelagos. These countries have expressed their concerns over marine pollution due to its adverse 
effects on coral islands. Rogers, op. cit., p.121.
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the waters than to wash away.”185 These special characteristics of marine 
environment of mid-ocean archipelagos make them more vulnerable 
against pollution than other parts of marine environment of the world. 
Accordingly, archipelagic States are at greater risk than other coastal States 
in the case of serious pollution like oil spillage.186
One important adverse effect of pollution of archipelagic waters is 
on living resources upon which local people depend, whether as economic 
assets or as sources of food.187 It is also the case with respect to mangroves 
which have been considered as valuable biological and economic 
resources. Marine pollution has destructive effect on mangroves. They are 
found in the coastlines of coral reefs and islands of archipelagos. Pollution 
in the marine environment of these reefs and islands “can destroy the 
organisms that are essential for the coastal mud to retain its validity and 
support the flora, notably mangroves, which in many instances constitute 
an essential rampart against the sea.”188
Thus, archipelagic States have been making efforts to achieve the 
recognition of an archipelagic regime to protect the marine environment 
within their archipelagos. The adoption of archipelagic principle has 
considerably given a regulatory competence to archipelagic States to 
control pollution within their archipelagos which are sensitive marine 
environments. Although the marine environment pollution has been a 
major concern of all States, whether within their waters under their 
sovereignty or sovereign rights or on the high seas, such a pollution control 
was taken with special consideration into account due to the fragility of 
marine ecosystems of mid-ocean archipelagos.189
7. Other Reasons
To give more support to their archipelagic claims, archipelagic States 
have put forward some other arguments. One argument is based on the 
need to facilitate communications and transportation between constituent
185 Andrew, op. cit., p.48.
186Munawar, op. cit., p.36.
187Such an impact on the marine resources are said to “confirm and strengthen the necessity to look at 
the archipelago as one unit, not only in geographical but also in environmental terms.” Ibid.
1880 ’Connell, op. cit., 1971, p.54.
189 Waters o f mid-ocean archipelagos are not the only marine environments which were given special 
consideration with respect to environmental aspects. Some other marine environments such as closed 
and semi-closed seas were also given necessary protection against pollution.
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islands of an archipelago.190 This need is particularly intensified due to the 
fact that “[t]he great distances between islands of an archipelago naturally 
pose problems of communication among the different parts of the state.”191 
Accordingly, archipelagic States were attempting to reserve the interinsular 
waters for the local vessels. Convenient maritime communications between 
the islands within an archipelago have an economic impact.192 This is 
because many local people are involved in trading with people living in 
other islands and the only efficient way of their communications is through 
the sea. The establishment of archipelagic waters will facilitate and 
guarantee the feasibility and safety of these communications.193
Archipelagic States have also held that the establishment of archipelago 
principle is required for a more efficient control over foreign or local 
vessels for customs purposes. It has been difficult for archipelagic States 
to prevent smuggling and illegal trades. The enclosure of insular waters 
gives these States the authority necessary to deal with these problems and 
also to avoid such problems as illegal entry.
In short, the main reasons for the introduction of a new legal regime for 
the enclosure of mid-ocean archipelagos can be understood in the following 
passage which formed part of the report of the Seabed Committee to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations stating that:
“the preservation of the political and economic unity of an 
archipelagic State and the protection of its security, the preservation 
of its marine environment and the exploitation of its marine resources 
justified the inclusion of the waters inside an archipelago under the 
sovereignty of the archipelagic State or the granting of a special status 
to such waters.”194
190It is stated although distribution of products among the islands is not easy for developing archipelagic 
States, it would be more difficult “if to go from one island to another pockets o f high seas would have 
to be crossed.” Mendioza, Estelito P., ‘The baselines of the Philippines archipelago’, Philippines Law 
Journal. V o l.46 ,1971, p.632.
191 Andrew, op. cit., p.48.
192As one points out “[t]o distribute and market the products of various islands, an integrated and 
complete transportation network is indispensable. Anand, op. cit., p.239.
193See Munavvar, op. cit., p.32 and Anand, op. cit., p.240.
194Report o f the Seabed Committee (Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor 
Beyond the Limits o f National Jurisdiction) to the General Assembly of the United Nations, United 
Nations General Assembly Official Records. 28th Session, Supplement No.21, Doc. A/9021, p.55, 
para.79.
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VII. The Mid-Ocean Archipelagos and State Practice
States concerned have indicated a divergence of practice in applying 
the conventional rules to their archipelagos. In general, Article 47(1) of the 
LOSC states that an archipelagic State may use archipelagic baselines to 
enclose its archipelagic waters. For example, Tonga and Seychelles 
consisting respectively of more than 150 islands and some 90 islands 
scattered in a wide area of water are able to construct archipelagic 
baselines.195 This is because the ratio of water to land for these States falls 
between 1:1 and 9:1. However, these States have not yet proclaimed 
archipelagic baselines.
In addition, some other States, like the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, and Japan196, which may qualify for the definition of archipelagic 
States, do not consider themselves in the group of archipelagic States.197 It 
seems that even if these States may fall into category of archipelagic States, 
they may prefer to keep the status quo governing their waters. This may be 
due to the fact that waters behind the straight baselines drawn around 
constituent islands of these countries are considered as internal waters, 
while waters enclosed by archipelagic baselines are archipelagic waters. 
As a recognised principle of international law, States have complete 
sovereignty in their internal waters whereas such a strong position of 
coastal States does not exist in regard to archipelagic waters. For example, 
while there is no right of passage for foreign ships through waters behind 
coastal archipelagos' baselines, i.e. internal waters, without permission of 
coastal States, foreign ships are entitled to exercise passage through 
archipelagic waters under the legal regimes of innocent passage and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage. It seems that each island State takes 
different factors (such as geographical, political, economic factors) into
195Jamaica in the Caribbean region and Bahrain in the Persian Gulf are also regarded as those States for 
which the ratio o f  water to land falls within the accepted limit by Article 47(2) o f the LOSC. 
Kwiatkowska and Agoes, op. cit., p.3.
196As was mentioned before, Prescott disregards the possibility o f considering these countries as 
archipelagic States because they do not meet the requirement of minimum ration of water to land 
which is 1:1. The issue o f uncertainty over the status of some States as archipelagic States is a 
sensitive issue. This is because adoption of a State as an archipelagic State is, in most cases, in the 
interest o f such State while it is in contrary to the interests of some other States (particularly maritime 
powers). Accordingly, this may lead to some controversy in practice.
197Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., pp.92-93. In the view of Kwiatkowska, the reason that such countries as 
Cuba, Iceland, Madagascar, New Zealand and the UK are not considered archipelagic States is 
because these countries do not meet the requirement of minimum ratio of 1:1 for the area o f water to 
that o f land. Kwiatkowska and Agoes, op. cit., p.2.
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account to find out whether it is in its interest to proclaim an archipelagic 
status.
There also exist a few cases where ocean States have not been able to 
construct archipelagic baselines in accordance with the LOSC to enclose all 
constituent islands within a single archipelago. However, the LOSC has 
empowered these States to form a multi-archipelagic baseline system. This 
enables the States concerned to employ archipelagic baselines around more 
than one archipelago while complying with the requirements included in 
the LOSC for any constituent archipelago.198 The legal basis for such 
possibility comes from Article 46(a) which stipulates that an archipelagic 
State may constitute “wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include 
other islands.”199 Examples of States which are able to construct a multi 
archipelagic baseline system include Fiji, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, and 
Tonga. At the present, such countries as Solomon Islands and Fiji have 
employed such a system. (See maps of Solomon Islands and Fiji below.)
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1992 , 
p.108.
198In addition, as Brown asserts “it is theoretically possible that State A might consist of A1 and A2, 
both of which satisfied the definition o f an archipelago in Article 46(b), but only one o f which (Al)  
would be entitled to adopt a system of archipelagic baselines.” Brown, op. cit., 1994, p.109.
199This means that the territory of an archipelagic State includes one or more archipelagos and also some 
islands located outside these archipelagos. It is clear that these islands are governed by the general 




Source: Francalanci, Giampiero (ed.), e t a l, Atlas of the Straight Baselines - Part 
1: Art.7 of the Convention of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea. Giuffre 
Editore, Milano, 1986, pp.53 and 55.
Further, there are some archipelagic States which have drawn 
archipelagic baselines in a way that is not in conformity with the LOSC. 
For example, Cape Verde has employed 14 archipelagic straight baselines, 
two of which are longer than the maximum permitted length of 125 miles 
for such baselines and the length of one baseline (which connects Ponta 
Prainha and Ponta Preta) amounts to 137 miles.200 (See map of Cape 
Verde below.) Maldives is an archipelagic State which has not complied 
with the rules of the LOSC (Art. 47(2)) whether regarding the ratio of
water to land or the length of baselines.201
Map 5.8
Cape Verde’s Archipelagic 
Baselines
Source: The Law of the Sea: 
Practice of Archipelagic 
States. Office for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the 
Sea, United Nations, New 
York, 1992, p. 19.
200Kwiatkowska and Agoes, p.15.
201 Ibid., pp.15-16.
265
There are some groups of islands which may in general qualify as legal 
archipelagos (within the definitions and requirements incorporated into the 
LOSC) but are not self-governing entities. These groups of islands are 
dependent territories of certain continental States which do not wholly 
consist of islands. This dependency prevents these groups of islands from 
relying on archipelagic status.202 If these groups of islands become fully 
independent and self-governing, they are able to rely on the archipelagic 
rules introduced by the LOSC. This is because once the islands become 
independent countries, they are no longer part of continental States and are 
eligible to benefit from archipelagic principles. The islands are then only 
required to comply with the provisions incorporated into the LOSC, as is 
the case with other existing independent archipelagos. Examples of these 
groups of islands are Antilles (the Netherlands), New Caledonia (France), 
Micronesia (the USA), Cook Islands and Tokelau Islands (New 
Zealand).203
Another issue is related to the status of waters enclosed by archipelagic 
baselines. It is particularly the case with respect to the Philippines. 
Although the LOSC describes the waters within archipelagic baselines as 
“archipelagic waters”, the Philippines has considered waters within its 
archipelagic baselines as “internal waters”. At the time of depositing its 
instrument of the ratification of the LOSC (8 May 1984), the Philippines 
stated that “[t]he concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of 
internal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines ...”.204 This 
statement was countered by a number of States, including Australia, 
Byelorussia, the former Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, the United States and 
the former USSR.205
202Putting aside the element of dependency, the United States of America and New Zealand are among 
certain continental States which “may have preferred not to make use of the rules applicable to 
archipelagic regime due to their vital interest in preserving freedom of navigation.” Ibid., p.5.
203Ibid., p.4. Other examples o f this category of groups of islands are American Samoa (the USA); 
Anguiila, Turks and Caicos Islands (the UK); the Azores and Madeiras Island (Portugal); Dahlac 
Archipelago (Ethiopia); Falkland Islands (the UK); Guadeloupe (France); Jan Mayen (Norway). 
Alexander, L. M., Navigational Restrictions within the New Law of the Sea Context; Geographical 
Implications for the United States. Offshore Consultants Inc., Peace Dale, Rhode Island, December 
1986, p.91 (Table 10B). In general, provisions of Articles 46 and 47 of the LOSC imply that there are 
three kinds o f archipelagos: “(i) archipelagic States which qualify under the Convention for 
archipelagic baselines; (ii) archipelagic States which do not so qualify under the Convention; (iii) 
dependent archipelagos which do not so qualify under the Convention.” Brown, op. cit., 1994, p.109.
204yrn1ti1ateral Treaties Deposited With the Secretary-General. United Nations, New York, 1984, p.682. 
Article 1 o f the new 1987 Philippine Constitution states: “The waters around, between, and 
connecting the islands of the archipelago, irrespective o f their breadth and dimensions, form part of 
the internal waters o f the Philippines.” (<emphasis added)
205See Ibid ., pp.866-868.
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The main argument against the Philippine claim is based on the fact 
that coastal States generally enjoy exclusive and absolute rights in internal 
waters where there are no internationally guaranteed rights for foreign 
ships and aircraft. This is in contradiction to the legal regime established 
for archipelagic waters where the rights of international community are 
guaranteed in the form of innocent passage and the archipelagic sea lanes 
passage.206 In addition, reliance on historic title over the waters within the 
Philippines’ archipelago does not appear to be recognised since such a 
recognition would deprive international community of accessing some 
important waterways. This is why (following an Australian objection over 
the position of the Philippines concerning the waters within the Philippine 
archipelagic baselines) the Philippines submitted a declaration to the UN 
Secretary-General on 26 October 1988. This declaration asserted the 
Philippines’ intention to make its legislation in harmony with the LOSC. 
The declaration, inter alia, included that “[t]he necessary steps are being 
taken to enact legislation dealing with archipelagic sea lanes passage and 
the exercise of Philippine sovereign rights over archipelagic waters, in 
accordance with the Convention [LOSC].”207
Table 5.1 shows the current status of non-continental States 
proclaiming archipelagic baselines. There are also other States which may 
lay claims on the ground of having archipelagic status.208 However, not all 
claims comply with the LOSC.
206In Diplomatic Note of 29 January 1986 to the Philippines, the United States, inter alia, maintained 
that “the concept of internal waters differs significantly from the concept of archipelagic waters. 
Archipelagic waters are only those enclosed by properly drawn archipelagic baselines and are subject 
to the regimes of innocent passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage.” Roach, J. Ashley, and Robert 
W. Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims. Second Edition, Volume 27 of the 
Series of the Publications on Ocean Development, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1996, 
p.402.
207Declaration by the Philippines concerning an objection by Australia to the Understanding recorded 
upon signature by the Philippines and confirmed upon ratification, The Law of the Sea: Current 
Developments in State Practice - No. II. Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United 
Nations, New York, 1989, p.96.
208According to one source, States with archipelagic status can presently be divided into two main 
categories: actual claimants and potential claimants. The former category includes Indonesia (1.2:1), 
Philippines (1.8:1), Comoros (3.9:1), Papua New Guinea (1.3:1), Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu (4.7:1), Antigua and Barbuda (6.6:1), Grenada (1.4:1), St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
(1.3:1), Trinidad and Tobago (1.4:1), Cape Verde (2:1), Sao Tome and Principe 3:1). The latter 
category includes: (a) in Indian Ocean: Bahrain (1.2:1), Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles; (b) in 
South Pacific: Tonga (2.3:1 or 8.9:1); (c) in Caribbean: Jamaica (1.2:1), St. Kitts and Nevis (0.8:1), 
Bahamas, and Cuba; (d) in Mediterranean: Malta (0.64:1). (The figures in the parentheses indicate the 
ratio of water to land.) Kwiatkowska and Agoes, op. cit., p.60.
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Table 5.1 •
States Proclaim ing Archipelagic Status for 
Establishing Archipelagic Straight Baselines
State Official Source of the Proclamation Source Containing theProcIamation
Antigua and Barbuda Maritime Areas Act, 1982 The Law of the Seaa, pp. 13-15
Cape Verde Decree Law No. 126/77 o f 31 December 
1977
The Law of the Sea, pp.99-100
Comoros Law N o. 82-005 relating to the 
delimitation of the maritime zones
Practice o f Archipelagic States15, pp. 
20-22 (particularly Article 1)
Fiji
Marine Spaces (Archipelagic Baselines 
and Exclusive Economic Zone) Order, 
1981
Fiji Royal Gazette, Supplement No. 
41, 27 November 1981 (Legal Notice 
No. 117)
Indonesia Act No. 4 (Straight Baselines) o f 18 
February 1960
Limits in the Seasc, No.35, 20 July 
1971
Kiribati Maritime Zones (Declaration) Act, 1983 
- Act of 19 May 1983
Practice o f Archipelagic States, p.56­
60
Marshall Islands — Limits in the Seas (N o .ll2 )d, p.45.
Papua New Guinea National Seas Act, 1977 - Act No. 7 of 7 
February 1977
Practice of Archipelagic States, pp.61­
74
Philippines
Republic Act No. 3046 of 17 June 1961, 




Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Maritime areas Act, 1983 - Act No. 15 of 
19 May 1983
Practice of Archipelagic States, pp.86­
92 (particularly pp.86-87)
Sao Tome and 
Principe
Decree-Law No. 48/82, 2 December 
1982
The Law of the Sea, pp.271-273
Solomon Islands
The Delimitation o f Marine Waters Act 




Archipelagic Waters and Exclusive 
Economic Zone A c t, 1986 - Act No. 24 
of 11 November 1986
Practice o f  Archipelagic States, 
pp.112-123 (particularly p. 114)
Tuvalu Marine Zones (Declaration) Ordinance, 
1983 - National Limits of Jurisdiction
Practice o f Archipelagic States, pp. 
124-130 (particularly pp.126-127)
Vanuatu The Maritime Zones Act No. 23 of 1981 The Law of the Sea, pp.376-380
(a) The Law of the Sea - Baselines: National Legislation With Illustrative Maps. Office for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York, 1989.
(b) The Law of the Sea: Practice of Archipelagic States. Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United 
Nations, New York, 1992.
(c) Limits in the Seas. No. 35. Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, The United States 
Department of State, Washington D.C., 20 July 1971.
(d) Limits in the Seas. No. 112. Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, The United States 
Department of State, Washington D.C., 1992.
(e) National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Continental Shelf, the 
High Seas, and to Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea. United Nations, New York, 1970.
(f) National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea United Nations, New York, 1980.
- Comoros, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tuvalu have not 
yet provided maps illustrating their archipelagic baselines. Prescott maintains that The Bahamas, Grenada, Jamaica, 
and Maldives are eligible to draw archipelagic baselines. Prescott, J. R. V., ‘Straight and Archipelagic Baselines’, in 
Gerald Blake (ed.), Maritime Boundaries and Ocean Resources. Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1987, p.47. 
Brownlie also considers Mauritius and Seychelles as archipelagic States. See Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public 
International Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p.193 (no.75). The Mauritius’ Act of 16 April 1970 (S.5(b)) 
provided an archipelagic baseline system for those islands forming an archipelago. See International Boundary 
Series, published by the Geographer to the U.S. Department of State, Ser.A, No.41. Cuba is not mentioned among 
archipelagic States in the source mentioned in paragraph (b) above. However, Cuba has employed straight lines in a 
way that assimilates to archipelagic baselines. For example, the map produced on page 118 of the source mentioned 
in paragraph (a) is named “Cuba- Archipelagic Baselines”. .See Verbal Note to the United Nations, 13 November 
1985 in the source mentioned in paragraph (a), pp. 112-118. In assessing such claims, the provisions of Article 
47 of the LOSC should be kept in mind as determinant elements in finding whether a State is an archipelagic State 
within the framework of the LOSC.
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VIII. The Issue of Outlying Islands of Continental States
Despite the fact that the provisions on archipelagic baselines were 
designed for merely legal archipelagic States as defined in Article 46 of the 
LOSC2°9, some continental States have applied straight baselines around 
groups of their offshore islands.* 210 These baselines connect the outermost 
points of outermost islands indicating that the baselines play the same role 
as the archipelagic baselines.211 The continental States with outlying 
archipelagos were seeking at the UNCLOS HI to gain a recognition for the 
application of the new archipelagic regime to their archipelagos.212 These 
States expressed their “interests in the resources of the seas and national 
security” to justify the archipelago principle for their archipelagos.213 
Although efforts made during the UNCLOS III to extend the applicability 
of the new archipelagic baseline system to offshore islands of continental 
States214, no provision was adopted for this purpose.
200Article 1(1) o f the 1974 proposed articles by Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius, and the Philippines on 
archipelagos stated that “these articles apply only to archipelagic states.” UN Document 
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.49.
210One views that “if the islands in question constitute in fact a closely related group, geographically 
separate and distinct from the coastal state, it is somewhat difficult to see why the mere fact of being 
related to a coastal state should prevent the drawing of archipelagic baselines.” Vicuna, Francisco 
Orrego, ‘International Ocean Law Developments in the Southeast Pacific: The Case o f Chile’, in 
John P. Craven et al (eds.), The International Implications of Extended Maritime Jurisdiction in the 
Pacific. Proceedings o f the 21st Annual Conference of The Law of the Sea Institute (3-6 August 1987, 
Honolulu), The Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, 1989, p.228. Also see Brown, op. cit., 1994, 
pp.123-124.
211 As one source states ‘several continental states, including Denmark, Ecuador, Portugal, and Spain, 
have established straight baselines around their islands in a manner simulating an archipelago. Limits 
in the Seas. No. 112. Office o f Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the United States 
Department o f State, Washington D.C., 1992, p.44.
212For example, at the UNCLOS III Ecuador proposed that “[t]he method applied to archipelagic states 
for the drawing o f baselines shall also apply to archipelagos that form part o f a state, without any 
change in natural regime o f the waters o f such archipelagos or of their territorial sea.” Ecuador: Draft 
Article on Archipelagos, A/CONF.62/C.2/L.51, 12 August 1974, UNCLOS III. Official Records. 
Vol.III, p.227. See also the position of India in UNCLOS III. Official Records. Vol.II, p.263 and 
Vol.HI, p.187.
2130 ’Connell, op. cit., 1971, p .l. Anand also writes that Ecuador and India have claimed archipelago 
status for their outlying islands “for practically the same security and economic reasons” as were 
relied upon by the archipelagic States. Anand, op. cit., p.255. For the political and economic reasons 
of the exclusion o f “archipelagic dependencies” from the employment of archipelagic baselines see 
Bowett, op. cit., pp.106-107.
214See for example Articles 9-11 of the Working Paper prepared by Canada, Chile, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Mauritius, M exico, New Zealand, and Norway at the UNCLOS III. UN Doc. 
A/CONF.62/L.4, 26 July 1974. At the UNCLOS III, these countries (except Indonesia which later 
preferred to follow its own criteria) along with such other continental countries as Ecuador, France, 
Portugal, and Spain (which all possess groups of offshore islands) were advocators o f inclusion o f a 
provision applying archipelagic regime to these islands. However, the UNCLOS III did not adopt 
such an inclusion mainly due to its effects on free navigation.
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Currently there are a number of continental States (those coastal 
States which are not wholly composed of groups of islands) which have 
applied straight baselines around their offshore islands with the effect of 
archipelagic baselines.215 These States include Australia (Houtman 
Abrohols and Fumeaux), China (Xisha (Paracel) Islands), Denmark 
(Faeroes Islands)216, Ecuador (Galapagos (Colon) Islands)217, France 
(Kerguelen Islands), India218 (Andaman Islands and Nikobar Islands, and
215 Although straight baselines and archipelagic baselines may be assimilated in the sense that they both 
enclose a wide area of waters, their applications are governed by different legal rules. In addition, 
straight baselines have a longer history while archipelagic baselines have their legal foundations in the 
new convention on the law of the sea (LOSC, 1982). There are only a limited number o f legal 
archipelagos whereas there are many coastlines for which the use of straight baselines has been 
justified. This fact has led to a wider application of straight baselines in comparison with archipelagic 
baselines.
216Denmark issued a decree on 12 March 1964 and applied 13 straight baselines with the total length of 
163 nautical miles around the Faeroes Islands and considered the whole islands as a single unit. See 
Dubner, Barry Hart, ‘A proposal for accommodating the interests of archipelagic and maritime States’, 
International Law and Politics. Vol.I, 1975, p.58. The ratio of water to land in the case of the Faeroes 
Islands is said to be 2:1. Bowett, op. cit., p.91.
2*2A s the first country which laid claims over ocean islands as a single unit, Ecuador drew baselines 
between the outer most points of the outermost islands in the Galapagos. The basis for this measures 
was the Presidential Decree of 2 February 1938 on Fisheries which was completed by the Presidential 
Decree o f 22 February 1951. See Evensen, op. cit., pp.298. Then, the Ecuadorian Decree of 28 June 
1971 enclosed the Galapagos islands (including the Darwin Island) by drawing eight straight baselines 
resulting in a high ratio of water to land. Bowett, op. cit., p.92. In addition, following a Presidential 
Decree o f No. 1810-A on 29 April 1986, Ecuador established a marine resource reserve consisting of 
the waters, seabed and subsoil of the Galapagos Islands within the baselines drawn in 1971 and 
outside o f these baselines up to 15 miles. According to its Preamble of the Decree, the measure was 
taken on “ecological, economic, scientific, educational, and political reasons.” Vicuna, op. cit., p.228. 
The Reserve area covers a marine area of 70,000 km2 of which 50,000 km2 are internal waters 
enclosed by archipelagic baselines and the other 20,000 km2 are located in the 15 mile area (the 
buffer zone). Brown (1991), op. cit., p.212. It is also stated that “[t]he length of protected coastline is 
greater than the total coastline of continental Ecuador.” Ibid.
218According to the 1976 Act o f India on its maritime zones, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and 
Lakshadweep Islands are considered as single units that is the core of the archipelago principle. The 
Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act 
(1976), Reprinted in Indian Journal of International Law.. Vol.16, p.447. Khodie is of the view that as 
far as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep (Laccadive) Islands are concerned, India is 
regarded as an archipelagic State and the sovereignty of India extends over archipelagic waters and 
territorial seas of these islands. Although Article 297 of the Constitution of India does not refer to 
archipelagic waters, Khodie relies on this Article to extend the rights of India over resources of 
maritime areas located within the islands on an archipelagic status. Khodie, Narmada, ‘International 
Maritime Law and India’s State Practice’, in Satish Chandra et al (eds.), The Indian Ocean and Its 
Islands: Strategic. Scientific and Historical Perspectives. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1993, p.98. 
In contrast, Sharma writes that despite its efforts at the UNCLOS III to treat archipelagos forming part 
o f continental States in a manner similar to those of archipelagic State, “India was not able to 
persuade the Conference to accord the status of an archipelago to a group of islands of a continental 
coastal state such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands or the Lakshadweep group of islands.” 
Sharma, O. P., ‘India and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’, Ocean Development 
and International Law. Vol.26, 1995, p.398. There are two main effects arising from refusing the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands as legal archipelagos: (a) India would not enjoy sovereignty or 
sovereign rights over a maritime are of 23,000 km2; (b) the passage of foreign ships through the Ten 
Degree Channel would not be subject to “the restrictive regime of innocent passage or archipelagic 
sealanes passage.” Ibid. For the view of the Indian Delegate on the extension of archipelagic regime 
to Andaman and Nicobar Islands see UNCLOS III. Official Records. Vol.II, p.263 (para.40).
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Lakshadweep Islands), Norway (Spitsbergen (Svalbard archipelago))219, 
Portugal (Azores Islands), Spain (Balearic and Canary Islands), and Sudan 
(Suakin Archipelago).220 (See for example maps of Azores Islands, 
Faeroes Islands, and Galapagos Islands below.)
Prescott argues that claims of continental States over their outlying 
archipelagos may be justified if there is a large island surrounded by other 
small islands.221 Prescott refers to the Kerguelen archipelago as a clear 
example where there exists a principal island to justify the use of straight 
lines to connect islands surrounding the principal island.222
Whatever the justification for the use of archipelagic baselines by 
certain continental States might be, it seems that the provisions of the 
LOSC on archipelagic baselines were engineered to be only applied to real 
archipelagic States and it was not intended to extend these provisions to 
non-archipelagic States.223 Adoption of the notion of legal archipelagos
219The sovereignty o f Norway over the Svalbard Islands was recognised by the Spitsbergen o f 9 
February 1920. Norway has considered the islands as a single unit connecting the outermost islands 
by a series of straight baselines. According to Bowett, the Norwegian Decree of 25 September 1970 
set up two separate straight baseline system for the islands of Svalbard, Bear (Bjomoya), and Hopen. 
with “a very low water/land ratio.“ Bowett, op. c it., p.91.
220Prescott, op. cit., 1996, p.18; Roach and Smith, op. cit., p.23; Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.92, and 
Kwiatkowska and Agoes, op. cit., p.6 .. Brown also names some other mid-ocean archipelagos which 
are part of continental States. These archipelagos are the Aleutians, Florida Keys, and Hawaiian 
Islands (the USA); the Bermudas (the UK); and Tuamotu (France). Brown, op. cit., 1994, p.107. 
Other examples are: Gilbert Island, Ellice Islands, Falklands, and Chagos Archipelago (British); 
Ryukyu Islands (Japan); New Hebrides (British/French Condominium); Wallis and Futuna (French); 
Cocos (Australia); and Kermadee (New Zealand). Bowett, op. cit., p.93. In the case of the Arctic 
Islands of Canada, Canadian Government decided to link the Islands (including Queen Elizabeth 
Islands, located in the north of the Parray Channel) to the Canadian mainland by drawing lines around 
outer side of the islands. By doing this, waters between islands were enclosed by straight baselines. 
The Canadian Government did not claim archipelagic status for its Arctic Islands and did not employ 
archipelagic baselines for these islands. For background information on State practice concerning 
outlying (mid-ocean) archipelagos, including the Faeroes, the Svalbard Archipelago, the Bermudas, 
the Galapagos, Cook Islands, and Hawaiian Islands see Evensen, Preparatory Document No.15, op. 
cit., pp.297-299. For information on some other archipelagos see O’Connell, op. cit., 1982, pp.246­
254. In the Fisheries Case (1951), the UK rejected the application of any archipelagic baseline system 
for the Cook Islands and Fijian Islands. See Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), ICJ. Pleadings. Vol.II. 
1951, pp.523-524. Also see ibid., p.532 with respect to the Bermudas Islands.
221Prescott, op. cit., 1987 (Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p.45. Prescott states that the argument 
may work for the Furneaux Group in Bass Strait but it does not work for Houtman Abrolhos off 
Western Australia, the Islas Canarias or the Islas Galapagos. Ibid.
222Prescott, op. cit.., 1996, p.18.
223In the Caracas Session of the UNCLOS III (10 July 1974), the Thai delegation opposed to the 
application of archipelagic principles to those archipelagos “which do not have the status of States.” 
Two reasons were forwarded for such opposition: “The first reason is that, if the same principles 
should apply, why should there be the concept of archipelagic states at all. ... The second reason ... is 
that if theses principles should apply to all archipelagos, which may again have their territorial waters 
and other jurisdictional zones, how much will be left for the international area. In that case, we may 
ask ourselves if we are really serious with the principle of common heritage of mankind, we know 
uphold. We may also ask ourselves that while we challenge the principle of mare liberum, whether
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has already resulted in conversion of a vast area of the high seas into 
archipelagic waters. Thus, it would not be reasonable to enclose offshore 
archipelagos of continental States by the application of the straight lines 
which have the same impact as archipelagic baselines. Otherwise, such 
enclosure would exclude the freedom of navigation and overflight in a 
wider area of waters which would not be consistent with the balance of 
interests achieved by the adoption of the LOSC.224
Map 5.9
Portugal’s Straight Baselines (Azores Islands)
Source: The Law of the Sea - Baselines: National Legislation With 
Illustrative Maps. Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United 
Nations, New York, 1989, p.266.
we are no swinging back to the other extremity of mare clausum.” Statement by Dr. Arun Panupong 
(Head of the Thai Delegation at the UNCLOS III), Caracas Session of the UNCLOS in, 10 July 1974.
224Sharma points out that the reason why the UNCLOS III did not adopt the extension of archipelagic 
rules to the ocean islands of continental States was “a fear of interference with the freedom of 
navigation through vast tracts of archipelagic waters that would be created if the off-laying islands of 
continental coastal states were to be granted archipelagic status.” Sharma, op. cit., p.398.
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Map 5.10
Faeroes Islands’ Baseline System (Denmark)
Map 5.11
Galapagos Islands’ Baseline System (Ecuador)
Source: Francalanci, Giampiero (ed.), et al, Atlas of the Straight Baselines - Part 
1: Art.7 of the Convention of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea. Giuffre 
Editore, Milano, 1986, pp.47 (Faeroes Islands) and 51 (Galapagos Islands).
IX. Conclusion
It is apparent that although the drawing of archipelagic straight 
baselines is permitted by the LOSC in the case of island States qualified as 
archipelagic States, some requirements were incorporated into the 
Convention for the validity of these baselines.225 These requirements must 
completely be met if the baselines are to be recognised. Although these 
requirements restrict the unilateral drawing of archipelagic baselines, the 
application of the archipelagic baselines, even in compliance with the 
provisions of the LOSC has a significant impact on the enclosure of large 
areas of the seas. This has, in turn, had adverse implications for the free 
navigation in the seas. For example, Fiji and Mauritius (which enjoy small 
area of land) have been able to claim a very large sea area with reliance on 
the archipelagic State concept.226 Due to the effects of the archipelagic 
baselines on the enclosure of the high seas and their freedoms, it is
225As regards the binding force of Article 47 of the LOSC, it is mentioned that certain archipelagic States 
(like Kiribati) are of the view that compliance with the provisions of Article 47 is “arbitrary” and they 
do not have binding force for those archipelagic States which were not involved in the preparation of 
these provisions. Prescott, 1987 (Straight and Archipelagic Baselines), p.48.
226Dupuy, op. cit., p.213.
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therefore necessary to draw these baselines in conformity with rules and 
spirit of the LOSC.
It should, however, be noted that although certain rights were 
granted to the legally qualified archipelagic States (including the right to 
employ proper archipelagic baselines), inclusive rights of third States and 
the international community were preserved. In fact, the provisions on mid­
ocean archipelagos in the LOSC show a balance between the competing 
interests of archipelagic States and user States. The obvious example is the 
adoption of archipelagic baselines in return for acceptance of innocent 
passage227 in archipelagic waters and the new right of archipelagic sea 
lanes passage228 through straits within archipelagic waters which have been 
traditionally used for international navigation and flight.229 The existence 
of these rights makes the legal status of the archipelagic waters sui generis. 
While in normal situations waters within baselines are internal waters, in 
the case of the mid-ocean archipelagos, waters within archipelagic 
baselines are considered “archipelagic waters” where there are certain 
rights of transit for third States.230
227According to Article 19(1) of the LOSC, the right of innocent passage is a right of passage which will 
not be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of coastal or archipelagic States. Article 19(2) 
o f the LOSC provides a lists of activities which are considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security o f coastal or archipelagic States.
228Article 53(3) o f the LOSC provides that "[ajrchipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in 
accordance with this Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely 
for the purpose o f continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone."
229Article 53(12) of the LOSC.
230In addition to the maintenance o f the rights of navigation and overflight, there are some other 
preserved rights for third States. Article 51(1) o f the LOSC requires archipelagic States to respect 
their agreements previously concluded with other States and to recognise "traditional fishing rights 
and other legitimate activities o f the immediately adjacent neighbouring States in certain areas falling 
within archipelagic waters.” Article 51(2) of the LOSC also contains another right for third States in 
the archipelagic waters. It states that the recognition o f the new legal regime for the mid-ocean 
archipelagos does not affect the existing submarine cables in the archipelagic waters. These cables 
may be maintained and replaced or repaired provided that the State concerned submits a notice to the 
archipelagic State which includes the place of the cables and the intention to do so. This does not 
apply, if these cables make a landfall. It seems that because in this case the cables enter the land 
territory o f the archipelagic State, this State is more involved and it is the only authority which has 
competence to make a decision concerning these cables.
Chapter Six




Delimitation of the Outer Limit of the Territorial Sea 
I. Introduction
The issue of delimitation of the outer limit of the territorial sea1 has 
been one of the most controversial issues in the recent history of 
international law in general, and of international law of the sea in 
particular.2 The main reason for this controversy has been the implication 
of extension of territorial seas for the freedom of navigation and other 
freedoms of the high seas.3 The national claims over territorial seas 
covered a wide range, from 3 nautical miles to 200 nautical miles, although 
the latter excessive claims failed because of their impacts on the right of 
navigation since they would restrict the freedom of navigation by 
subjecting it to national discretion. The following part of this chapter will 
show how the international community went through the process of 
compromising between national interests of coastal States and the 
maintenance of the freedom of the high seas. This is, for example, evident 
in the acceptance of twelve nautical miles for the maximum limit of the 
territorial sea and the adoption of the right of transit passage through 
international straits.
II. Historical Development in the Delimitation of 
the Outer Limit of the Territorial Sea
The history of the extent4 of the territorial sea is, in fact, part of the 
history of the territorial sea which constitutes maritime territory of coastal 
States. It is essential to study the development of the extent of this 
maritime territory in historical context to present a comprehensive
1 It was the Second Committee of the 1930 Hague Conference (Committee on Territorial Waters) which 
introduced the term “Territorial Sea” as an appropriate substitute for the term “Territorial Waters” The 
term “Territorial Waters” was previously used to include inland waters and waters beyond the inland 
waters to a certain extent.
2The extension o f the territorial sea breadth was a controversial issue (a) particularly because of its 
impacts on passage through international straits; and (b) because the freedom of navigation in some 
parts o f the high seas would become subject to the limited right of innocent passage.
3 As Harris writes “ the extension o f the territorial sea to 12 miles has important consequences for the 
right o f innocent passage for ships; it also affects aircraft which have no right of innocent passage over 
the territorial sea. Harris, Cases and Materials on International La%, Fourth Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1991, pp.353-354.
4The words “extent”, "breadth", and "limit" are used interchangeably in this thesis.
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approach towards the final resolution of this issue in the modem law of the 
sea and the impacts on the right of navigation.
1. The Era Before the 1930 Hague Conference
The traditional law of the sea had recognised that coastal States have 
sovereignty over a maritime belt adjacent to their coasts. However, the 
controversial issue has been the determination of the permissible extent for 
such a maritime area. Ngantcha argues that "[t]he main obstacle to 
reaching agreement (on the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea) has 
always been the link made by most States between the legal status of the 
territorial sea and the issue of its maximum permissible outer limit.”5 It has 
been clear that the extension of territorial sea would restrict the scope of 
the principle of the freedom of high seas. Therefore, attempts have been 
made to reconcile competing interests of coastal States and user States. 
The history of the law of the sea demonstrates that for a long time States 
were not able to agree on a specific limit ensuring the economic and 
security interests of coastal States on one hand and the freedoms of the 
high seas on the other.
In the seventeenth century, there was no doubt that a coastal State 
was entitled to exercise a degree of jurisdiction in its adjacent maritime belt 
despite the existing conflicts of opinions on the scope of freedom of the 
seas. Some criteria were suggested in order to determine the extent of such 
a jurisdictional area. One of the primary criteria for the extent of the 
marginal waters was the vague method of "the range of visibility". 
However, the first physical method proposed for the determination of the 
territorial sea limit was based on the cannon-shot rule. In the eighteenth 
century, the range of cannons was approximately equivalent to a marine 
league or three nautical miles6. The application of the method was an 
outcome of the theory created by Grotius and Bynkershoke7, that is
5Ngantcha, Francis, The Right of Innocent Passage and the Evolution of the International Law of the Sea; 
The Current Regime of Tree' Navigation in Coastal Waters of Third States. Printer Publishers, London, 
1992, p.15.
6In this thesis a reference to the measure unit o f "mile' is a reference to "nautical mile". Different 
measures have been cited for a nautical mile, such as 1852 and 1853 meters. In 1929 the International 
Hydrographic Bureau adopted an International Nautical Mile as being equivalent to 1852 meters. This 
measure was later accepted by the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. State practice has 
indicated a wide recognition o f this measure. Maritime Limits and Baselines; A guide to their 
delineation. Special Publication No.2, Third Edition, The Hydrographic Society, Essex, June 1987, p.6 .
7Churchill, R. R., and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983, 
p.59.
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sovereignty of a coastal State ends at a point being the final range of a 
cannon-shot.8 However, advances in military technology and production of 
modern cannons proved that such a theory was not reliable. This was 
because changes in the developments of cannons equalled changes in limits 
of the territorial waters. It was later realised that the limit of territorial sea 
had to be fixed.
It was Galiani, an Italian jurist, who in 1782 suggested three nautical 
miles for the width of the territorial waters for the first time. At the time of 
emergence of such a rule, it became acceptable for a number of States such 
as the United Kingdom and the United States of America. For example, the 
USA officially declared three nautical miles as the breadth of its territorial 
sea in its 1793 proclamation for neutrality purposes.9 This limit gradually 
attracted the attention of many States and in the beginning of the twentieth 
century it obtained the most support. This led to an idea that the three mile 
rule was in the process of transformation into a customary rule. This limit 
was considered as traditional limit for the breadth of territorial sea. 
Although this limit was largely supported by some States, it was not the 
sole existing limit for territorial waters. According to Churchill the three- 
mile limit "was never unanimously accepted."10 Ngantcha also states that 
"the three-mile rule was not universally accepted as the limit of territorial 
waters in international law."11
Among other limits applied to the territorial sea were four and six 
nautical miles. The four nautical miles extent was recognised by 
Scandinavian countries such as Norway and Sweden. It could be 
considered as a regional custom. As Smith writes, the existence of the four 
nautical mile claim dates back to the eighteenth century12, that is before the 
emergence of three nautical mile claims.13 The six nautical mile limit was 
another classic claim to the territorial sea, though not as old as the four
8in 1744, Cornelius van Bynkershoek, the Dutch jurist, stated! Potestatern tervae finiri, ubifinitur 
armorum vis’ ( . . .  the control from lands ends where the power of men’s weapons ends.) Bynkershoek, 
Cornelius van, De dotnitiio tnciris disssrtatio, 1774, cap II. (English Translation. Magoffin, R van. D., 
The, n a d ir s  o f International Law. N o .lL  Edited by J. B. Scott, Oxford University Press, 1923, p.44.
9Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.59.
l0Ibid.
1 Ngantcha, op. cit., p.15. In 1927, Jessup found that at that time the three mile limit was an established 
rule o f international law. Jessup, Philip C., The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction, 
G. A. Jennings Co., INC., New York, 1927, p.66.
12Smith, H. A., The Law and Custom of the Sea. Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1948, p.14.
13In the World War I, Norway established a four mile limit as its neutral waters. However, the United 
Kingdom and Germany did not accept four miles for neutrality purposes. Ibid.
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nautical mile limit. The six mile limit was adopted by such countries as 
Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Such claims indicated that the three mile 
limit was not an absolute rule for the breadth of the territorial sea. In fact, 
it has been argued that there exists no "single limit for territorial sea claims 
existing at any one time."14
State practice in the nineteenth century illustrated that there was no 
claim less than three nautical miles for the breadth of the territorial waters 
and there was no dispute on the minimum breadth of the territorial sea. 
However, the controversy was on its maximum limit.15 There was no 
agreement on the maximum breadth of such adjacent waters. Such a 
dispute lasted until the UNCLOS in  (when the establishment of the twelve 
mile limit was adopted as the maximum limit for the territorial sea). One 
example of the conflicts which arose among the supporters of different 
limits for territorial sea is "the Anglo-Spanish dispute". 16The determination 
of the outer limit of territorial waters was important for the avoidance of 
conflicts among coastal States and user States. Such tensions might result 
in military conflicts. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the three 
nautical mile limit obtained the support of a larger number of States, but it 
was not officially recognised for universal application.
2. The 1930 Hague Conference on the Codification of 
International Law
At the time of League of Nations Conference for the Codification of 
International Law (the 1930 Hague Conference), there was strong support 
for the three nautical mile limit in comparison to other existing limits for 
territorial sea.17 Maritime States of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, 
Japan, the UK and the USA supported the three mile limit.18 The
14Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.60. As an exceptional case, Lebanon did not put any claim on its 
adjacent waters, known as territorial sea until quite recently. Lebanon ratified the LOSC on 5 January 
1995 and it now claims 12 nautical miles for its territorial sea. The lack of claim to the territorial sea 
by Lebanon led to a number of uncertainties on the rights and responsibilities of Lebanon as a coastal 
State. See, for example, Dissenting Opinion of Judge McNair, ICJ RepQriS. 1951, p.160. n
15 In 1907, Westlake was in the opinion that there is universal agreement on three mile limit as a 
minimum", but "[a]s a maximum the agreement is not universal." Quoted in Jessup, op. cit., p.65.
16Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.60. . ,
17The Conference was convened by the League of Nations to discuss three issues of international law , 
namely Nationality; Territorial Waters; and Responsibility of States for Damage done in their Territory 
to the Person or Property of Foreigners. See Resolution of 27 September 192L the Assembly of the 
League o f Nations. The Conference was held at The Hague, the Netherlands, from 13 March to 12
18Oda, Shigeru, International Control of Sea Resources. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, 
p.14.
279
Scandinavian countries relied on their traditional four mile limit.19 The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) favoured the twelve mile limit 
for the breadth of the territorial sea.20 As is shown in Table 6.1, at the time 
of the 1930 Conference twenty States were in favour of the three mile limit, 
four States in support of a four mile limit, twelve States in favour of a six 
mile limit (particularly Mediterranean countries), and one State in favour of 
the twelve mile limit.21
In the last session of the Territorial Waters Committee of the 
Conference, the three mile limit could not achieve the required majority of 
votes for its adoption as the maximum limit of the territorial sea.22 As is 
well-known, this failure was the major reason the Conference could not 
approve any draft articles on the breadth of territorial sea. After the 
Conference, the divergence in State practice continued.23 In such a 
situation, in 1934 Gidel contended that there existed no definite rule for 
delimitation of the territorial sea.24 If the Conference had accepted three 
nautical miles, it would possibly have become well-established rule for the 
breadth the territorial sea in international law.
After World War II the controversy on the extent of the territorial 
sea became wider. This is because a number of the newly-emerged 
countries claimed a variety of limits for the territorial sea ranging from 
three to two hundred nautical miles.25 Smith considered that in the
19These countries included Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. Boggs, op. cit., p.542.
20 The origin o f the Soviet Union claim of the twelve mile limit dates back to the 1909 Russian claim for 
customs purposes along its coast. Oda, op. cit., p.15.
21Boggs writes that at the 1930 Conference it was pointed out that “four-fifths of the shipping of the 
world” was conducted by nations which applied three nautical miles for their territorial sea. Boggs, S. 
Whittemore, ‘Delimitation o f the Territorial Sea’, American Journal of International Law. Vol.24, July 
1930, p.542.
22Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.60.
23Akehurst writes that "[t]he failure of a codification scheme may cast doubt on customary rules which 
were previously well established. (This is what happened to the three-mile rule concerning the width of 
the territorial sea after the failure of the 1930 conference.)" Akehurst, Michael, A Modem Introduction 
to International Law. Sixth Edition (3rd impression), Harper Collins Academic, London, 1991, p.33.
24Ibid.
25Major reasons for the extension o f the territorial sea have been economic and security reasons. Having 
a wide territorial sea would ensure fishing and security interests of coastal States, particularly those of 
developing States. This is because the only right available for foreign ships in the territorial sea is the 
right o f innocent passage. No fishing activities by foreign ships are permitted in such a maritime zone. 
The interests o f States opposing the extension o f the territorial sea have also been based on the same 
grounds but with different approaches. On this point see Bowett, D. W., ‘The Second United Nations 





3 4 5 6 9 10 12 15 18 20 30 35 50 130 170 200 TNS*
1900 20 — — 1 — — — . — — — — — — — — — 21
1930a 15 4 — 10 — — I — — — — — ' — — — — 30
1958b 41 4 1 11 1 1 11 — — — — — — — -- 4 74
1960e 40 4 1 12 1 1 16 — — . — — — — — — 4 79
1973d 26 4 — 11 — 1 . 52 — 1 — 4 — 1 1 1 7 109
1988 12e 2 — 4f — — 1032 1 — 1 2 1 2 — — 13 141
1990 10 2 — 4 — — 110h — — 1 2 1 I — — 12 143
1995» 5 1 — 3 — — 121Í — — 1 2 1 1 — — 11 146k
Conference on the Law of the Sea (Geneva), (c) At the time of the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(Geneva), (d) At the time of the Third Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Caracas, Venezuela), (e) United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) also applied a 12-mile limit to Sharga. (f) The 6-mile territorial sea of Turkey applies to the Agean Sea. Turkey also claims a 
12-mile limit in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, (g) Excluding UAE and Turkey, (h) Excluding UAE and Turkey, (i) Recent 
practice of States (As at 16 June 1995). (j) Including Belize, Japan, and UAE. Belize applies a 3-mile limit from the mouth of the 
Sarstoon River to Ranguana Caye. Japan also applies a 3-mile limit to the Tsugaru Strait, the eastern and western channels of the 
Tsushima Strait and the Osumi Straits, (k) There are 151 coastal States in the world, including the Cook Islands and Nieu. However, 
as of 16 June 1995, 146 States have enacted legislation on the breadth of the territorial sea. The remaining five States are Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Eritrea, Georgia, Philippines, and Slovenia. There also exist 42 land-locked States in the world. *Total Number of 
States.
Sources: (1) Brown, E. D., 1973 (December), Passage through the Territorial Sea. Straits Used for International Navigation and 
Archipelagos. University College, London, p.13. (2) Burke, William T., 1977 (April), 'Submerged Passage through Straits: 
Interpretations of the Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty Text', Washington Law Review, vol.52, no.2, p. 195. (3) Larson, David L., 
1987, 'Innocent, Transit, and Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage', Ocean Development and International Law, vol.18, no.4, p.413. (4) 
United Nations, Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin, no .ll, July 1988, pp.46-9. (5) Dupuy, 
Rene-Jean, 1991, 'The Sea Under National Competence', in A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, vol.l, eds. Rene-Jean Dupuy 
and Daniel Vignes, pp.308-310. (6) Information obtained directly from the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. Office 
of Legal Affairs, United Nations.
toooo
281
period after the Word War II the three nautical mile limit developed as "a 
general rule of law."26 However, the coming years proved that such a limit 
was not able to become a general rule of international law. For example, 
the 1956 session of the Council of Jurists of the Organisation of American 
States was a forum in which an opposite view was expressed. In this 
session the Council of Jurists maintained that the three mile limit for the 
maximum breadth of the territorial sea was not a general rule of 
international law.27 Thus, it was suggested that the conflicts resulting from 
divergent claims over the territorial sea need to be resolved through 
diplomatic channels.28
3. The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(Geneva, 1958)
Prior to the UNCLOS I, the ILC29 was asked to prepare a draft for 
the basis of discussion on different issues related to the law of the sea. To 
this end, the Commission performed an extensive study through period of 
1950-56. One of the issues was about the breadth of territorial sea. In its 
1956 report to the United Nations General Assembly, the Commission 
stipulated that at the time "there was no uniformity as regards the three- 
mile limit of territorial sea."30 The Commission expressed that "the 
extension by a State of its territorial sea to a breadth between three and 
twelve miles" was not considered "as a breach of international law."31 
However, the Commission pointed out that international law did not 
recognise the territorial seas of larger than twelve miles.32
In the UNCLOS I, it became clear that the three mile limit would not 
achieve a consensus among the participants. This was why a number of 
proposals were submitted to bring about compromises among States 
enabling the conference to reach an agreement on the limit of the territorial 
sea. Efforts were made to recognise a fixed limit for the territorial sea.33
26Smith, op. cit., p.15.
270d a, op. cit., p.15.
28 Ibid. . . .
29 The International Law Commission was set up by the General Assembly o f the United Nations in 
1947. Its major duty is to promote codification and progressive development of international law. This 
Comm ission presently has thirty-four members who are elected by the General Assembly from 
different geographical regions.
30YILC. Vol.II, 1956, United Nations, New York, p.265.
31Ibid
32Ibid.
33The USA was primarily in favour o f a three mile limit. Its representative at the UNCLOS I argued for 
such a limit as follows. “One o f the merits o f the three mile limit was that it was safest for navigation.
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The issue was complicated because there were a number of purposes for 
claiming adjacent maritime areas that were different from those for 
claiming territorial sea. Claims to fisheries zones and also to certain zones 
for customs, immigration, and fiscal and sanitary purposes are examples of 
different purposes for various maritime areas adjacent to coastal States. 
The various proposals submitted to the Conference for the delimitation of 
the outer limit of the territorial sea included three mile limit, six mile 
limit34, twelve mile limit, and the right to fix the territorial limit up to 
twelve miles. None of these proposals was accepted at the Conference. 
Accordingly, although Article 1 of the TSC recognises the sovereignty of a 
coastal State over the territorial sea, it does not define the outer limit of the 
territorial sea.
The failure of the first conference to make a final decision on the 
issue had an impact on State practice. After the conference a number of 
States extended their territorial sea, mainly up to twelve nautical miles. 
Since the TSC lacked provisions on the extent of the territorial sea and 
fishery zone, a second conference on the law of the sea was convened to 
deal with these issues.
4. The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(Geneva, 1960)
The major aim of this conference was to specify a limit for the 
territorial sea and a limit for the fishing zone. It was apparent that the 
issues of the extents of these maritime areas are interrelated35 and these 
issues had to be resolved together. Like in the UNCLOS I, major maritime
Many landmarks still used for visual piloting by small craft were not visible at a range o f 12 miles; only 
20 per cent o f the world’s lighthouses had a range exceeding that distance; radar navigation was o f only 
marginal utility beyond 12 n.m. miles; and many vessels (which frequently did not wish to enter the 
territorial sea) did not carry sufficient cable or appropriate equipment to anchor at the depths normally 
found outside the 12- mile limit. In addition, any extension o f the breadth o f 1 sea would mean an 
increase in the cost o f patrolling the larger area... One further objection to extending the territorial sea 
was, that, in time o f war, a neutral State would have greater difficulty in safeguarding the broader belt 
o f territorial waters against the incursions o f ships of belligerents.” (emphasis added) UNCLOS I. 
Official Records. Vol.III, 1958, p.26.
34In an attempt to reach a compromise, the USA proposed a six mile limit for the territorial sea and a 
further six mile limit for a fishery zone, provided that States engaging in fishing in the fishery zone for 
the past five years could continue to do so. Canada also suggested a twelve mile exclusive fishing 
zone. See, for example, Heinzen, Bernard G., "The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the 
Seas", Stanford Law Review. V ol.l 1,1959, pp.652-655.
350 da writes " ... under traditional and existing concepts, the extent o f the territorial sea prima facie 
coincides with the monopoly o f marine resources by the coastal State. It is, consequently, o f great 
importance to the fishery interests o f every State to determine how far the territorial sea should extend 
from the coast." Oda, op. cit., p.13.
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States (excluding the Soviet Union which was among the advocates of the 
twelve mile limit) supported the three nautical mile limit to guarantee the 
freedoms of the high seas. However, it became clear in the UNCLOS II 
that the three mile limit would be no longer a basis for a compromise on 
the extent of the territorial sea. The problem was similar to that of the 
UNCLOS I in 1958.
To achieve a compromise on the issues, the USA, being one of the 
traditional sponsors of the three mile limit again presented its formula 
called "six plus six", but this time in the UNCLOS n .36 This formula was 
rejected. Canada suggested a similar formula but without any rights for 
foreign States in the fishing zone. The USA joined the Canadian proposal 
to pave the way for adoption of a fixed limit for the territorial sea.37 This 
joint proposal was similar to the USA proposal with the difference that the 
joint proposal limited the rights of the foreign fishing States to fish in the 
six mile fishing zone to a period of ten years.38 This proposal was 
considerably favoured but it did not gain a two-thirds majority of votes. 
The proposal needed just one more vote in favour to succeed. 
Accordingly, the UNCLOS II was unable to produce any official 
agreement on the major issues on its agenda.39
The number of States extending their territorial seas dramatically 
increased when the UNCLOS II could not determine a limit for territorial 
sea.40 It became clear that the three mile extent no longer could be a
360 ’Connell, D. P., The International Law of the Sea. V ol.l, Edited by: I. A. Shearer, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1982, p.163.
37For various proposals on the extent o f the territorial sea and the fishing zone discussed at the 
Committee o f the Whole and the Plenary Session of the UNCLOS II see Dean, Arthur H., ‘The Second 
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas’, AJIL, Vol.54, 1960, 
pp.773-777, and Bowett, op. cit., pp.421-433.
38In relation to the Canadian/United States proposal at the UNCLOS II to establish a territorial sea as 
narrow as possible, the representative o f Byelorussia stated that “[t]he main objective o f the champions 
o f the six-mile limit was to obtain for their naval forces unconditional, so-called legitimate, access to 
foreign waters close to coasts in which they were interested for strategic or political reasons, 
(emphasis added) IJN Doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.17, p.13.
39In relation to the failure o f the UNCLOS I and the UNCLOS II to establish the outer limit o f  the 
territorial sea, Harris writes that the existence o f such disagreement “reflected the uncertainty which has 
existed in customary international law for a number of years.” Harris, op. cit., p.353. Also Brown 
maintains that the failure o f the UNCLOS II made clear that “it would no longer be possible to maintain 
one boundary marking the outer limit o f both the coastal State’s territorial sea and its exclusive fishing 
zone” . Brown, E. D., The International Law o f the Sea, V ol.l: Introductory Manual, Dartmouth, 
Aldershot, 1994, p. 19.
40in  general, Anand endorses the fact that “[t]he trend to curb the freedom of the seas by extending 
coastal states jurisdiction for protection o f security and economic interests o f the coastal states 
increased after 1960. By the end of 1973, nearly 35 percent o f the ocean, an area equal o f the land mass 
o f the planet, was claimed by the coastal states. Deploring this trend, some well-meaning jurists 
regretfully felt that the era of mare liberum “may now be drawing to a close.” Anand, R. P., ‘Changing
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foundation for the outer limit of territorial sea, because of the increasing 
support for twelve and two hundred mile limits. While at the time of the 
Second Conference (1960) forty States claimed a three mile limit for the 
territorial sea, at the time of the UNCLOS III (1973) there were twenty-six 
States in favour of such a limit. (See Table 6.1.) This indicates that the 
number of supporters of the three mile limit declined in the period of 1960­
1973. (See Table 6.1.) By comparison, at the time of the Second 
Conference the twelve mile limit was supported by sixteen States, while at 
the time of the UNCLOS III this limit obtained the support of fifty-two 
States.41 These data demonstrate a twenty-eight percent increase in support 
for the twelve mile limit in the same period. (See Table 6.2 below.)
Table 6.2
Percentages of Various Claims of States to 
the Territorial Sea Over Time (1900 - 1995)
YEAR
NAUTICAL MILES
3 4 6 12 150-170 200 Others
1900 95% — 5% — — — —
1930 50% 13% 33% 4% — — —
1958 55% 6% 15% 15% — 6% 3%
1960 51% 5% 15% 20% — 5% 4%
1973 24% 4% 10% 48% 7% 6% 1%
1988 8% 2% 3% 73% 5% 9% —
1990 7% 1% 3% 77% 4% 8% —
1995 4% 1% 2% 83% 3% 7% —
The two hundred mile limit was first claimed by the Latin American 
States.42 The terms epi-continental sea and patrimonial sea reflect these 
claims. However, there were two approaches on the claim of two hundred
Concepts o f Freedom o f the Seas: A Historical Perspective’, in Jon M. Van Dyke, Durwood Zaelke and 
Grant Hewison (eds.), Freedom for the Seas in the 20th Century: Ocean Governance and Environmental 
Harmony. Island Press, Washington D.C., 1993, p.81.
41The majority o f  the supporters o f the twelve and two hundred mile limits are developing countries 
some o f  which came into being after the World War II. Akehurst writes that these new States are 
"economically and militarily weak, and therefore favour an extension o f their territorial seas." 
Akehurst, op. cit., p.175.
42Although the extent o f 200 nautical miles was claimed, national legislation containing such a claim 
provided that the claim would not affect the freedom of navigation and overflight For example, Article 
1 o f  the Law N o.l7,094-M  24 (29 December 1966) o f Argentina set up a 200 nautical miles for its 
territorial sea. However, Article 3 o f the Law stipulated that “this law shall not affect freedom of 
navigation or of air traffic.” UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/15. p.45.
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nautical miles. One approach was that the territorial sea extends up to 
twelve miles, but the coastal States have sovereignty over the maritime belt 
adjacent to States up to two hundred miles for the purposes of exploration 
and exploitation of natural resources (patrimonial approach). Ecuador, 
Panama, and Peru are examples of these States. Another approach was 
towards a two hundred mile territorial sea in which the right of innocent 
passage was recognised (territorial approach).43 Examples of these States 
are Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Venezuela.
5. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(1973-1982)
The UNCLOS III began its work in 1973 and ended with the 
codification of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, opening for 
signature on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. The first 
substantive session of the Conference was held in 1974. (Examples of 
Claims to the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, as of 1974, are presented in 
Table 6.3.)
It was in the UNCLOS III that the twelve mile limit, as the 
maximum extent of the territorial sea, was finally adopted in order to be 
incorporated into the forthcoming convention.44 The maximum limit of 
twelve miles emerged in the draft Convention in Caracas session on 7 
March 1975.45 This adoption was in line with a number of compromises 
made in the conference to achieve "a package deal”.46
The twelve mile limit was codified mainly because it was agreed to 
establish a new regime of passage through international straits. Maritime 
powers favouring the three mile limit for the territorial sea were afraid of
43In August 1952 delegates o f the Latin American States o f Chile, Ecuador, and Peru attended the 
Santiago Conference (Chile) to discuss resource issues in the South Pacific. Subsequently, a 
declaration was made, the so-called Santiago Declaration. According to this Declaration sovereignty 
and jurisdiction o f these three States extended to a 200 mile maritime zone adjacent to their coasts in 
which the right o f innocent passage was recognised. A second Conference was held in Lima (Peru) in 
December 1954 in which the Santiago Declaration was confirmed. Oda, op. cit., pp.21-22.
^A lthough Ecuador attempted to convince the delegates at the UNCLOS III to accept the limit of 200 
nautical miles for the breadth o f the territorial sea, its attempt failed to succeed. See UNCLOS III. 
Official Records, Vol.IV, pp.75-80.
45United Nations, Third Conference on the Law o f the Sea, ISNT. A/Conf. 62/WP.8/Part II, 7 May 1975.
46The method o f decision-making at the UNCLOS III was different from the method at the past two 
conferences on the law of the sea. Whereas in the First and the Second Conferences decisions were 




Examples o f Claims to the Breadth o f the Territorial Sea as o f 1974 (At the time o f the first 
substantive session o f the Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea)
STATE N.M.a NATIONAL LEGISLATION
Brazil 200 Decree Law N o.1098 o f 25 March 1970 Altering the Limits o f  the 
Territorial Sea, Article 1.
Canada 12 Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act o f 16 July 1964, as Amended by Act 
o f 1970,3.(1).
Costa Rica 3 Information concerning Constitutional Provisions and Definition by Courts 
o f the Breadth o f the Territorial Waters.
Equatorial
Guinea
12 Information concerning Presidential Decree No. 17/70 o f 24 September 
1970, Extending the Breadth o f the Territorial Waters
Gabon 100 Renseignements concemant l'Extension de la Limite des Eaux Territoiales, 
1972.
Ghana 30 Information concerning the Extension of the Territorial Waters
Iran 12 Act o f 12 April 1959 Amending the Act o f 15 July 1934 on the Territorial 
Waters and Contiguous Zone o f Iran, Article 3.
Jamaica 12 Territorial Sea Act, 1971, 3(2).
Libyan (AR) 12 Act No. 2 o f 18 February 1959 concerning the Delimitation o f  Libyan 
Territorial Waters, Article 1.




Constitution of the Republic o f Maldives
Malta 6 Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Act, 1971
Mauritania 30 Renseignements Concemant VExtension de la Limite des Eaux Territoriales, 
1972.
Mexico Inti Law0 Decree o f 28 August 1968 Delimiting the Mexican Territorial Sea within 
the Gulf o f California, V.
Nauru 12 Provision o f the Interpretation Act 1971 Defining the Territorial Waters
Nigeria 30 Territorial Waters Decree 1967, as Amended in 1971,1(1).
Norway 4 Royal Decree o f 25 September 1970 concerning the Delimitation o f the 
Territorial Waters o f Parts o f Svalbard
Oman 12 Decree o f 17 July 1972 concerning the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf 
and Exclusive Fishing Zones o f the Sultanate o f Oman, Article 2.
Yemen
(PDR)
12 Territorial Waters and the Continental Shelf o f the People's Republic of 
Southern Yemen Law, 1970,9.
Peru 200 Supreme Resolution No.23 of 12 January 1955 Determining the Peruvian 
200-Mile Maritime Zone, 1.
Spain Not
Specific41
Coasts Act o f 26 April 1969
Sri Lanka 12 Proclamation by the Governor-General o f 7 January 1971 concerning the 
Extent o f the Territorial Sea, (i).
Sudan 12 Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Act, 1970, Chapter n , 5.
USSR 12 Regulations o f 5 August 1960 for the Protection o f the State Frontier o f the 
Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, as Amended in 1971, Article 3.
(a) Nautical Mile. . .
(b) As o f 1974 the Constitution o f the Republic of Maldives did not establish the breadth o f territorial sea
o f this Republic.
(c) The Decree provides that the limits of the territorial seas are "established by international law and by
domestic maritime law." . . .  .
(d) This specific Act does not define the breadth of the territorial sea o f Spain. Spain traditionally was in 
favour o f six nautical miles for such a breadth. However, Spain now claims twelve nautical miles for its 
territorial sea limit.
Source: National Legislation and Treaties relating to the Law o the Sea. United Nations Legislative 
Series, ST/LEG/SER.B/16, 1974, United Nations, New York, pp.3-5, 9-12, 14-17, 19-21, 23, 25-28, 30­
31, 34.
287
the impact of acceptance of the twelve mile rule on many international 
straits. Many international straits are less than twenty-four nautical miles 
making the passage through them under the control of strait States within 
the concept of innocent passage. This was not desirable for maritime 
powers. Accordingly, these powers were seeking a concession from 
supporters of the twelve mile limit to accept specific provisions on 
international straits in return for adoption of such a limit.
The compromise was made on the issue of the breadth of the 
territorial sea because of a need for a unanimous agreement on this issue 
and at the same time on the issue of navigation through international straits. 
This was necessary for achieving a "package deal". Subsequently, the 
twelve mile limit was endorsed as the maximum permissible breadth for 
the territorial sea. Article 3 of the LOSC explicitly permits the extension 
of the territorial sea up to twelve nautical miles. It is said that the 
Convention sets this limit "in accordance with the clearly dominant trend in 
State practice."47
Although there still exists a number of States applying limits other 
than the dominant limit of twelve nautical miles, "it seems likely that the 
practice of all States will, in the near future, be brought into line with this 
limit."48
III. The Twelve Mile Rule: A Contractual or 
Customary Rule of International Law
In line with the development of State practice, a question has arisen 
as to whether the recognition of the twelve mile limit originates from 
conventional or customary law. This issue is examined below from both 
viewpoints.
1. The Twelve Mile Rule: A Contractual Rule of International Law
There is no doubt that a treaty is binding and in force for its parties. 
The only way for a State to limit the range of application of a treaty with 
respect to itself, is to make a reservation. This is possible if the treaty 
explicitly permits States to make reservations. The foundation of
47Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.61.
48Ibid.
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reservation is found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Article 19 of this Convention provides that a State may make a reservation 
to a treaty save in the following cases:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty; (b) the treaty provides 
that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation 
in question , may be made; or (c) in cases not falling under sub­
paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty.
Article 309 of the LOSC makes it clear that "[n]o reservations or 
exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by 
other articles of this Convention." (emphasis added) This means that the 
range of possible reservations to the Convention is limited to the cases that 
the Convention explicitly refers to. In principle, if there is no reference to 
the matter of reservation in a provision of the Convention, it is implied that 
no reservation is possible. This is the case concerning Article 3 of the 
Convention allowing States to have a territorial sea up to twelve nautical 
miles. This provision does not fall in the cases to which reservations may 
be made. In addition, in the line with Article 19(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, it may be argued that a reservation 
made to Article 3 is "incompatible with the object and purpose" of the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, if due attention is paid to the "package 
deal" nature of the Convention. It is, therefore, certain that from a 
contractual law viewpoint Article 3 of the LOSC will apply to all the 
parties.
2. The Twelve Mile Rule: A Customary Rule of International Law
The second viewpoint in relation to the twelve mile limit is that such 
a limit became part of customary international law even before the LOSC 
came into being. This view argues that the drafters of Article 3 of the 
Convention codified the existing customary law on the breadth of the 
territorial sea, and in fact it is declaratory of customary law. Such a claim 
is supported by the evidence (including statistical information) presented 
below.
To prove the second viewpoint, the essential elements of the 
formation of customary rule expressed by the international Courts should 
be taken into account. The constituent elements of a rule of customary 
international law are State practice and opinio juris. In modern
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international law there is a necessity to identify the existence of State 
practice and opinio juris before relying on a rule as a customary one.49 As 
the ICJ asserted in the Asylum Case, the burden of proof is on the shoulder 
of the claimant State relying upon an alleged rule of customary law.50 As a 
result, the claim that the twelve mile limit had been crystallised into 
customary law must be proved.
As regards State practice, the factors of duration, repetition, 
consistency, and generality should be investigated with respect to the 
twelve mile limit rule. Despite the fact that duration and repetition are not 
essential factors in the creation of State practice, these factors can be traced 
in the history of the twelve mile rule. There is no precise definition for 
duration.51 It is, for example, said that a considerable period of time is 
necessary for the formation of a customary rule. However, such a period 
may be different depending on the existing circumstances for each 
individual case.
The twelve mile limit was first claimed by Russia in 1909. In the 
following years, the limit attracted the attention of a number of States. In 
1930, the limit acquired the support of ten States. There was a slight 
increase on the number of States seeking the twelve mile limit between 
1930 and 1960. A sharp rise in the number of States supporting the twelve 
mile limit occurred when the UNCLOS II failed to resolve the problem of 
the outer limit of the territorial sea.52 In 1973, that is at the time of the 
UNCLOS III, the most supported limit for the breadth of the territorial sea 
was the twelve mile limit. Since then the number of States applying the 
twelve mile limit for their territorial sea has been ever-increasing.
49For a full discussion o f the constituent elements o f a customary rule, analysis o f the ICJ Cases related 
to a customary rule, and the examination o f the twelve nautical mile limit as a rule o f customary 
international law see Talaie, Farhad, Final Chapter in a Conflict over the Breadth o f the Territorial Sea: 
Recognition o f Twelve Nautical Mile Limit as Declaratory of Customary International Law , M m  
Journal o f International Law. Vol.36, No.3, July-September 1996, pp.36-66.
5°In the Asylum Case, the Court maintained that “[t]he Party which relies on a custom o f this kind 
(regional custom) must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become 
binding on the other Party.” (emphasis added) Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), ICJ RepQft5> 1950, 
p.276. See also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic o f Germany/Denmark, Federal 
Republic o f Germany/The Netherlands), ICJ Reports, 1969, pp.44-45.
51 In common law, it is referred to “time immemorial”, while in civil law the period o f thirty to forty 
years is sufficient to change the nature o f a behaviour or usage as a custom. Shaw, Malcolm N., 
Tutffpatmnal Law. Third Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p.64.
52o'Connell writes that after the failure of the 1958 and 1960 Conferences to determine the outer limit of 
the territorial sea, it was predictable that "the progression to twelve miles as the majority limit would be 
fairly rapid and persistent" O’Connell, op. cit., pp. 165-6.
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As of 16 June 1995, 121 States claimed territorial seas of twelve 
miles. Although the year 1909 can be regarded as the time for the first 
claim of the twelve mile limit, the major contribution of States to the 
extensive application of the limit was made after 1960. In fact, the 
beginning of the 1960s was the turning point in the acceptance of the 
twelve mile limit by many States. (See Table 6.1.) It seems that the era 
between 1960 -1973 was a reasonable period of time in which the actual 
State practice relating to the twelve mile limit was formed. As Table 6.4 
shows 52 States expressed their claims over the twelve mile territorial seas 
in the period between 1953-1973. These claims made in different times are 
indicative of repetition of State practice in passage of time.
Table 6.4
States Claiming The Twelve Mile Territorial Sea 
(52 States - As at 1973)
State Date State Date State Date
Albania 1970 India 1967 Romania 1951
Algeria 1963 Indonesia 1957 Saudi Arabia 1958
Bangladesh 1966 Iran 1959 Senegal 1968
Bulgaria 1951 Iraq 1958 Somalia 1967
Burma 1968 Jamaica 1971 Sri Lanka 1971
Canada 1970 Kenya 1969 Sudan 1960
China 1958 Khmer Rep. 1969 Syria 1964
Colombia 1970 Kuwait 1967 Tanzania 1967
Costa Rica 1972 Liberia 1967 Thailand 1966
Cyprus 1964 Libya 1959 Togo 1964
Dahomey 1968 Madagascar 1963 Tonga 1972
Egypt 1958 Malaysia 1969 Trinidad &b 1969
Equ. Guinea8 1970 Mauritius 1970 USSR 1909
Ethiopia 1953 Mexico 1969 Venezuela 1956
France 1971 Morocco 1973 Yemen (AR) 1967
Guatemala 1934 Nauru 1971 Yemen(PDR) 1970
Haiti 1972 Oman 1972
Honduras 1965 Pakistan 1966
(a) Equatorial Guinea, (b) Trinidad and Tobago.
Source: Brown, E.D., 1973 (December), Passage through the Territorial Sea, Straits 
Used for International Navigation and Archipelagos. University College, London, p.9.
As far as the twelve mile limit is concerned, State practice 
demonstrated major consistency even before the UNCLOS III. The 
practice of the 52 States supporting the twelve mile limit prior to the 
Conference illustrated a uniform and consistent practice of the use of such 
a limit. In 1973, there still was inconsistency in State practice concerning 
the outer limit of the territorial sea. However, the twelve mile limit had the
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most support in comparison to other existing limits. It may be said there 
was major consistency about the twelve mile limit for the territorial sea's 
breadth, though there was minor inconsistency in this regard. Akehurst 
with reference to the Fisheries Case writes that "[mjinor inconsistencies 
(that is a small amount of practice which goes against the rule in question) 
do not prevent the creation of a customary rule."53
As regards the generality, the twelve mile limit was supported world­
wide before the UNCLOS IE. The twelve mile rule was not in the category 
of rules classified as regional or local customs, even though this rule 
obtained greater support in some regions, such as in Asia. The number of 
States claiming twelve mile territorial sea increased from 16 in 1960 to 52 
in 1973. (See Table 6.1.) This indicates an increase of 28 percent for the 
support of the twelve mile limit among existing States within thirteen 
years. (See Table 6.2.) Meanwhile, during the same period, there was a 
sharp drop in the number of States supporting the classic limit of three 
miles from 40 in 1960 to 26 in 1973, a decrease of 27 percent for its 
support among existing States. ( See Tables 6.1 and 6.2.)
In 1973, the 52 States advocating the twelve mile rule were from all 
five regional groups in the world defined by the United Nations As at 
1973, the twelve mile limit was supported by 16 African States, nineteen 
Asian States, 4 Eastern European States, 9 Latin American and Caribbean 
States, and 4 Western European States and Others totalling 52 States.54 
Recent data available, as of 16 June 1995, illustrate that these numbers 
have changed to 26 African States, 41 Asian States, 10 Eastern European 
States, 23 Latin American and Caribbean States, and 17 Western European 
States and Others. (See Table 6.5 below.)
There is no doubt that the twelve mile limit for the breadth of the 
territorial sea became well-established in State practice before the 
UNCLOS III. The question is whether the twelve mile rule achieved 
recognition as law to become a customary rule before the UNCLOS III. 
This means whether opinio juris was crystallised into the rule prior to the 
UNCLOS III. Opinio juris implies that States believe that a rule should be 
respected in their relations because of an existing legal obligation to behave
53Akehurst, op. cit., p.28.
54Brown, E. D., Passage through the Territorial Sea. Straits Used for International Navigation and 
fljYfrpelagos. University College, London, December 1973, p.12.
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so.55 The question is how such a belief can be substantiated. There are a 
number of ways to identify whether there is a subjective conviction 
towards a certain State practice.
Table 6.5

















Number of  
States
3 — 3 — 1 1 5
4 — — — — 1 1
6 — — — 1 2 3
12 26 41a 10 23 17 117b
20 1 — — — — 1
30 2 — — — — 2
35 — 1 — — — 1
50 1 — — — — 1
200 5 — — 6 — 11
(a) Including Belize, Japan, and UAE and excluding Turkey (see Table 1, g and k).
(b) Estonia, Israel, South Africa, and the USA also claim twelve nautical miles for their 
territorial seas. As at 24 May, 1995 these States were not members of any regional 
groups. United Nations Handbook. 1995, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, p.21.
*The Philippines has not yet declared the extent of its territorial sea in accordance with 
Article 3 of the LOSC. It claims that its territorial waters consist of the water areas 
defined by the 1889 and 1901 Treaties between Spain and the United States and the 
1933 Convention ratified by the United Kingdom and the United States. Accordingly, 
the current extents of territorial waters of The Philippines range from 1 n.m. in the Sulu 
Sea (between Pearl Bank and Babuan Islands) to 285 n.m. in the northeast of Amianan 
Island (the most northerly point of The Philippines territory).56
It is not always easy to prove the psychological element. 
Nevertheless, opinio juris can be inferred from actual intentions of States. 
For example, when a State enacts legislation, the purpose is to enforce that 
legislation. The issue is whether, to reflect State practice, this legislation 
should actually be enforced. Judge Read's opinion in the Fisheries
55In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ referred to the rule o f the “opinio juris sive 
necessitatis”. The Court held that not only there is a need for a “settled practice’, but States should feel 
“a legal obligation” in conducting a certain behaviour. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal 
Republic o f Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic o f Germany/The Netherlands), ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 
44.
56Prescott, Victor, The South China Sea: Limits o f National Claims, MIMA, Kuala Lumpur, 1996, p.2. 
For the text o f the 1889 and 1901 Treaties and the 1933 Convention see respectively: Parry, C., Treaty 
o f Peace between Spain and the United States, The Consolidated Treaties Series, Vol.187 , Oceana 
Publications, New York, 1979a, pp.100-105; Parry, C., Treaty o f Peace between Spain and the United 
States for the cession o f outlying islands o f the Philippines, The Consolidated Treaties Series, Vol.189 
(or 1189), Oceana Publications, New York, 1979b, pp.108-109; and Convention between His Majesty 
in respect o f the United Kingdom and the President o f the United States o f America regarding the 
boundary between the Philippine Archipelago and the State o f North Borneo, LNTS. Vol.137, 1933, 
pp.298-317.
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Jurisdiction Cases was that State practice concerning a given claim is 
established when it enforces such a claim in practice.57 However, the ICJ 
accepted that State's claims are adequate to create customary rules.5* It 
appears that the ICJ did not mean the existence of the psychological 
element is not necessary to form a custom, but the ICJ intended to show 
that opinio juris may be found in the claims of States and from their real 
intentions. When States reflect their claims in their national legislation, or 
issue a declaration or statement reflecting their claims, they intend to make 
their claims legally binding on other States. Although at the primary stage 
of the formation of a customary rule, States' claims may be asserted 
unilaterally, the amount of support given to such claims by other States 
would play a significant role in the process of transition of a rule into 
customary law.
As Table 6.4 indicates, as of 1973, fifty-two States enacted national 
legislation or issued a declaration or statement establishing twelve miles as 
their territorial sea. By taking such a measure, these States demonstrated 
that they believed that their twelve mile territorial sea had to be respected 
since the limit was supported by State practice and it was legally binding 
on other States. Although such claims faced a number of protests from 
some States, mainly the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 
there was no change in the positions of supporters of the twelve mile rule. 
The effect of such protests was that the rule could not be enforced against 
persistent objectors. However, it can be argued that since the twelve mile 
limit was widely crystallised into State practice, it can be considered as a 
customary rule. There is no need for argument that customary law is 
formed by common consent of States, whether expressly or tacitly.
As was seen, the practice of States in the period of 1960-1973 paved 
the way for the transition of the twelve mile rule into a customary rule. 
This is mainly supported by statistical information and national legislation 
or States' declaration.59 As a result, it could be claimed that the twelve mile
57See Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), ICJ Reports. 1951, Dissenting Opinion o f Judge 
Read, p.191.
5 8See Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland; Federal Republic o f Germany v. 
Iceland), ICJ Reports, 1974.
59in 1950 the International Law Commission named a number o f instances as evidence o f customary 
international law among which was national legislation. See YILC. 1950, Vol.II, pp.368-372.
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limit was a customary rule, or at least it was in the process of becoming a 
rule of customary international law before the UNCLOS m , in 1973.60
The ever-increasing support of the twelve mile limit for the 
territorial sea in the UNCLOS III resulted in the incorporation of the 
maximum limit of twelve miles in the ISNT on 7 March 1975.61 This later 
became Article 3 of the LOSC. Accordingly, it may be assumed that 
Article 3 is one of those provisions of the Convention reflecting the 
customary law. The customary nature of the twelve mile rule means that it 
may be enforced against either parties or non-parties to the LOSC, as it was 
so before codification of the Convention. Therefore, the rule is not a
Shearer writes that after the failure of the 1960 Conference in resolving the issue of the breadth o f the 
territorial sea, “States reverted to the traditional mode o f law creation through unilateral claims and 
broad acquiescence in or tolerance o f those clams, so that a 12-mile territorial sea became accepted in 
customary international law by the time the United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea 
opened in 1973.” Shearer, Ivan, ‘Navigation Issues in the Asian Pacific Region’, in James Crawford 
and Donald R. Rothwell, The Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1995, pp.199-222, at 201.
61 Folio wing this event, Japan (which traditionally was in favour of three nautical miles) enacted a law in 
1977 accepting the extent of twelve nautical miles for its territorial seas except within the straits around 
Japan for which the extent of three nautical miles remained unchanged. See Japanese Law, Law No.30 
on the Territorial Sea, 9 May 1977, in United Nations Legislative Series No. 19: National Legislation 
and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea. UN ST/LEG/SER.B/19, 1980, pp.59-62. There are some 
other cases in which States apply a combination of limits for their territorial seas based on the 
geographical location o f these adjacent seas. For example, Chile and Argentina have adopted twelve 
nautical miles for their territorial seas. However, in regard to the maritime delimitation in the Sea of 
the Southern Zone these countries apply three nautical miles as being valid only among them. Article 8 
o f the Treaty o f Peace and Friendship between Argentina and Chile (18 October 1984) provides that “in 
the area comprised between Cape Horn and the easternmost point of Isla de los Estados the legal effects 
o f territorial waters are limited, in their mutual relations, to a three-nautical-mile strip measured from 
their respective baselines.” It added that in the area described above “each Party may invoke vis-a-vis 
third States the maximum width o f territorial waters permitted under international law.” The Law of 
the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice (No.I), op. cit., pp.169-191, at 173. Article 5 o f the 
1982 Law o f the USSR on the State Frontier established a twelve nautical mile limit for the territorial 
sea o f the USSR but provided that “[i]n individual cases, a different breadth for the territorial waters 
(territorial sea) may be established by international treaties concluded by the USSR, and in the absence 
o f treaties, in accordance with the generally recognised principles sand norms of international law.” 
Law o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on the State Frontier o f the USSR - 24 November 1984, 
in ibid., pp.96-102, at 97. The application of different limits by a coastal State to its territorial sea 
raises a question as to whether international law of the sea enables such State to do so. Article 3 o f the 
LOSC only provides the maximum limit for the territorial sea and does not include any provision to 
restrict coastal States to use a single limit for their territorial sea. Accordingly, it appears that coastal 
States might apply a number o f limits for their territorial seas. Current practice o f some coastal States 
indicates that they have used a combination o f three and twelve nautical miles for their territorial seas. 
The three nautical mile limit has mainly been applied to straits surrounding the States concerned in 
order to change the legal regime o f navigation in the straits in accordance with the interests o f such 
States. For example, Sweden has extended its territorial sea from four to twelve nautical miles on 1 
July 1979. However, after consulting with Denmark (which still claims three nautical miles for its 
territorial sea), Sweden considered three nautical mile limit for its territorial sea within certain straits 
located between its land territory and Denmark in (the Baltic Sea region). Alexandersson, Gunnar, The 
ppific Straits, in the series o f International Straits o f the World, Gerard Mangone (ed.), Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1982, pp.84-85.
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contractual rule but its applicability goes beyond the limited range of 
contractual provisions.
If there was any doubt about the validity of the customary nature of 
the twelve mile rule before the codification of the LOSC, it is now certain 
that the rule is among rules of customary international law. This claim is 
strongly supported by looking at the recent data available.62 As of 16 June 
1995, there were 151 coastal States, of which 146 States have enacted 
national legislation encompassing the outer limit of the territorial sea. Out 
of 146 coastal States, 121 States now support the twelve mile limit, eleven 
States are in favour of the two-hundred mile limit, and only five States 
claim the three mile limit. This indicates that as of 16 June 1995, 83 
percent of coastal States' claims to the territorial sea are to the twelve mile 
limit.(See Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below.)
This overwhelming State practice leaves no doubt that the twelve 
mile rule has become a customary rule. Therefore, the rule can be enforced 
against all States with the exception of the persistent objectors. It seems 
that there are no longer any persistent objectors, since the twelve mile limit 
was already adopted by the major objectors to the rule, that is the UK and 
the USA, and Australia. The UK recognised the twelve mile limit as the 
breadth of the territorial sea by incorporating such a limit in the Territorial 
Act 1987.63 Also the USA officially adopted the twelve mile limit in 1988. 
The Presidential Proclamation on the Territorial Sea of the United States of 
27 December 1988 provides that "[t]he territorial sea of the United States 
henceforth extends to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of the United 
States determined in accordance with international law."64 Also Australia 
adopted the twelve mile limit for its territorial sea on 20 November 1990.65
62 For the diagrams of changes to the number o f States supporting three, twelve and two-hundred miles 
over time see Figures 6 .3 ,6 .4 ,6 .5 , and 6.6.
63Territorial Sea Act 1987, Chapter 49, 1(1). The Taw of the Sea; Current PevelODmentS-ilI-Stai£ 
Practice N o .II . Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, New York., 1989, 
p.48.
64 Ibid., p.83. In fact, the USA and Japan declared their readiness for accepting twelve nautical miles in 
1970 and in 1971 respectively. However, they expressed pre-conditions for such adoption. For 
example, the USA concern was to guarantee the free navigation through international straits while 
Japan was interested in limiting the exclusive fishing rights o f coastal States to twelve nautical miles 
beyond which coastal States would only enjoy preferential fishing rights. See Oda, Shigeru, ‘Proposals 
Regarding a 12-Mile Limit for the Territorial Sea by the United States in 1970 and Japan in 1971: 
Implications and Consequences’, Ocean Development and International La%> Vol.22, 1991, pp.189­
197.
65Burmester, Henry, ‘Australian Policy and the Law of the Sea’, Proceedings Of the Conference on 
r^fiTm ing Legal Education. Faculty o f law, The University o f Sydney, 1991, p.2. See also the 
Proclamation o f the Governor-General (9 November 1990) in pursuance to s.7(2-a) o f the Seas and
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In fact, adoption of the rule by these States is evidence that the rule has 
been strongly established in State practice and has become customary rule. 
Thus, it is a legal obligation for States to respect such a limit. If a foreign 
ship entering the territorial sea of a State claiming twelve mile limit 
violates international rules and regulations recognised for the territorial sea, 
the State can intervene to end such violations.
IV. Concluding Remarks on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea
Since the UNCLOS I and the UNCLOS II were unable to set up a 
uniform breadth for the territorial sea at the time of the Conferences, the 
solution was left to be found in the customary law on the issue. As was 
argued, the twelve mile limit was well-established in State practice and 
became a customary rule before the UNCLOS in. This means that Article 
3 of the LOSC is declaratory of customary international law.66 Even if 
there has been any dispute on the customary value of the twelve mile rule, 
it is now certain that the twelve mile limit is supported by customary law as 
well as conventional law.67 Therefore, the rule is may be enforced against 
non-parties based on its customary nature. As a result, it is a legal 
obligation for those few States claiming territorial seas less than twelve 
nautical miles to respect the twelve mile territorial seas, unless these States 
have been persistent objectors to the twelve mile limit.68 Also, it may be 
argued that the rule also implies that in the customary international law of 
the sea the maximum permissible breadth of the territorial sea is twelve
Submerged Lands Act 1973. Although Australia extended its territorial sea to 12 n.m. in 1990, it did 
not affect the extent o f the territorial sea o f its islands within the Torres Strait, north o f seabed 
jurisdiction line with Papua New Guinea. According to Article 3 o f the 1978 Torres Strait Treaty (the 
1978 Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime 
Boundaries in the Area between the Two Countries, Including the Area Known as Torres Strait, and 
Related Matters) the extent of the territorial sea o f the above-described islands is 3 n.m.. This treaty 
was signed on 18 December 1978 and came into force on 15 February 1985 (after the conclusion of 
LOSC in 1982). ATS. (1985), No.4.
66Reisman is in the opinion that “[t]he rather alarming tendency, enunciated most authoritatively by the 
International Court in the Iceland Fisheries case, to view select provisions in international drafts as 
indicators o f consensus and hence evidence o f innovative customary law, despite their failure to win the 
formal support necessary for adoption in conformity with constitutive processes, virtually transforms 
Article 3 into custom.” (emphasis added) Reisman, W. Michael, ‘The Regime of Straits and National 
Security: An Appraisal o f International Lawmaking’, AJIL, Vol.74, 1980, p.59. C f Moore, John 
Norton, ‘The Regime o f Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’, AJIL. 
Vol.74, 1980, pp.115-116.
67As was stated "[i]ntemational agreements constitute practice of States and as such can contribute to the 
growth o f customary law." Knight, Gary, and Hungdah Chiu, The International Law of the Sea: Cases, 
pnrnments. and Readings. Elsevier Applied Science, London, 1991, p.35. An example o f this is 
Article 3 o f the LOSC that contributed to the firm establishment of the twelve mile limit as a customary 
rule.
68See Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p.61.
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miles.69 Accordingly, the limits of more than twelve miles are not 
recognised in international law and these limits are only enforceable 
against States with identical claims.70
In conclusion, the history of the development of the breadth of the 
territorial sea illustrates that it is State practice, or in fact, common consent 
of States, which plays a definite role in the establishment of the 
international rules and also in developing such rules. Such State practice 
was developed through striking a balance between the interests of coastal 
States and the interests of international community, most importantly by 
maintaining the right of innocent passage in territorial seas and introducing 
a more liberal right of passage - transit passage - through overlapping 
territorial seas which comprise international straits.
69Akehurst is o f the opinion that if a small number of States behave in a manner in opposition with the 
existing major practice on the same subject-matter, these States "will probably soon fall into line with 
the practice o f the majority." Akehurst, op. cit., p.31. This is true with respect to the twelve mile limit.
70According to the Limits in the Seas, the excessive claims over the territorial sea have been expressed 
by the following countries: Angola (20 n.m. - Decree No. 159/75, 6 November 1975), Benin (200 n.m.
- Decree No. 76-92, 2 April 1976), Brazil (200 n.m. - Decree Law No. 1098, 27 March 1970), 
Cameroon (50 n.m. - Law No. 74/16, 5 December 1974), Congo (200 n.m. - Ordinance No. 049/77 20 
December 1977), Ecuador (200 n.m. - Decree Law No. 1542, 11 November 1966), El Salvador (200 
n.m. - Constitution, 7 September 1950), Germany (16 n.m. - Federal Gazette, 16 March 1985), Liberia 
(200 n.m.- Act, 5 May 1977), Nicaragua (200 n.m. - Act No. 205,19 December 1979), Nigeria (30 n.m
- Decree No. 38, 26 August 1971), Panama (200 n.m., Law No. 31, 2 February 1967), Peru (200 n.m. - 
Supreme Decree, 1 August 1947), Philippines (Rectangle - Act No. 3046, 17 June 1961), Sierra Leone 
(200 n.m. - Interpretation Act, 19 April 1971), Somalia (200 n.m. - Law No. 37, 10 September 1972), 
Syria (35 n.m. - Law No. 37, 16 August 1981), Togo (30 n.m. - Ordinance No.24, 16 August 1977), 
Uruguay (200 njm. - Decree 604/969, 3 December 1969). The USA has protested to all these claims. 
See Limits in the Seas (No. 112), op. cit., p.31. However, some States claiming more than twelve 
nautical miles reduced their claims to this limit before or after the coming into existence o f the LOSC 
in 1982. These States are Albania (1990), Argentina (1991), Cape Verde (1977), Gabon (1984), Ghana 
(1986), Guinea (1980), Guinea-Bissau (1978), Haiti (1977), Madagascar (1985), Maldives (1976), 
Mauritania (1988), Senegal (1985), Tanzania (1989), Tonga (1972). The year in the parentheses in front 
o f the name o f the States is the year in which they reduced their territorial sea claim to twelve nautical 
miles.) Ibid., 32. Also see the Law of Chile (Law No. 18.565 of amending the Civil Code with regard 
to maritime space) by which Chile, inter alia, replaced 200 n.m. by 12 njn for its territorial sea. See 
The Law of the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice (No.I), op. cit., p.7.
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Diagrams of Changes in Territorial Sea Claims Over Time for 
the Three Limits of 3, 12, and 200 Nautical Miles 
(Analytical Comparison)
Figure 6.1
Comparison of Claims to 3,12, and 200 Nautical 
Mile Limits from 1900 to 1995.
Figure 6.2 Figure 6.3
Comparison o f Claims to 3,12,  and 200 
Nautical Mile Limits in 1995.
Number o f States Claiming a 3 Nautical 
Mile Limit from 1900 to 1995.
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Figure 6.4 Figure 6.5
Number o f State Claiming a 12 Nautical 
Mile Limit from 1900 to 1995.
YEARS
Number o f States Claiming a 200 Nautical 
Mile Limit from 1900 to 1995.
Figure 6.6
1900 1930 1958 1960 1973 1988 1990 1995
YEA RS
—  3 N.M.
— -12 N.M. 
-------- 200 N.M.
Comparison of the Number of States Claiming 
3,12, and 200 Nautical Mile Limits (1900 to 1995).





This thesis has investigated the rules of the international law of the 
sea governing the delimitation of maritime areas which are subject to the 
sovereignty of coastal States, and has discussed issues related to such 
delimitation. The scope of the thesis included issues related to: (a) the 
delimitation of internal waters by the application of normal and/or 
straight baselines; (b) the delimitation of single-State bays; (c) the 
delimitation of multi-State bays; (d) the enclosure of mid-ocean 
archipelagos; and (e) the delimitation of the outer limit of the territorial 
sea.
As detailed in Chapter One, the study of the historical development 
of the law of the sea demonstrates that States have claimed adjacent 
maritime areas since many centuries ago. Although the theory of mare 
liberum prevailed over the theory of mare clausum, States continued to 
claim larger maritime spaces adjacent to their coasts for a variety of 
reasons. In its Memorandum of 14 July 1950 on the Regime of the High 
Seas, the United Nations Secretariat clearly asserted that “the Grotian idea 
of the freedom of the high seas is losing the paramountcy which, 
generally speaking, has survived fairly well down to the present day.”1 
With new developments in the law of the sea since 1950, more areas of 
the high seas have become subject to the authority of coastal States. In 
particular, in the past few decades, many States have significantly 
extended their control over adjacent maritime areas.2 Although this 
practice was once opposed by other States favouring the exclusion of the 
free seas from jurisdiction of States, the practice was finally confirmed by 
the international community, though with some modifications.3 As one 
author writes:
What one cannot overlook... is that the evolution of the Law of the Sea 
in the past three decades has been marked by the repeated assertion of 
claims based on special interests and circumstances of a geographic, 
economic, or environmental nature. Moreover, while strongly contested
lLauterpacht, Hersch., ‘Sovereignty over Submarine Areas’, BYIL, Vol.27, 1950, pp.376-433, at 378. 
For the Memorandum on the Regime of the High Seas (14 July 1950), see Doc. A/CN. 4/32, United 
Nations Secretariat, YILC. 1950, Vol.II, pp.67-79.
2Reasons which have motivated States to widen their maritime ares are based upon security, economic, 
and environmental interests of these States.
3Ahnish points out that “[t]he principle o f the freedom of the seas has never been considered so 
immutable as to preclude investigation into possibilities of its adaptation to the legitimate interests of 
coastal States.” Ahnish, Faraj Abdullah, The International Taw of Maritime Boundaries and the Practice 
Pf Stares in the Mediterranean Sea. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p.197.
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at the beginning, these claims have actually prevailed over the 
competing general interest of the freedom of the seas.4
The thesis, however, demonstrated that while the international law 
of the sea has responded positively to the trend of States by formulating 
rules which can satisfy the concerns of these States, certain standards were 
created to prevent unreasonable enclosure of the free seas by coastal 
States. Chapter Two, in particular, examined the use of the straight 
baselines and its impact on the enclosure of vast areas of adjacent 
maritime areas as internal waters. Although the ICJ recognised the 
Norwegian straight baseline system, this recognition was due to particular 
geographical conditions of the Norwegian coasts. Meanwhile, the ICJ was 
aware of the impact of these baselines on the encroachment upon the high 
seas, and accordingly, it set up certain requirements for the use of the 
straight baselines.5 In addition, the TSC (and the LOSC) only allows the 
employment of straight baselines in those coastlines which are deeply 
indented and cut into, or are fringed with islands.6 All these requirements 
were established to prevent unnecessary enclosure of the high seas areas 
into maritime areas under national jurisdiction. However, the use of 
straight baselines by as many as half of coastal States raises the question as 
to whether the requirements have been met in all cases. In addition, since 
there is no mention of the maximum length for a straight baseline in the 
TSC and the LOSC, certain States have employed remarkably long 
straight baselines.
Chapter Three discussed issues concerning the delimitation of 
single-State bays. The chapter demonstrated how the adoption of the 24 
nautical mile closing line for the enclosure of bays converted large parts 
of the high seas into waters under national sovereignty.7 As was 
calculated, a bay covering a semi-circular area with a diameter of 24
4Francioni, Francesco, ‘The Status of the Gulf of Sirte [Sidra] in International Law’, Syracuse Journal Of 
International Law and Commerce. V o l.ll, No.3, Winter 1984, p.234.
5These requirements are: (a) "the drawing of baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the 
general direction o f the coast"; and (b) sea areas lying within these lines should be “sufficiently closely 
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. " Fisheries Case (UK v. 
Norway), ICJ Reports. 1951, p.133.
6Article 4(1) o f the TSC and Article 7(1) of the LOSC.
7Although the adoption o f the 24 mile closing line for the enclosure of legal bays decreased the number 
of claims over maritime areas on the basis of historic title, there have still been some recent cases where 
States have relied on historic titles to enclose large bodies of water, particularly large bays. Examples are 
the Canadian claim to the Arctic Archipelago; Libya’s claim to the Gulf o f Sidra; Tunisia’s claim to the 
Gulf o f Gabes and the Gulf o f Tunisia; Italy’s claim to the Gulf of Taranto; and Australian claim to 
Anxious Bay, Encounter Bay, Lacepede Bay, and Rivoli Bay.
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nautical miles includes a maritime area of 775,432, 696 square meters. 
Although the limit of 24 nautical miles was included in the TSC and 
maintained in the LOSC, certain criteria were incorporated into these 
conventions to avoid unlawful enclosure of bays.8 Also, no line longer 
than 24 nautical miles could be used for the enclosure of single-State bays. 
Although the adoption of 24 nautical miles and the definitional criteria 
gave certainty to the delimitation of single-State bays, there are still 
shortcomings and ambiguities in the TSC (and the LOSC) with respect to 
the delimitation of single-State bays. These ambiguities and shortcomings 
are evidenced in situations such as: (a) where there is a tributary bay 
within a bay and the question is whether the tributary bay should be taken 
into account in conducting the semi-circle test (mathematical criterion); 
(b) where there are not clear natural entrance points and the question is 
how to determine the proper natural entrances for drawing the closing 
line; (c) where there are islands located near but out of the mouth of a 
bay and the question is whether the island may be taken into account for 
satisfying the semi-circle test; and (d) where there are coastal islands 
which, due to their location, may form headlands of bays. These 
ambiguities and shortcomings have left the interpretation and decision to 
the discretion of costal States concerned. States make best use of this 
situation, either by a liberal interpretation of the provisions, or by 
making their own decision where there are no provisions at all, thus 
enclosing larger areas of the free seas into the waters of bays.
Another issue examined in Chapter Four was the question of the 
delimitation of multi-State bays, bays which are located in the shores of 
more than one State.9 The international law of the sea has not codified 
rules on the delimitation of multi-State bays. Those rules established for 
the use of a closing line were to be applied to those bays situated in the 
coasts of individual coastal States. However, certain coastal States 
attempted to enclose multi-State bays by drawing a closing line, no matter 
how wide their entrance may be. Regardless of whether the mouth of a 
multi-State bay is wider or narrower than 24 nautical miles, according to
8To assess whether a body o f water is a bay in legal sense, two sets of criteria must be satisfied: the 
geographical criterion and the mathematical criterion. The geographical criterion includes the following 
requirements: (a) the indentation should be “well-marked”; (b) the ratio o f the depth of the penetration to 
width o f the indentation should be such that the indentation is surrounded by land mass, except in its 
mouth; and (c) the indentation should contain landlocked waters. The mathematical criterion is based on 
a semi-circle test.
9There are more than forty multi-State bays in the world. For a list of multi-State bays see Table 4.1 
(Chapter Four).
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most publicists, it is not subject to enclosure. This is so when international 
navigation plays a significant factor in some multi-State bays. In addition, 
the enclosure of multi-State bays reduces the free seas available to all 
States. However, certain States have relied on historic title to enclose 
some multi-State bays.10
Chapter Five discussed the issue of the enclosure of mid-ocean 
archipelagos. The chapter demonstrated that although the TSC contributed 
to the enclosure of large areas of the high seas by its provisions on 
straight baselines and single-State bays, the LOSC reinforced this 
contribution by recognising a special regime for the enclosure of mid­
ocean archipelagos.11 This recognition was mainly a response to the 
strategic, economic, and environmental concerns of those States which 
consist wholly of islands. The LOSC grants a right to legally qualified 
archipelagic States to link their outermost islands by drawing straight 
lines, so-called archipelagic baselines.12 Under Article 47(2) of the LOSC, 
an archipelagic baseline may be as long as 100 nautical miles, with the 
possibility of 3% of the total number of archipelagic baselines being as 
long as 125 nautical miles. Accordingly, the use of archipelagic baselines 
encloses large areas of the free seas. Again, like the case of straight 
baselines and bays, although the international law of the sea has developed 
rules for the enclosure of archipelagic waters (waters within archipelagic 
baselines which are subject to sovereignty of archipelagic States), the 
delimitation of these waters has not been left to the discretion of island 
States. There are certain requirements to be met.
First of all a State should be legally qualified as an archipelagic 
State, which is a State constituted wholly by a series of islands as 
archipelagos.13 Only those States which meet the legal definition of an 
archipelagic State may employ archipelagic baselines. Even being 
qualified as an archipelagic State does not permit these States to apply 
archipelagic baselines. Article 47 of the LOSC details the essential
10The case o f the Gulf o f Fonseca is usually considered as an exception to the general rules governing 
multi-State bays, where the claim of costal States (El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua) was also 
based on historic title. See the Decision o f the Central American Court o f Justice (Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua), in Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, AJIL. V o l.ll ,  1917, the 
Case Concerning the Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua 
intervening), ICJ Reports. 1992.
llS e e  Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in Chapter Five.
12For a list o f States proclaiming archipelagic status see Table 5.1 (Chapter Five).
13See Article 46(a & b) for definition of an archipelagic State and an archipelago.
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requirements for a validly drawn archipelagic baseline system. Like the 
delimitation of single-State bays, there are geographical and mathematical 
tests to be used for the application of archipelagic baselines. In particular, 
Article 47(3) of the LOSC provides that the drawing of archipelagic 
baselines “shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general 
configuration of the archipelago” and Article 47(4) stipulates that 
archipelagic baselines must not be drawn “... in such a manner as to cut 
off from the high seas or the exclusive economic zone the territorial sea 
of another State.”
The case of mid-ocean archipelagos is another indication of how the 
international law of the sea has responded to the needs of States, while 
taking the interests of the international community into consideration. 
This is why the right of innocent passage was maintained within 
archipelagic waters, and the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage was 
designed to be applied to those straits within archipelagic waters which 
have been used for international navigation. Despite the fact that the 
principles for the enclosure of mid-ocean archipelagos were developed 
exclusively for those States consisting entirely of archipelagos, a number 
of continental States with outlying islands have enclosed these islands by 
employment of archipelagic baselines. This may affect the delicate balance 
created by the international law of the sea. The maintenance of a fair 
balance of interests among coastal States and the international community 
requires States to respect the rules of the international law of the sea.
As the final chapter, Chapter Six of the thesis reviewed the issue of 
the delimitation of the outer limit of the territorial sea, as one of the most 
controversial and long-standing issues in the international law of the sea. 
This long-lasting issue was finally concluded by the acceptance of a 12 
nautical mile limit as the maximum limit of the territorial sea into Article 
3 of the LOSC. The main reason for the controversy over the extent of 
the territorial sea has been its direct impact on the enclosure of the high 
seas. Greater territorial seas result in less high seas available to States.14 
The traditional supporters of 3 nautical miles for the territorial sea were
14The significance o f a proper delimitation of the territorial sea can be understood by what Fitzmaunce 
has emphasised. In his words, [The law governing the territorial sea ] is essentially a compromise 
between the necessities and interests of the coastal State in the water off or near its shores, and the 
general concern o f all States with the freedom of the seas -- freedom of navigation, o f communication 
and passage, o f reasonable exploitation of the living and other resources, and of use for experiment and 
research. Fitzmaurice, G., ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court o f Justice, 1950-54: 
Points o f Substantive Law’, BYIL. Vol.31, 1954, at 371-2.
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concerned about the effects of the enclosure of the high seas. However, 
the practice of many States in proclaiming a 12 nautical mile limit for 
their territorial seas strengthened the support for that limit.15 In addition, 
some Latin American countries (such as Ecuador, Panama, and Peru) 
even based their claims on the so called patrimonial approach. According 
to this approach, the territorial sea could extend up to 200 nautical miles, 
which did not gain approval of the international community. The 
international law of the sea then adopted the moderate extension of the 
territorial sea to a limit of 12 nautical miles.16 In addition, where the 
application of the 12 mile limit would result in converting all waters of 
straits used for international navigation into territorial seas, the LOSC 
recognised the right of transit passage through these straits.17 These 
developments reflect the role of the international law of the sea as a body 
of law whose main purpose is to accommodate the competing interests of 
coastal States and those of the community of nations.
In conclusion, developments in the rules for the delimitation of 
maritime areas under national sovereignty show that:
(a) The international law of the sea has recognised the need of costal 
States to enjoy larger maritime areas on the basis of their strategic, 
economic, and environmental interests;
(b) The international law of the sea has developed rules for delimitation 
of maritime areas (particularly those under national sovereignty) parallel 
to the tendency of States to claim larger maritime areas;
(c) Despite the developments of rules favouring the extension of 
maritime areas under national authority, the international law of the sea 
has taken into account the traditional rights of international community in 
these areas. These rights are reflected in the maintenance of navigational 
rights in the maritime areas which were newly enclosed by straight
15For the development o f State practice over time (from 1900 to 1995) see Table 6.1 in Chapter Six.
16In fact, the support given to this limit by an ever-increasing number o f States over time has 
crystallised it as a rule o f the customary international law
17Article 38(2) o f the LOSC defines transit passage as “the exercise ... of the freedom of navigation and 
overflight solely for the purpose o f continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of 
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zo n e .... ”• It is obvious that transit passage applies to straits completely overlapped by territorial seas. 
I f  a strait used for international navigation is wider than 24 nautical miles and includes an EEZ area or 
an area o f the high seas, then navigation in these areas will be subject to the legal regime of the EEZ or 
the high seas respectively.
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baselines, in the preservation the of right of passage through archipelagic 
waters, and in the consolidation of the right of innocent passage in the 
territorial waters. This demonstrates that the international law of the sea 
has struck a fair balance between the exclusive interests of coastal States 
and the inclusive interests of the international community in the maritime 
areas under national jurisdiction; and
(d) Despite the recent trends of States to extend their sovereignty over 
maritime spaces, and the contribution the international law of the sea has 
made to this enlargement, the modern international law of the sea has not 
revived the theory of mare clausum, although it has modified the theory 
of mare liberum. The reality is that maritime spaces subject to mare 
liberum have decreased as a result of creeping jurisdiction of States. This, 
however, has been a result of developments in State practice recognised 
by the international community.
Finally, what will be the future challenges to the rules of the 
international law of the sea on the delimitation of maritime areas under 
national jurisdiction? Will there be more encroachment upon the free seas 
by the future claims of States, or will States attempt to keep the status 
quol The practice of States with respect to the seas and oceans, in the past 
few decades, reflects a gradual inclusion of larger parts of these maritime 
spaces. This practice may continue in the future, particularly because of 
the strategic and economic importance of adjacent maritime areas. It is 
clear that States prefer to have full sovereignty in maritime areas to better 
enjoy their rights in these areas. However, States should realise that any 
change in the rules governing the delimitation of maritime areas should 
be recognised by the international community. Unilateral actions of States 
in delimiting maritime areas without considering the interests of the 
community of nations will not be in line with the new world order for the 
seas and oceans through which the interests of all competing parties are 
met. States should also consider the legitimate interests of other States in 
the uses of the seas by respecting the rules of the international law of the 
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